

Adler-Rudel's visits to Sweden¹

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While Raoul Wallenberg's detention by the Soviet organs and his final fate in Russian hands still remain matters for speculation, there has, by contrast, been a steady and useful accumulation of material disgorged from non-Russian archives casting new light on the broader context of his mission to Budapest. This has been valuable because the *mission itself*- and not just its *aftermath* – is worthy of careful historical study. The present essay is to be seen essentially as a contribution to an ongoing process of contextualization – that is to say, placing the mission in context. In particular, it aims at improving understanding of some of the preliminary work paving the way for the Swede's eventual dispatch to Hungary in mid-1944. In a year devoted to celebrating Raoul Wallenberg's individual contribution to rescue efforts, it is easy to lose sight of a familiar truth: most of what is worthwhile in life is not the product of a moment and the work of a single person. Rather it is something which is embedded in a historical process and depends on the efforts – not always successful - of many different people with different skills.

1. A Jewish Visitor from Britain

On 24 February 1943, an unusual visitor flew into Sweden from Britain. As he was to recall later,

For more than three years no representative of a foreign Jewish organisation had visited Stockholm and my arrival created something of a stir.

The visitor's name was Solomon Adler-Rudel

¹ © C.G.McKay. I am extremely grateful to The Leo Baeck Institute for allowing me to quote from Solomon Adler-Rudel essay A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts, which appeared in the Institute's Yearbook for 1966. They also kindly made available to me some notes in German by Adler-Rudel, forming the basis of an open lecture in England, on his return from his first wartime trip to Sweden in 1943. This document forms part of the Institute's Adler-Rudel Collection, 1927-1948. I have also made independent use of other Leo Baeck collection of documents, notably the Robert Weltsch Collection, 1813-1981 and the Max Kreutzberger Collection, 1848-1998. The documents I have specifically used are already available online via the portal of the Center for Jewish History at <http://access.cjh.org/>. In addition to these documents, I have made use of various papers of Adler-Rudel to be found at the Central Zionist Archives (CZA) in Jerusalem, including an informative and detailed report in English about his trip to Sweden in 1943.



Solomon Adler-Rudel

In London, Adler-Rudel was attached to the Jewish Agency, a body set up by World Zionist Organisation at its conference in August 1929, and which was destined to become an appropriate organisational interface for the *Yishuv* (the Jews of Palestine) in their negotiations at government level. Born in Czernowitz, Austro-Hungary, in 1894, Adler-Rudel had been active in Jewish causes in Berlin. From 1933 until 1936, he had acted as Executive Secretary of the Reich Deputation of German Jews (*Reichsvertretung der Deutschen Juden*) which in co-operation with other Jewish bodies such as *Children and Youth Aliyah* and *Movement for the Care of Children from Germany* arranged for the emigration of a great number of children and thereby saved many lives. After his move to London in 1936, Adler-Rudel continued his humanitarian efforts with the assistance of the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee and the Central British Fund. These activities were supported by various individuals who were prominent in Zionist circles in England such as Berl Locker of the Jewish Agency, the Leeds mathematician Professor Selig Brodetsky and the Manchester historian, Lewis (later Sir Lewis) Namier.

Then came the war. As news of what was happening to the old Jewish communities of Europe filtered through to John Bull's island, Adler-Rudel was understandably gripped by a new sense of urgency, intensified by what was experienced as bureaucratic inertia, not to say obstruction, on the part of the British Foreign Office and in due course the U.S. State Department. It was all very well to dwell on the practical difficulties involved in rescue schemes and to stress that the only ultimately effective rescue was victory over Hitler and his armed forces. This was undoubtedly correct. But a consequence of this perspective was that priority tended invariably to be given to *military* rather than *humanitarian* ends. In the meantime, Jews were being systematically rounded up in the occupied countries, prior, it was believed, to their elimination altogether.

By the end of 1942, the Jewish Agency in London approached the British Foreign Office with a practical suggestion. Why not get in touch with the governments of neutral states and see if they would agree to the admission of a certain number of children from Nazi-occupied countries? In a letter to the Foreign Office, the secretary of the Jewish Agency, Joseph Linton, took up one aspect of this proposal:

We are anxious to send Mr. S. Adler-Rudel to Stockholm on a visit of about one month's duration. His task would be to get into touch with representatives of the Jewish Community and with other organisations in Sweden to find out what can be done to help the Jews in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and other Baltic States.

After being granted the requisite approval from the Foreign Office, practical preparations could now go ahead for the dispatch of two emissaries, Solomon Adler-Rudel to Stockholm and Wilfred Israel to Portugal and Spain.²

Thus it was that Adler-Rudel found himself flying off to the Swedish capital in the middle of the war with two letters of introduction: one from Berl Locker of the Jewish Agency addressed to Gustav Möller, the Swedish Minister of Social Affairs and a high ranking member of the Swedish wartime Cabinet, and another from Professor Namier addressed to the British Minister at Stockholm, Victor Mallet. Adler-Rudel's saw his primary task as that of persuading the Swedish Government to admit 20,000 Jewish children from German occupied Europe.

Conversations and contacts

Not unnaturally Adler-Rudel began by meeting prominent members of the Jewish community in Sweden to elicit their opinions and help. As it happens, this was not Adler Rudel's first visit to Sweden on a humanitarian mission. Already prior to the outbreak of war, more precisely in November 1938, he had been asked by the *Reichvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*³ to undertake a trip to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland to encourage the establishment of a training programme in these countries which would allow the release of hundreds of trainees, then detained in concentration camps and prisons in Germany. Already then he was made aware of the pressures working against him. All four countries were heavily involved in trading with Hitler's Germany and NS propaganda in various shapes and forms was making itself increasingly felt. Nevertheless, Adler-Rudel appears to have had a number of constructive conversations in Sweden where he considered the prevailing attitudes more positive than those in Denmark for example. He participated in a meeting at the synagogue in Stockholm where the rabbi, Dr. Ehrenpreis and Gunnar Josephson, chairman of the Jewish community and also brother-in-law of Erik Boheman, Undersecretary at UD (the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), took part in the discussion. This was followed by another public discussion and further talks with informed Swedish officials such as Gösta Engzell, the head of the legal department at UD, E.G. Drougge secretary to the Swedish Delegation at the Évian Conference and Dr. Glueck who was in charge of the Training Committee in Sweden. The visit ended on an upbeat note with a promise of more support for the training programme and the setting up of a special body charged with bringing Jewish children from Germany to Sweden.

Thus when Adler-Rudel made his appearance in Stockholm in February 1943, he was not entering completely uncharted waters. He had already met many of the leading personalities in the Jewish community. But in the interval, the strategic situation had altered drastically with Sweden now an isolated and neutral country surrounded by Hitler's legions. Fastidious caution rather than bravado was the order of the day. It did not take the visitor very long to discover that the Jewish

² Wilfred Israel's mission ended tragically. He was a passenger on board a BOAC flight from Lisbon which was shot down on June 1, 1943 by the Luftwaffe. There were no survivors. The same flight carried the Hungarian born actor Leslie Howard, who played the leading role in both *The Scarlet Pimpernel* (1934) and later in *Pimpernel Smith* (1941).

³ The name subsequently adopted by the previously named *Reichsvertretung der Deutschen Juden*

community in Sweden was divided in its attitude and approach. On the one hand, people like Ehrenpreis and Gunnar Josephsson received the emissary from London “with great courtesy but with a certain reservation and aloofness”.⁴ Josephsson was in particular sceptical about the viability of Adler-Rudel's project for the children, arguing that all previous initiatives had foundered.⁵ On the other hand, the Baltic businessman Gillel Storch was keen to offer support and assistance as were Daniel Brick, Dr. Emil Glueck, Fritz Hollander, Norbert Mazur and Hugo Valentin.

Another useful supporter was Bruno Kreisky, the future Austrian Chancellor and then a refugee in Sweden. Although of Jewish origin, Kreisky was neither a Jew in terms of religious belief nor a Zionist. But as a social democrat, he had many useful contacts among Swedish politicians, including Gustav Möller whom Adler-Rudel was planning to meet. Indeed Adler-Rudel goes so far as to assert that it was with Kreisky's intervention that the first meeting with Möller took place. The Austrian took the trouble to phone up Möller on Adler-Rudel's behalf and fix a meeting. At the same time, Kreisky suggested that it would be wiser to place an upper limit of 5000 (rather than the figure of 20,000 favoured by Adler-Rudel) to the number of children admitted to Sweden.

The meeting finally took place on March 5 and lasted about an hour.⁶ After he had handed over his letter of introduction from Locker, Adler-Rudel began by describing for the Minister the situation of the Jews in the occupied countries and then passed to the principal object of his mission: could the Swedish Government be persuaded to approach the German Government with a request to permit the transportation- and here Adler-Rudel did not follow Kreisky's advice- of 5 to 20,000 Jewish children to Sweden. But Möller, though friendly, refused to take up the matter, on the grounds that the Germans were unwilling to enter any discussions about relief for the Jews. The scheme would never get off the ground.

This first meeting with Möller was undoubtedly disappointing. Adler-Rudel had met with all sorts of good, well-intentioned and helpful people. But there was a practical problem. The majority of Adler-Rudel's contacts were members of the Jewish community and therefore could be dismissed simply as spokesmen for purely sectional, rather than national interests. Supportive refugees like Kreisky and Stephan Szende or Karniol attached to the Polish Legation in Stockholm simply didn't count. What was needed was a “door-opener”: someone with social clout *in Sweden*-- who could ensure that the whole issue was taken to a higher level. Later on the same day of the meeting with Möller, Rabbi Ehrenpreis made what was perhaps to be his most valuable contribution to the Adler-Rudel mission: he asked the visitor from England to accompany him on a visit to Countess Ebba Bonde.

4 S.Adler-Rudel, *A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts*, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, 1966, p221

5 Josephson's reluctance to become involved was apparent also at a later occasion when Adler- Rudel asked him if he could set up a meeting with Erik Boheman at the Swedish Foreign Office, a key figure in decision-making during the war. Josephson's answer that it was not an appropriate time to seek such a meeting.

6 In the CZA account of his visit to Sweden, Adler-Rudel writes (on page 5) “Visit by Gustav Möller” thus giving the impression to an English reader that Möller visited him. But this is probably due to a mistaken Germanism (translating “bei” by “by”). In the later account published in the Leo Baeck yearbook, it is implicitly made clear (he writes that “ He [Möller] received me very amiably”) that he in fact went to see the Minister

2. The Female of the Species

The Wallenberg clan has often been written about, both by its praisers and detractors: that is to say the male members of the clan. But as regards the female of the species, references are much more sparse.⁷ Ebba Wallenberg (born 1896) was the daughter of the banker Marcus Wallenberg Senior and the sister of Jacob Wallenberg (born 1892) and Marcus Wallenberg (born 1899). Jacob, according to his biographer, considered his little sister the most gifted of the children. In the patriarchal world of the bank, however, there was no place for a woman at the table. So Ebba had to seek her life's role elsewhere. She delighted in the company of artists and theatre people and was considered a regular Bohemian.⁸ On one occasion, at a party, she had arranged for a game of chess to be played, somewhat in the manner of Wormold in Graham Greene's *Our Man in Havana*, where the usual chess pieces had been replaced by bottles – the queen being replaced by a magnum of champagne, the king by a bottle of burgundy, the pawns by pilsner etc. Losing a piece of course meant drinking it up. On another occasion she asked the young Povel Ramel to accompany her on the piano, while she sang “I can't give you anything but love” in (according to one witness) a voice that was a strange mixture of Marlene Dietrich and Sophie Tucker.⁹



Seated (from the left) Karl Gerhard, Ebba Bonde, Gösta Ekman and Zarah Leander

⁷ A typical example of the selective is the Wiki entry on the Wallenberg Family at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallenberg_family when consult last on 16 April 2012.

⁸ In these interests, she was most akin to another member of the Wallenberg family, Gustaf Wally.

⁹ See <http://hellbom.wordpress.com/2008/01/03/povel-ebba-morfar-och-anarkisten/>

At the age of 23, Ebba had married the much older Count Carl Bonde of Hörningsholm. One of her stepsons, Carl Carlsson Bonde, a colonel and later wartime head of Swedish Military Security after the departure of Major Thorwald Lindquist, was born in 1897, that is to say the year after the birth of his new stepmother. Ebba's relationship with Count Bonde (the elder) was less than ideal and the marriage was dissolved in 1941.

During the war, Ebba Bonde took an active interest in the work of *Rädda Barnen* [Save The Children] and was thus a natural talking party for Adler-Rudel. Her open personal stand against Nazism, of course, did not pass unnoticed by the German Legation in Stockholm who wrote her off essentially as a "high society Bolshevik" albeit one with interesting friends like Laurence Steinhardt, the U.S. diplomat. See the document ¹⁰

On March 8, three days after the fruitless meeting with Gustav Möller, Adler-Rudel went to meet the Countess with Rabbi Ehrenpreis and had a chance to present to the Committee of *Rädda Barn* a report about the situation of Jewish children in Germany and the occupied countries. Ebba was clearly impressed by the seriousness of the situation and promised to give the matter greater prominence by hosting a reception attended by the diplomatic corps and other prominent figures where Adler-Rudel could once again speak about the situation. This reception duly took place on March 17 at Ebba Bonde's home and was attended by some 150 people, including most of the diplomatic corps. The emissary from London was able to address the meeting for half-an-hour and then answered questions from the floor.

But Ebba was to do something much more significant than merely arrange a large reception for the diplomats. She had clearly decided to back Adler-Rudel's efforts. On March 29, the latter went to have tea with her and the main topic of the conversation was the Minister of Social Affairs, Gustav Möller. It was then that Ebba gave Adler-Rudel the crucial help he needed. *She promised to speak to her brother, Jacob Wallenberg about the matter.* If one could obtain his goodwill in the matter, there was just a chance by virtue of his influence, that the Swedish Government would be led to reconsider its position. Meanwhile before the meeting with Wallenberg, Ebba Bonde introduced Adler-Rudel to other friends and potential supporters to discuss what other practical measures could be undertaken, for example by making use of the *Rädda Barn* organisation.

This first crucial meeting with Jacob Wallenberg took place on April First, 1943. Adler-Rudel describes what transpired as follows:

Visited Jacob Wallenberg. Had a very long discussion about my project. He advised me to look for some kind of economic compensation because without that there is no sense in approaching them. [author's remark: the Germans]. He will speak to Boheman and ask him to support Möller when the point came up at a meeting of the Government.¹¹

From this, it would seem that Möller personally was assumed to support Adler-Rudel's proposal.

¹⁰ See the German intercept reproduced in the appendix. Steinhardt had been appointed U.S. Minister in Stockholm in 1933. Subsequently he would served as Minister in the Soviet Union (1939-1941) before being appointed U.S. Minister in Turkey in 1942. Steinhardt was one of the few Jews holding a senior position in the State Department at that time.

¹¹ Manuscript dealing with his 1943 Visit, p.11.,140/132, CZA, Jerusalem.

The real issue was rather the Cabinet as a whole and here Jacob Wallenberg was hoping to get the influential Undersecretary at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to back up the Minister when push came to shove.

There was, of course, another tantalizing ingredient in the talk with Jacob Wallenberg: the question of possible compensation. But what kind of compensation did the banker have in mind? On this important and fascinating question, the documents I have cited, are silent.¹² All we know for certain is that Adler-Rudel returned for a second meeting with Jacob Wallenberg six days later to “consider compensation suggestions”. Just prior to that, he had had a conversation with Ebba Bonde in which she briefed the Jewish Agency's emissary about her own conversations with her brother and the British Minister, Victor Mallet .

It would take some time and considerable lobbying on the part of Adler-Rudel before the Swedish Government was prepared to change its fundamental position with regard to his rescue proposal, and even then it was only prepared to do so if certain stringent financial conditions were met. Was Jacob Wallenberg's intervention crucial in securing this change of direction? Probably not. While Wallenberg's role undoubtedly ensured that Adler-Rudel's status as a serious negotiator was considerably strengthened- no small matter- the change in the Government's position owed more to the intervention of the British and American Ministers, particularly the latter. In Adler-Rudel's discussions with Erik Boheman at UD, the Undersecretary had given the Jewish emissary from London to understand that a precondition for any Swedish participation in a rescue scheme was a guarantee from the American and British Governments that they were prepared to back it. Although Gustav Möller was later to claim that Boheman had failed to interpret the Swedish Government's position correctly and that no such guarantee was necessary, the ultimate formulation of the scheme which the Swedes were prepared to support, as we shall presently see, left no doubt whatsoever that Allied approval *was* implicitly required. The decisive step which probably caused the Swedish Government to review its position was the message received by Herschel Johnson, the U.S. Minister , from Cordell Hull , the Secretary of State on April 5:

The Department has been informed that the Swedish Government has under consideration a

12 The fact that it is Jacob Wallenberg who stresses the importance of compensation to the Germans, leads one naturally to wonder whether the compensation issue re-emerged later on in negotiations between Raoul Wallenberg and Becher. Certainly Becher's conversation with Himmler with regard to his dealings with Saly Mayer in Switzerland is particularly suggestive. Instead of fixing the release of Jews against heavy lorries , Becher wished instead to link such a release to compensation in terms of articles in great demand for the German war effort such as nickel, chrome, wolfram, ball-bearings etc previously obtainable through neutral countries, but latterly well nigh unavailable due to the increased pressure of the Allied economic blockade. Such a deal was potentially a win-win situation for four of the interested parties involved: first of all the Jews got exit visas; their rescuers would have accomplished something concrete; the Germans got critical war materials; and any group of people orchestrating such a scheme might hope to pick up commission on the deal. The big loser was of course the Allied belligerents and their economic warfare. This last point underlines why any such deal would have been kept hidden *after the war* because of the controversy it would have provoked. At present, there is nothing to suggest that such a deal took place and this should be clearly acknowledged. But at the same time, in Excerpts from McKay's Notes (available at <http://www.raoul-wallenberg.eu/articles/excerpts-from-mckay%E2%80%99s-notes-on-the-case-of-raoul-wallenberg/>) I have drawn attention to a deal hatched between Raoul Wallenberg and Becher which came too late to be implemented and about which we know almost nothing.

There is also another relevant aspect to the compensation question. Recall that Raoul had demanded from UD in taking the post in Budapest, the right to certain 'unorthodox' methods, such as bribery. Naturally bribery is something that can take many forms.

plan for the admission into Sweden of a number of Polish Jewish children . This Government is interested in any possibility for the alleviation of the condition of these unfortunate people. You are authorised in your discretion to make informal inquiries of the Swedish Government in regard to the status of this matter.

The words “in your discretion” and “informal enquiries” are not the usual verbal components of something intended to be a guarantee, but nevertheless Hull's message probably sufficed to induce the Swedes to flesh out the terms of a rescue proposal that they *would be* prepared to support. Ironically, the idea of compensation first introduced by Jacob Wallenberg in discussing any approach to the Germans, found a new application. Swedish governmental humanitarianism was not intended to be self-financing: it came with a very definite price-tag. The Swedish Government was prepared to approach the German Government with the offer to admit 20,000 Jewish children of ages between 5 and 15 from Germany and the occupied countries, subject to three conditions: *(1) the Governments of the United States and Britain must undertake to pay for the upkeep of the children in Sweden (2) the Governments of the United States and Britain had to agree to an adequate rise in the import of foodstuffs to Sweden (3) the Governments of the United States and Britain must take measures for the removal of the children from Sweden at the end of the war.*

Although Adler-Rudel was aware that the above proposal was still very far from being a done deal , it at least offered something concrete and he was able to return to London in a state of elation and optimism. In fact, however, the whole initiative , despite congratulations and fine words of support, ended up a dead duck. A pointer to the eventual sequel of events came already at the so-called Bermuda Conference which began on April 19 and was avowedly about what could be done to save the threatened Jewish remnant. Adler-Rudel's “Swedish proposal” remained undiscussed.

Yet despite the ultimate failure of Adler-Rudel's first wartime mission to Sweden, it nevertheless did undoubtedly help to sow seeds which would ripen in later, more successful Swedish endeavours such as the rescue of the Danish Jews in the autumn of 1943¹³ and the assignment of Raoul Wallenberg to the U.S. sponsored-and U.S. financed- mission to Budapest. In his article *A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts* which appeared in the Leo Baeck Yearbook for 1966, Adler- Rudel makes a particular point of underlining the importance of Raoul Wallenberg's efforts¹⁴ and we know from certain British Foreign Office documents relating to Raoul's mission in Budapest that Adler-Rudel received (at least some) copies of the Swede's reports from the Hungarian capital. When Adler-Rudel visited Sweden again in 1944, he also brought with him lists of the names of Hungarian Jews who were candidates for “Protective Passports”. These lists , he noted, had been furnished by the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem and were presumably used by Raoul Wallenberg and

13 During Adler-Rudel's first wartime visit to Sweden, a number of young Jews belonging to the Pioneer movement (*Hechalutz*) escaped from Denmark to Sweden by boat. This led to various discussions and preparations which envisioned the evacuation of the whole Danish Jewish community to Sweden , a matter taken up by Adler-Rudel in one of his discussion with Gustav Möller. Möller gave his word that any Danish Jew escaping to Sweden would be welcomed. However, Adler-Rudel was not inclined at this stage to take any chances. Through Jewish subscription , a ship “Julius” was eventually acquired for 30,000 crowns and placed at the disposal of the *Hechalutz* and a special committee under Fritz Holländer and Norbert Masur was set up which liaised with Ebbe Munck of the Danish resistance.

14 It has to be remembered that in 1966, Raoul Wallenberg was not then the high profile figure that he has subsequently become.

the Swedish Legation in their work in Budapest.¹⁵

3. Ebba Bonde and the Polish Thread

It is also interesting to note that the name of Adler-Rudel's old supporter, Ebba Bonde, crops up at various points in the mission of Raoul Wallenberg. Thus in a report to the US. War Refugee Board shortly after Wallenberg's departure for Budapest, Iver Olsen noted:

(A) Wallenberg left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds for preliminary expenditures, such as purchase of easily carried barter articles for Hungarian relief. I placed 10,000 kronor at his disposal. In order to channel it through an organization so I could get a good receipt, I gave it to his Aunt, Countess Bondé who is head of the "Committee for Aid to Belgian Children", earmarked for "Special Hungarian Relief Activities."

Indeed there were other, still unexplained contacts which took place between Ebba and Raoul. For example, on September 4, Raoul Wallenberg visited Hungary on behalf of Mellaneuropeiska. There is a note in German from Ebba Bonde to Koloman Lauer thanking him for an excellent lunch and drawing attention to certain papers which she wished Raoul to study. On this note, Raoul had scribbled – presumably in reference to some request in the papers- that an exact street address was lacking. So what exactly was the subject of the papers that Ebba wanted Raoul to study? This may seem a matter of trivial importance but it gains in interest when it is linked to another request from Ebba when Raoul Wallenberg was finally in Budapest on his mission in 1944. The message passed on by Lauer read as follows:

Countess Bonde has asked for a Provisional Passport to be issued for Eduard Fietowicz, Budapest. His address can be obtained through Dr. Geza Soos, Legation Secretary in the Cultural Department of the Foreign Ministry.

¹⁵ It would be interesting to know more about these Jewish Agency lists and the names on them.



Ebba Bonde in conversation with Sven Salén at a sporting event , 1940.¹⁶

The names occurring in this request are worthy of comment. Dr. Géza Soós , secretary of the Calvinist international student movement *Soli Deo Gloria* and a devout Christian, was a member of the Hungarian Foreign Office who was a known and trusted contact of Lauer and Raoul Wallenberg.¹⁷ He played an important part in the dissemination of reports about Auschwitz which arrived in Hungary. He was also a member of the Hungarian resistance group *Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom* (MFM) [Hungarian Independence Movement].¹⁸ Fietowicz [Fietz] had been appointed Polish vice-consul in Hungary and head of the W-organisation which functioned as communications link between the Polish Government in London and the Home Army in Poland after the German occupation. In essence, Fietowicz became the principal political representative of the Poles in Hungary and enjoyed excellent contacts in the Hungarian Foreign Office. After being arrested by Hungarian counterintelligence in 1941 at German insistence and held for over half a year, he was set free on the request of the Hungarian Foreign Office. Fietowicz personally undertook two trips in 1942 and again in 1943 to London with the sponsorship of the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Kállay who, while staunchly anti-Soviet, favoured a realignment of Hungary on the side of the Western Allies. In 1944, when the Germans invaded Hungary, Fietowicz was seized by the Gestapo and later executed at the Mauthausen-Gusen camp on August 23 1944. The request of Ebba Bonde concerning Fietowicz, forwarded by Lauer to Wallenberg two days before this, therefore came

16 Samlingar, KSS, Fo157527, Sjöhistoriska museet, Stockholm.

17 In the special private code employed by Lauer and Wallenberg, Soós appeared under the pseudonym “herr Syllberg”.

18 According to a coded OSS message of 7 November 1944, Soós had a Swedish signals schedule and Nagy, formerly a secretary at the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm, was asked to get in touch with Ternberg, a senior figure in C-Bureau [the Swedish Secret Intelligence Service], regarding this schedule.

altogether too late and it also explains- at least in part¹⁹- the reply, two months afterwards, from Wallenberg in Budapest on October 28, 1944, that he had been unable to find out Fietowicz's address.



Tadeusz Pilch

The mention of Fietowicz is not the only Polish thread to be found in the Lauer-Wallenberg correspondence and this is something that requires further archival research in Poland and Hungary. In a long letter of August 21, 1944, Wallenberg was instructed to enquire of Soós concerning Henryk Sławik, Andrzej Pysz, Kasimierz Gargal [sic] and Stanisław Meysner. The first three were certainly highly active in safeguarding the interests of Polish refugees in Hungary: Sławik was president of the Polish Civilian Committee, in which capacity he helped not only Polish refugees but also Jews and Pysz was a member of the same body. Gurgul, a gifted mathematician, eventually became a close colleague of Fietowicz and was involved in the technical communications work of the W-organisation.

We also find for example a mention in an undated document headed “Notis för Herr Wallenberg” of “unser Freund Pilch” in all probability, Tadeusz Pilch, a Counsellor at the Polish Legation in Stockholm, officially concerned with commercial matters but also in all probability involved in other much more secret matters.²⁰ In this interesting communication, as a favour to Pilch, Wallenberg is instructed to contact Georg von Pogany in Budapest with the intention of raising through the latter a million *pengö*.

This sum, it was stressed, had no political purpose but was intended solely for Polish refugees in Hungary who were no longer given the relief which they had previously received from the Hungarian

¹⁹ What is slightly odd is why Wallenberg was not in a position, given his access to good information sources in Budapest, to state that Fietowicz had been arrested and taken away by the Gestapo to a place unknown, though clearly such a message would have had to be formulated carefully to avoid attracting undue suspicion on the part of hostile surveillance authorities.

²⁰ My friend, the late Józef Lewandowski, with whom I talked on countless occasions in the 1980s about the clandestine work of the Polish legation in Stockholm, remained convinced that Pilch had played a much greater role in underground and conspiratorial work than had emerged in the archival record at that time.

Government. Finally, Wallenberg was told that payment for the *pengö* could be made in Swedish crowns and that he must not reveal to von Pogany the purpose for which the money would be used. Finally it was added that the Swedish Government had been notified of this transaction.

The fact that the Swedish Government had been notified of this transaction, is itself highly interesting.

Let me end this digression on what I have called the Polish thread, by returning to the subject of Fietowicz. Thanks to his well-placed source²¹ inside the German Foreign Office, Allen Dulles who headed the OSS desk in Switzerland, was soon informed of Fietowicz's capture. According to a report supplied by this agent and based on information reaching OKW, Fietowicz had confessed that the Poles had tried by all means to bring Hungary over to the Allied side. Negotiations between the Poles and the Hungarians had taken place in Portugal and plans were tentatively hatched for Polish troops to be sent from Italy to Hungary where they would work as partisans on the part of the Allies.²²

All such plans, needless to say, *if* they were picked up by Soviet Intelligence, can only have heightened the fear and suspicion of Stalin. For it was obvious that the main object of such manoeuvres on the part of the Hungarians and Poles was less concerned with the defeat of the *Wehrmacht* than it was with pre-empting or at least counterbalancing the advance of the Red Army. It followed that any person linked in some way, however remote, to Fietowicz and his group would become a potential object of study by the Soviet organs. For this reason, it is desirable to explore further all the various aspects of the Polish thread in the case of Raoul Wallenberg.²³

4. Adler-Rudel's Second Wartime Visit to Sweden

We have already mentioned that Adler-Rudel returned to Sweden on a second wartime visit, arriving on September 1, 1944. This visit is of particular interest to me for two reasons. Let me begin with one of them- his meeting with Alexandra Kollontay, the Soviet Minister. The reason for this meeting arose because of Adler-Rudel's great anxiety about the Jews held at the camp of Theresienstadt, situated in what is now the Czech Republic and his fear that they might be liquidated before the the Red Army arrived. He therefore hoped that by speaking with Kollontay, he would be able to stress the seriousness of the threat and the desirability of a rapid Russian military advance. In order to set up the meeting with Kollontay, Adler-Rudel enlisted the help of two people. One was Erik Boheman, Undersecretary at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The other was Dr. Kucera who represented the London Czechs in Stockholm and in whose territory Theresienstadt lay. Both men, whatever their own feelings about Adler-Rudel's realism in asking the Red Army to modify their operations at his request, were undoubtedly supportive and promised to do what they could. What then happened in the case of Dr. Kucera is fully documented in the relevant document in the appendix to this essay. Suffice it to say that Adler-Rudel was invited to speak with Kollontay on 15 September 1944. The ensuing conversation was carried out in German. It is to be remembered that

21 Fritz Kolbe = "George Wood".

22 See the relevant document in the Appendix.

23 Those who are acquainted with my essay on Lolle Smit, will be aware that Smit too had close links with the Poles in Hungary. It might well turn out that by focussing too much attention on the activities of the larger Allied intelligence services such as OSS and SIS and their possible link to the Wallenberg case, one has failed to note the relevance of certain discreet operations mounted independently by the Poles for example.

Adler-Rudel was appearing not as a private individual but as the authorised representative of the Jewish Agency , and therefore Kollontay began by asking him to describe the Agency and its functions.

I explained as well as I could and then spoke of my suggestions. She interrupted me several times, asked questions about the situation of the Jews in general, and I gave her some information. She seemed to be much impressed by the facts and figures about the extent of the Jewish disaster. In the end I asked her what she thought of my suggestion . She replied that a final decision rested with the military authorities, but *promised to inform her Government about our conversation immediately; she would use whatever influence she had, to obtain a favourable reply.*²⁴ [present author's italics]

Adler-Rudel was pleased with the outcome of his meeting with the Grand Old Lady of Soviet Diplomacy and apparently remained convinced that the Soviet Army had accelerated its advance in the liberation of Theresienstadt. But whatever the truth of the matter, his meeting with Kollontay was indeed a remarkable event. As Pollock, a senior figure at the British Legation and the American Minister, Herschel Johnson were to note, it was surprising that Madame had been prepared to meet the Jewish emissary at all.

I have already mentioned my view that there is room for more research on the Polish Thread in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The meeting between Kollontay and Adler-Rudel is another subject which certainly deserves further investigation. ***Given what we already know, there is every reason to suppose that there must be some documents in the archives of MID (Министерство иностранных дел) dealing specifically with Adler-Rudel and Adler-Rudel's intervention in the autumn of 1944. It would be extremely valuable if the Russian authorities can be persuaded to release these documents.***²⁵

There is, however, another equally interesting aspect of the matter and that is the view of Adler-Rudel's 1944 mission taken, not by well-wishers and Jewish activists, but by the various Allied intelligence and security services, sitting at the sidelines watching. Indeed Adler-Rudel's mission is a beautiful illustration of how humanitarian and intelligence activities became intertwined in a potentially dangerous double-thread during the war, a theme which I have had reason to emphasize time and time again in my writings dealing with the case of Raoul Wallenberg.

During his first wartime visit to Stockholm in 1943, various German officials had tried to contact Adler-Rudel, but he was dissuaded from meeting them on the advice of the British Legation. By 1944, he was evidently no longer prepared to show the same circumspection and restraint, arguing (i) that he was not, in any case, a British citizen and (ii) that negotiations had already got under way between his friend Gillel Storch and certain German contacts, namely Werner Böning, Dr. Edgar Klaus and Dr. Peter Kleist. In addition - and importantly - the representative of the U.S. War Refugee Board

²⁴ Adler-Rudel, A Chronicle of Rescue Efforts, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, 1966, p. 240.

²⁵ It would for example be extremely interesting to know if in his discussion with Kollontay, Adler-Rudel had any reason to mention Wallenberg's mission in Budapest and if he did, what exactly he said about it.

was also said to be involved in these talks. The name of this representative was Iver Olsen, Raoul Wallenberg's chief contact in Stockholm. Finally, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was being kept informed about the negotiations.

So what was discussed at these meetings? In a memorandum, dated January 19, 1945, Adler-Rudel has left a brief but informative account²⁶. According to this memorandum, the

Subject of the discussions was a suggestion by Mr. Storch that the Nazis should release to Sweden or Switzerland

[a] several thousand Jews who are holders of Latin-American passports and who are interned in Bergen-Belsen;

[b] about 1,300 Hungarian Jews who were part of a transport from Hungary of about 2,000 on their way to Switzerland. The transport was stopped and about 1,300 Hungarian Jews were brought to Bergen-Belsen.

[c] 3,000 to 4,000 Baltic Jews who were working at a labour camp near Königsberg;

[d] about 300 Jewish women who were working in a camp near Tallinn in Estonia.

To reach an agreement on these terms. Dr. Kleist had suggested that a payment of one million U.S. dollars (later reduced to one million Swedish crowns = \$250,000) should be made to the Swedish Red Cross. This money was to be used for the purchase of medical articles which would be then transferred by the Swedish Red Cross to the German Red Cross as a gift.

According to Adler-Rudel,

It was at that stage of the negotiations when the representative of the war Refugee Board participated in the talks and when Count Folke Bernadotte, the President of the Swedish Red Cross, was informed of the negotiations. He agreed to participate in further negotiations.

It was also at this stage, that Adler-Rudel himself entered the negotiations, by meeting that strange enigma, Edgar Klaus, at Storch's house. His impressions of Klaus are worth stating:

Dr. Klaus is a very intelligent and a very cunning man. He tried to impress me with his anti-Nazi remarks, but from my previous experiences with similar types I am convinced that he is as bad a Nazi as one can be, but he is clever enough to hide it.²⁷

Klaus informed Adler-Rudel that he had heard from his friend Dr. Kleist in Berlin that

²⁶ Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Adler-Rudel's archive, CZA, A 140/231.

²⁷ Adler-Rudel's *Nachlass* at CZA, Jerusalem contains an essay Note on Certain Negotiations with German Officials in Stockholm. Signum A140/231.

his proposal had been favourably received and that he hoped to return to Stockholm in the near future with good news. In following up this conversation, Adler-Rudel went with his friend Storch to call on Count Bernadotte who had recently returned from London. The latter expressed interest in meeting Kleist. In the ensuing conversation, it was suggested that the Count should approach Kleist about the the Swedish Red Cross visiting Jews in concentration camps.

For Adler-Rudel, this was to be as far as his involvement would go. His new talking partner Klaus was soon to drop out of the picture. For Adler-Rudel, the reason was clear:

At a Press Conference which took place on the 11th November 1944, and which was reported in the whole of the Swedish press, I used very strong words about the brutalities of the Germans. A few days later Dr. Klaus informed Mr. Storch that after having seen the report in the press about my opinion of the Germans, he does not think that Dr. Kleist who had still not arrived in Stockholm, would like to see me, but he informed me at the same time that Kleist informed him that he brings good news.

Adler-Rudel returned to London without having met with Kleist. At the end of the Note describing this whole incident, he mentions the fact that he received a message from Storch intimating that a party of 1,300 Hungarian Jews from Bergen-Belsen had arrived in Switzerland. However, as Adler-Rudel was at pains to admit, he still did not know if this release was due to the exertions of Dr. Kleist or of someone else.²⁸

The substance of Adler-Rudel's summary of these rescue negotiations can be confirmed in other contemporary documents, for example in Iver Olsen's Final Report of War Refugee Board Activities from Sweden, dated June 15, 1945 and sent to General William O'Dwyer, Executive Director of the War Refugee Board. The point, I wish to make here, is the inherent diplomatic risk involved in such discussions, a point which Adler-Rudel tacitly admits. In commenting on the British response to these discussions with Kleist and company, he explains the unease on the part of his contact at the the British Legation in Stockholm, as follows:

The main reason, I think, why he objected to my seeing the Germans was that he was afraid that my meeting with the German officials would not remain secret and that it would come to the knowledge of the Soviet Embassy *and there create suspicion about the contents of my talks*. [present author's italics].

My hunch is that the negotiations with the Germans *did come* to the notice of the appropriate Soviet organs, for two very good reasons. The first is simply this. Adler-Rudel had requested an audience with a Soviet Minister (Kollontay) in wartime. It would have been a standard procedure within *any* diplomatic service of a belligerent power to undertake a series of personal security checks on such an applicant. In the case of the Soviet Mission in Stockholm, this would almost certainly have also involved routine shadowing of Adler-Rudel's movements in Stockholm to identify his other

²⁸ See the discussion on page 245 of Yehuda Bauer's *Jews for Sale, Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994)

contacts. The second reason is that his talking partner, Dr. Klaus, may have been a much more complex mystery man than Adler-Rudel imagined. In an unpublished talk submitted to a conference on Cryptological History organised by the National Security Agency, I have provided some detailed arguments which suggest that Klaus may in reality have been a Soviet double agent planted on German intelligence. If this is correct, then there is no doubt whatsoever that the Soviet Legation was exactly informed of what transpired between Kleist and his talking partners in Sweden. Curiously enough, one of Klaus' "handlers" in Stockholm was none other than the self-same Spitchkin [cover name *ABRAM*] who appeared on the scene in Budapest in March 1945.²⁹

Now as it happens, Dr. Kleist and his friends were not – repeat not- the only potentially dangerous talking partner whom Adler-Rudel was to meet in Stockholm during this closing stage of the war while Raoul Wallenberg was serving in Budapest. There was another person, equally suspicious, who suddenly popped up in Stockholm but one who had a much more concrete Hungarian connection. Indeed, he was a Hungarian and an important member of Hungarian Intelligence. I refer, of course, to Ferenc (more familiarly Ferry or Feri) Bagyoni. Bagyoni, like his boss, Colonel Hatz, was – to put it mildly- a man of fluid loyalty and several faces. Like Hatz, he combined routine liaison with the *Abwehr* with membership of the OSS DOGWOOD group of agents³⁰ in the Balkans. In addition, he took on the occasional well paid courier job on behalf of the Jewish Agency.³¹ Indeed, as he was at pains to persuade the Swedish authorities on his arrival, it was the hope of expanding these connections with the Western Allied intelligence services and with the Jews which had brought him to Stockholm in November 1944. In part, this may well have been true. What we do know, as the telegram from Menachem Bader in Istanbul to Adler-Rudel in Stockholm shows (see appendix), is that the Jewish Agency were well aware of Bagyoni's trip and were anxious that Adler-Rudel should meet him, seeing in this an opportunity to back up and insure Kasztner's position in Budapest.³²

All this is reasonably familiar stuff, at least to Israeli Holocaust experts, and has been written about for example by Messrs Bauer³³ and Friling³⁴. These scholars (and here I would also add the name of Shlomo Aronson), like the present author, are all extremely

29 See the entry on ABRAM in *Excerpts from McKay's Notes on the Case of Raoul Wallenberg*, also available on this site. It would seem to me that someone like Storch who was much more actively involved with Klaus and Kleist and over a longer period, must have been an object of particular interest for the organs of Soviet Security, particularly because of his natural concern with the Baltic countries. He too maintained contacts with Iver Olsson and was one of the talking partners of Fritz Hesse in 1945, when that gentleman arrived in Stockholm on a bizarre "separate peace" assignment. How the Soviet Legation judged Storch's activities, would make interesting reading.

30 Bagyoni's covername was PINK.

31 In his contacts with Jewish Agency personnel, he made no secret of his anti-semitism. But he was happy to be employed by the Jewish Agency as a courier, provided the price was right.

32 There are countless books and articles touching on Kasztner's train and with Kasztner's negotiations with Eichmann and Becher.

33 Yehuda Bauer, *Jews for Sale, Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994)

34 Tuvia Friling, *Arrows in the Dark*, David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust, Vols. I and II, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005)

alive to the problems which arose because Jewish rescue efforts became repeatedly entangled with intelligence and security matters. They are also well aware of Bagyoni's dubious reputation. What they probably are not aware of, is the *extent* to which Bagyoni's arrival in Sweden caused alarm bells to be sounded in several intelligence agencies.

Let us begin with an obvious question. How did Bagyoni obtain permission from the Germans to travel to Stockholm in the first place? Clearly, he had to sell them the scheme, otherwise permission would not have been granted. Essentially what he did was to undertake a mission sponsored, among others, by Wilhelm Höttl of the SD in Hungary to go to Sweden on a joint Hungarian- German intelligence operation of intelligence-gathering aimed *against* the Western Allied countries. For this purpose, he was supplied with a radio and a cryptosystem for communication. When he arrived in Stockholm, Bagyoni not only got in touch with people like Adler-Rudel and Rabbi Ehrenpreis. He also made contact with Dr. Karl Heinz Krämer, a man who was not only reckoned a star agent by the Abwehr by virtue of his reports on the British aircraft industry, but was also a hidden hand and personal acquaintance of Walter Schellenberg, head of SD *Ausland*. With such a merit list, Krämer himself was soon to become the chief target of British counterespionage in Sweden and his movements and communications were continuously monitored. The net effect of Bagyoni's appearance in Stockholm was to place him in the very spotlight of surveillance and to raise questions about his true mission in this northern outpost. Since Krämer at an earlier stage of his career had worked closely with Hungarian intelligence, this only served to further stimulate British curiosity. The ironical thing was that while the British were trying to fathom what Bagyoni was up to, their opposite numbers in German intelligence, Krämer and his colleague Wenzlau, were doing exactly the same and firing off messages to Berlin requesting further clarification about the new arrival. In Krämer's as ever astute view, Bagyoni appeared to know far too much about sensitive German operations in the Balkans and moreover, there was the haunting fear that the good Ferri - all appearances to the contrary - might be working for the Russians.

The world of espionage is a murky business where it is helpful to think five ways at once, but fortunately in this essay we do not require to clear up all the mysteries. It suffices merely to point to the immense suspicion with which Bagyoni was regarded by Western intelligence services. And thus we come to the critical question: is there the slightest reason whatsoever to believe that Soviet intelligence would have been *less* interested to find out Bagyoni's talking partners in the Swedish capital? What we therefore have to reckon with is that - not for the first or only time - people like Adler-Rudel who were wholly concerned with humanitarian issues, inevitably ran the risk of compromising themselves in the eyes of watching security services by the company they kept. People like Kleist, Klaus and Bagyoni, came with a *Caveat Emptor* label attached. The fear was naturally that in trying to achieve *their* purpose, rescuers, like Adler-Rudel in their desperation and exasperation, might go behind the backs of their Allied sponsors by allowing themselves to be incautiously talked into entering into underhand agreements with German negotiators, which ran counter to the proclaimed

united front of Allied policy and perhaps even threatened either to prolong the war on at least one front or placed the lives of allied combatants at risk. After all, this had been one of the principal stumbling blocks with the “Jews for trucks” deal communicated through Joel Brand.

Conclusion.

When we study Adler-Rudel's wartime journeys to Sweden, we find that many of the chief actors involved in Raoul Wallenberg's later mission to Budapest, had already been brought into play. We have highlighted in particular the role played by Ebba Bonde in trying to further Adler-Rudel's aims with the consequence that her brother Jacob Wallenberg, was persuaded to lend his influential support. Similarly, we observe that it was the Americans at State Department level who were prepared most strongly to back Adler-Rudel's project for rescuing children, with an opportune endorsement that helped to bring about some change of heart in the ranks of the Swedish Government. All this happened in 1943. Although Adler-Rudel's mission of that year failed to achieve its specific purpose, it can surely be said to have paved the way for later and more successful efforts, such as the rescue of the Danish Jewish community and Raoul Wallenberg's work on behalf of the War Refugee Board in Budapest. Finally we have shown how even in the case of Adler-Rudel's visits to Sweden, humanitarian efforts became entangled, perhaps inevitably, with the concerns of the intelligence and security services of several of the belligerent nations.

Note on the Documentary appendix.

The documents reproduced are the following.

1. German wartime cypher telegram intercepted and read by Swedish Signal Intelligence, relating to Countess Ebba Bonde From my own collection of intercepts.
2. Telegram from Raoul Wallenberg to Lauer stating that he was unable to find Fietowicz's address. I am grateful to Mr. Georg Sessler for generously drawing my attention to this telegram and several other in the Wallenberg-Lauer *Mellaneuropeiska* correspondence.
3. Extract from information incoming to OKW and supplied by the source 'George Wood' to Allen Dulles regarding what Fietowicz confessed . Available on line at
http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/MC019.09/Reports_English_1943-1977_and_undated/19440411_0000033487.pdf
4. Telegram sent by Kucera, Stockholm to the Czech Exile Government in London, reporting Adler-Rudel's approach to Kollontay. This is already available online at
http://www.archive.org/stream/robertweltsch_29_reel29#page/n483/mode/1up
as part of the Robert Weltsch Collection , 1770-1997 at the Center for Jewish History site at <http://access.cjh.org/home.php?type=repository&term=TGVv#1>
5. Two telegrams from Menachem Bader of the Jewish Agency in Istanbul to Adler-Rudel in Stockholm concerning Ferenc Bagyoni. CZA, Jerusalem, Signum 140/347.

1585

H

MEDDELANDE

Överlämn den 18 / 2 1943

Serie C 75

Nr 680

Avsänd den 17 / 2 1943 kl

Mott kl 1900

Tidsnr 1850

Tjanm

Till AW Berlin

Från DG Stockholm Nr 165

Mit G - Schreiber.

An Auswärtig Berlin

442/17.

Auf fernmündliche Anfrage des Gesandten von Grundherr:

Schwedische Staatsangehörige Ebba Gräfin Bonde, geb. Wallenberg, geboren 21.11.1896 in Stockholm, ist wegen ihrer mehr oder weniger salonbolschewistischen Einstellung wiederholt in Erscheinung getreten. Sie hat sich auch in antifaschistischen Vereinigungen betätigt (vergl. u. a. Schriftbericht vom 20.11.39 - A 22991) und war mit früher in Stockholm, alsdann in Moskau tätigen jüdischen amerikanischen Botschafter Steinhardt nahe befreundet. Mit Rücksicht auf ihre Einstellung ist ein von ihr im März 1941 gestellter Antrag auf Einreise nach Norwegen hier seinerzeit abgelehnt worden. Gräfin Bonde hat im Januar 1943 Studienreise nach Karelien unternommen und in einem Interview hierüber erwähnt, sie beabsichtige baldmöglichst nach Genf zu reisen, um dem internationalen Roten Kreuz neue Pläne für Finnlandhilfe vorzulegen. Antrag auf Erteilung deutschen Durchreisegesichtvermerks ist bei Gesandtschaft bisher nicht gestellt worden.

Dankwort

Kaz

2.

KÖNIGLICH
SCHWEDISCHE GESANDTSCHAFT

Budapest, 28. Okt. 1944.

F.

Firma

Mellaneuropeiska Handels A.-B.,
Stockholm.


Betr. Eduard Fietowicz.

Zurückkommend auf Ihr wertres Schreiben v. 28.3.
in obiger Angelegenheit, teile ich Ihnen mit, dass es mir
leider nicht möglich war, die Adresse von Herrn Fietowicz
auszufinden und ich ihm deshalb auch keine Fragebögen zu-
senden konnte.

Betr. Familie Paul Sternberg u. István Kertész.

Diese beiden Familien haben bereit ihre Schutz-
pässe erhalten.

Ich empfehle mich mit dem Ausdruck meiner
vorzüglichsten Hochachtung



3.

(22) HUNGARY

OKW March 27, 1944.

Fietowicz, Free Poland's representative to Hungary, has been arrested by the Germans and confessed that the Poles tried by all means to draw Hungary to the Allied side. Negotiations took place with the Hungarian military attache Szatoy in Lisbon. From Italy Polish troops were to be sent to Hungary to take part as partisans of the Allies. In Hungary major-general Jean Kollontay-Rzednicki took part. He was arrested and shot by the Germans. Tibor v. Eckardt sent information from the U. S. to Count Bethlen ~~xxxx~~ in Budapest that a) Horthy should oppose Germans, b) No more Hungarian troops should be sent to the front and c) Home and foreign policy should be agreed upon with Washington. Bethlen has fled and is in hiding. *Hayis are trying to track him down.*

4.

Nr.: 73/vertr./44
 Sache: Hilfe der internierten Juden
 Dr.V.K./EE.

Stockholm, den 20.Sept.1944
 Stempel: Aussenministerium eingelangt
 am 3.Okt.44 Nr.8261

V e r t r a u l i c h

An das Aussenministerium der CSR
in L o n d o n.

Zum telegraphischen Erlass Nr.19275/44:

Herr Adler-Rudel hat mich im Buero fuer eine kurze Zeit Freitag den 8.d.M.besucht. Ich habe ihm zu mir nachhause zum Mittagessen eingeladen, weil ich einen Anfall von akutem Rheumatismus hatte, fuer Dienstag, den 12.d.M.

Adler-Rudel erzaehtle von London und im allgemeinen ueber seine ^{himon} ~~Sendung~~ in Schweden. Er selbst macht sich keine grossen Illusionen, weil die Hilfs-
 aktiona eingeleitet wird zum Zeitpunkt, wo es zu schon zu spaet ist und
 eine praktische Hilfe auch nicht mehr moeglich ist. Ich ~~magst ihm~~ ^{informierte} meiner-
 seits ~~sagte~~ ihm, vom Ergebnis meiner Intervention beim Gesandten Boheman,
 dass die Schweden unseren Juden in Ungarn helfen ^{wollen}.

Daraufhin sagte mir Adler-Rudel, dass die wertvollsten juedischen
 Elemente ^{jetzt} ~~hier~~ in Theresienstadt sind. Dort ^{beinhaltet sich} ~~ist~~ die Majoritaet der juedischen
 Intelligenz, darunter einige Personen von hervorragendem Niveau. Waere es nicht
moeglich die Russen zu bitten, dass sie ihre Kriegsoperationen so einrichten,
dass sie sich so bald als moeglich des Theresienstaedter Lagers bemaechtigen?
 Adler-Rudel ist sich dessen bewusst, dass in diesem Wunsche viel Phantastisches
 ist, aber es ist tatsaechlich der einzige Weg zu einer wirklichen Hilfe.
Koennte ich Ihnen behilflich sein, dass ^{ich} ~~Sie~~ jemand in hiesiger Soviet-
legation in dieser Sache empfaengt? Ich versprach ihm alles was in meiner
 Macht ist zu tun, ~~um~~ sobald mein Fieber vorbeigeht. Zwei Tage spaeter
 habe ich den Begantionsrat Semenov ~~zum~~ ersucht zu mir nachhause zu kommen
 und erzaehtle ihm den Inhalt des Gespraeches mit A-R und ersuchte ihn, Frau
 Botschafter Kollontay zu informieren und ihr die Sache zur Erwaegung vorzu-
 legen. Am naechsten Tag, abends den 15.d.M., hat mir schon A-R telefoniert,
 dass er schon ^{schon} bei Frau Kollontay war, dass sie fuer die Sache das lebhafteste
 Interesse gezeigt hat und ihm versprochen hat, dass sie selbst die Bitte der
 Jewish Agency mit ihrer Empfehlung ihrer Regierung vorlegen wird.

Dr.W.Kucera

Vor der Ablage nochmals Dr.Frischer
 zur Information.

5.1.

**TELEGRAM.**

KUNGL. TELEGRAFVERKET.



fur=hba

ddd snd752 beyoglu 22w 28/9 1410

=urgent= adler rudel grandhotel

stkm 544.

VIA SVERIGERADIO

recommend serous consulation ferry bagyoni grandhotel
for ezra hagar wired same ehrenpreis stop cable perapalas
mendel bader

5.2.



TELEGRAM.

KUNGL. TELEGRAFVERKET.



Exp. av elg=hba

sn1181 beyoglu 27w 29/9 2125

VIA SVERIGERADIO

adler rudel grandhotel stockholm

your 22/9 re my yesterday about ferry stop anyway his influence
 may insure kasztners situation stop please inform all steps and
massamatan

bader

1. equal
2. 1000
3. 1000 at 1000