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An Inquiry
Steered From The Top?

Twenty-five years later, still many loose ends in three major Cold War Cases
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Twenty-five Years Later, Still Many Loose Ends In Three Major Cold War Cases

Susanne Berger

In 1944, the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg went to Hungary to protect the Jewish population of Budapest from deportation and death at the hands of Nazi death squads. In six short months, he managed to save thousands of lives and aided countless more by implementing an extensive humanitarian aid effort. In January 1945, he was arrested by Soviet troops and disappeared in the Soviet Union. In 1957, Soviet authorities announced that he had died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. They never presented any conclusive evidence for this claim and the full circumstances of his fate remain unknown.

On June 13, 1952 a Soviet fighter plane shot down a Swedish DC-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic sea.\(^1\) The DC-3, which is believed to have carried an eight men crew, was unarmed and had been flying over international waters at the time of the incident. Swedish authorities denied for years that the crew had been engaged in intelligence gathering activities, claiming instead that the plane had been on a simple training exercise. Three days after the loss of the DC-3, another Swedish plane that was engaged in the search effort was also attacked. It was able to make an emergency landing, despite heavy fire, incurring no casualties.\(^2\)

From December 1941 – November 1981 eighteen Swedish ships vanished, all of them traveling through the Baltic Sea. Some fell victim to bad weather conditions or un-cleared mines. However, several of the ships were known to have engaged in smuggling refugees to and from Poland. They also played a role in infiltrating Swedish agents into iron curtain countries and other intelligence operations. These activities were carried out with the active assistance of Swedish as well as Allied intelligence personnel. The precise circumstances of the ships’ disappearance and the fate of their crews remain a mystery. The vessels carried more than one hundred people.

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\(^1\) The aircraft was a TP 79, a variation of the Douglas DC-3.

\(^2\) This plane, a Catalina TP 47, was later found to have violated Soviet territorial boundaries. The loss of the DC-3 and the downing of the Catalina aircraft are commonly referred to as "the Catalina Affair". A good summary of the cases can be found at [http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2519&artikel=5318984](http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2519&artikel=5318984)
Preface

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989, hopes were high that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe would usher in a new era of openness. Swedish and Soviet officials accelerated their contacts to clarify some of the major open historical issues between the two countries. This article provides an overview of these efforts and discusses their effectiveness.

From 1989 -2001, three cases were studied: The fate of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg who disappeared in the Soviet Union in 1945; the loss of a DC-3 reconnaissance plane in June 1952 over the Baltic Sea with an eight men crew; and eighteen Swedish ships that disappeared during and after WWII, with altogether over one hundred people.

The families of the missing also had great expectations that both Russia and Sweden would now be able to shed light on additional facts, since the overt reason for protecting certain secrets – the Soviet Union – was about to disappear.

While the priority of the relatives of the disappeared was to win clarity about the fate of their loved ones, the Swedish and Russian governments shared other, coinciding (though not always identical) interests. As a result, they pursued a more pragmatic, ‘Realpolitik’ approach.

Among the three cases, the Raoul Wallenberg question was the politically most sensitive one, both internationally and in Sweden. The case of the lost DC-3 constituted a serious domestic problem for the Swedish government, but by 1989 had few international ramifications, while the question of the disappeared ships during the Cold War was known only to a small circle of Cold War specialists and, of course, to the relatives of the missing sailors.

The failure to fully resolve these three major issues on the Swedish-Russian agenda appears to have been a direct consequence of the strict limits imposed on the investigations by the lingering effects of the severe ideological and political tensions of the Cold War era.

A key contributing factor was undoubtedly the great political and social upheaval in Russia of the early 1990s, which saw the demise of the Soviet state. This period offered important opportunities, but was also fraught with great risks.

Another obstacle was the culture of secrecy of the Soviet government and its security apparatus, which continued to wield great influence in the new Russia. The engrained reticence of the Russian security services to release any information about past crimes that would be detrimental to their reputation,

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3 Since 1945, the Raoul Wallenberg investigation has overshadowed all other Cold War investigations, including the inquiry into repeated violations of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet and Western u-boats.

4 The Russian economy found itself under extreme strain at the time, due to a devastated infrastructure, the collapse of its currency and the indiscriminate sale of former Soviet state assets. The resulting capital flight, combined with the slow process of creating democratic institutions, led to a period marked by corruption and lawlessness. This, as well as a myriad of other challenges, like the need to properly safeguard the Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal or the problem of caring for an aging population stripped of its traditional safety net, posed enormous difficulties for the Russian political leadership but also for its international partners during the 1990s.
especially with regards to Western perceptions, and their fierce loyalty to its own members, past and present, imposed difficult hurdles for the three investigations.\(^5\)

As for the Swedish government, its main aim was to conduct inquiries that avoided the creation of any additional political strains and that did not infringe upon its plans for a rapid expansion of both political and economic ties with Moscow. However, Swedish officials apparently had concerns that a full scale investigation could expose or possibly escalate a number of other, highly sensitive historical issues, many of them directly related to Sweden’s neutrality policy.\(^6\)

These included information about the extent of Swedish cooperation with Western projects of intelligence collection about the Soviet Union\(^7\), the infiltration of Swedish political and intelligence structures by KGB and Stasi agents, as well as questions about Sweden’s complex economic relationship with both Nazi Germany and communist Russia, during World War II and - in the case of the latter - beyond.

Swedish diplomats may have also worried about the accidental revelation of foreign intelligence operations that involved Swedish citizens, or persons who had close associations with Sweden. Some of these individuals may have ended up in Soviet captivity and may not yet be known to the Swedish public or to an international audience.

Finally, like Russia, Sweden appears to have been intent on minimizing the exposure of any missteps of its own intelligence community or its political leadership in the cases under discussions.\(^8\)

Therefore, the failure to obtain complete answers was also the result of a great reluctance on the part of Swedish decision makers to push the Soviet and later the Russian authorities for a more complete resolution, if this process would raise any controversies or result in a potential loss of reputation for Swedish institutions.

While both sides stated publicly that they wished to establish the “full facts” in all three inquiries, their main priority arguably was to avoid any serious [political] controversy - or potential collateral damage - from the investigations and to win just enough clarity in order to be able to remove the subjects from the two countries’ official political agenda.

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6 Sweden’s priorities have traditionally centered on ensuring Baltic and Scandinavian security and on ensuring open markets for its businesses.

7 The Swedish public never learned of Sweden’s close cooperation with the U.S. and Britain after World War II until the early 1990s. The Swedish government’s public motto was “Non-alignment in peace time, neutrality in war time”; see, among others, the official report about Sweden’s security policy during the Cold War, Fred och Säkerhet, SOU 2002:108. [http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/16/35/d3d0dbb3.pdf](http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/16/35/d3d0dbb3.pdf); also Wilhelm Agrell, Den stora lögnen - ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i allt för många akter, Ordfront, 1991; and Mikael Holmström, Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO förbindelser, Atlantis, 2011. In the late 1990s, Sweden launched a major historical research project called “Försvar och det kalla kriget” (FoKK) [http://fokk.eu/om/](http://fokk.eu/om/).

8 The protection of important intelligence trade secrets obviously also ranked high on the list.
I. Introduction

In her much discussed book "Inte bara Spioner..." ("Not only Spies...", Carlssons, 2011), Swedish Professor Birgitta Almgren concludes that the formal government inquiries into East German spying operations in Sweden did not go nearly deep enough. She urged researchers and Swedish officials to gather additional facts, including from foreign intelligence collections, which could shed light on the precise circumstances and motives behind such operations. 9

This failure to dig deep is not an unusual phenomenon for official investigations.10 A review of the efforts in three major Swedish inquiries of Cold War subjects in the 1990s reveals similar problems: These are the fate of diplomat Raoul Wallenberg who disappeared in the Soviet Union in 1945; the loss of a DC-3 reconnaissance plane in June 1952 over the Baltic sea with an eight men crew; and eighteen Swedish ships that disappeared during and after WWII, over one hundred missing sailors.11

Roger Älmeberg, the son of DC-3 pilot Alvar Älmeberg, summarized his impatience with official efforts in 2008:

"After nearly sixty years we still do not know ...how the Soviet decisions .. behind the attack [on the plane] were conceived." And he added:

"The unsolved questions are deeply connected to why ... the wives, parents, siblings and children of the ...crew members were left to ponder the fate of the eight men in unnecessary uncertainty."12

Raoul Wallenberg’s niece, Louise von Dardel, and Kerstin von Seth, daughter of Gösta Rudnert, captain of the ship Sten Sture that disappeared in 1947, share Älmeberg’s frustration. In their view, the Swedish government’s approach in particular has lacked crucial resolve to obtain the hoped for answers.

"Swedish officials were mostly concerned with the country's international prestige and have shown an incredible nonchalance towards the relatives", says von Seth.13 [Fig.1 a, b]

Why did the collapse of communism not bring full clarification of these three major historical questions? Can the failure to solve the cases be simply ascribed to the complex constraints the

9 Birgitta Almgren, Inte bara spioner... : Stasi-infiltration i Sverige under kalla kriget, Carlssons, 2011.

10 See for example Christer Jönsson’s essay “Truth and Consequence”, 2000. (English text provided by Professor Dennis Tölborg http://www.statewatch.org/news/nov00/SWEDEN.PDF). Professor Jönsson describes his experiences during the 1990s as head of a Swedish government sponsored project to investigate the history of MUST, the Swedish Military Intelligence Services. A number of researchers resigned from the project when it became clear that they could not obtain the access necessary to do their work.

11 Approximately 270 Swedish ships sank during World War II. They frequently escorted German trade vessels which exposed them to great risk. The attention after 1989 focused mostly on approximately seventeen boats that disappeared after the end of hostilities in 1945. One exception was the ship Bengt Sture which had disappeared in 1942, but whose crew was rumored to have been captured by Soviet forces. Inger-Siw Eruths Lindell ed., Rapporterad Saknad: Sjöfolk i krig, Carlssons, 2002.


13 The complaints of the relatives of the disappeared have been well documented. In all three cases, Swedish authorities knowingly withheld information and in many instances lied outright about certain facts. For example, Swedish officials claimed for decades that the lost DC-3 had simply been out on a “training flight”. Family members were made to feel that their continued requests for answers were somehow unreasonable or even inappropriate. As late as December 1998, FRA informed the relatives of the missing crew that they were not eligible to receive compensation for their loss because the plane’s disappearance had not been “FRA’s fault”; see Försvarstog inget ansvar, Dagens Nyheter, October 17, 1999.
investigators continued to face in the waning years of the Cold War. Or was this failure in some way intentional? The study of a vast set of documentation for all three inquires suggests that it was a complicated mixture of the two.

II. Opportunity and Risk - The End of the Soviet Union

a. The creation of three Working Groups

In the years preceding the formal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Swedish and Russian officials began a cautious exchange about still unsolved historical questions on the bilateral agenda of the two countries.

Swedish-Soviet contacts during this period have to be viewed in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations at the time. The two sides had held extensive behind-the-scenes talks regarding a number of human rights issues since about 1987.

The first tentative discussions between Sweden and the Soviet Union took place as early as 1986 and were carried out mostly at the Foreign Ministry level. It was the start of what is now generally

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14 Among these were suspicions on both sides about the true motives behind the investigations; as well as practical issues, such as the uncertain legal precepts governing archival research in Russia and locating aging or often reluctant witnesses. In the Wallenberg case, Russian officials repeatedly pointed to the extensive document destruction that had allegedly occurred in certain Soviet era collections, although only limited proof of such destruction has been presented. In all three cases there are strong indications that far more information exists in Russian archives than has been released until now.

15 See, for example, Anatoly L. Adamishin and Richard Schifter, Human Rights, Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. Since 1992, several bilateral Working Groups, working under the umbrella of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, have investigated a variety of historical topics from the Cold War era: The World War II Working Group, the Cold War Working Group, the Korean War Working Group and the Vietnam War Working Group.

In the Wallenberg case, the U.S. remained involved in Swedish efforts throughout the 1990s, even though Sweden had periodically rejected U.S. help. An internal State Department e-mail message from February 10, 1992 whose subject line reads “Swedes Happy w/ cooperation,” states “the Swedish government has asked the U.S. to ease up on inquiries about Wallenberg, since the Swedes are satisfied with the Russian government’s cooperation in the joint Swedish/Russian Working Group.” U.S. State Department Records, www.state.gov, declassified material, Raoul Wallenberg; message from Edward D. Keeton to Francisco Sainz,, February 7, 1992. See also cable from May 1996, re “Talking points for DCI meeting with Jan Eliasson”: “The Swedes are currently engaged (with our support) in opening up the Kremlin files to try to establish the true fate of Wallenberg.” NARA, RG 263, Entry Z218, Second Release, Name Files Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts, 1936-2000, NN3-263-02008, Box 105, Vol.3 (2 of 2).

16 Some limited research initiatives, like the “Wallenberg Project” led by Swedish historian Helene Carlbäck, began as early as May 1989. Throughout 1989, Raoul Wallenberg’s brother, Dr. Guy von Dardel, conducted several private discussions with the Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly L. Adamishin in Geneva, Switzerland to open the way for in-depth research of the Wallenberg case in Moscow.
considered the very short “golden age” for Russian archival research that lasted only until the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{17}

Both sides followed similar motivations: Removing the three main historical problems from the two countries’ official agenda would mark an important step in the process of normalization of political and economic relations.

To prevent the complete collapse of the Soviet Union had been a central goal of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’. This effort required increased outreach to Western economies. Public sentiment in countries like Sweden and the U.S. welcomed the possibility of closer ties, yet the warming of relations was accompanied by strong demands for accountability regarding the crimes committed under Soviet rule.

In October 1989, President Gorbachev invited Raoul Wallenberg’s closest relatives to Moscow, with the intention of returning Wallenberg’s personal belongings and to repeat previous Soviet assertions that he had died of a heart attack in prison on July 17, 1947. The invitation had been preceded by a formal decision of the Politburo which stated that the aim of the visit was “to persuade” Wallenberg’s family that he was indeed dead.\textsuperscript{18} [Fig. 2]

Family members were also allowed to briefly tour Vladimir Prison, the Soviet Union’s most important isolation prison, where - according to numerous witness accounts - Wallenberg had reportedly been incarcerated some time after 1947.\textsuperscript{19}

Raoul Wallenberg’s brother, Dr. Guy von Dardel, used this initial opening to return to Russia in 1990 and to form an international commission, comprised of Russian and international experts. This group conducted the first ever on-site investigation of the Vladimir prison and to begin a review of other relevant Russian archives.\textsuperscript{20} Most notably, the commission received permission to photograph a set of about 1200 prisoner cards.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17} For a good overview of the conditions researchers faced during these years see Mark Kramer, Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Woodrow Wilson International Center, Issue 3, Fall 1993.

\textsuperscript{18} The allegedly accidental recovery of Raoul Wallenberg’s personal possessions, among them his diplomatic passport, his calendar and address book as well as his prisoner registration card, raises important questions. So does the rather fortuitous timing of the discovery, which supposedly occurred on September 22, 1989, barely a month before the family’s scheduled visit to Moscow. The invitation was formally issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID); Report of the Swedish Working Group, Stockholm, 2000, p.118-119.

\textsuperscript{19} The Vladimir Prison is located about 150 km northeast of Moscow, in the Vladimir Oblast.

\textsuperscript{20} The commission was called The \textit{International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg}. Its members were Professor Guy von Dardel, Dr. Vadim Birstein, Dr. Rolf Björnerstedt, Dr. Mikhail Chlenov, Professor Irwin Cotler, Alexei Kartsev, Dr. Kronid Lubarsky, Professor Marvin Makinen, Alexander Rodnyansky, Arseni Roginsky.

\textsuperscript{21} See Makinen and Kaplan, 2001. In 1999, this project was expanded to cover the entries for about 8000 prisoners. During the years 1993-1997, Marvin Makinen and Guy von Dardel also made repeated trips to Vladimir prison to interview former staff members.
In October 1990, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Y.A. Shevardnadze, proposed to draw up a list of additional actions required "in order to be able to remove the [Wallenberg] case from the agenda of Soviet- Swedish relations". He suggested the creation of a Working Group that was to include Swedish and Russian officials from relevant ministries and archives, as well as Guy von Dardel as the family representative. Similar efforts were initiated in the DC-3 case and - in subsequent months - for the disappeared Swedish ships.

By September 1991, the Wallenberg Working Group met for its first full session. It was able to continue its work without any interruption throughout the political transition period in Russia.

In 1992, the newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued instructions to his government agencies, including the Russian intelligence services, to fully cooperate with the Swedish investigative efforts. Finally, in February 1993 Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and President Yeltsin signed a formal agreement in which they stressed "to intensify their close cooperation" in all three Cold War era cases and to work for "full clarity".

On the Russian side, the Working Groups included - in varying combinations - representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Services (FSB), the Ministry of Defense, and - in connection with the DC-3 and the Swedish ships – Russian military officers from the Air Force and the Navy.

The Swedish side was comprised of members of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), as well as the Swedish Defense staff (Navy and Air Force representatives). Swedish historical experts joined the Working Groups for the disappeared ships and the DC-3 inquiry, but were noticeably absent in the Wallenberg case.

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22 Minister of Foreign Affairs Y.A. Shevardnadze’s memo to President M.S. Gorbachev, "On Further Action in the Matter of R. Wallenberg", October 20, 1990; Report of the Russian Working Group, 2001, p. 6 http://www.regeringen.se

23 The Swedish Working Group on the DC-3, DC-3 Utredningen, was established in March 1991. It published its final report already in 1992. A special Russian “investigative panel” (utrednings grupp) complemented the inquiry. Roger Almeberg, son of Alvar Almeberg, the pilot of the DC-3, had for many years conducted his own private inquiries and he decided not to join the official DC-3 Working Group. In June 1992, he led a separate group of experts and family members of the DC-3 crew on a trip to Moscow where they consulted with Russian representatives from the Armed Forces and the FSB. The Swedish-Russian Working Group on still outstanding questions in the Raoul Wallenberg Case was formally founded in June 1991 and was active for ten years, until 2001. It held about fifteen formal meetings, with additional separate discussions conducted by the Swedish and Russian sides throughout the years. The Swedish-Russian Working Group on disappeared ships and their crews was formed only in 1993. It held six official meetings between 1993 -1998. It was not formally disbanded until 2010, after a long period of inactivity. It never released a summary of its findings. Bengt Kappelin, brother of Per Iohan Kappelin, the Second Mate on the Bengt Sture served as a member of this Working Group.

24 The alleged Soviet era u-boat incursions into Swedish territorial waters constituted a fourth major subject area of discussion which are not touched up in this article. Deklaration Mellan Ryska Federationen och Sverige, February 10, 1993. Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive. By then, the Swedish side had already begun to prepare the first draft of its findings. Swedish Foreign Ministry Archives, P2 Eu 1, February 23, 1993, Samfattade redovisning av vad framkommitt i svensk-ryska Wallenbergsarbetsgruppen vid årsskiftet 1992-1993.

25 The historians of the Russian human rights group Memorial provided vital expertise to all three inquiries and served as adjunct advisors. Swedish historians Krister Wahlbäck and Helene Carlbäck assumed a similar advisory role in Sweden. In Poland, the Swedish Embassy received assistance from The Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, (IPN), in Warsaw. In all three cases, numerous additional independent experts and historians were also consulted. In the Wallenberg investigation, Dr. Marvin Makiern, who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, joined the Working Group as a special consultant and served in this capacity during its full duration.
Many of the same Swedish and Russian diplomatic personnel, as well as archivists from relevant Russian archives, were closely associated with all three entities.26

b. Narrow parameters

The difficulties faced by these initial investigations cannot be overstated. Swedish diplomats carried an enormous workload and faced staff shortages, plus they had to cautiously negotiate the chaos of Russia’s internal political situation. The lack of any in-depth knowledge of Soviet archives posed a serious obstacle as well. Most of all, Swedish officials had to be mindful to ensure the cooperation of their Russian counterparts. Despite shared motives to close the cases, there existed diverging opinions how much of a resolution of the problems was required to accomplish this. Given these facts, the very cautious approach taken early on in all three cases is not surprising.

All in all, it was a truly pioneering effort that also carried a lot of risk. The thorough examination of historical issues can expose entirely new sets of facts, the full consequences of which cannot be easily gauged. And if diplomats dislike anything, it is precisely this kind of uncertainty. Therefore, controlling the circumstances of the inquiry was a key priority for both Russian and Swedish officials. 27

The exchanges with Russian representatives were generally cordial and constructive. Many Russian archivists and their staff put in long hours and went to great lengths to provide the Swedish side with

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26Among the Russian archives utilized in the investigations (with important restrictions) were the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Russian State Military Archives (RGVA), the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO RF), The Central Navy Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsVMAMO), The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), the Central Archive of the FSB (TsA FSB) and several others. There were also exchanges with The Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repression, chaired by the former Soviet Ambassador and politician Alexander Yakovlev.

27On the Swedish side, Ambassador Örjan Berner, and (then) Minister Hans Magnusson, for example, had a leading role in all three inquiries, as did on the Russian side Vladimir Vinogradov (FSB Archive Directorate), Col. Nikolai Nikiforov, General-Colonel Dimitri Volkogonov, Konstantin Nikishkin (MVD), Valery Filipov (Ministry of Defense), Sergei Zhuravlyov (MID) and others. The Russian representatives in turn worked closely with all U.S. commissions.

27 In December 2000, on the eve of the release of the Swedish Working Group Report in the Raoul Wallenberg case, the Swedish government was so nervous about any unwanted surprise revelations that it made an urgent request to the CIA to check “one more time to see if there was any additional information about Wallenberg’s activities during World War II... concerning an intelligence connection between Wallenberg and the OSS or State Department.” The stated reason for the request was that Sweden “would prefer not to be surprised by some journalist at the January 12, 2001 press conference.” Swedish officials also renewed their request for any new information available to U.S. intelligence agencies regarding Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. NARA, RG 263, Entry Z218, Second Release, Name Files Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts, 1936-2000, NN3-263-02008, Box 105, Vol.3, 2 of 2.
the requested information. However, they obviously acted in accordance with the instructions issued by their superiors. Direct access to important documentation, particularly from the Russian intelligence archives, was strictly limited.28

In the Raoul Wallenberg case, the official work [of the bilateral Working Group] was shadowed and supplemented throughout 1992 by talks between Swedish Embassy officials, like Sweden’s Ambassador to Moscow Örjan Berner and [then] Minister Hans Magnusson, and high ranking representatives from the Russian intelligence services, including the KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and the Deputy Head of Foreign Intelligence (SVR) V.M. Rozhkov.29

In late 1993, the Swedes requested an official statement from Mr. Rozhkov explaining why representatives from Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR) were not participating in the official Working Group. In their reply, SVR representatives argued that their archive contained no relevant information about Raoul Wallenberg and that all questions had been addressed in the earlier Rozhkov-Magnusson discussions. SVR officials did agree, however, to make themselves available should additional issues arise.30

The Swedish diplomats did not further press for SVR’s participation, even though the agency’s claim that it had no information at all about Raoul Wallenberg was clearly questionable. It was also directly contradicted by other Russian officials. Colonel Igor Prelin, the head of the KGB Press Department in the early 1990s, stated on numerous occasions that the Soviet security services had important foreign intelligence sources in both Sweden and Hungary in 1944/45 and beyond.31 Prelin said that he had been in charge of the review of this very documentation prior to the start of the Working Group investigation.32

Similar claims about relevant documentation in foreign intelligence collections were made by the former Soviet intelligence officer Pavel Sudoplatov.33 All this material would have been an important potential

28 For example, in the Wallenberg investigation, a single Russian investigator (Vladimir P. Galitsky) took on a huge collection of documentation – about 100,000 pages – related to foreign prisoners and then reported back about his findings. The collection was the Operational Committee’s Fond 451 of the NKVD/MVD’s Executive Committee for Questions concerning Prisoners of War and the Interned, [GUPVI], located at the Russian State Military Archives. The Swedish side was not allowed to assist in this review; see the Swedish Working Group Report, p.224-225 (Appendix 2, Report by V.P. Galitsky, December 14, 1992).


30 Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Örjan Berner to S. Noreen, October 26, 1993, official P.M. from SVR, regarding SVR’s attitude to the Swedish-Russian Working Group, delivered by Yuri Fokin (Head of the 2nd European Directorate, MiD)

31 These sources supposedly reported in depth on Wallenberg’s activities in Hungary, as well as his professional and personal background as a member of a leading Swedish banking family, the Wallenbergs. The influential Swedish bankers Marcus Wallenberg (1899-1982) and Jacob Wallenberg (1892-1980) were Raoul Wallenberg’s first cousins once removed. Raoul’s father, Raoul Oscar Wallenberg, had died before his son’s birth in 1912. His widow, Maj, some years later married a lawyer named Fredrik von Dardel. Together, they had two more children, Nina Lagergren and Guy von Dardel.

32 Interview with Igor Prelin in a German TV Documentary, Was wurde aus Wallenberg?, ZDF, April 21, 1997. Soviet foreign intelligence agents also would have reported on important discussions with Swedish representatives in Turkey and Finland in the years 1955-1957, that involved high ranking Soviet diplomatic and intelligence personnel; see also note 129.

33 This included the trade of Swedish ball bearings for platinum between Wallenberg family companies and the Soviet Union during World War II, for example; see Pavel Sudoplatov (with Jerrold L. and Leona Schecter), Special Tasks, Little Brown and Company, 1994. From 1941-53 Sudoplatov headed various sabotage and terrorist services within the Soviet secret services.
Russian officials stressed from the beginning that they operated with the idea that Wallenberg's death in 1947 was an "incontrovertible" fact and that both sides should concentrate on answering "still pending questions", such as how Wallenberg died. 34

The Swedish Foreign Office subsequently named its group Working Group to study still pending questions in the search for Raoul Wallenberg. 35

A similar format was established for the other two investigations.

The Working Group for the DC-3 had begun its work already in March 1991. An official entity to investigate the cases of the disappeared Swedish ships was not established until June 1993. It was formed in part as a response to the increased demands from relatives of the missing sailors, historians and the Swedish press for the Swedish Foreign Ministry to pressure their Russian counterparts for answers. 36

On the Swedish side, the three Working Groups were strictly entities of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. They were not accountable to any outside institutions, like the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), for example. The groups did not have the right to subpoena witnesses or to question them under oath.

There was no attempt to coordinate the three inquiries in any form. Neither the relatives of the missing, nor the independent experts in one group, knew about information or insights obtained in the other [groups]. Only a small number of official Swedish and Russian representatives, therefore, had a complete picture of all three investigations.

In each group, Swedish Foreign Ministry officials set the working agenda, in consultation with their Russian colleagues. Family members and the independent consultants had only limited input and no means of control regarding the direction of the inquiry. All formal decisions regarding the work conducted by all three groups rested entirely with Swedish and Russian officials.

One exception occurred in 1997, when the independent experts in the Working Group for the Raoul Wallenberg case insisted that certain research inquiries were carried out before the Swedish side issued its final report. Swedish officials eventually relented and two of three suggested projects were implemented. 37

34 Russian Working Group Report, p.7., meeting headed by Deputy Foreign Minister V.M. Nikiforov, KGB Deputy Chairman V.F. Lebedev and MVD Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs, L.G. Sizov. In this meeting, Nikiforov stated that "... it is our considered opinion that the fact of the death of Wallenberg in 1947 is incontrovertible, and that nothing is to be gained by further investigation of his fate..." Since the Swedish public had "remaining questions", Nikiforov added, further inquiries were to be addressed "within the framework of the working groups."

35 Arbetsoff med uppdrag att studera utestående frågor i efterforskning av Raoul Wallenberg, Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, see text of the official decision [Beslut] to create a Working Group to address "still pending questions", signed by State Secretary Stig Andersson, September 2, 1991

36 HP 80 B, 1991-1993

37 In a separate memorandum, Guy von Dardel stated that he would not join the official Swedish report if important questions were not addressed; see, P2 Eu 1, Guy von Dardel, David Matas et al., Statement of Dissent, 1997.
The starting premise in the DC-3 case was that most likely all men onboard the plane had perished as the result of the crash. Swedish officials had already informed their Russian counterparts a mere three weeks after the disappearance of the plane - on July 1, 1952 - that they believed that the crew had died.38

In the search for the disappeared ships, according to instructions sent by the Swedish Foreign Office to its Embassy in Moscow in 1991, the main focus was to be on the boat Bengt Sture, since members of its crew were suspected to have been held in Soviet captivity.39

In each instance, the parameters of inquiry were framed in very direct and narrow terms: What happened to the people who disappeared? In the beginning, such a narrow approach seemed reasonable enough and worked quite well in the early stages of the investigations.

c. Early successes, with significant limitations

The early 1990s brought impressive results, but also already showed notable limitations:

In the Raoul Wallenberg case, the Russian side handed over two hundred documents, mostly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Archives of the KGB, concerning Soviet era records of the prison authorities. All were in copy form, with some showing severe signs of censorship.40 While these documents provided some helpful new information, they did not offer any insights into the core question of what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg after his trail breaks off in Lubyanka Prison in March 1947.41

As it emerged much later on, Russian officials in 1991 had suppressed important information contained in prison registers.

38 Rapport från DC 3-utredningen, 1992. This action is reminiscent of the behavior of the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, Staffan Söderblom, who in June 1946 informed Stalin that all Sweden required was a confirmation that Raoul Wallenberg had died in Budapest in January 1945. He did so even though the Soviet government had informed him that Raoul Wallenberg had been taken into protective custody by Soviet troops on January 16, 1945.

39 The Bengt Sture was attacked by the Soviet u-boat SC 406 on October 27, 1942 and sunk. In 1963, a German historian discovered that seven crew members had apparently been rescued by Soviet forces; Rappoterad Sakanad, 2002.

40 In some instances, only parts of a page were copied or sections of the pages were blacked out. Especially the KGB, and later its successor, the FSB, permitted researchers only limited access to its collections.

41 The last known record for Wallenberg’s presence in Lubyanka Prison is an entry in the interrogation register, under his own name, for March 11, 1947.
Only in 2009 did researchers learn from the FSB Central Archive that the interrogation registers of Lubyana Prison allegedly show that Wallenberg may have been held as a numbered prisoner during investigation (*Prisoner no. 7*) and was perhaps alive as late as July 23, 1947, six days after previous Soviet claims of his death in Lubyanka Prison, on July 17, 1947.\(^{42}\) [Fig. 3]

Back in December 1990, KGB officials also actively interfered with and later stopped an archival review by two historians from the human rights organization *Memorial* [who worked with Guy von Dardel’s International Commission] when they discovered important documentation about Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Special Archive (now the Russian State Military Archives). Swedish officials learned about the KGB action, but took no formal steps to protest the decision.\(^{43}\)

The two researchers - Dr. Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky - had found several documents with references to both Raoul Wallenberg and his driver, Vilmos Langfelder. One of the papers mentioned a planned transfer of Raoul Wallenberg from one prison to another in February 1947. This information proved for the first time that Soviet officials had lied in 1957 when they declared that the so-called *Smoltssov Report* - the note from the Lubyanka Prison doctor A.L. Smoltssov which states that Wallenberg had died suddenly of a heart attack on July 17, 1947 - was the only document about Wallenberg available in Soviet archives.\(^{44}\)

The Working Group also conducted numerous formal interviews with former Soviet government and intelligence officials. Most of these interviews were carried out by a joint interview group comprised of Swedish and Russian representatives. No researchers or family members (Guy von Dardel) were able to participate. Unfortunately, many officials active in Soviet times were hesitant to provide detailed information and some - like Dr. Smoltssov’s son - were questioned only by the Russian side. Some asked for their statements to remain confidential. As a result, many of the interview protocols are still classified.

Regarding the DC- 3, Russia finally admitted that a Soviet MiG-15 had intentionally downed the plane, but offered no further explanation for this action.\(^{45}\) The documents also showed the MiG pilot reporting that crew members of the disabled plane had "parachuted", but offered no information if and how the issue may have been followed up.\(^{46}\) There exists at least a theoretical possibility that some of the crew

\(^{42}\) Letter from the FSB Central Archive to Dr. Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, November 2, 2009. The FSB (Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) is the main successor agency of the KGB. In 1991, Russian officials did not include copies of the Lubyanka interrogation register for July 22-23, 1947 in their release, even though the register shows a sixteen and a half hour long interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg’s driver, Vilmos Langfelder on July 23, 1947. About a dozen other prisoners with direct links to the Wallenberg case were also questioned at the time. FSB archivists continue to refuse to release the entry for a *Prisoner no. 7* who was interviewed along with Langfelder. They also refuse to release the complete list of all prisoners who were interrogated on July 22-23, 1947.

\(^{43}\) Louise Nordström, Document backs claims KGB stopped Wallenberg probe, *The Associated Press*, January 17, 2012; In September 1991, Anatoly Prokopenko, the director of the Special Archive, told Swedish officials that a year earlier the KGB had asked him to provide copies of everything Birstein and Roginsky had reviewed and later, to stop their access; see Swedish Foreign Ministry Archives, P2 Eu 1, Hans Magnusson to Martin Hallqvist, September 16, 1991.

\(^{44}\) The *Smoltssov Note* was presented to the Swedish government by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on February 6, 1957.

\(^{45}\) The MiG 15 was part of the 483 IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment), of the Soviet Air Force in Tukums (Riga). Rapport från DC 3-utredningen, 1992. The information was released on November 18, 1991.

\(^{46}\) In 2003, the DC-3 was located by private efforts. Four bodies were recovered: Alvar Ālmeberg, Gösta Blad, Einar Jonsson and Herbert Matsson. So far, the fate of four other known crew members remains unresolved. Haverirapport 79001, Förvarsvarmakten, 2007. This was a purely technical investigation of the plane’s demise. It did not address the political background questions of the incident.
survived the MiG’s attack and were picked up by the Soviet fleet that was conducting its annual naval exercises in close proximity to the crash site.\textsuperscript{47}

There have been persistent rumors of a ninth man onboard the plane which received renewed attention through Swedish investigative journalist Anders Jallai’s interview with former Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) chief Olof Fränstedt in 2011.\textsuperscript{48} Five of nine parachutes and life vests the plane was carrying remain unaccounted for.\textsuperscript{49} [Fig. 4]

In the inquiry regarding Swedish ships, the Russian archivists quickly produced a number of documents about the Bengt Sture which had been sunk by a Soviet u-boat in 1942. These confirmed the presence of possibly seven of its fourteen-member crew in the Soviet Union but it remained unclear what happened to them after 1942, when they were held in a prison in Leningrad.

\textsuperscript{47} Roger Ålmeberg, Hemliga förbindelser: DC-3:an, Sverige och kalla kriget, Norstedts, 2007. About ninety Soviet ships were in the area at the time. The capture of some crew members would have constituted a public relations coup. However, in the middle of the Korean War (1950-1953), the necessary admission such a presentation would have required - that the Soviet military had shot down an unarmed plane from a neutral country, over international waters - was perhaps seen as too risky or too cumbersome. As Anders Jallai has pointed out, the DC-3 crew possessed special technical skills that may have been useful for Soviet intelligence operations. The Soviet leadership, therefore, might have decided to keep the capture of any survivors secret. Soviet authorities sometimes waited many years before acknowledging the detention of certain foreign personnel. The arrest of a number of Swedish agents in the Baltic countries in 1949/1950 was only revealed seven years after the fact, in 1957. The archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, HP 1 Eu, P.M. by Rolf Sohlman, March 8, 1957 and March 12, 1957. On the other hand, it appears that the Soviet response immediately after the downing of the DC-3 lacked coordination. An internal memorandum dated July 2, 1952, from MGB Chairman Semyon Ignatiev to the Soviet Central Committee, indicates that “the search for the crew (presumably four people) of the downed plane remained without result”. A forensic “impact analysis” of the seats in the DC-3 plane appears to suggest that all of them were occupied at the time the plane hit the water, but the analysis was highly theoretical and is far from conclusive. If the four missing crew members indeed were seated in the plane at the time of the crash, the question is why none of their remains were found in or around the aircraft. Haverirapport, 2007.

\textsuperscript{48} Jallai, an accomplished pilot and diver, headed the private consortium that located the wreck of the DC-3 in 2003. Anders Jallai, Vem använde DC-3:ans nionde fallskärm?, February 11, 2011, \url{http://www.jallai.se/2011/02/dc-3ans-nionde-fallskarm/} Official investigators attribute the rumors about a “ninth man” to the fact that an additional person (Ove Huzell) was scheduled to accompany the DC-3 on June 13, 1952, but that he left the plane well before the crew took off. An earlier flight of the same DC-3 on June 10, 1952, piloted by Alvar Ålmeberg, carried a crew of nine men. Haverirapport, 2007

\textsuperscript{49} According to the official equipment list, the plane was carrying nine parachutes and either nine or ten life vests. Haverirapport, 2007; see also Nilsson, 2010
Russian officials speculated that they were either executed, perished due to harsh prison conditions or were transferred – during the Leningrad siege - to other facilities with no available trace left in archival collections.\(^{50}\) [Fig. 5]

While most of the attention understandably focused on the *Bengt Sture*, very limited research was conducted into the fate of other vessels. One exception was the boat *Kinnekulle* (whose crew disappeared in 1948), which received more serious scrutiny after 2000 when a private researcher, Jan Sjöberg, brought important new facts to light.\(^{51}\)

In short, these results were enough to satisfy the general public but left many of the central questions in each case unanswered, while also giving rise to new ones about the handling and purpose of the respective Working Groups.

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\(^{50}\) HP 80 B, December 27, 1991, Cabinet to Swedish Embassy, Moscow

\(^{51}\) Jan Sjöberg, *Mysteriet M/S Kinnekulle i skuggan av det kalla kriget*, D-uppsats vid Historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs Universitet, vt 2000. The *Kinnekulle*, bound from Ustka (Poland) to Helsingborg, was found floating along the Danish coast in February 1948, with no crew. The ship was burnt and showed other damage. No detailed forensic examination of the cause of the fire was ever made, nor was it established how exactly the ship may have drifted to the position at which it was found.
III. An Inquiry steered from the Top?

Russia – The Problems of an indirect Inquiry

a. The suppression of documentation in the Raoul Wallenberg case

The intentional censoring and withholding of information with central importance to the Wallenberg case by Russian archivists is a serious matter, since it appears to be indicative of a broader policy. It underscores the impression that the KGB interference in 1991, in the early stages of the investigation, was not an isolated incident, but was instead symptomatic of the official Russian approach to all three inquiries.

If researchers had learned about the issue of Prisoner no. 7 already in 1991, it almost certainly would have attracted close attention at the time and an all-out push for clarification would have followed.

The circumstances surrounding the interrogations of Prisoner No. 7 are undoubtedly sufficient to suspect that this man could have been Raoul Wallenberg. Consequently, they establish “reasonable doubt” about Wallenberg’s death on July 17, 1947. 52

Russian officials claim that Raoul Wallenberg’s name does not appear in any prison registers or journals after March 1947. 53 If, however, Wallenberg was assigned a number around this time, how could his presence be traced in such journals, by his name alone?

The censorship marks one of the proven instances of intentional deception by Russian officials and raises questions whether they also committed such deliberate omissions on other occasions in the Wallenberg case or in the other two inquiries.

52 In interviews with the Swedish-Russian Working Group, Boris Solovov, a former investigator in the MGB’s 3rd Main Directorate, 4th Department that oversaw Raoul Wallenberg’s case, had testified that some time in 1947 he had been given a parcel that should be delivered to the MGB archive section. This parcel had carried the label “Contains material related to Prisoner no.7.” Solovov stated that he knew explicitly at the time that the term Prisoner no.7 referred to Raoul Wallenberg. See Report of the Swedish Working Group, p. 126, available at http://www.regeringen.se, 3.6.2011, 15:13, Microsoft Internet Explorer; see also note 42

53 Russian archivists say that they checked the registers of Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons until the early 1950s. The joint Working Group briefly discussed the case of another Prisoner no.7, a man who had been held in Lubyanka prison in 1945. This person was definitely not identical with Raoul Wallenberg. Interestingly, FSB archivists were able to identify the Prisoner no.7 from 1945 as “a Russian national”. They have never provided a full explanation how this identification was achieved and if this method could also be applied to establish the identity of Prisoner no.7 from 1947. The archivists have also never fully explained the system of assigning numbers to prisoners under investigation in the Soviet Security Apparatus; see Swedish Working Group Report, 2001; also Berger and Birstein, Raoul Wallenberg: Gaps in our current knowledge, 2012.
One can see a number of possible motivations behind the Russian decision in 1991:

1. KGB archivists perhaps had concrete evidence that Raoul Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947 and they therefore knew that *Prisoner no. 7* was a different inmate. If so, one has to ask why this evidence was never shared and why Russian officials in 2009 publicly claimed that "*Prisoner no. 7* was with great likelihood Raoul Wallenberg."  

2. Russian archivists may have had information that Raoul Wallenberg died or disappeared, but not on July 17, 1947. *Prisoner no. 7* may have been Wallenberg, but Russian officials wanted to avoid a protracted inquiry and discussion of the issue.

3. Russian officials had and have no definitive information about either Raoul Wallenberg’s fate in 1947 or the identity of *Prisoner no. 7*. Yet, they wished to avoid the discussion of any information that seemed to contradict the official Soviet and Russian accounts of Raoul Wallenberg’s death in 1947.

In all three of these scenarios, one would be left to conclude that the primary purpose of the Russian Working Group was to confirm the official [Soviet] version of Wallenberg’s fate.

The statement by the Chairman of the Russian Working Group, Vyacheslav Tuchnin, to the Swedish newspaper *Aftonbladet* in 2001 underscores the impression that he and his colleagues did not necessarily feel compelled to follow the strict rules of evidence and formal investigation: “We already knew what happened to Wallenberg,” he told the publication. “For that reason we did not devote much attention to Wallenberg possibly being alive after 1947.”

The question whether or not Wallenberg could have been designated as a numbered prisoner was discussed in the Working Group on several occasions until 2000, also in connection with Vladimir Prison.

If the failure of Russian archivists in 1991 to share the information about interrogations of a *Prisoner no. 7* on July 22-23, 1947 had simply been an inadvertent oversight, there would have been plenty of opportunities over the next ten years to correct the mistake. Yet the Russian side never indicated to researchers that they possessed such information.

54 Letter from the FSB Central Archive to Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, November 2009

55 Another possibility is that Russian archivists believed that the *Prisoner no. 7* held in Lubyanka Prison in 1947 could have been identical with a *Prisoner no. 7* from 1945 (who was definitely not Raoul Wallenberg). In this case, however, it is unclear why Russian officials would not have released the information and a copy of the interrogation register for July 22-23, 1947, except to avoid possible discussions.

They merely verbally relayed the fact that Wallenberg’s driver, Vilmos Langfelder, had been questioned for sixteen and a half hours [on July 23], but never released copies of the actual page. They also did not allow researchers to review the original interrogation registers, in spite of their many requests. Thirteen years after the end of the Working Group, this documentation continues to remain firmly classified.

It is unclear what information exactly Swedish officials possessed about the matter – if in the time from 1991-2001 they saw the prison registers in question and the entry for a Prisoner no.7 and Vilmos Langfelder (and decided to ignore them), or if they simply acquiesced that no copies of certain entries were provided.

During the time of the bilateral Working Group, Swedish diplomats repeatedly failed to insist on proper documentation of important information they had received from Russian officials in the course of the Working Group investigation/s. The failure to do so prevented an effective evaluation and follow-up of the provided details. As a result, a number of potentially crucial leads were missed.

For example, Russian officials did not disclose the fact that - in spite of their numerous denials – the investigative documentation for Wallenberg’s longtime cellmate, Willy Rödel has been preserved in Russian archives. This includes some of his interrogation protocols. During the Working Group, Swedish officials had repeatedly inquired about this material. In the end, however, they contented themselves with the few copied documents the FSB archivists had provided about his case. Swedish officials never insisted to review the file from which the material had originated. Only in 2010 was it finally revealed that more than fifty pages of investigative documents concerning Rödel had in fact been withheld from the Swedish Working Group.

The file in question – identified only as “operative correspondence” (PF-9653) - is part of a collection of documents regarding foreign diplomats who died in Soviet prisons in the years 1945-1947. It would have been important to establish if Wallenberg’s case is included in this collection and if similar

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57 We obtained a copy of the page only in 2003, after placing a follow-up request with the FSB Archive. It is not clear what prompted the FSB’s decision in 2009 to release the information regarding the interrogation of a Prisoner no.7 on July 22-23, 1947. Researchers so far have not been able to independently verify the information. The FSB archivists’ refusal to present an uncensored copy of the relevant pages of the Lubyanka Prison interrogation register which shows the actual entry for Prisoner no.7 or to allow researchers access to the original documentation raises questions about what details in this Russian officials may continue to hide; see Marie Dupuy, Wallenberg’s family demands access to key documents in his case, The Jerusalem Post, March 12, 2014.

58 The Swedish Working Group Report in the year 2000 mentions Langfelder’s sixteen and a half hours long interrogation on July 23, 1947. It remains unclear why Swedish officials did not insist on a copy of the Lubyanka Prison register for this entry during the time of the Working Group. The positive identification of Prisoner no.7 would have been of considerable importance for the investigation, regardless if this man was Raoul Wallenberg or not.

59 Letter from the FSB Central Archive to Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, November 2, 2009.
investigative documentation also has survived for him. The last page of Rödel’s file consists of an envelope that contained his prisoner card and diplomatic passport. This raises the question if Wallenberg’s prisoner card and diplomatic passport were archived in a similar way. The file (PF-9653) remains inaccessible even today.

b. Severe restrictions of access to relevant Soviet and Russian Intelligence Archives

The central question remains: Was the basic intention of these three major Cold War inquiries to obtain a full resolution of key questions or was the main goal to address the cases in a way that would allow them to be closed? Here too, the truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle.

The available documentation shows that Swedish officials had several opportunities to broaden their approach in each case which they did not pursue, although such a step could have yielded important clues for the respective investigations. Two such areas of inquiry were the politically sensitive issue of Swedish intelligence cooperation with Western nations, at the expense of the Soviet Union, as well as the equally problematic question of other Swedish citizens held in Soviet captivity after World War II. Both subjects had serious ramifications for all three cases under investigation, yet they were left off the agenda of all three Working Groups.

A third subject – Sweden and the Wallenberg family’s close economic ties with Nazi Germany during the war – arose in connection with the Wallenberg case, but was discussed only fleetingly. The issue would have been quite relevant since Stalin considered these relations part of a broader Allied, anti-Soviet conspiracy. Stalin feared that eventually, with the help of Sweden, a defeated Germany would make common cause with the U.S. and Britain, to then turn in a one-front war against the Soviet Union. These ideas obviously helped shape Stalin’s general attitude toward Sweden in the postwar years.

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60 Russian officials have always insisted that no such file was ever created for Raoul Wallenberg, since he was apparently never formally charged or sentenced for a crime. However, a close analysis of the records of other prisoners of war like Raoul Wallenberg clearly shows that from the moment of their detention, a formal investigation file (sledstvennoe delo) was created for each prisoner. Swedish officials unfortunately simply accepted Russian claims; see Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, Russia continues to obscure facts in the Raoul Wallenberg case, Newsmill, April 13, 2013. In 2012, the FSB Archives published the documentation regarding Willy Rödel contained in file PF-9653. Vasilij Christoforov (Hg.), Oberfurer SA Villi Redel’. Dokumenty iz archivov FSB Rossii, Moscow, 2012.

61 For this reason, Stalin was also extremely suspicious of all separate peace negotiations that involved neutral countries like Sweden, and in particular, the Wallenberg family; see, among others, Antal Uleln-Reviczky, German War- Russian Peace: The Hungarian Tragedy, Central European University Press/Helena History Press, 2014. Stalin was equally paranoid about a vast “Jewish conspiracy”, which would join this broad international front against the Soviet Union. Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest, his ties to U.S. intelligence and to the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), an international Jewish relief agency, as well as his plans for an organization devoted to the restoration of Jewish assets, undoubtedly attracted Stalin’s deep suspicions; see for example, Jenő Lévai, Raoul Wallenberg, translated by Frank Vajda, White Ant Occasional Publishing, 1988.
In the Wallenberg inquiry, for the first seven years of the Working Group’s existence, the Swedish side only occasionally insisted on full and direct access to documentation, settling instead into a slow moving question-and-answer format with the Russian side. This process forestalled proper identification and confirmation of cited sources, which in turn allowed only for limited conclusions concerning the content of these documents. Most papers were also never seen in their original context.

The limited [q & a] exchange essentially forced researchers into a guessing game, where control of the information was entirely one-sided. As a result, the inquiry rarely met the accepted standards of a formal and transparent investigation.

When access to important documentation was denied, Swedish officials often did not effectively protest this failure. In other words, Russian non-compliance faced few if any negative repercussions.

Swedish officials in some instances did push back when Russia did not permit the review of essential intelligence files. One such notable exception was the expanded project to scan and analyze prisoner cards of more than 8,000 individuals who had been held in Vladimir prison between 1945-1972, as well as the implementation of a limited prisoner file review.

However, the Swedish side agreed to support these projects only after Guy von Dardel had made it clear that he would not sign the final Swedish Working Group report and that he would issue a public dissent unless certain several core research questions had been addressed.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry subsequently commissioned a sophisticated database analysis of the prisoner cards of Vladimir, in order to identify secret prisoners incarcerated there. This project, as well as the prisoner file review, yielded a number of interesting findings, yet the results were never pursued further.

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62 Direct and uncensored access to original documents (not photocopies) is necessary for determining authenticity and integrity of the presented material, a vital part of any historical analysis.

63 The projects were designed and carried out by special consultants to the Swedish Working Group, Dr. Marvin Makinen, Ari Kaplan and Susan E. Mesinai; see www.raoulsfate.org. With no access to documentation that could clarify what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg in the crucial summer of 1947, the investigation largely focused on verifying or disproving the statements of specific witnesses in the case who claimed to have met Raoul Wallenberg in Soviet camps or prisons.

64 See note 33

65 Thanks to highly specialized software which enabled them to recreate the full occupancy of each prison cell in various years, American researchers Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan were able to identify those cells which presumably held strictly isolated prisoners in Vladimir Prison at particular times. A cell will appear "empty" if such a prisoner’s registration card has been removed and his name could therefore not be entered into the database. Makinen and Kaplan’s analysis coincides in a number of cases with testimonies from witnesses who reported hearing of Raoul Wallenberg or a highly secret Swedish prisoner in Vladimir Prison after 1947.

66 The Swedish Foreign Office spent over $300,000 on both projects; a sign that officials felt at the time that in spite of Russian claims that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947, the possibility that he may have been held in isolation for some time past this date deserved a thorough examination. The Swedish side knew in advance that the study of Vladimir prison would yield a certain set of questions, questions about seemingly “empty” cells and who may have occupied them. That meaningful follow-up
On the whole, so-called operative and/or investigation files, especially of prisoners closely connected with Wallenberg in captivity, were strictly off limits for researchers. They continue to remain inaccessible today.  

Researchers were also not allowed to review the reports from Soviet agents in Hungary that could shed further light on the activities and contacts of the Swedish Legation, Budapest in 1944. This documentation is known to exist in special collections in the FSB archives and could help clarify the reasons for Wallenberg’s detention.

Equally important to study would have been Soviet intelligence reports from Stockholm for the years 1943-1945 which could have provided insights into what exactly Soviet authorities knew about Raoul Wallenberg’s personal and professional background and how they viewed his selection for the humanitarian mission to Budapest.

No documentation related to Swedish wartime business dealings, particularly those of the Wallenberg family, were made available for review. This material could reveal if and how they may have affected Raoul Wallenberg’s actions in Budapest, including possible deals he made with Nazi authorities to save lives, as well as the Soviet perception of such activities.

Several key archives that could be expected to contain additional important information regarding the circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest were never approached.

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67 One or two such investigative prisoner files (Hermann Grosheim-Krisko, Franz Rudolf Gfroener) were made available only to the Chairman of the Swedish side of the Working Group, Ambassador Hans Magnusson. Magnusson also successfully pushed for limited access to a classified collection concerning numbered prisoners that was reviewed by independent expert Susan Mesinal.

68 These reports are not to be confused with the recently released Soviet diplomatic cipher cable traffic from 1944-1947. In 2011, the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry released almost 7,000 diplomatic cipher cables sent between Stockholm and Moscow in the years 1944-1947. However, an additional 3,000 cables have stayed strictly classified in different collections, including those of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). See Johan Matz, Cables in Cipher, the Raoul Wallenberg Case and Swedish-Soviet Diplomatic Communication 1944-47, in: Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 38, issue 3, 2013, S. 344–366. Of particular interest are – aside from Wallenberg’s well known ties to United States and British intelligence representatives – his direct contacts with members of the Hungarian political and economic elite who were active in the anti-Nazi resistance, among them the former Minister in Stockholm, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, and others; see Susanne Berger and Vadim Birstein, Not a Nobody, 2012.

69 In the eyes of the Soviets, Raoul Wallenberg’s last name alone may have associated him with these activities. In October 1945, the Swedish ball bearing trust SKF which was controlled by the Wallenbergs had handed over its entire European inventory to the Germans, including its holdings in Budapest; see Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, HP 64 Eu, SKF headquarters in Gothenburg to SKF Budapest, September 20, 1944, in Susanne Berger, Stuck in Neutral: The Reasons Behind Sweden’s Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg case, 2005, available at http://www.raoul-wallenberg.eu Sweden’s post-war economic relations with the Soviet Union are also of considerable interest to the Wallenberg investigation. This includes the complex negotiations for lost Swedish business in the Baltic countries and in Eastern Europe, which involved huge sums and dragged on until the early 1950s. They involved important Wallenberg controlled companies like Swedish Match and SKF. Until the early 1950s, Sweden also functioned as the main supplier of ball bearings to the Eastern Block. It later served as an important facilitator of trade with iron curtain countries.

70 A good example is the Razvedupr (RU, field military intelligence) Collection in the Defense Ministry Central Archive (TsAMO RF). After Wallenberg had been detained at the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, most probably he was debriefed not
Raoul Wallenberg’s extensive contacts to the Hungarian resistance, in close cooperation with Allied intelligence services, definitely would have aroused Stalin’s suspicions, since aside from seeking the defeat of Nazi Germany, these operations had the aim of limiting future Soviet influence in Hungary. The Swedish government clearly worried about public revelations of these direct violations of its stated neutrality which apparently occurred with at least some official Swedish knowledge and assistance.

Just as disconcerting must have been the news the Swedish government received shortly after Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance. It indicated that the Soviets had arrested him with the possible intention of using him in a show trial “with other leading persons in trade and finance who allegedly aided German interests during the war.”

It has never been revealed what Wallenberg’s colleagues told Russian interrogators about his activities when they were themselves briefly detained — and later released — by Soviet officials in Budapest in March 1945. The Swedish Foreign Ministry, for still unexplained reasons, failed to create official protocols when it debriefed the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest upon their return home to Stockholm a month later.

Equally unavailable are crucial correspondence records between the Russian security services and the decision making bodies of the Soviet leadership, including the so-called ‘special papers’ (ocobye papki) of the Politburo and Central Committee, which would show how the Soviet leadership, and especially Stalin, assessed Wallenberg’s case and what considerations may have determined his fate. [Fig. 7]

only by SMERSH, which is known, but also by military intelligence officers. There is a possibility that transcripts of these interrogations might provide some information about Wallenberg’s detention and the arrest that followed; see Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, Gaps in our current knowledge, 2012

71 While the central focus of Raoul Wallenberg’s mission was clearly humanitarian, several other aspects were closely associated with it. One was the protection of future Swedish/Allied political interests in Hungary, with the aim of preventing a Soviet occupation of the country or at least limiting Soviet influence. Another priority was the protection of the assets of leading Hungarian industrialists and the rescue of skilled technical workers. This involved especially the holdings of the Manfred Weiss Group and Lipót Aschner. See Berger, 2005.

72 See Gellert Kovacs, Skymning över Budapest, Carlssons, 2013; see also Susanne Berger and Catherine Schandl, Raoul Wallenberg’s unexplored intelligence connections, Dagens Nyheter, August 2, 2007. Other documentation from Russian archives shows that the Swedish Legation in Budapest was suspected of a variety of transgressions, ranging from the sale of Swedish protective passports to Nazi officials and helping to facilitate the delivery of Swedish ball bearings to Hungary’s Nazi regime, to the neglect of Soviet POWs in its care; see Berger, 2005.

73 The information was conveyed by the Hungarian National Bank President Takácsy who served at the will of the Soviet occupation powers. Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, P2 Eu 1, Raoul Wallenberg case file, Report by Kalman Lauer, September 1945 to Birger Ekeberg. The Soviets also may have associated Raoul Wallenberg with efforts to establish a separate peace between Germany/Hungary and the U.S./Great Britain. Several of these discussions utilized Swedish channels, including members of the Wallenberg family; see Berger, 2005.

74 The members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest issued short written accounts of their experiences in 1944, especially about the attack by the Hungarian Arrow Cross on the Legation building in December 1944. See Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, P2 Eu 1.
The problem, therefore, is not that this documentation has been lost or was destroyed, but that it remains fully classified. 75

As late as 2012, during a renewed official evaluation of the Wallenberg case for the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Hans Magnusson could not gain access to essential records, including those related to Prisoner no.7 in the Central Archive of the FSB (TsA FSB). 76 In this instance, too, the Swedish government did not noticeably protest the obvious Russian failure to cooperate with an official Swedish investigation. 77

The DC-3 and the Swedish ships [Fig. 8 a]

In the other two inquiries, Russia has also refused to open critically important documentation, including key internal correspondence records of certain Soviet agencies with the Soviet leadership.

In addition, operative military and naval intelligence files from Polish and Russian archives, essential for the investigation of disappeared ships (including those of the Russian Navy’s and Baltic Fleet's Special Departments) have been withheld.

Similarly, records from Russian signal intelligence as well as reports to and from the Soviet Military intelligence (GRU) regarding the downing of the DC-3 have not been shared.

Some of this material goes to the very heart of the DC-3 investigation, including the need to establish the precise chain of events and motivations that led to the fateful decision to attack the plane [over international waters], as well as the question of Stalin’s precise role in the drama. 78

75 One important depository for such documentation is the Russian Presidential Archive, for example. For a list of specific documentation and Russian archival collections, see Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, Raoul Wallenberg: The Current Gaps in our Knowledge, English version of a presentation in Russian at the international conference “Raoul Wallenberg, a 20th Century Hero” (Moscow, May 28, 2012), devoted to the 100-anniversary of Wallenberg and sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History of the Russian Academy of Science, www.vadimbirstein.com. Important records remain inaccessible in the archives of the FSB (TsA FSB) as well as the Presidential Archives (APRF)

76 Magnusson’s official review of the Wallenberg case for the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 2012 occurred as part of the Swedish government’s recognition of the Wallenberg centenary (1912-2012).

77 Russian officials claim that they must comply with Russian privacy and secrecy laws. In 1993, Russian authorities passed two laws that governed the handling and declassification of historical documents. These were the laws “On the Russian Federation’s Archives and Archive Files” and “On State Secrets”. As a result, many documents that had been released now had to be re-evaluated. Many were once again stamped “secret”. Numerous procedural and legal loopholes have persisted since then, which has stalled further declassification efforts; see Mikhail Prozumenshchikov, Declassifying Soviet Archives, RIA Novosti, February 2, 2004.

In January 2013, however, Russia’s Constitutional Court found that most historical records should not be classified for more than thirty years. Some important exceptions apply which keep records sealed for up to seventy years or more.

78 The shoot-down of the plane was almost certainly ordered at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership, with direct involvement of the Soviet Security Services (MGB). It appears that the DC-3 did not violate Soviet airspace on this particular flight, but the plane may have come close to Soviet territory. Also, earlier violations allegedly occurred on previous flights in
As Roger Ålmeberg argued in 2008, about inaccessible files regarding his father’s plane: "It is impossible that [the pilot’s] reports about the crew parachuting from the plane would not have been followed up [by Soviet officials – SB]."  

In fact, in 2006 investigators determined that the crew had a full five minutes to prepare for an emergency exit from the plane. According to a technical simulation of the events of the attack, there was a low probability that all crew members would have been hit by ammunition fragments.

Also, highly relevant documentation that would help to verify information provided by the Russian side in 1991 was not presented. One example is the original recordings of the MiG pilot’s conversations with Soviet ground control. While a formal transcript of the exchange was released, the original tapes were never made available. It would have been highly unusual for a single Soviet plane to take on the DC-3 by itself. Normally, such a task would have been handled by a group of fighters.

The logbooks of several Soviet ships in the area, especially the lead cruiser Admiral Makarov, would be of central importance to reconstruct the downing of the DC-3, as would be the communications with the Soviet Naval Intelligence Command. The Admiral Makarov had onboard cameras that may have documented how the events unfolded and could provide information whether or not some members of the crew survived or if their bodies were recovered.

The MiG-15 fighter plane too was equipped with advanced photographic equipment. Such equipment was standard at the time, but none of the photos have been released.

In the case of the disappeared ships, even though, or rather precisely because Sweden was officially neutral, air and sea traffic in the Baltic sea region after 1945 was monitored closely by Soviet authorities who strongly suspected Swedish cooperation with U.S. and British intelligence.

1951 and 1952. In July 1951, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, Rodionov, demanded an apology for two incidents in which Swedish aircraft had crossed over Soviet territorial waters; see Peter Bratt, Sovjet visste sanningen men inte svenska folket, Dagens Nyheter, October 23, 2003; also Haverirapport, 2007

79 Roger Ålmeberg, 2008. The pilot of MiG fighter plane, Grigory I. Osinsky, stated in an official report from 1952 that he saw "the crew parachute". When interviewed in 1993 and 1994, he denied that he had ever made such a statement. Sam Nilsson, Nedskjutningen av DC-3:an: en tragisk händelse i FRA:s historia, FRA, 2010

80 In fact, the investigators established that “among the four crew members not found are [the] three of the crew members that had the lowest probability of being hit by fragments, according to the simulations.” Mats Hartmann and Andreas Tyrberg, Simuleringar av nedskjutningen av DC-3, FOI-R—1969-SE, 2006 (see Haverirapport, 2007); see also Mikael Holmström, DC 3:ans saknade kan ha bärgats, April 10, 2006, Svenska Dagbladet; as noted earlier, no remains of the four or five missing men were found either in or around the plane; also Alexander Smirnov, The mystery of the dead ‘crow’, Sovshennno sekretno (Top Secret), July 1, 2006.

81 There have been reports that also a U.S. plane was operating near the DC-3 on June 13, 1952. This may have caused some confusion for the Soviet Security Forces. The U.S. government has denied these claims. However, the Soviets had shot down an American plane (PB4 Y2) already in April 1950; An RB-29 was downed on June 13, 1952, the very same day as the Swedish DC-3, over the Sea of Japan and in October 1952 another RB-29 was lost in the same geographical area; see Haverirapport, 2007.

82 Roger Ålmeberg, 2008. A multi-plane attack would suggest that the assault was well planned and premeditated. On the other hand, Soviet authorities may not have wanted too many witnesses for the action. Another unanswered question is why the plane was not forced into a landing, as this would have been a reasonable alternative. The international outcry that would have resulted from such an action may have been the reason why Soviet authorities decided against pursuing this course.

83 Smirnov, July 1, 2006; and Ålmeberg, 2007, p. 414
As has emerged in recent years, intelligence operations of the Swedish Defense staff made use of Swedish commercial vessels for collection of photographic intelligence as well as infiltration of agents into iron curtain countries. Some of the ships were also known to have been heavily involved in smuggling Eastern European refugees to Sweden.  

The disappearance of Swedish vessels cannot be viewed separately from this broader context. Yet, the papers of the Working Group regarding disappeared ships contain only passing references to these issues. In fact, the Swedish Foreign Ministry did not conduct a thorough review of Swedish intelligence documentation until 1999, when important new details surfaced in connection with the ship Kinnekulle.

**Sweden – No Desire to dig deep**

a. **The failure to address important background questions**

The disappeared Swedish ships

a. **M/S Kinnekulle and S/S Iwan**  [Fig. 9]

Some of the ships' disappearances can be linked to rough weather conditions in the Baltic sea, especially during the winter months. The area was also littered with acoustic and magnetic mines left over from World War II, posing serious risks to all vessels. Still, it is curious that so many people disappeared without a trace. None of Sweden's Nordic neighbors suffered similar losses.

A deeper inquiry into the background of the various disappearances could have yielded details which might have been helpful to press Russian and Polish archivists for answers.

Polish records show that the smuggling activities of Swedish ships after 1945, including Kinnekulle and Iwan, were discussed at the highest levels of Polish Intelligence. However, official inquiries did not touch upon essential military and naval intelligence collections in either Poland or Russia.

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84 Redfearn, Mason and Aldrich, Richard J.(1997), The perfect cover: British intelligence, the Soviet Fleet and distant water trawler operations, 1963-1974, Intelligence and National Security,12:3,166 — 177. After the end of World War II, Britain had instituted several programs that would later cumulate in Operation Hornbeam, the use of fishing trawlers for photographic surveillance of the Soviet fleet in the Barents Sea. In his memoirs, Thede Palm confirmed that Sweden actively participated in this type of program, including earlier forms known as Tiara and Long Look, which monitored the Baltic and Black Seas. "I do not know how many cameras we had loaned out to different ships", Palm wrote; see Palm, 1999 and Nilsson, 2010.

85 Ship traffic in the Baltic Sea, between Sweden and Poland, moved in designated shipping lanes that had been cleared of mines.

86 See Peter Johnsson and Jagienka Wilczak, Polytika, No. 41, October 7, 2000. The Deputy Chief of the Police Security Service, Józef Różański, personally questioned individuals believed to be connected to Swedish smuggling operation. In the beginning of
In 2001, the chairman of the Swedish side of the Working Group about disappeared Swedish ships, Nils-Urban Allard, pointed out in an internal memo that the formal reviews conducted at the time by IPN, Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance, did not include access "to documentation which deals with Polish operational intelligence work"; and he added: "This is the type of documentation that is best suited to shed light on the truth..." 87

The fact that IPN had been conducting any in-depth review at all regarding the fate of the two ships was exclusively due to the new findings a private Swedish researcher - Jan Sjöberg - had presented in 1999.

Swedish Foreign Ministry files contain information that a few weeks after the Kinnekulle and Iwan had disappeared in February 1948, Thede Palm, the chief of T-Kontoret (foreign intelligence), had informed Swedish officials that the loss may not have been accidental. 88

According to confidential reports from Poland, Palm wrote, the crews of the Iwan and Kinnekulle had been apprehended by Polish and possibly Soviet authorities because the ship’s crews had contacts to the "Polish underground organizations". 89

Sjöberg found that Palm had not obtained this information from British intelligence (MI6), as had been previously assumed. Instead it came from a trusted local source, identified only as "R 98". 90

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87 HP 80, P.M. February, 22, 2001: "IPN skall emellertid enligt ambassaden inte ha tillgång till dokumentation som berör polska underrätelsetjänstens operativa verksamhet..." And he added: "...Det torde vare den typen av dokumentation som bäst kunde belysa den verkliga sanningen ....." IPN also serves as the chief investigative organ for crimes committed against the Polish nation under Communist rule. After 2005/6, additional archival collections were placed under the purview of IPN, but none that provided any additional information about the fate of disappeared Swedish ships during the Cold War era. Important restrictions continue to govern this material.

88 The information is mentioned in an internal Swedish Foreign Ministry memorandum; HP 80 B, Krister Göransson, Förlista och försvunna fartyg i Östersjön, January 22, 1992. Sjöberg established that the Swedish Foreign Office in 1948 had apparently never formally tried to discuss the information further with Thede Palm. Palm’s personal papers remain classified in the Swedish War Archive until 2015.

89 Letter Thede Palm to Sven Grafström, May 18, 1948. The unnamed source further claimed that the crew was placed on a Soviet ship called the General Suvorov. The official Working Group established that a ship by the name of Alexander Suvorov did exist, but that it was supposedly posted in the Mediterranean Sea in 1948. Another report from the same source indicated that the crew of the Iwan had allegedly been imprisoned in “the Polish State Security Prison in Warsaw”. Sjöberg also showed that the Swedish Foreign Ministry had already been informed about the possible arrest of the men on the Kinnekulle and Iwan some weeks earlier, before Palm sent his letter. Envoy Claes Westring in Warsaw had received information about the rumors directly from the Swedish Defense Staff as early as March 24, 1948. The Swedish Foreign Ministry was informed that same day; see Jan Sjöberg to Gunnar Haglund, February 19, 2001, HP 80 B

90 According to Sjöberg, this man was a Polish exile, living in Sweden, with a broad network of sources in Poland and excellent ties to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Letter Sjöberg to Haglund, February 19, 2001. Sjöberg obtained this information from a Swedish intelligence officer (name withheld). The Working Group apparently made no attempt to pursue additional information about source R 98, or to see if he had provided information also about other disappeared ships through the years.
It further emerged that Thede Palm in 1948 had not shared certain details with Swedish Foreign Ministry officials. In fact, R 98 had alleged that the crew of the Kinnekulle may have been arrested in the vicinity of Ustka, near a Polish military installation. 91

Prompted by Sjöberg’s discoveries, Swedish officials helped him to track down the archive of the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw from 1948. This collection had not been previously reviewed and Sjöberg discovered that several other witnesses had provided first-hand accounts of the possible arrest of the crews of the Kinnekulle and Iwan by Polish or Soviet authorities. 92

When the Swedish-Russian Working Group and Polish authorities were slow to take up Sjöberg’s new findings, he contacted Swedish journalist Peter Johnsson who began to draw attention to the issue in the Polish media. It was then that the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw asked IPN to conduct an official inquiry. 93

In 2002, IPN issued a report that argued against the opening of an official legal investigation into the disappearance of Kinnekulle and Iwan since investigators had found no concrete evidence that the ships’ crews had been intentionally targeted or taken prisoner by Polish communist agents. 94

However, Swedish diplomats for some reason never informed IPN of other potentially highly relevant information contained in their own intelligence archives. This includes the fact that Swedish Navy personnel as well as officers of the Swedish Defense staff had been directly involved in intelligence operations aimed at Poland and the Baltic countries, involving Swedish commercial vessels. Some of these Swedish officers are known to have been active agents for U.S. and British intelligence. 95

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91 The information was obviously known at the Swedish Defense Staff, however. Swedish intelligence archives contain three separate reports dated between March – May 1948, all of which were based on information received from R 98. One report claimed that the crew of the Kinnekulle had been invited by Polish contacts to visit a place called Czarnkowo which housed a facility “for the launch of V-weapons”. None of the details provided in these memos has been confirmed. Palm apparently found the information provided by source R 98 credible enough to share (partly) with the Swedish Foreign Ministry; see Jan Sjöberg, 2000, and HP 80 B, Memorandum by Gunnar Haglund to Nils-Urban Allard, Efterforskning av Kinnekulle and Iwan, September 14, 2000.

92 Ibid; the information was shared on April 22, 1948 with Envoy Claes Westring in Warsaw

93 Johnsson and Wilczak, Polytika, No. 41, October 7, 2000; and Sjöberg to Allard, September 18, 2000; see also Mats Staffansson’s request to IPN from October 5, 2000, HP 80 B. IPN’s investigators informed Staffansson that no names of Swedish sailors appeared in the registers of the notorious Mokotowo prison for the year 1948, nor did the name of a central witness in the Kinnekulle/Iwan drama [Julian Wyszykowski] who claimed to have heard of Swedish sailors shortly before his release from prison in 1948. However, the Swedish Working Paper from September 27, 2001 emphasizes that the prison registers were often found to be incomplete and not fully reliable.

94 see HP 80 B, 2002. IPN’s director informed the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw that a review of Polish archives had found no information regarding the fate of the two ships or their crews

95 One such source was Swedish Naval Captain Sven Wahlquist, a trusted associate of Thede Palm. Wahlquist’s name appears on a list of confidential contacts for U.S. intelligence after the war. See NARA, RG 226, Report No. D87, May 31, 1946. He worked closely with Adolf Lium, a U.S. agent in Malmö, who handled the secret liaison with Danish intelligence.; see Per Henrik Hansen, Second to None: US Intelligence activities in Northern Europe 1943-1946, Republic of Letters, 2011. Yet another Palm confidante, Captain Ove Lilienberg, had contacts with British intelligence since World War II.
Records in the archives of the Swedish Security Police also show that the smuggling of refugees was financed and organized via a network of leading Polish political figures with close ties to the Polish government-in-exile in London. Some of these operations specifically concerned the ship *Iwan*. It is equally clear that Swedish Foreign Ministry officials, including Foreign Minister Östen Undén, had at least a sense of these activities as early as 1947.

Two [previously] secret memoranda from the Swedish Defense Staff, dated March 3 and March 31, 1948 respectively, indicate that officials had received indications that the two ships had not disappeared by accident, but that they had been delivered “intentionally” into Soviet hands, in retaliation for Swedish smuggling operations.

b. **S/S Sten Sture** [Fig. 10 a,b]

The *Sten Sture*, along with a nineteen men crew, disappeared precisely during the weekend of national elections in Poland, when many prominent Polish political figures decided to flee. It seems to have carried an extra passenger whose identity remains unknown. The ship also made regular stops in Fårö Gotland, to pick up unspecified cargo. Fårö at the time was off limits to regular shipping traffic as a center of Swedish intelligence operations.

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Lieutenant Thorsten Akrell, a special agent for the Swedish Defense Staff, arranged at least one secret transfer of an agent to Poland in 1946. See Archives of MUST. The smuggling operation itself is outlined in an unsigned memo dated November 20, 1951. P.M., angående Torsten (sic) Akrell’s utsmuggling av en polsk medborgare från Trelleborg till Gdansk i Augusti 1946.

96 SÄPO, P 3771, Tadeuz Pilch


98 Archives of MUST. Polish Espionage in Sweden, 1945-1950, Beträffande *s/s Ivan*, March 3, 1948. The second memo, dated March 31, 1948 is untitled and remains heavily censored. A Polish agent in Sweden by the name of Stanislaw Musnicki was believed to have provided information about both the *Kinnekulle* and *Iwan* to Poland before they disappeared. A third memo, from September 20, 1948 (and September 28, 1948) also remains heavily expunged. Polish authorities had repeatedly warned the ships against smuggling activities; see also Johnsson and Wilczak, 2010.

99 It cannot be excluded that Swedish ships fell victim to crimes committed by rogue Soviet and Polish operators who boarded ships in the hope of finding cash and valuables on board. This could have involved some personnel from the Polish Security Services (UB, Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) or the Polish Military Counterintelligence Service (IW, Informacja Wojskowa). Still, some information about these events should be contained in Polish intelligence files.

100 Kerstin von Seth, *När du ser Karlavagn, Domarringen*, 2008; the body of at least one crew member of the *Sten Sture* was found at the Danish island of Bornholm three months after the ship went missing. The identity of a second body that washed ashore at the time is unknown.
Furthermore, from an interview conducted in 1952 with a well known Swedish shipping agent in Gdansk, Karl Joel Nilsson, Swedish Security Police officials learned that on a number of occasions the Sten Sture had aided several Polish refugees in their escape to Sweden.\textsuperscript{101}

The Working Group, however, never dealt with the Sten Sture in detail, since it believed - incorrectly - that the ship had sunk off the coast of Bornholm (Denmark).

Records in the Swedish National Archives nevertheless show that Swedish officials had received information from the crew of another ship already in January 1947 that the ship almost certainly had disappeared in Polish territorial waters.\textsuperscript{102}

Polish authorities had discovered the wreck back in 1977 and put the ship's clock on display in the Maritime Museum in Gdansk in 1997. Yet the Working Group, unaware of this fact, did not address the ship's loss beyond including the names of the crew in their initial inquiries to Russian and Polish authorities.\textsuperscript{103}

According to several experts, the known damage sustained to the Sten Sture does not appear to be typical of an encounter with a mine (the whole top was shaved off and the bottom remains largely intact), so it is possible that the ship was blown up and then sunk. It is unclear what would have happened to the crew in such a scenario.\textsuperscript{104}

c. M/V Dan

Upon receiving the information that the wreckage of a ship that “may” be the Dan had been discovered in Polish waters as far back as 1957, the Swedish officials wrote off the case without attempting to verify the report or trying to see if any relatives of the crew were still alive to be contacted.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{101} Swedish National Archives, Files of the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), Dossier of Karl Joel Nilsson. Nilsson had been imprisoned for several years in Poland for his role in the flight of Stefan Korboriski.

\textsuperscript{102} Swedish National Archives, Records of the Swedish Consulate in Gdansk, R 18, Efterforskningen Fartyg, January 1947.

\textsuperscript{103} Kerstin von Seth, 2008; and Förlista med man och alt – nu återfunna, Båtologen, 3-99, see also Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, HP 80 B 1999-2008

\textsuperscript{104} Urzad Morski w Gdynia, April 7, 2010, Report to the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw. It cannot be entirely excluded that this wreck was partially removed in earlier years which could account for the damage. See discussion below re the ship Dan.

\textsuperscript{105} In August 1993 the Polish Foreign Ministry informed the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw that the wreck of a ship that matches the description of the Dan had been discovered already in 1957 in Polish territorial waters; see also HP 80 B, Arbetspapper, September 27, 2001, p. 20: “I den polska flottans 'Vrakbok' finns ett vrak noterat 3,5 km norr om den lilla orten Jastrzębia Góra, som skulle vara Dan. Vraket bärgades delvis 1964 i uppdrag att röja navigeringshinder. Det uppdagades då att vraket hade ett hål midjekeps som hade orsakats av en explosion. En terori är att Dan drabbats av hård vind och snöstorm och gått på en mina.” The paper then states “that the case of the Dan can be considered solved”: “Fallen Dan kan få anses vara löst i och med de uppgifter som kommit från den polska sidan.”

The former Swedish Naval Attaché in Moscow, Magnus Haglund, briefed a full meeting of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on disappeared Swedish ships about the Dan in May, 1998.
Several discrepancies in the newly obtained information were ignored. For example, the Dan had measured only 40 meters, yet according to the Polish authorities the wreck in question was about 60 meters in length. It cannot be excluded, in fact, that the wreck of the merchant ship the Polish officials suggested “could” be the Dan may have been another ship altogether (possibly the Sten Sture). The Dan had been fully refurbished and overhauled just a few months before it disappeared. It also carried modern technical equipment, including a radio and ‘ekholot’ (echo sounding system/sonar).

d. Läckö [and Lina]

Questions also persist about the ships Läckö and Lina. In 1994, the Working Group learned that in connection with Soviet search operations in March 1949 for the Lina, two lifeboats were found containing altogether five dead sailors. Russian archives apparently did not clarify to which boat the men had belonged, but there were indications that further information could perhaps be available from Lithuanian or Latvian archives. It is unclear what happened to the bodies of the dead men and if the Working Group pursued the question further.

e. Sm 156 Silvana

In 1991, the Izvestiya correspondent in Stockholm, Marat Zubko claimed that the Silvana which disappeared in December 1960 off the coast of Estonia, had been equipped with an ultra-modern

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106 In fact, the wreck is located in close proximity to the spot where the Sten Sture had sunk — which, in fact, measured about 68 meters. Dan coordinates: Longitude 54° 52 min 1 sec North, Latitude 18° 17 min 9 sec East; Sten Sture coordinates: Longitude 54° 56 min 54 sec North, Latitude 18° 20 min 12 sec East. According to the so-called ‘wreck book’ of the PRO (Polish Ship Salvage Co.) and the Hydrographic Office of the Polish Navy a ship believed to be the Dan was discovered in 1957 (Wreck no. 65). The ship was partially lifted in 1964. Another wreck, the merchant ship Sten Sture, (Mount Vernon) was supposedly first found in 1977 and was explored by divers in 1997. It carries the designation W-22, which was assigned by the Polish Maritime Office. The code was introduced only in August 1977, so it is not clear that the wreck of the Sten Sture may not have been discovered before 1977. Polish officials in 2010 checked different archival collections to see if there was any earlier notations of a wreck at the position first cited by the Gdansk Maritime Office in 1977. They found no such entries. However, the official positions of Wreck 65 and W-22 (Sten Sture) vary slightly, so the entries would not match precisely. The Dan was a converted whaling vessel, a ship that could withstand very difficult weather conditions. The Swedish Foreign Ministry Reports contain statements from several witnesses who reported seeing the Dan in the vicinity of Liepāja (Libau, Latvia) when it disappeared.

107 Swedish National Archive, R 18, Dossier of the ship Dan

‘ekholot’ (depth sounding) system.\textsuperscript{109} Sonar and echo sounding technology are commonly used by fishing vessels as well as for identifying objects on the sea floor.

According to several reports, various forms of this technology were used and tested - among other places - on Swedish fishing vessels in the area of Nynäshamn, the home port of the \textit{Silvana}.\textsuperscript{110}

When the ship went missing, Swedish authorities immediately notified the Soviet Sea Rescue Services. However, Swedish officials asked the Polish Coast Guard not to conduct an outright search for the \textit{Silvana}, with the argument that it would be too costly.\textsuperscript{111} According to the wife of the captain of the \textit{Silvana}, the ship was equipped with a radiotelephone, yet no emergency call was ever sent out from the crew.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1994, Russian officials requested additional information about five sailors, including the captain of the \textit{Silvana}. It remains unclear what precisely prompted this request and how the matter was followed up.\textsuperscript{113}

Zubko’s claim about the \textit{Silvana} allegedly carrying advanced technical equipment was never discussed in the Working Group.

\textbf{The \textit{Silva}}

The Working Group formally discussed the ship \textit{Silva} from Nynäshamn, that supposedly disappeared in December 1968. Investigators apparently relied entirely on information received from private

\textsuperscript{109}Onboard one of the ships, the \textit{Silvana}, was an ultra-modern ‘ekholot’ system that would lead one to assume that the crew was involved in finding underwater objects near Soviet shores.” Marat Zubko, The fate of the captured sailors, Izvestiya, December 9, 1991, in R19 D/419 (HP 80 B sf 6/6, 1991-2008). It has not been possible to substantiate this claim. It is also not clear from where Zubko obtained this information. The official incident report (Sjöförhör, March 29, 1961) regarding the disappearance of the \textit{Silvana} confirms that the ship carried an ‘ekholot’ as well as modern radio equipment, but does not specify the type. The ship disappeared 25 nautical miles off the coast of Hiiumaa, which was at the time a closed Estonian military zone; Swedish National Archive, R18, Dossier of the ship \textit{Silvana}.

\textsuperscript{110}In the 1950s and 60s, high-end ‘ekholot’ equipment and related technologies were developed and produced in Great Britain. The Swedish Navy acquired some of this equipment. It is known that Anton Larsson, the captain of the \textit{Silvana}, and his son, Bertil Larsson, had close ties to the Swedish Navy, in particular to Commander Captain Bo Cassel, one of the chief designers of the Swedish rescue ship \textit{Belos}. Anders Franzén, Cassel’s associate and the discoverer of the ancient Warship \textit{Vasa} in 1956, worked for the Swedish Naval Administration and used sonar technology to aid his search efforts. In his memoirs, Franzén explains that he also made use of several specially equipped fishing boats; see Anders Franzén, The Warship \textit{Vasa}: deep diving and marine archaeology in Stockholm, Norstedts, 1974. According to several Swedish technical experts on the military and civilian use of sonar at FMV (Försvarsmaterielverk, the Swedish Defense Material Administration), no testing or use of advanced echo sounding systems occurred on civilian vessels in Sweden during the 1950s or 1960s; conversations with the author, 2012.

\textsuperscript{111}Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive and the Swedish National Archive, R 18, Konsulatet i Gdansk, Dossier on the ship \textit{Silvana}, Memorandum “XSM 156”, December 13, 1960 and Telegram traffic of the same day; see telegram no. 49 (signed “Sidenmark), December 17, 1960.

\textsuperscript{112}Swedish National Archives, R18, Silvana, Letter from Erik Westerlind to Folke Persson, February 16, 1961

\textsuperscript{113}Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, HP 80 B, 1994 , Valery Filipov to Nils-Urban Allard
researchers, in particular Torsten Hernod and Terje Fredh. In fact, there never was such a ship. Instead, the researchers confused the boat with the *Silvana* which had disappeared in December 1960.

**The DC-3**

During the Cold War, the results of Swedish intelligence collection in the Baltic sea were shared with U.S. and British intelligence agencies. Regarding the DC-3, British and also American records, from the U.S. Air Force (Strategic Air Command), the Navy (aerial reconnaissance), the CIA and other agencies could help clarify the plane’s mission and equipment. This in turn could have pressured Russian officials to answer one central question in the case, namely why and how the Soviet attack on the DC-3 was ordered.

As has emerged in recent years, one of the plane’s intended tasks was to monitor the large military exercises the Soviet fleet was conducting precisely at this time in the Baltic Sea. The main intent appears to have been to record the “signature” of the advanced radar and air defense systems of the special cruiser, the *Sverdlov*.

Lieutenant Colonel Christer Lokind of the Swedish Airforce, a former FRA officer and technical advisor to the DC-3 investigation in 2004-2007, suggests in a recent book that in 1952, the DC-3 reconnaissance missions in general constituted a “concrete threat” in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. Lokind claims that the plane’s sudden and sharp diversions from its main route — on June 13 and on several other flights - taking direct course straight towards one of the Soviet Union’s most advanced new radar stations in Latvia, was perceived as a direct act of aggression.

According to Jallai and other experts, the Soviet leadership may have simply wanted to deliver a strong message to Sweden that it would not tolerate the country moving too closely towards a de-facto alliance with the U.S. and NATO.

In 2012, the Swedish magazine *Ny Teknik* disclosed that Swedish officials in charge of examining the DC-3 wreck in 2007 may have withheld sensitive information regarding the type of technical equipment the plane was carrying.

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114 Fredh, 1992; both Fredh and Hernod name as the ship’s crew Anton and Bertil Larsson. Both men had served on the *Silvana*.

115 see Anders Jallai’s claim that “the DC-3 had flown near a Soviet cruiser ..., presumably to take photographs ...” Jallai bases his claim on documentation discovered in the Swedish War Archive (Krigsarkivet). [www.jallai.se](http://www.jallai.se); see also Björn Hagberg, DC-3:an på jakt efter sanningen, Fischer & Co, 2004; and Mikael Holmström, DC 3:an spanade på ryska fartyg, Svenska Dagbladet, November 22, 2004. The official Working Group report from 1992 states that the DC-3 carried no special photographic equipment.

116 The main target was apparently the new Soviet P-20 radar installation. Lokind also served in Sweden’s Military Intelligence Service (MUST). He bases his claims on a detailed analysis of Russian documentary sources regarding the incident on June 13, 1952. He also suggests that the fact that just a few weeks earlier, in April 1952, U.S. planes [with British crews] had flown practice routes that would be utilized to carry out a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union further added to Soviet apprehensions. In fact, the Air Chief Marshal Ralph Cochrane of the British Royal Air Force had been on an official visit to Sweden when the DC-3 was shot down. Christer Lokind, DC-3:an: Kalla krigets hemligheter, Medströms Bokförlag, 2014
According to Ny Teknik, the advanced radar monitoring device the DC-3 was carrying – a so-called APR-5A - was apparently capable (with some adjustments) of measuring frequencies of up to 10 gigahertz. This was the frequency used by modern Soviet emitters.\(^{117}\) [Fig. 11]

Back in 2006, Roger Ålmeberg also discovered that the U.S. and Britain had given permission to Sweden’s Agency for Signal Intelligence (FRA) to “loan” an advanced version of the APR-5, the APR-9, already in 1949. Documentation released by the Swedish government in 2003 shows that the British may have delivered an APR-9 to Sweden as early as 1951. However, FRA has adamantly denied that it received the system before June 1952.\(^{118}\)

FRA experts have always insisted that the DC-3 in June 1952 definitely did not carry an APR-9 and that Swedish signal intelligence never collected any transmissions above 6 gigahertz. Almost all information collected by the DC-3 reconnaissance flights in 1952 remains classified.\(^{119}\) The technical investigation in 2007 noted that no equipment consistent with an APR-9 installation had been recovered at the wreck site. Investigators also stressed, however, that the plane would have been capable of accommodating the weight and dimensions of an APR-9 monitoring set.

According to Swedish officials, the DC-3 carried only so-called U.S. “surplus” equipment. The term is slightly confusing, however. After World War II, the U.S. military had slowly phased out its electronic monitoring instruments, many of which had ended up in so-called “junk” or “surplus” stores. By 1949, however, U.S. officials were scrambling to buy back this old reconnaissance equipment, due to rising demand for accurate information about the Soviet advances in the development of high technology weaponry. Such “surplus” electronic monitoring devices, reclaimed and refitted, in fact constituted the most sophisticated technology available at the time.\(^{120}\)

It is generally believed that FRA had the ability to listen in to real-time cockpit conversations and therefore may have known for years the precise location of the plane when it was hit, as well as the events that unfolded in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

\(^{117}\) Monitoring at 10 gigahertz would have required some adjustments of the equipment, including the mixing of certain overtones. Monica Kleja, FRA:s nya rapport om DC3:an, Ny Teknik, February 20, 2012. Specialists from the FRA claim that signal personnel on the DC-3 could only monitor frequencies up to 5, 5 gigahertz. According to technical expert Staffan Gadd, however, the special antennas the DC-3 was carrying probably allowed for monitoring of higher frequencies. FRA insist that no such modifications had been carried out. Gadd also suggested that signals at 10 gigahertz have a very particular sound that could be tracked relatively easily.

\(^{118}\) Försvarets radioanstalt (FRA); Roger Ålmeberg, 2008; see also Mikael Holmström, DC 3:an spanade för britterna, Svenska Dagbladet, November 5, 2003; and Haverirrapport 2007.

For the close American-Swedish cooperation in the technology sector, see Mikael Nilsson, Svenskt-amerikanskt samarbete kring utvecklingen av robotvapen under kalla kriget; and Johan Gribbe, Svensk systemutveckling under det kalla kriget. These reports were issued as part of the Royal Institute of Technology’s(KTH) research project called “Teknik, vetenskap och svensk säkerhetspolitik”, which began in 2001.

\(^{119}\) Kleja, February 2012

\(^{120}\) Captain Don C. East, USN, A History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance, Part I The Pacific and VQ-1,
http://www.coldwar.org/histories/HistoryofUSNavyFleetAirReconnaissance.asp
In 2013, technical expert Staffan Gadd told the Swedish publication Teknikhistoria (History of Technology) that he is convinced “that it was possible in Sweden to listen to the shoot-down in the Baltic Sea in June 1952.”

There are numerous other indications that FRA had detailed knowledge about the plane’s position immediately after it crashed.

Anders Jallai, the co-discoverer of the wreck of the DC-3 in 2003, has been outspoken in his criticism that he believes the investigation into the disappearance of the plane has been strictly ”steered from the top.”

When the private consortium he had helped to create discovered the wreck of the DC-3, only a selective group of investigators from the Swedish Defense Forces was allowed to review the content of the plane.

From 2003-2007, the former Swedish Air Force engineer and SAS Pilot Christer Magnusson headed the DC-3’s technical investigation. He is the brother of Ambassador Hans Magnusson, who has had a leading role in the Wallenberg inquiry for more than two decades and who oversaw the DC-3 investigation at the Swedish Embassy, Moscow during the early 1990s.

Raoul Wallenberg

In addition to the need to obtain a proper identification of Prisoner no. 7 in 1947 and related issues, many important background questions also persist in Raoul Wallenberg investigation.

Russian officials have never revealed in which archival collection the famous “Smoltsov Note” was discovered, nor have they been able to explain the full circumstances behind the creation of this document.

On the Swedish side, it would be of some interest to determine the exact nature and purpose of U.S./British intelligence operations in Budapest in 1944, which occurred with active Swedish participation. How was Raoul Wallenberg connected to these efforts and what was his precise task?

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121 Monika Kleja, FRA mördade om radiospaning, Teknikhistoria, Number 3, June 2013; FRA allegedly had the ability to monitor in-flight communication, between planes and ground control using advanced VHF (Very High Frequency) technology. “Jag är övertygad att om att man i Sverige kunde avlyssna beskjutningarna på Östersjön …i juni 1952.” It may have also been able to monitor the communications of the Soviet MiG that shot down the DC-3.

122 See http://www.jallai.se/2010/06/at-vem-arbetar-var-underrattelsetjanst/ In 2003 Jallai discovered in formation in the Swedish War Archive (Krigsarkivet) which indicates that FRA had tracked the flight of the DC-3 by radar and even had plotted its precise route on a map. On the map was indicated the precise time of the Soviet attack against the plane, 11:24 am. The information was never shared with the public or the families of the missing crew. If this information had been made available, Jallay says, the private search effort in 2003 could have saved “millions” of Swedish Kronor.

123 See www.jallai.se Jallai says the investigation has been “topp-styrd”.

Also, why did the Swedish government (especially Foreign Minister Östen Undén) in the time from 1945-1957 repeatedly pass up opportunities to obtain news about Wallenberg’s fate from Soviet representatives, especially during the negotiations for a $300 million Swedish-Russian trade agreement in 1946, which heavily involved the Wallenberg family bank and its associated businesses?126

Just as interesting is the question why Russian authorities have never released any documentation about the Wallenberg family’s role in World War II, including the full range of their business activities—and those of Raoul Wallenberg—in Hungary. This also includes the many unknown details surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s extensive plan for an organization devoted to the restoration of Jewish assets in Hungary, which undoubtedly stirred Soviet suspicions.127

What was Stalin’s assessment of these issues and did they play a role in Wallenberg’s arrest? And how may they have affected the Soviet leadership’s decision not to release him? Why did Swedish officials not insist on reviewing these files?

Why did Jacob Wallenberg in 1954 attempt to contact Soviet officials via confidential business channels in Prague? What were the results of these discussions in which he apparently offered to make “great sacrifices” in return for valid information about Raoul Wallenberg?128

And what exactly was the purpose of the secret discussions carried out by Swedish and Finnish diplomats with Soviet representatives in Ankara and Helsinki in the years 1955-1957? Why has the Russian side released so few documents regarding these exchanges, even though they involved high ranking Soviet officials? 129

Another interesting question is why the arrest of Swedish Air Force colonel Stig Wennerström as a Soviet spy 1963 was not used more directly by the Swedish government to demand answers from Russia about any of the three cases?130 Wennerström’s helpers in Sweden have never been identified. Important questions also persist about how much influence other, still unknown, KGB and Stasi infiltrators had on the decision making process in official Swedish institutions.131 [Fig. 14]

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126 Sweden also did not use the repatriation of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war held in Norway, who had to travel through Swedish territory, or the expulsion of over a 140 Baltic prisoners in 1946 to press for answers about Wallenberg; see Berger, 2005; and Ett Diplomatiskt Misslyckande, 2003, et.al.

127 see Lévai, 1988

128 Ibid

129 They included the Soviet intelligence officer Pavel Yerzin, as well as Boris Podtserob, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey in 1956 and later, Secretary General of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

130 Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Erik Constans Wennerström was arrested in June 1963. A Swedish court sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. He was pardoned in 1974. It is known that he had informed his Soviet handlers about the DC-3 reconnaissance flights and related information in the spring of 1952. Another theory is that the telegraphist Erik Carlsson may have betrayed the plane and the mission. According to the files of the Swedish Security Police, Carlsson was a communist and a suspected Soviet agent. See Kenth Olsson, Gripande men träglast, www.kristiansbladet.se, October 1, 2007. Tage Erlander apparently secretly contacted the Soviet leadership in 1968 to propose an exchange of Wennerström for the crew of the Bengt Sture. His approach supposedly received no reply; Kenth Olsson, Kristianstad-sjöman skulle utvaxlas mot storshipen, Kristianstadsbladet, February 27, 1992. Some tentative attempts to negotiate an exchange for information about Raoul Wallenberg were made in 1966-1972, involving unofficial Swedish and East German channels (Wolfgang Vogel); see Archives of SÄPO, Raoul Wallenberg case file.

131 See, for example, the diaries of the former legal adviser to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in the 1970s and 80s, Ambassador Bo Theutenberg, Dagbok från UD, Vol. 1, Skara, 2012. Theutenberg resigned in 1987, in protest over what he perceived as a tendency by some Swedish diplomats to define foreign policy not solely according to the standards of international law, but largely on the basis of ideological preference.
In October 1981, a Soviet submarine (U-137) ran aground in the waters outside of Karlskrona, in the immediate vicinity of one of Sweden’s most highly advanced military bases. The Swedish Foreign Ministry’s legal adviser at the time, Bo Theutenberg was ready to use the incident to press the Soviets for answers about Raoul Wallenberg. However, the Swedish Foreign Ministry refused to proceed. Theutenberg’s entry into his diary is revealing: “Absolutely not, says the Swedish Foreign Ministry! We cannot take the submarine and its crew hostage, meaning we cannot counter one violation (taking Wallenberg) with another (taking the submarine hostage). This supposedly goes against the idea we have of ourselves as a society based on laws, it is stated pompously. Who the h-ll has written this?”

Swedish officials argue that they were reluctant to delve into the background questions in all three investigations because any answers received would not provide any “direct” or very specific information about the fate of the missing men. This argument underscores the very narrow line of inquiry Swedish representatives generally adhered to.

b. Other Swedes in the Soviet prison system

Another topic not addressed in any detail by either Working Group was the subject of other Swedish prisoners in the Soviet Union, which has important implications for all three inquiries.

Already in late 1991, the director of the former Special Archive [now the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA)], Anatoly Prokopenko, approached the Swedish Embassy in Moscow with what he claimed was a list of about 300 Swedes held in Soviet captivity over the years. After receiving a sample list, the Swedish Foreign Office felt that Prokopenko’s figures were inflated and that many of the names he had provided were long known to Swedish authorities. According to correspondence records of the time, officials decided to focus instead on specific inquiries to the [then] KGB archives.

When researchers repeatedly raised the question of other Swedish citizens in Soviet captivity in connection with the Wallenberg investigation, they received evasive and misleading answers from Swedish officials. They were told, for example, that Cabinet Secretary Jan Eliasson in 1998 had made a formal inquiry to Russian officials about other Swedes in Soviet captivity. While this was true, they later learned that Eliasson’s request had only covered the years 1942-1945 and that it had been strictly limited to the crew of the Bengt Sture.

The head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Department for Secrecy, Berndt Fredriksson, has confirmed that his archive contains no trace of any requests placed to Russian officials during the time of the

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132 See for example Bo Theutenberg, Dagbok från UD, Vol.1, p.42; “Absolut inte, säger UD! Vi kan inte ta ubåten och besättningen som gisslan, d v s att ett brott (att ta Wallenberg) skall besvaras med ett annat brott (att ta ubåten some gisslan). Detta skulle strida mot den uppfattning vi har såsom en rättsstat, fastslås pomspöst. Vem f-n har skrivit detta?”

133 Hans Magnusson, Raoul Wallenberg - lägesbedömning, December 5, 2012

134 In the Wallenberg case, the counterpart to this was the Russian position of wanting to provide only documentation that specifically includes Raoul Wallenberg’s name.

135 JP 80 B, “Svenskar i sovjetisk fångenskap”, February 12, 1992 and February, 13, 1992. The archives of the former KGB are now part of its successor agency, the FSB. The individuals in question included Swedish soldiers who had served in the German Wehrmacht, Swedish emigrants and Communist sympathizers, the so-called “Kiruna Swedes”, from Northern Sweden, some
stateless individuals who spied for Sweden, as well as the historic “Gammalsvenskby” (Old-Swedish) population in Ukraine.

136 Correspondence of the author with Hans Magnusson and Berndt Fredriksson, 2002 and 2011.

Diplomats regularly employ semantics to obscure or distort the exact meaning of their statements. For example, if a diplomat is asked whether he or she has “heard” anything about a certain topic or inquiry, they may answer “no” even if they did — they may have “read” about the issue, but did not “hear” about it. So, in this interpretation, they are telling the truth even when giving a deceptive reply.

When Russian diplomats say “We have released all documents in the Wallenberg case”, few people realize that this may only refer to documents that include the words “Raoul Wallenberg”. When Swedish diplomats in the past told the relatives of the missing that “our files do not contain any information [about your disappeared relative]”, they failed to explain the narrow meaning of such a statement. It may refer only to the Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, for example, and may not include the Swedish intelligence archives.
Working Groups for comprehensive information about all Swedish nationals who were imprisoned throughout the Soviet penal system after 1945."

Many aspects of Swedish intelligence operations in iron curtain countries remain a closely guarded secret. U.S. archives contain information that immediately after World War II, affiliates of Swedish companies in Eastern Europe and their staff were to serve as important sources of information about economic and industrial intelligence regarding the Soviet Union. These and possibly still unknown projects could have led to the arrest of a number of individuals working on behalf of Swedish interests. [Fig. 15]

The Swedish archives contain independent reports of at least one heavily isolated and still unidentified Swedish prisoner/s in Vladimir prison for the years 1950-1972. Could one of these men have been Raoul Wallenberg? And if not Wallenberg, who exactly was this person or persons? For unexplained reasons, Swedish officials have shown little interest in solving this particular mystery. [Fig. 16]

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137 Letter from Berndt Fredriksson to Susanne Berger, July 14, 2011

138 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 379. Telegram Taylor, Stockholm to Director, August 1, 1945. Already in the summer of 1944 the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was beginning to implement a full-fledged economic intelligence program aimed at influencing “the major industrial and financial centers in Europe”. In this plan business men from neutral countries were to play a critical role; see Berger 2005. There is some evidence of a functioning Swedish economic intelligence network in iron curtain countries in the postwar period; see Berger 2005 and Ulfving 2001. According to a former member of T-Kontoret, John Magnus Lindberg, such an operation would have surpassed the capacity of T-Kontoret during the 1950’s; see John Magnus Lindberg, Underrättelsetjänstens och Wallenberg ärendet, Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, Vol.2, 2008. However, the issue deserves to be thoroughly examined further.

139 These individuals may have been mixed nationals, or individuals married to a Swede. The arrest of ex-patriot Swedish citizens living abroad for many years would not necessarily have attracted much attention back home in Sweden.

140 Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, P2 EU 1, Raoul Wallenberg case file, the official testimonies of Ludwig Hunoldt (July 15, 1957) and Marvin Makanin (December 20, 1963). Hunoldt reportedly met a Swedish representative by the name of “Eriksson” who had been arrested in 1944 while working for an international aid organization in Eastern Europe. “Eriksson” is definitely not identical with Raoul Wallenberg, but his case profile shows important similarities which could have led to confusion among witnesses. No prisoner card for “Eriksson” has been found in the official prisoner registry of Vladimir prison. Marvin Makanin was told by his cellmate, Zigurs Krumins, about a highly secret Swedish prisoner being held in Vladimir some time before 1961. Apparently the man had been arrested on charges of espionage. In Vladimir, Kruminsch shared cells with important foreign prisoners, including the American U-2 Pilot Francis Gary Powers. Another prisoner later confirmed to Makanin that Krumins had shared a cell with a Swedish prisoner. A former cleaning woman by the name of Varvara Larina stated in an interview in 1993 that a prisoner matching Raoul Wallenberg’s description (photograph) had been held in isolation in Section 2 (Korpus 2) in Vladimir Prison some time in the mid to late 1950s.

These testimonies have been overshadowed by the more well-known and largely discredited statements from other witnesses, such as Avraham Kalinski. In the late 1970’s Kalinski was shown to have manufactured evidence to support his claim that he had seen Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir during the late 1950’s; see Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, P2 Eu 1, Raoul Wallenberg case file. Swedish author Ingrid Carlberg has demonstrated that in the late 1970s the CIA knowingly promoted a number of witnesses in the Wallenberg case for [Cold War] propaganda purposes, even though the agency knew these claims to be questionable or outright false; see Ingrid Carlberg, Det står ett rum och våntar på dig: Berättelsen om Raoul Wallenberg, Norstedts, 2012. However, even in the case of Kalinski it cannot be entirely excluded that he may have heard widespread rumors about a secret Swedish inmate in Vladimir prison. Further research and direct access to Russian archive documentation is needed to determine whether these rumors had any basis in fact.
Important questions also persist about the numbering of prisoners in the Soviet security system, especially for Vladimir prison. At least six numbers assigned to prisoners sentenced between the period of June 1947 and May 1948 – the most crucial period in the Wallenberg case - remain unidentified.141

As late as 2007 then Foreign Minister Bildt refused to support researchers' request for access to Russia's extensive statistical records regarding prisoners held in Soviet camps and prisons, as well as specific information regarding Swedish citizens under investigation by the Soviet Security services in the late 1940's.142 The files include detailed lists, with prisoners categorized according to nationality, date of arrest, official charges, sentence received and places of imprisonment.

While statistical data alone cannot provide answers to all questions, these files would have furnished very useful information not only about where Swedish nationals were imprisoned but also exactly when and how late these individuals were held in the Soviet Union.

In the past, some Swedish diplomats pushed for a closer coordination of the different investigations about missing Swedes, as is made clear by an internal Swedish Foreign Ministry memorandum from February 27, 1960.143 The document was authored by Gunnar Lorentzon, one of the officials in charge of the Wallenberg investigation during the 1950s, and is addressed to the head of the Political Department, Sverker Åström.

In the memo, Lorentzon writes that he cannot rule out [at the time] that Raoul Wallenberg may have been held in Vladimir Prison. He also asks: "Have you considered that an in-depth study of the Vladimir materials can possibly touch upon information about the search for the crew of the DC-3 that was shot down? Would it not be valuable to arrange that the material is analyzed in the same way?" Åström's answer is not preserved but there is no indication that he took up Lorentzon's proposal.144

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141 Mesina, 2001; the identities of prisoners 14, 16-20 remain unknown; Russian archivists have also never provided detailed information about the system of numbering prisoners under investigation (before sentencing).

142 Letter to Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, January 23, 2007. In his reply, Bildt stated that the Swedish government supports research efforts in Russian archives and that researchers should go and find the information themselves. Appeals to the effect that a formal Swedish inquiry could prove to be much more effective and far less time consuming were unsuccessful; see letter Mats Staffansson, June 7, 2007.

143 Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, P2 EU 1, Raoul Wallenberg case file, Gunnar Lorentzon to Sverker Åström, February 27, 1960.

144 "Har du tänkt på att ett ingående studium av Vladimir materialet kan medföra, att uppgifter om efterforskningarna av den nedskjutna DC:3ans besättning tangeras? Vore det inte värdefullt att få även detta material behandlat i samma ordning?" Also, clearly, eight years after the DC-3's disappearance, Lorentzon did not seem to have written off the idea that some of the plane's crew members could have survived. There are no reports about any surviving crew members having been imprisoned in Vladimir Prison. However, several witnesses have stated that they reportedly met "Swedish flyers" in a prison camp in Norilsk. For example, Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Raoul Wallenberg case file, Leif Leifland, March 29, 1957, testimony of Peter Baltins (Baltinc), via Lucija Lapins.
In 1992, during their visit to Moscow, Soviet officials suddenly invited Roger Älmeberg and other relatives of the DC-3 to visit Vladimir Prison and to speak to former staff members. They were shown around the grounds for two hours but their hosts gave no further explanation for the trip.\(^{145}\)

In all three investigations the handling of witness interviews was far from uniform or systematic. Neither was the analysis or follow-up of the gathered information. Instead, both were often haphazard and incomplete, despite the best efforts of the rank-and-file staff throughout the years to follow every lead. Swedish officials frequently did not or could not inform the relatives of the missing about certain witness statements for several months or even years, which lead to tensions and mutual recriminations.\(^{146}\) In many cases, the witnesses themselves were disparaged, often needlessly, due to the fact that the investigating diplomats lacked a full understanding of the number and placement of other Swedish prisoners throughout the Soviet prison system. Rather than being intentionally deceitful, some witnesses simply assumed that any “Swede” they had encountered in Soviet camps or prisons must have been Raoul Wallenberg.

In the early 1990s, many historians and journalists, too, did not realize the full scope of this problem because information about other missing Swedes was not readily available to them. As a result, the focus and pressure of the investigation shifted away from obtaining access to information that would have answered the central question in the Wallenberg case, which is what happened to him after March 11, 1947, his last fully confirmed presence in Lubyanka Prison.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry made some attempts to track when and where Swedish prisoners had been encountered, but the system was very basic and received only limited circulation. If Swedish officials and other researchers had been better informed about these Swedish detainees, it would have made the analysis in all cases far more efficient.\(^{147}\)

In fact, in the Wallenberg investigation, the independent consultants to the Working Group were not allowed to review the complete set of available witness testimonies until the day of the presentation of

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\(^{145}\) Älmeberg, 2007; as mentioned earlier, such a short initial visit to Vladimir Prison had also been arranged for Raoul Wallenberg’s family in 1989. This gesture was less surprising, since several witnesses had talked about Wallenberg’s alleged detention in the prison after 1947.

\(^{146}\) Maj and Fredrik von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg’s parents, repeatedly clashed with the Swedish Foreign Ministry over the issue, as did the wife of the captain of the Swedish ship Kinnekulle, Mary Johansson. It is not clear that certain witness testimonies received in one case were always properly shared with other investigators. For example, in the 1950’s, witnesses in the Wallenberg case reported that they had met a Swedish sailor or fisherman by the name of “Olsson” in a camp in Vorkuta. “Olsson” said he was from Malmö and that he had been picked up by “a Soviet patrol boat”. The captain of the Svän which disappeared on a trip between Lübeck and Malmö in 1946 was named “Valfried Olsson”; see Kenth Olsson, 1992. The name of the captain of the ship Dan was “Nils Petter Olsson”.

\(^{147}\) The official in charge of identifying and tracking Swedish prisoners in the Soviet Union for many years was Ambassador Sven-Fredrik Hedin; see, for example, Swedish National Archives, Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, HP 39 I, Sammanställning over I samband med Norils-kaffären framkomna upplysningar om andra svenska I Sovjetunionen. During the post-war years, some reports about Swedish prisoners in the Soviet Union were collected by a Swedish businessman living in Berlin, Carl-Johan Wiberg. His information was obtained mostly from returning German prisoners of war. Wiberg had served as a valuable source for U.S. intelligence during World War II.
the official reports in January 2001, even though the evaluation of all witness statements in the Raoul Wallenberg case had been their stated task.  

IV. Incomplete Record – Mixed Results

a. A tightly controlled inquiry

Due to a variety of factors, Sweden and Russian conducted a serious yet limited and tightly controlled inquiry. This is in many ways understandable, but for the families of the victims, it produced once again a situation where they were not given full means of disclosure. They were also never really briefed about these limitations. Partly due to time/labor restrictions, partly due to the sensitive subject matter, there were few efforts to address the deeper background questions in each case.

There has also been a noticeable reluctance among Swedish officials to press for answers at home. When it comes to supporting efforts intended to establish the full circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate, for example, the powerful Wallenberg family has stayed very much on the sidelines.

The Wallenbergs are among the most influential decision makers in Sweden and since 1945 they clearly had the power to set the Swedish agenda in this case. Over the past seventy years, Wallenberg representatives have granted only limited access to their family’s archives, allowing only a select few scholars and researchers to study their holdings.

Surprisingly few records are available from the Swedish intelligence services that deal with the Wallenberg case. While the CIA has declassified several thousand pages concerning the inquiry, no comparable release has occurred in Sweden. Evidently, many records were [allegedly] lost or destroyed in a number of post-war scandals, including the so-called IB-Affair. Still, events such the 1989 visit by Raoul Wallenberg’s next-of-kin in Moscow, the Working Group investigations, or, in earlier years, Stig Wennerström’s arrest in 1963 or the sudden emergence of important witnesses in 1979 that led to a

148 The independent consultants to the Working Group signed contracts prepared by the Swedish Foreign Office in 1998 which specified their tasks.

149 In fact, Guy von Dardel was denied access in 1997 when he applied to study records concerning his brother.

150 In 1973, Swedish journalists Jan Guillou and Peter Bratt exposed a secret Swedish intelligence agency called the “IB”. Many holdings of the Swedish military intelligence archives (T-Kontoret) were burnt. Some of the documentation for the years 1946–1965 was later recovered, stored on several rolls of microfilm, and handed over to the Swedish National Archives in 1997. There is evidence of some confidential, undocumented consultations between the Swedish intelligence services and the Swedish Foreign Office through the years regarding all three Cold War cases; see Ulfving, 2001. Sweden’s legal ‘principle of openness’ [Offentlighetsprincipen] makes it very difficult to keep information secret by placing very severe restrictions on both the length of time and the reasons for which documents may be classified. This has had the unintended effect that officials who may feel very strongly that access to certain information or documents should stay privileged, see no other option but to take them out of circulation; see Evabritta Wallberg, Att undvika offentlighetsprincipen, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlighoch Tidskrift, Vol.1, 2005.
formal reopening of the Wallenberg case (after it had lain dormant for fifteen years) should have given
rise to at least some comment and assessment by Swedish intelligence personnel. However, no such
documentation has ever been presented.\textsuperscript{151}

Many questions also remain about what information remains in the archives of the FRA regarding the
precise events following the downing of the DC-3 on June 13, 1952, including the question if Swedish
intelligence officials and possibly a number of politicians had any knowledge whether or not some of
the crew managed to leave the plane before it crashed.\textsuperscript{152}

In their 2007 report, Swedish investigators explicitly state that other relevant documentation in the
archives of SÄPO and FRA regarding the loss of the DC-3 remain classified [under the official 70 year
secrecy rule].\textsuperscript{153}

During the time of the Working Groups, Russian officials stressed repeatedly that they faced no
limitations to presenting the complete facts in all cases. The recent revelations in the Wallenberg
investigation as well as Russia’s consistent refusal to grant access to important archival documentation
raises doubts that this is indeed so.

Since 1989, the Wallenberg inquiry has been closely monitored by the Russian leadership. It is known
that shortly before publication of the Russian Working Group report in 2001, instructions were issued to
substitute a fuller version of the report for a much shorter one. The reasons prompting this change as
well as the content of the withheld report have not been revealed.

Anatoly Prokopenko is one of the few former Russian archivists who has openly challenged the
Kremlin’s insistence that no additional relevant documentation remains secret in the Wallenberg case.
\textsuperscript{154} [Fig. 17]

\textbf{b. The results of the Working Groups and supplementary investigations}

The Working Group for the DC-3 published its final report already in 1992, concluding that no
information had been discovered that would indicate the survival of the crew, even though the Soviet
pilot had reportedly seen one or two persons parachute from the plane.

\textsuperscript{151} In January 1961 Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz brought news from a distinguished Soviet colleague, Professor Aleksandr L.
Myasnikov, that Wallenberg, contrary to Soviet claims, was alive, although in poor physical condition. Immediately thereafter,
Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander requested Wallenberg’s release, but the enthusiasm did not last long. Myasnikov later
claimed that he had been misunderstood, and the Soviet leadership reacted quite angrily to Sweden’s demands. Fearing both a
deeper foreign and domestic political backlash, Swedish officials eventually backed off from their requests.

\textsuperscript{152} Thorsten Sandberg, 2008

\textsuperscript{153} Haverirapport 2007

\textsuperscript{154} Russian former archivist challenges Kremlin over Raoul Wallenberg saga, \textit{The Telegraph}, January 27, 2012
In the Raoul Wallenberg case, due to significant disagreements between Swedish and Russian officials, two separate reports were issued (in 2001), with the Swedish side stressing that while it appeared likely that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947, no final conclusions about Wallenberg’s fate could be drawn on the basis of the available evidence.

Neither side of the bilateral Working Group on disappeared Swedish ships produced a summary of its work.

Some of the remaining background questions were taken up in follow up investigations.

In the Wallenberg case, a special commission in 2003 analyzed the official Swedish handling of the issue. This inquiry, however, focused largely on the years 1945-1947 and failed to answer the core question of why Sweden’s passivity regarding Raoul Wallenberg had been so extreme.

Formal research projects sponsored by grants from the Swedish Foreign Ministry in the years 2001-2012 focused almost exclusively on Raoul Wallenberg’s legacy and the background details of his humanitarian mission in Hungary in 1944.

From 2003 - 2012, two researchers - Susanne Berger and Vadim Birstein - continued a written exchange with the FSB Archive Directorate, via the Swedish Embassy, Moscow. Though the discussions moved slowly, they yielded some important results. When in 2009 FSB archivists provided information about an unidentified Prisoner no.7 [who had been interrogated in Lubyanka Prison six days after Raoul Wallenberg’s official death date], there was hope that this could prove to be the first step towards a full resolution of the case.

With the exception of the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Tomas Bertelman - who called the new details “almost sensational” and who wrote two letters asking Russian authorities for additional details and clarification about the provided information - Swedish officials did little to pursue the new leads.

Sweden’s Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt who met with Russian President Medvedev in November 2009 and again in early 2010 did not take up the new findings in the

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156 Ett Diplomatiskt Misslyckande: Fallet Raoul Wallenberg och den Svenska Utrikesledningen. SOU 2003:18, Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU) Februari 2003, Utrikesdepartementet. The Commission conducted an impressive review, but ultimately it too could not provide conclusive answers about the reasons for Sweden’s profound passivity in the Wallenberg case. The Commission funneled its analysis of the Swedish political leadership’s handling of the question through the relatively narrow lens of bureaucratic and administrative behavior. In doing so, it omitted a whole set of other motivating factors that may have influenced official Swedish actions over the years.

157 Almost none of the projects directly addressed the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate.

158 Letter by Swedish Ambassador Tomas Bertelman to Yuri Trambitsky, FSB Central Archive, December 9, 2009. Bertelman issued at least one reminder to the FSB Archive Directorate, but he received no reply.
Raoul Wallenberg case in their formal discussions but simply chose to remind the Russian side to ensure that scholars be granted adequate access to key archival collections.\textsuperscript{159} So far, Russia has not complied with this requests and the issue of \textit{Prisoner no.7} remains unsolved.

In 2011 - in connection with the Wallenberg centenary - the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) did agree to release a collection of about 7000 diplomatic cipher cables for the years 1944-47. However, even in this release, approximately 3000 additional cables remain classified in several other archives, including those of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO) and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (TsASVR).\textsuperscript{160}

In January 2012, in response to numerous appeals from researchers, Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt appointed the former Chairman of the Swedish Working Group, Ambassador Hans Magnusson, to conduct a review of the current state of affairs in the Raoul Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, Magnusson’s report, presented in early 2013, did not provide any new or particularly helpful insights. Most importantly, it did not offer a solution to the core problem of lack of direct access to Russian archival documentation.\textsuperscript{161}

The enormous effort of lifting the DC-3 out of the Baltic Sea, followed by an extensive forensic and technical inspection of the wreck from 2004-2007, could not conclusively determine the fate of four crew members. It also could not settle the questions about the plane's mission or about the alleged “ninth man” onboard. In 2006, Swedish investigators placed a new appeal to Russian authorities and the [Russian public] to provide any information they may possess about the fate of the crew. Of special interest are potential eye-witnesses who saw an unidentified sea plane near Gotska Sandön at the time of the crash. The aircraft may have been waiting to assist in any potential rescue operation regarding the downed plane.\textsuperscript{162}

A follow-up report on the ship \textit{Sten Sture}, commissioned by the Swedish Embassy, Warsaw in 2010 from IPN, yielded no additional information about the eighteen men still unaccounted for or the suspected extra person on board, nor did it solve the cause of its sinking.\textsuperscript{163}

When Navy historian Stellan Bojerud asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 2009 to convene an official meeting of the Working Group to discuss new information that had recently emerged regarding the ship, the Foreign Ministry refused his request.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{159} Russian President Vladimir Medvedev visited Stockholm on November 18, 2009. Carl Bildt and Fredrik Reinfeldt again met with him on March 11, 2010.

\textsuperscript{160} 2012 marked Raoul Wallenberg’s 100\textsuperscript{th} birthday (1912-2012); re the 2011 release from the archives of MID, see note 68.

\textsuperscript{161} Hans Magnusson, Raoul Wallenberg – lägesbedömning, December 5, 2012

\textsuperscript{162} Smirnov, July 1, 2006

\textsuperscript{163} Urzad Morski w Gdynia, April 7, 2010, and Report by Stanislaw Flis, Chief Inspector, IPN, Report of the review of archive material containing information about the disappeared ship \textit{s/s Sten Sture} and its crew, November 18, 2010. The report was commissioned after Kerstin von Seth had presented new information which proved that the \textit{Sten Sture} had in fact sunk in Polish territorial waters.

\textsuperscript{164} Deputy Head of the Department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Jan Nyberg, to Stellan Bojerud, December 21, 2009. Nyberg specifically indicated that while many of the former Russian members of the group had retired ,
It is clear that Swedish officials were eager to reach a tangible result in the case of the ship Bengt Sture. In 2005 they pushed hard for further formal talks regarding the fate of crew, but Russian officials refused, stressing that they had provided all available information regarding Swedish vessels. They also pointedly indicated that it was in the interest of both Sweden and Russia to have the issue removed from the bilateral agenda. It would be interesting to determine if similar pressures had been brought to bear in the Raoul Wallenberg and DC-3 inquiries.

Conclusion

The Working Groups were not purely a "play for the galleries", as some observers have contended. However, they did not pursue many important avenues of inquiry. As a result, crucial question marks remain - about the cases under investigation as well as the core aims of Swedish and Russian officials.

Both sides frequently seemed more concerned about avoiding the potential pitfalls of the inquiries (as well as those posed by the political realities of the day) than in mounting a determined, multileveled quest for the truth.

All three cases have now been relegated to historical inquiry which essentially means researchers are running in place because they cannot gain direct and uncensored access to essential Russian archive collections.

Both Sweden and Russia have stated that they remain ready to assist scholars with additional inquiries. However, currently such assistance exists in name only, with researchers’ requests pending for a full two years without any answers from Moscow. Swedish officials have done very little to improve this state of affairs and to ensure that researchers are able to conduct a meaningful investigation. In several cases, Swedish officials have failed to forward research requests altogether to their Russian counterparts.

Evidence that key documentation remains available in all three inquiries [in both Swedish and Russian archival collections] that could help to address many of the still unresolved issues gives rise to the question why Swedish officials have not made more serious efforts to press the Russian government for access to this documentation or to provide researchers with effective support to do so.

Would such access truly make a difference? For the Wallenberg and DC-3 investigations the answer is almost certainly ‘yes’. The situation regarding the Swedish ships is less obvious but also in this query significant progress could be made to clarify once and for all what Polish and Soviet authorities have known about the demise of certain ships and their crews. Until these additional collections have been

the Swedish side of the Working Group was not yet defunct. He also stated that the 1997 report made by divers who had explored the wreck of the Sten Sture indicated that no new meeting on the ship’s demise was warranted. The 1997 report included no information what had happened to the ship’s crew.

165 HP 80 B. In the spring of 2004, the Swedish company Marin Mätteteknik AB set out to explore the ship’s wreck (April 18 – May 10, 2004). Marin Mätteteknik AB had discovered the wreck of the DC-3 the previous year.

166 Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive, HP 80 B, Tobias Thyberg to EC (Staffansson, Anderman, Mård), De försvunna båtarna i Östersjön, June 12, 2006. The Russians refused the Swedish request for a final meeting and stated that they felt the Working Group had in fact concluded its work.
examined, neither Sweden or Russia can claim to have availed themselves of all possible avenues of inquiry.

In the end, however, it is a question of how one defines success: The primary goal for both Russia and Sweden in the years 1989-2001 was to arrive at a resolution of the pending issues that would allow for their removal from the two countries' official agenda and permit relations to move forward. Consequently, both Swedish and Russian diplomats were ready to content themselves with what they considered to be a fair approximation of the truth.

Since 1989, Sweden has become one of Russia’s most important trading partners, currently ranking among the top ten foreign direct investors. 400 companies are actively doing business in the country and Swedish trade has increased eleven times in the years from 1998-2012.167

Over the last twenty-five years, Sweden has successfully expanded its role as an active facilitator of European integration. In spite of rising tensions in recent years, Russia frequently turns to Sweden to help mediate relations with the E.U. and other international bodies, as was the case during Moscow’s almost two decade-long bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), which finally succeeded in December 2011.

For the families of the missing, the single purpose of the Working Group was to obtain full clarity about the fate of their loved ones. Many Swedish and also Russian officials undoubtedly privately shared this goal, yet in their roles as diplomats a partial resolution clearly was an acceptable 'successful' result.

Future research will have to address what exactly has guided the actions of officials on both sides over the years and if there were any preferred outcomes for the three investigations. A related question is if the Swedish and Russian governments ever had an unspoken agreement or understanding to keep the result of the inquiries within 'safe' parameters, and what internal and external considerations continue to play a role for these three inquiries today.

For both Swedish and Russian decision makers, the same central questions persist in each case: What exactly have they known about the fate of the missing men and when did they know it? More specifically, who among Swedish and Russian officials knew precisely what and when? And do they possess knowledge today they have not shared with the public?

Parallel to this issue, it would be just as important to examine in greater detail the rules and laws governing ‘privileged access’ to historical documentation in the two countries (i.e. the various levels of secrecy, including the restriction of access on a ‘need to know’ basis). Closely related is also the question how exactly these respective rules and laws have been applied [in the three cases] and how they have evolved over the last twenty-five years.

In the 21st century and especially in the post 9/11 world, the efforts to safeguard human rights (which includes ongoing investigation into so-called 'historical' cases) are facing a number of serious

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167 see the website of the Swedish Embassy, Moscow www.swedenabroad.com Areas of tensions currently range from specific issues, like Sweden's concern over the North Stream gas pipeline project, to broader topics, like Baltic security. Closely related to this is the continuing erosion of human rights and the rule of law in Russia, as well as the country's aggressive pursuit of its security and foreign policy interests in areas that it considers its traditional sphere of influence, i.e. Ukraine; for a more general discussion see also Lars Wedin, Russia as seen from Sweden, French Institute for Strategic Analysis (IFAS), September 19, 2011
challenges. One is the increased focus on security concerns that once again dominates the bilateral and international political agenda among states. Another is the ascendency of an ever more integrated, 'multi-polar' global economy, with large businesses and corporations increasingly rivaling and in some cases substituting the traditional roles of state governments.

The Financial Times recently reported that “the revenues of the world’s largest multinationals exceed the gross domestic product of a host of countries.” 166 This shift in power and priorities has undoubtedly further enhanced the trend towards a more ‘pragmatic’ or ‘realistic’ approach to human rights.

That the direction and possibly the outcome of three official inquiries may have been largely determined in advance, while diplomats and other official representatives insisted that a meaningful investigation was being conducted, is a troubling thought. For the families of the disappeared, and for those who exert enormous time, expense and energy in finding the truth, this is a truly dispiriting situation.

For the relatives of the disappeared, the search continues as a matter of principle, says Louise von Dardel: "We, the families, including new generations, will not be satisfied until we have full answers."

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166 Ken McPhail, Human rights should be on the MBA curriculum, The Financial Times, March 16, 2014
Table 1. Disappeared Swedish ships 1940 -1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crew</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frida M/S</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengt Sture</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Gdansk/Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caje</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Karlshamn/Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kalmar/Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigg</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoppet KA 162</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Karlskrona/Baltic Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Svan M/S</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lübeck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sten Sture S/S</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwan S/S</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ustka</td>
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<td>Kinnekulle M/S</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ustka</td>
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<td>Läckö</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ustka</td>
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<td>Inger MVF</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rostock</td>
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<td>Vale M/S</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ustka</td>
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<td>Dan M/V</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
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<td>Emmanuel KA 201</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vägen KA 400</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Höken M/F</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Rute YX 203</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gotland</td>
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<td>Silvana Sm 156</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dagö/Hiiumaa</td>
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<td>VG 179</td>
<td>SIN 6</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The Central Navy Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsVMAMO)

The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI)

The Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) T

The Central Archive of the FSB (TsA FSB)

The Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF)
Other

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Illustrations

**Fig. 1 a** Louise von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg’s niece and daughter of Guy von Dardel. Her family has fought for seven decades to learn the full circumstances of the young Swedish diplomat’s disappearance in the Soviet Union. Photo: Marie Dupuy

And Roger Älmeberg, son of DC-3 pilot Alvar Älmeberg. Photo: Cato Lein
http://www.norstedts.se/forfattare/Alfabetiskt/A2/Roger-Almeberg/

**Fig. 1 b** Kerstin von Seth, one of three daughters captain Gösta Rudnert left behind when he and eighteen other men disappeared on the Swedish ship *Sten Sture* in 1947. Photo: Kerstin von Seth
Fig. 2  Wallenberg’s siblings, Guy von Dardel and Nina Lagergren in Moscow, in 1989. They are holding their brother’s diplomatic passport which was returned to them by Soviet officials, together with a number of other items. Photo: Private Archive, Guy von Dardel

Fig. 3  Heavily censored page from the interrogation register of Lubyanka Prison for July 23, 1947. The page, as well as the entries for July 22, 1947, were not included in the release of nearly 200 documents concerning the Wallenberg case in 1991. Only the entries for Raoul Wallenberg’s driver, Vilmos Langfelder, and Langfelder’s cellmate, Sandor Katona, are visible. The men endured sixteen and a half hours of interrogation. According to FSB archivists, Prisoner no.7, who they concluded was with “great likelihood Raoul Wallenberg”, was questioned alongside the two men. The FSB has refused to declassify the register entry for Prisoner no.7.
Fig. 4 Four crew members of the DC-3 may have survived the initial crash. The bodies of Nilsson, Svensson, Book and Carlsson have not been recovered.

Upper row, from left to right: Alvar Älmeberg, Gösta Blad, Einar Jonsson Bengt Book
Lower row: Ivar Svensson, Erik Carlsson, Börge Nilsson, Herbert Mattson

Fig. 5 New information released from Russian archives in 1991 confirms that seven crew members of the Swedish ship Bengt Sture became prisoners in the Soviet Union at the end of 1942.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sture Hedberg</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>b. 1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Walter</td>
<td>First Mate</td>
<td>b. 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per I. Kappelin</td>
<td>Second Mate</td>
<td>b. 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustav Roslind</td>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
<td>b. 1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketty von Hamm</td>
<td>Purser</td>
<td>b. 1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskil Thelin</td>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>b. 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nils Fritz</td>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>b. 1919</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Photo: www.balticwrecks.com
Fig. 6  Photo of Raoul Wallenberg from 1943. Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest

Fig. 7  Josef Stalin and the Politburo in the early 1950’s: Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov (from left to right). Photo: http://www.hubertlerch.com
Fig. 8a The DC-3 (Tp 79001 (Hugin) reconnaissance plane at F 8 Barkarby in 1951. The DC-3 was shot down by a Soviet MiG fighter plane on June 13, 1952. Photo: Herman Allwin (Wikipedia).

Fig. 8b The salvaged wreck of the DC-3, 2003. Source: Flygvapenmuseum, Haverirapport, 2007

Fig. 9 The ships Iwan and Kinnekulle which disappeared on the same day in February 1948. Source: Terje Fredh
**Fig. 10 a** Wreck pieces of the *Sten Sture* were discovered at the Danish coast near Bornholm in early February 1947.
Photo: Svend Parkso - Bornholms Museum

**Fig. 10 b** The *Sten Sture*’s Captain Gösta Rudnert in his office at the Swedish Navy Command, Malmö, 1943.
Source: Kerstin von Seth
Fig. 11 Radar monitoring system APR-5 from 1952, recovered in the wreck of TP 79 (DC-3) in 2004. Source: Haverirapport 2007; Ny Teknik 2012.

Fig. 12 In 2013, Swedish technical expert Staffan Gadd explained in the magazine Teknikhistoria that FRA was almost certainly capable of listening to real-time cockpit conversations in 1952 via advanced VHF technology and therefore may have had knowledge about the events unfolding immediately following the MiG attack. Source: Teknikhistoria, No.3, June 2013
Fig. 13 Anders Jallai, co-discoverer of the wreck of the TP 79 (DC-3) in 2003, has been an outspoken critic of the official Swedish inquiries into the loss of the DC-3. He has repeatedly claimed that the investigation has been “steered from the top”. Photo: Jonas Forsberg

Fig. 14 Swedish Airforce Colonel Stig Erik Wennerström (1906-2006) was convicted as a Soviet agent in 1964. He had provided his handlers with vital information about the Swedish Air and Signal intelligence program. Source: Wiki commons/Wikipedia
Fig. 15 August 1, 1945, Office of Strategic Services, Taylor (Stockholm) to Director, [excerpted text]; outlining plans for Swedish businesses and their affiliates abroad to provide economic and industrial intelligence about the Soviet Union to U.S. authorities after the end of World War II. Source: NARA, RG 226

Fig. 16 Zigurds Krumins (left) who shared a cell with Dr. Marvin Makinen (right) in Vladimir prison in 1962, told Makinen about a highly secret Swedish prisoner held there a few years earlier. Apparently the man had been arrested on charges of espionage and was to be “well rewarded” when he returned home. Krumins shared cells with a number of foreign prisoners, including Francis Gary Powers. As a native Latvian, Krumins should have had few problems distinguishing a Swedish citizen from other Baltic/Scandinavian prisoners. Krumins’s account has been echoed by at least five other former inmates of Vladimir prison. Photo Source Krumins: “Operation Overflight”, Francis Gary Powers, with Curt Gentry, Tower Publications, 1965; Photo Makinen: Makinen, 2012
Anatoly Prokopenko, the head of the former Special Archives (now the Russian State Military Archives). Prokopenko has been outspoken about the fact that important records remain classified in Russian intelligence archives. Source: [http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700219522/Archivist-challenges-Kremlin-in-Wallenberg-saga.html?pg=all](http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700219522/Archivist-challenges-Kremlin-in-Wallenberg-saga.html?pg=all)