Raoul Wallenberg’s Swedish intelligence contacts and his support for the Hungarian resistance may have jeopardized his fate
Joint Swedish-American intelligence operations in wartime Hungary began much earlier and were more extensive than previously thought. They may have compromised Raoul Wallenberg in the eyes of both Swedish and Soviet officials.
Susanne Berger September 2024
While Raoul Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest were primarilyhumanitarian, his work also involved other aspects such as contacts with the Hungarian anti-Nazi resistance and efforts to safeguard the extensive interests of Sweden and the Western Allies in the region. These included important postwar interests, such as the protection of what Wallenberg and his Hungarian business partner Kalman Lauer referred to as “Zukunftsmenschen” (“people of the future”) – members of the professional class: businessmen, politicians, scientists and technical experts, and, in some cases, the protection of their assets.
Alleged transport of weapons in Wallenberg’s diplomatic car
The aims of the resistance were threefold: to defeat Nazism and to secure Hungary’s exit from the war; to prevent a Soviet occupation ; and to ensure Hungary’s democratic future.According to the statements of several witnesses, on at least one occasion, Wallenberg transported weapons and ammunition in his diplomatic car intended for members of the Hungarian resistance and even offered financial support for the purchase of arms and other supplies. Similar, partly corroborated claims were made about Wallenberg’s colleague, Swedish First Secretary Per Anger.
There are also several (still unconfirmed) reports that Raoul Wallenberg and the resistance collected information about crimes and atrocities committed by the Red Army in Hungary and Poland. Given Wallenberg’s and Anger’s status as Swedish diplomats, some of their actions would have constituted a violation of Swedish neutrality or at least a serious transgression of diplomatic norms.
Swedish intelligence support for the Hungarian resistance
Records from the U.S. National Archive and Records Administration (NARA) released in the early 1990s show that the Swedish C-Bureau of the Swedish Defense Staff [C-byrån, foreign military intelligence] – in close cooperation with U.S. intelligence representatives in Stockholm – tried to support the Hungarian resistance in the autumn of 1944 by providing a secret “signal plan” that was to be used during a planned revolt against the German occupiers.
Fig. 1 From left: First Secretary Raoul Wallenberg, Hungarian resistance leader Dr. Géza Soós and First
Secretary Per Anger
One of Hungary’s largest and most important resistance groups, the Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM, the Hungarian Independence Movement), and its leader Dr. Géza Soós, played a central role in these plans. He also had direct contact with both Raoul Wallenberg and Per Anger. Matter of fact, Soós was among the first people Raoul Wallenberg met after he arrived in Hungary in July 1944.
While information remains sketchy, it has become clear in recent year that this Swedish support for the Hungarian resistance wasnot an isolated incident but part of a much broader Swedish-American intelligence operation that began more than a year earlier.
Wallenberg may have been compromised in the eyes of both Swedish and Soviet officials
Previous investigations have found no indication that Wallenberg had any formal ties to Swedish or Allied intelligence operations. However, it appears that this assessment needs to be at least partially revised. Documentation from the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Services Archive (MUST, Militära underrättelse– och säkerhetstjänsten) reveals that Swedish wartime intelligence operations in Hungary began much earlier and were more extensive than previously known. They were also in part directed against the Soviet Union. This aspect would have been especially problematic since Sweden represented Soviet interests in Hungary at the time. Wallenberg’s activities may have compromised him in the eyes of both Swedish and Soviet officials. It could be one of the reasons why Sweden displayed such extreme passivity after Wallenberg’s disappearance in the Soviet Union in January 1945.
Swedish-American intelligence cooperation in Hungarybegan in 1943
Systematic preparations by American and Swedish intelligence representatives to collect intelligence information from Hungary, as well as to provide active support to the Hungarian resistance, began in earnest as early as October 1943. The aim of these efforts – which also involved important Hungarian contacts in Stockholm – was to explore the feasibility of a planned Anglo-American military intervention in Hungary, to bring about the defeat of Nazi Germany, and, at the same time, to prepare for (or, if possible, prevent) the expected Soviet occupation of the country.
The early Swedish-American intelligence interests and activities in Hungary in 1943 – almost a full year before Wallenberg’s diplomatic appointment in July 1944 – give rise to the question if Wallenberg had any knowledge of or connections to these plans and if his selection for the humanitarian mission to Budapest in June 1944 was as unexpected as it generally has been portrayed. Both Wallenberg’s activities and contacts in Hungary, as well as his disappearance in the Soviet Union in January 1945, should now be viewed in this broader and more complex context.
The Soviet leadership, intelligence, and counterintelligence services were extremely suspicious of all Western foreigners and considered them to act as potential spies against the Soviet Union. It is not known what – if anything – Per Anger and his colleagues at the Swedish Legation, Budapest told Soviet officials about Wallenberg’s Hungarian contacts when they were briefly detained in the spring of 1945.
Wallenberg’s personal and professional contacts with Hungary
Since 1941, Raoul Wallenberg worked as a director of Mellaneuropeiska, an import-export company that focused on trade with Hungary. During the war, the company functioned as an important economic agent for the Swedish state, procuringfoodstuffs and other vital goods, such as fuel, for the Swedish economy.
Wallenberg had close personal contact with many of the individuals connected to Swedish-Hungarian affairs, including political and intelligence matters. An important part of the communications between Swedish and Hungarian intelligence operatives was carried out via the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm. The individuals involved included most notably Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, the Hungarian Minister to Stockholm who had personal contact with Raoul Wallenberg since September 1943 and who attended a farewell dinner before Wallenberg’s departure for Budapest in July 1944; Ullein-Reviczky in turn had important connections to the influential circle around the son of the Hungarian Regent, Miklos “Miki” Horthy, Jr., head of the so-called “Bureau of Defection” (or “Jump Off Bureau”), which sought to secure Hungary’s withdrawal from the war. Robert Taylor Cole, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) Secret Intelligence (SI) branch in Stockholm, who secretly met with Ullein-Reviczky on numerous occasions. Cole cooperated closely with Iver Olsen, the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS, predecessor of the CIA)and U.S. War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm, who selected Raoul Wallenberg for the Budapest humanitarian mission in June 1944; as well as Captain Helmuth Ternberg, deputy head of the Swedish C-Bureau, whose brother, the Swedish Navy commander [kommandörkapten] Egon Ternberg, was one of Raoul Wallenberg’s godfathers.
Fig. 2 From the left. Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm; OSS and U.S. War Refugee Board representative Iver Olsen; R. Taylor Cole, head of the SI Branch of the OSS in Stockholm
They further included: Lt. Thorsten Akrell, a special agent of the Swedish Defense Staff; and Lt. Col. Carl C:sson Bonde, head of Swedish counterintelligence (Fst Inrikesavdelningen)and stepson of Raoul Wallenberg’s aunt Ebba Bonde (né Wallenberg). Her brothers, the two powerful bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg (Raoul Wallenberg’s cousins once removed) served as important contacts and sources of information for both Swedish and Allied intelligence during the war. Therefore, potentially, due to his personal and professional connections, Raoul Wallenberg could have had knowledge of and possibly some involvement in certain Swedish intelligence operations in Hungary during the years 1943–45. Wallenberg also served as an instructor in the Swedish Homeguard(Hemvärn) which functioned as an important recruiting ground for Swedish intelligence.
A secret network of radio communications
Already in November 1943, R. Taylor Cole had given instructions for setting up a secret network of radio communications and codes to be used “for transmission between selected Allied points outside [Hungary], perhaps Bari in Italy, and picked points in Koshoot [Hungary].”
He later explained in his memoir that, for this purpose, “Hungarian cooperation in Budapest was secured for the receipt of radios, codes and transmitting equipment which we managed to transmit through Swedish subjects carryingdiplomatic pouches on Nazi airplanes to Hungary.” He made it a point to add that “our Hungarian interests and contacts occasioned a meeting with Raoul Wallenberg”, shortly before his departure for Budapest, suggesting that Wallenberg’s mission possibly involved aspects that went beyond purely humanitarian aims.
In recent years it emerged that several (possibly as many as five) Swedish signal intelligence officers were deployed to Hungary, beginning in late 1943. The identity of one of these individuals has since been confirmed- Nils “Nisse” Johansson of the Swedish Defense Radio Establishment (FRA, Försvaretsradioanstalt). The new information lends added credence to previously reported claims that the resistance relayed key information about potential bombing targets to Allied forces located in Bari (Italy) and Malta via a transmitter located in or adjacent to the Swedish Legation. These signal intelligence specialists may also have provided the necessary technical assistance to Géza Soós and his colleagues in the MFM during the autumn of 1944.
Nils Erik Gerhard Johansson f 29/3 1919 i Torsö församl. Skaraborgs län.
1939 stamanställd i flottan.
1936 realexamen, maskinskr, handelskorr 1939, radiosignalskola 1938, korpralskola 1939, radioteknisk ingenjörskurs. Mycket goda skolbetyg.
Utb inom FRA: 2. tgf 1941, 1. tgf 1941, russ o spankurs, 1950 polska.
Gift tidigare med Märtha, nu skilsmässa.
Utl förbindelser: anm 1940 en finsk och en åländsk flicka.
Tjg vid svenska beskickningen i Budapest 1944-45 och anmält 1947 namneligen 11 ungerska brevkontakter. Utmärkta vitsord.
Civ anst: Mariestads Skeppsmäkleri 1936-37
Fig. 3 On the left, an undated memorandum, FRA, about Nils Johansson A notation states that he served with the Swedish Legation in Budapest 1944-45. On the right, Nils Johansson. Source: Anders Jallai
In August 1944, Per Anger returned briefly to Stockholm for consultations with, among others, the Hungarian Minister Ullein-Reviczky and Iver Olsen. One month later, Lt. Thorsten Akrell smuggled two wireless radio transmitters into Hungary, to be operated by members of the resistance. It is known that on two occasions in late October 1944, Per Anger forwarded urgent communications on behalf of the MFM, intended for Soviet representatives, presumably via radio transmissions from Hungary, relayed through the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. None of these communications sent and received by Anger or the Swedish signal intelligence personnel deployed to Hungary has been located in Swedish or Russian archives.
Fig. 4 On the left, Helmuth Ternberg, deputy head of C-Bureau. l; on the right, Maj. General István Ujszászy(1894–?) Courtesy of Professor Sándor Szakály; previously published in Sándor Szakály. A 2 vkf. osztály. Tanulmányok a magyar katonai hírszerzés és kémelhárítás történetéből 1918-1945. Második, javított és kiegészített kiadás. [2nd revised and supplemented edition]. Budapest: Magyar Napló Kiadó – VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet, 2015; In the middle, a memorandum dated March 3, 1944 on the meeting of Lt. Col. Harry Wester, Swedish Military Attaché in Budapest, Helmuth Ternberg, deputy head of the Swedish C-Bureau and Hungarian Maj. General Ujszászi in February 1944, to discuss a secret Swedish-Hungarian intelligence sharing agreement about Soviet espionage operations in Sweden and Hungary. Source: The Swedish Military intelligence and Security Service Archive (MUST)
A secret Swedish-Hungarian intelligence sharing agreement directed against the Soviet Union
Swedish officials apparently had other serious reasons to be concerned about Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance and possible arrest by Soviet military forces.
After Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Swedish intelligence representatives were ready to broaden their efforts to monitor and possibly help curtail the Soviet Union’s growing sphere of influence, not only in the neighboring Baltic states and Finland (as was their traditional radius), but also in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. By the autumn of 1943, Swedish intelligence officers entered into a secret intelligence sharing agreement about the Soviet Union with a high-ranking member of the Hungarian General Staff regarding Communist and Soviet espionage operations.
The agreement was discussed and approved at the highest levels of the Swedish Defense Staff. The Swedish actions occurred in direct response to a personal request made as early as April 1943 by Maj. General István Ujszászi, head of the Hungarian State Security Center (Államvédelmi Központ) that coordinated military and civilian defense activities in Hungary. A month later, in May 1943, Captain Ternberg (of the Swedish C-Bureau)traveled to Hungary. The precise purpose of his trip is not known but it stands to reason that it could have been at least in part in connection with Ujszászi’s request. All the relevant documentation about these contacts is missing from Swedish archives.
Fig. 5 On the right: Special agent of the Swedish Defense Staff, Lt. Thorsten Akrell. On the left: First part of the secret memorandum authored by Thorsten Akrell from October 16, 1943. Source: Swedish Military Intelligence (MUST) Archive, Stockholm.
Among other information, the Swedish Defense Staff compiled a top-secret report about Soviet intelligence networks in Sweden that it shared with its Hungarian counterparts. In return, Swedish intelligence officials received sensitive information about Communist underground activities in Hungary. Only the Hungarian report has been publicly disclosed and it is unclear if the Swedish report has been preserved. So far, it has not been located in Swedish archives.
The Swedish-Hungarian intelligence sharing was short lived and never fully implemented. It was cut short with the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. However, the agreement reveals an important shift in official Swedish attitudes toward the Soviet Union and its willingness to cooperate with Western Allies to counter the perceived Soviet threat, in direct violation of Swedish neutrality.
Possible postwar aspects
Another important question that needs to be examined in more detail is if – and if so, to what extent – these various intelligence contacts and activities in Hungary during the years 1943–1945 may have already included important post-war considerations. Aside from the protection of crucial industrial assets, this apparently also included the creation of Western post-war intelligence reporting structures in Eastern and Central Europe.
An OSS cable dated August 1, 1945, indicated that with the end of the war, the foreign branches of leading Swedish companies were to serve as important collection points for intelligence about the Soviet Union, to be shared with Western intelligence services. The telegram stated:
“[The] Swedes [are] planning [to] organize their future intelligence eastward, using representatives of large Swedish commercial and industrial firms which have agencies and representatives in Russia, Baltics, and Balkans. Economic intelligence will be furnished [by] us, they will endeavor collect military intelligence from Balkans and Turkey via Switzerland and have requested from us [to] present disposition Russian troops in Europe, can we supply?”
Fig. 6 Excerpt from the OSS Telegram dated August 1, 1945, Taylor (Wilho Tikander) to Director, OSS. Source: U.S. National Archive (NARA, Maryland)
Preparations for such arrangements must have occurred well before August 1945 and would have almost certainly involved Wallenberg owned or operated companies. It is not known if Raoul Wallenberg’s idea for the creation of a huge post-war organization dedicated to the reconstruction of Hungary was in any way connected to these plans.
Further research is required to clarify how the joint Swedish-American intelligence operations affected the official handling of the Wallenberg case by both Swedish and Soviet authorities.
[Among other things], Swedish officials may have worried thatsome of the broader aspects of Wallenberg’s (and the Swedish Legation’s) activities in Hungary could have been revealed if Wallenberg became part of a public show trial in either Hungary or the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, nearly all information regarding the Swedish Defense Staff’s clandestine activities in Hungary, including those of C-Bureau’s, seem to have completely vanished from Swedish archives. The material is believed to have been intentionally destroyed after World War II, but many analysts doubt that all information has completely disappeared.
Appendix
Documents and information that so far have not been located in Swedish archives
1. Major Gen. István Ujszászi’s request to the Swedish Defense Staff in March 1943, relayed by Lt. Col. Harry Wester, for a Swedish-Hungarian intelligence exchange. (C-byrån/MUST)
2. Report authored by the Swedish Defense Staff in October 1943, on Soviet espionage operations in Sweden. The report was delivered to the Hungarian Military Attaché Zoltán Vági and through him to the Hungarian General Staff. (C-byrån/MUST)
3.Letter (with several attachments) from Lt. Col. Carl Bonde to Lt. Col. Harry Wester in Budapest, from January 25, 1944. Itconcerned the Hungarian-Swedish intelligence sharing agreement. The letter mentioned that Bonde planned to send Thorsten Akrell to Budapest as early as January 1944. (C-byrån/MUST)
4.Messages from the Hungarian resistance group MFM to the Soviet Union, forwarded by the Swedish Legation, Budapest (Per Anger), on October 21 and 23, 1944 (UD, C-byrån/MUST)
5. All Information and communications regarding several Swedish signal intelligence officers deployed to Hungary in 1943-1945, including Nils “Nisse” Johansson. (FRA/C-byrån/MUST)
Timeline
1943
Some time
in 1943 The Swedish signal intelligence officer Nils “Nisse” Johansson, along with several
other officers, are deployed to Hungary. The Swedish government has never publicly
acknowledged the work of these officers. None of their communications have been
located in Swedish archives.
April Maj. General István Ujszászy, head of the Hungarian State Security Center under the
Interior Ministry, suggests that Hungarian intelligence could exchange info regarding
Soviet intelligence operations with Swedish intelligence officials. His proposal is
presented by Lt. Col. Harry Wester, the Swedish Military Attaché in Budapest, to the
Swedish Defense Staff in Stockholm. No documentation in Swedish or Hungarian archives
May Captain Helmuth Ternberg of the Swedish C-Bureau travels to Hungary. The purpose of
the trip is not known but it appears likely that it was at least in part related to Ujszászy’s
request.
September Raoul Wallenberg travels to Budapest and meets Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky.
Ullein-Reviczky is appointed Hungarian Minister to Stockholm
October R. Taylor Cole and Ullein-Reviczky meet in Stockholm
October 15 Lt. Col. Carl Bonde is appointed head of Swedish counterintelligence. Bonde’s attitude
was considered to be much more pro-Allied than that of his predecessors. Akrell
discusses the proposed intelligence sharing agreement regarding Soviet intelligence
operations in Hungary and Sweden with the Hungarian Assistant Military Attaché Vagy.
November R. Taylor Cole requests deployment of “codes, transmitting equipment” in Hungary
1944
January 25 Head of Swedish counterintelligence Lt. Col Bonde sends a letter to Lt. Col. Wester in
Budapest, regarding Swedish-Hungarian intelligence contacts. The letter contained
several attachments. Bonde’s letter has not been recovered. Part of its content is known
indirectly from Wester’s response, sent in March 1944. Bonde apparently suggests
sending Lt. Thorsten Akrell to Budapest.
January 28 The Hungarian Minister Ullein-Reviczky sends secret message to the Hungarian
government, via secret courier, relaying an urgent US request to engage in active
sabotage of Hungarian railway lines and German troop transports.
The Hungarian resistance allegedly provides information about bombing targets to US
and British forces in Italy, via a radio transmitter located in or near the Swedish Legation
in Budapest. The transmissions end in September 1944, when the Germans stop shipping
major supplies on the Danube
February 23 Captain Helmut Ternberg and Lt. Col. Wester meet Maj. General István Ujszászy re
implementation of the secret Swedish-Hungarian intelligence sharing agreement.
Ujszászy promises report about the Communist underground in Hungary.
July Raoul Wallenberg arrives in Hungary
September T. Akrell delivers wireless radio transmitters to members of the resistance in Budapest
November OSS cable outlining Swedish signal plan for use by the Hungarian resistance, Helmut
Ternberg, deputy head of the Swedish C-Bureau, is in charge of the project.