I. INTRODUCTION:

In her analysis of the various official and independent investigations into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg in the *The New York Review of Books*¹, Soviet expert Dr. Amy Knight’s concluded with my statement: “If one places one’s ear to the ground and listens, one will understand ... that there is too much insistence, and has been over time, that there is ‘nothing to be found’ and that this case is now ‘history’ – when in fact the real investigation has barely begun.”

On the negative side, the reasons for making such a statement remain the same as they were in January 2001 when our reports were first presented to the international community. In spite of the remarkable degree of cooperation shown by the Russian side, fundamental registries and files have yet to be produced that would provide clear-cut yes/no answers to evaluate reports of Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Gulag.² Although we were able to identify with precision the numbered sentenced prisoners who might have been Wallenberg, his driver or a fellow Hungarian – or ‘unoccupied cells’ which correspond to eyewitness reports of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison’s corpus 2 – the Russians’ failure to identify those numbers or occupants and/or to produce the relevant registries, isolation lists, or corpus cards has essentially blocked the most direct course on our side to determining Wallenberg’s fate.

The fact that the eyewitness sightings for the past thirty years, classified in Sweden, were not available during the existence of the Working Group was also a handicap which limited the investigation to a ‘beginning phase.’ Without access to either these Russian or Swedish sets of documents, my independent work from 1997-2000 was not only confined to 1945-1970, but remained inconclusive within that time period. As a result my interim report focused on the more substantiated question of *Liquidatsia* – i.e., Death or Disappearance in 1947 – rather than the collective results of verified eyewitness testimonies even though this was my primary objective in pursuing this work. This ongoing verification, strengthened by evidence provided by the transport and medical investigations, was reserved for the Follow Up Phase. All requests for prisoner files or proposals I have made to the Swedish Government to be presented to the Russian side over the past year relate to these objectives and/or are part of the follow-up for Dr.

¹ September 2001, Pages 47-51.
² Our first request remains the Butyrka Prison incoming registry for the period March 30/31 to April 5, 1950 when the prisoners who sat with Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder, 1945-1947, were sent from Lefortovo or Lubyanka to begin their pre-sentencing stage of interrogations under the jurisdiction of the Second Main Directorate.
Makinen/Ari Kaplan or my methods of live and archival search into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

Before launching on this follow-up on-site search in Russia, however, it is necessary to acquaint both governments with some of the findings of the past year. The testimonies discussed herein represent about 85% of the 1945-1970 eyewitness reports and an unknown percentage of those from the 1971-Present recently declassified time period. They provide a sufficient sample to show why a more directed, systematic and synergetic approach is necessary to resolving the Wallenberg case and that of other Swedes ‘lost in the Gulag.’

An Objective Pursuit

On the positive side, however, there is much to be said for the independent work that has emerged over the past year, building upon the very important discoveries which were made during the existence of the Swedish-Russian Working Group and in preparation for the eyewitness, transport and medical studies. We are at a critical crossroads for it is only now that we can begin to launch a truly objective investigation, one which – if handled correctly and with the proper cooperation – could come to fruition in a short amount of time. That such an objective, cooperative approach is now possible I attribute to the following factors:

1. The various analyses under the aegis of the Swedish-Russian Working Group which have laid the foundation, or grid, for evaluating any and all claims regarding sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, whether they come from the side of the authorities or of former prisoners. Through extensive hard work and documentation we have established a context – so that any eyewitness report or official claim can be measured against the norm and/or exception in prison procedures and regulations of that time. As this work also clarified how key decisions related to the disappearance or execution of an important prisoner were carried out by the highest collective level of leadership, we are all the more confident that there exists a paper trail both for the decision-making process and the carrying out of the final order.

There is now a widening public perception that the evidence turned over by the Soviets/Russians is proof that some portion of Wallenberg’s personal and archival investigation file must exist. Through my analysis related to the issue of possessions, we face also the question of a prisoner’s debit/credit accounts as another important portion of Wallenberg’s paper trail, at least until 1989 when his currency was returned to the next of kin. Should any of our work in the forthcoming follow up investigation establish the place of death – we will need to consult the regional death registries as well.

Most importantly, we have shown that even if such Wallenberg files (the ‘smoking gun’) are not produced voluntarily by the Russians, Wallenberg’s trail may be reconstructed through the painstaking work of evaluating the eyewitness reports against official

3 For example, the Smoltsov Document released with the Gromyko Memorandum in 1957 or the return of Wallenberg’s papers, identification card and currencies handed over to the next of kin in 1989.
records. To achieve this end, the Swedish government invested considerable funds not only in supporting my research into the prisoner files but for the computerized study of the cell occupancy of Corpus 2 during the 1945 – 1970 time period, generated by former Vladimir prisoner Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan – with the cooperation of the MVD. This system has already shown how much can be achieved to verify eye witness reports by systematically making use of the most basic prison procedures in a particular setting and time period. The findings published in the Makinen/Kaplan independent report are only the ‘first fruits’ of this invaluable system the Swedish-Russian Working Group constructed for ongoing use. Unfortunately neither Marvin Makinen nor Ari Kaplan have had the time to develop further applications so I, in my independent work over the past year, have gone over their findings and set forth new queries related to specific sightings in the early Sixties, such as the Svartz/Myasnikov controversy and the recently uncovered de Jaeger/Reydon testimony about a prisoner receiving ‘special treatment’ across the hall from them in 1962 whom they believe to be Swedish. These will be implemented when Ari Kaplan and I can schedule a trip to Moscow. (In the

4 These Vladimir Corpus 2 studies were most successful in the instances of ; the testimonies of V. Vorobei and others regarding Makinen’s cellmate, Kruminish, which would indicate that Kruminish may have been Wallenberg’s cellmate during the period of the Gromyko Memorandum (1957); the report by V. I. Larina, a longtime employee of Corpus 2, who repeatedly identified an anonymous prisoner as Wallenberg and who stated that he sat across the hall from the prisoner Osmak when he died (1960); the testimony of Terelya regarding a figure he believes to have been Wallenberg in Vladimir in 1969 (and for whom he provided a forensic drawing which matches computerized aged photographs later developed by the FBI and the Center for Missing and Exploited Children). In addition to this, Makinen and Kaplan were able to track down the links by which earlier reports of Wallenberg in Vladimir were passed through a Russian prisoner to Gogiberidse and others who remained certain of Wallenberg’s presence in Vladimir. The sighting attributed to Brugger, which Makinen/Kaplan rejected on a number of grounds, I re-introduce in my text because their work was based on a number of errors/miscalculations. In addition, a number of new sightings which have come to our attention as well as queries which could narrow the gap simply by employing the system to further focus our analysis demand that we return to the data held in Moscow and Vladimir to complete the research into Wallenberg’s presence in Vladimir Prison or under the authorities of the Vladimir KGB.

5 Please note that three sightings included in the Makinen/Kaplan report are now being reconsidered because of my recent work: Brugger (August 1954), Cumish via Voss (sometime in 1954) and Schoggl (January-March 1955), all of which have been strengthened by returning to the original texts. In the case of Brugger, there is indication that he was taken out of his cell at some point and returned to it in October 1954. Furthermore, there was an error in the reading of I.J. Goldstein’s card who died in October 1953 and therefore was not an occupant of the neighboring cell II-20 in August 1954. The question now is whether this cell was occupied by one person (pseudonym) or appears unoccupied, in either case corresponding to Wallenberg’s alleged statement that he was ‘in the cell alone.’ At the same time I am challenging the presence of Vasilyev in von Kleist’s cell as of July 1954, as it is out of sync with the sequence and type of prisoners who were placed there. This requires a review of his card and of his prisoner file. In the case of Cumish, it should be noted – as in the case of Schoggl and the alleged Wallenberg who met in Corpus III, not II – that the witness was soon to be released. Voss left Cumish on December 24, 1954 for Butyrka and was in Germany by early January 1955. His conversation with Cumish was not only very fresh in his mind, but may have been intentional. Schoggl said that the prisoner he claims to be Wallenberg at first refused to speak to him when he was brought into the sick cell in Corpus III, but when he understood that Schoggl as an Austrian was soon to be released, changed his mind and confided in him.
meantime I have made a trip to Chicago and had several meetings with Ari Kaplan at ARK Project expense to further the new phase of the work.)

The ‘bottom line’ for laying the foundation to evaluate the sightings and other reports is that we, the independents, have been the first to make successful use of the ‘empty’ or ‘unidentified spaces’ as a working tool. By gathering sufficient data and organizing it in such a way that we were able to work the vacancies which noted an ‘exceptional prisoner’ against the norm, we have greatly narrowed the gap which has kept us from the truth of Wallenberg’s fate. We have gone far – but not far enough. Further follow-up will narrow this even more, but ultimately the final result continues to depend in very precise ways on Russian cooperation.

2. For the first time in 57 years all the eyewitness sightings of the 1945-1970 time period to be found on the Utrikesdepartementet CD rams or produced by the independents – are being systematized into one coherent system. First, they are being entered into a computer data base to cluster in time and place, so that the patterns of movement and standstill of the prisoner or prisoners believed to be Wallenberg emerge more clearly. What on the surface has appeared as scattered or random sightings – more a reflection of their handling than their truth – may now prove to be a long-overlooked sighting by many related and unrelated eyewitnesses.\(^6\) This shows us which sightings to target and also enables us to define the most straightforward steps for determining the identity of the prisoner in question. Secondly, each report is being considered as part of a synergy – in depth on its own merits, in relation to our knowledge of the Gulag system, and in relation to the other sightings. This more scientific approach is very different than the investigation carried out during the Cold War period when too many reports were discounted by skeptical officials in the West with little-to-no knowledge of the Gulag whose only criteria were the personal impression given by the witness and/or how the Wallenberg case overall effected Swedish/Soviet policy considerations. To my view, this contributed to the great emphasis on making an icon out of Raoul Wallenberg the humanitarian while ignoring the signals sent to his Government that he was still in captivity and requiring help.

**Running an Investigation from both a Practical and Political Perspective**

In my speech “Only One Truth”, presented to the U. S. Congressional International Relations Committee, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and the American Jewish

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\(^6\) These instances are, at present, reports of Wallenberg’s ongoing presence in Lubyanka from 1948-1949 (which could imply that he remained in Moscow and was sentenced at approximately the same time as others in his original contingent, namely in 1951-52); interrogations for a period of time in Lwow, Kiev and possibly Leningrad, for which we have three or more reports, the date ranging from 1947 to 1948, which could correspond to the period when Wallenberg’s whereabouts are unknown, either before or after the alleged death date of 1947; a number of reports of Wallenberg and/or a Swede in Inta, Abez, Vorkuta, Khalymer-Yu (all of which fall within the same general region) from 1947 until 1952; the report of the Bratsk Poles which resonates with other reports from the Taishet, Ozerny, Amur/Khalymer Yu regions; three to five credible reports of Wallenberg in Verchne-Uralisk isolation prison, 1952-1954; and a number of new reports of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison 1954, and in the early Sixties.

Mesinai

April 4, 2002
Committee in Washington on February 13, 2002, I made the following point: “What is tragic is that no further attempts were made to cluster the eyewitness reports and present them as evidence – after the initial success in 1955/56,” leading to the Gromyko Memorandum. For the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 (which claimed that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory) in favor of the Gromyko came about precisely because returning prisoners of war who sat with Wallenberg and his colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, confirmed each other’s accounts. This occurred during one of the most critical phases of the Cold War. Still the Swedish government submitted these testimonies and the Soviets realized they were of such strength, they would have to amend their position. Were these the only testimonies regarding Wallenberg that reinforced and confirmed each other? By no means, as we will see in the tables in Part III below. Nor, if the handling of the sightings had been systematic with recognition of their judicial importance, would a computer have been necessary to show that a number of unrelated witnesses (diverse sources) have seen a prisoner they believe to be Wallenberg in the same time and place or region. So why wasn’t an effort made to continue to build and act upon the body of evidence pointing to Wallenberg alive in the Soviet Gulag? Why give up in a position of strength?

The Handling of Evidence

For this, or any investigation to work effectively, it is essential that the investigator have at her disposal the full body of testimonies, a ‘full deck of cards’. With this as a first step, the essential and relevant facts are then placed into a straightforward, yet synergetic system that strips the sightings and the summaries regarding them of speculation, interpretation or ‘invented explanations.’ The evidence has not been treated this way in the past – in part because the reports were often so fragmentary their value was elusive, especially when isolated one report from the next. As long as each eyewitness report is kept in a vacuum – written down and filed away without any expert’s analysis, and especially without placing it in the context of the system and other reports – the process will be as it is even now, slow-moving and relatively inert.

This report will show some of the focal points that have emerged in my study from the 1945-1970 time period. (See Part III. CLUSTERS AND CONFLICTS). The lack of testimonies from the 1971-2001 time period -- invaluable information that could eliminate and clarify Wallenberg’s paper trail extending into the present era by bringing the later sightings to bear against earlier conflicts in movement -- is again slowing down the results. My goal is a report that goes into the late Eighties – or beyond, if that is appropriate to the actual facts of Raoul Wallenberg’s captivity in the Soviet Union. This means simply that no sighting will be overlooked because of its ‘late date’ any more than it should have been because the witness was reported to have seen Wallenberg or a Swede sometime after July 1947.

I must also add that preparing these sightings to be included in the system has been time consuming. It is not enough to repeat what is written on the page or pass a testimony on without question. In many cases, errors have been made not only as a result of the
witness’ memory but by officials compiling several versions of the same report, so that
details like date, corpus, cell number begin to differ from each other. 7 Not only does this
confuse later investigators, but the witness’ credibility is diminished almost immediately
when it seems that he or she is stating one thing one day and something else tomorrow.
In certain instances it can be shown that this is not the result of the eyewitness’
uncertainty about the facts but of those handling their testimonies altering them slightly
through successive summaries.

Certainly, in retrospect and out of context, the witness will be the one blamed for
the error– not the official who wrote down the report. The end result of such
summaries is that the facts have been essentially disassociated from the most crucial
points of information in the original transcripts. The classic example of this is the
report that 26/28 Sebastapolsky Prospekt, a standard medical institutional facility of the
70s with several floors and a hospital industrial elevator where Albert Hollosy claims to
have seen Wallenberg in a locked ward on an upper floor in the Spring of 1981, was a
‘small house.’ But these divergences exist everywhere in the material at hand – which
necessitates the careful review of each report for the resolution of such contradictions. To
one who knows the system, and the place – some of these divergences stand out quite
readily because of the logic of the system. (Fortunately, also, through the Vladimir
Corpus 2 computer system and my work in the prisoner files, we now have enough data
at our disposal to correct essential factors like cell numbers or periods of occupancy so
that we can proceed independent of what has been written down by those who
interviewed them but could not make sufficient sense of the facts.)

While we can attribute these mistakes to confusion on the part of the unknowing
official in the West – the fact remains that the failure to cluster the sightings and
submit them as a body of evidence has had tragic consequences for Raoul
Wallenberg and other Swedes in captivity. This will become very apparent when, in
a few months, the inter-related eyewitness testimonies (1945- 2001) stand on their
own as a body of evidence, in most instances, against the alleged 1947 death date.
They will show that much of the mystery can be, and could have been, resolved by
taking very basic steps. At this point, lack of requisite action by those responsible
for Wallenberg’s return -- when acting on the evidence could have made a critical
difference to Wallenberg’s freedom -- will become a historical fact. This cannot be
confined to the 1945-47 period, or blamed on Soderblum alone. Unless it can be
proven that from an early point the Government of Sweden was privileged to
‘verified knowledge’ that justified their failure to respond, the fact that no effort
was made to inter-relate the eyewitness testimonies and present them to the Soviet
Government or international courts of law speaks for itself.

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7 Another common mistake is the confusion in wording which fails to distinguish between the date that the
report was made from one witness to another as opposed to the date of the original sighting. (For example,
a sentence that reads “The witness told me he saw Wallenberg walking in the corridor in 1954,” would
appear to mean that Wallenberg walked in the corridor at that time, when in fact the secondary witness is
giving the date when he was told by the source of his encounter with Wallenberg.
The question will then be asked whether this ‘isolation’ of reports was a deliberate attempt to devaluate the eyewitness testimonies. As I have noted in “Only One Truth”, this could have been a conscious or unconscious response to the strategy set into motion by the Gromyko Memorandum which states, without proof, that a man named ‘Walenberg’ died in his cell in Lubyanka in 1947. For no sighting alone, no witness, could withstand the impact of an official response from the Soviet Government. Any witness coming forth after escaping or being repatriated to the West would have to prove that the Soviet Government was lying, impossible without access to the kind of documentation we are only beginning to study now. In spite of the psychological challenges generated by the Soviet denial, the report of two or more unrelated witnesses – in many cases three to five – of Wallenberg in Inta or Verchne-Uralsk, are quantitatively as valid as those of the primary witnesses (Richter, Loyda, Pelkonen, Huber, Hille, Kitschman) who stated that they sat with Wallenberg and Langfelder in Moscow prisons in 1945 or carried on wall tapping communications until early 1947. Like the many reports of Wallenberg still in Lubyanka/Lefortovo and/or Butyrka in late 1947, 1948 to 1952, they should have been addressed. The fact that the Soviets seemingly refused to reopen discussions – other than to foster a debate between Doctors Svartz and Myasnikow -- did not help.

As we are now at a time of improved cooperation, I have tried to establish as many of these clusters as possible before beginning our pilot with the Russian archivists – so neither side need waste precious time and resources but can concentrate on the fulfillment of a prepared list of specific requests. This I hope will eliminate or greatly reduce the need to keep coming back to the Russian authorities to complete this work. (See Pages 20 and 21 below).

3. The third factor contributing to the objectivity of the current investigation is Susanne Berger’s study of what I refer to as “Anonymous or Alternative Swedes.” In a Working Group Meeting in the early phase, a Russian military historian gave the number of missing Swedes as, I believe, 110 – a surprisingly high account if we compare it with the existing list. Here, for example, the independent investigators are operating at a disadvantage when they proceed with the premise that the only Swedish diplomat with Red Cross connections involved in rescue work arrested in Eastern Europe and missing in the Soviet Gulag is Raoul Wallenberg. Ludwig Hunoldt’s testimony that sometime after his arrival in Vladimir prison in January 1950,

8 The only exception to this was the defection of an investigator – an Eastern European nation’s “Beria man”—in relation to yet another ‘disappearance.’ With the execution of Beria, Dekanozow and others in 1953, this investigator who was stationed in Poland packed his briefcase and surrendered to the Americans in Berlin. The investigator, as the person in charge of the case, provided the authorities with every detail of the American prisoner’s capture, the charges against him, his health and whereabouts up to the point of his recent defection. No such investigator came forth in Wallenberg’s case – which could be as much an indication of the investigator’s fate as of Wallenberg. (See, for example, the testimony of Karolyi Remenyi).

9 Susanne Berger will be preparing a report of her own separately from my work which was born specifically out of my research on the Wallenberg case, including eyewitness testimonies. Hers will include other Swedes known to have been in the Gulag, as well as those on the Government list.
he shared cell 57 in Corpus II with a Swede named Ericsson (who had a wife in Upssala and who could not understand how he, as the citizen of a neutral country, should be detained) puts a very different slant on our search. For Ericsson, according to Hunoldt, had been arrested in the fall of 1944 in either Sofia or Bucharest together with two other Swedes who were also supposed to be in Vladimir at that point. Hunoldt remembered that Ericsson told him that the three had worked for an organization affiliated with the Red Cross and had the task of handling the German diplomatic Legations in the Balkans (mit der Abwicklung der deutschen Gesandschaften betreut). In connection with these activities, they were arrested by the Soviets and taken to Lubyanka, sentenced in 1948 or 1949 to a term of 25 years for espionage and sent to Vladimir. By Hunoldt’s estimation, Ericsson was on the verge of death in 1950. Neither Hunoldt’s card nor that of Ericsson were found by Dr. Makinen for his Corpus 2 selection. However, it should be of interest to the Swedish Government that from January 6, 1950 until December 3, 1951 Cell II-57 remained ‘unoccupied.’

In addition to Hunoldt’s report on these three Swedes, there are reports of one – and perhaps two other trios of Swedes. The latter did not seem to have undergone interrogation in Moscow, from which we can presume that they sent directly to the East, possibly by plane, and sentenced regionally. In addition there is a report from Vorkuta of three Swedes, at least two of whom were reportedly air force officers. Tamvelius’ report from Inta regarding his encounter with a lone Swede in the Fall of 1947, whom he claimed was named something akin to “Raul Wallberg”, refers also to a group of twelve swedes.

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10 The text also says Budapest which is historically improbable as it was not occupied by Soviet troops in the Fall of 1944.

11 One might consider some of the reports by Kalinski and others of Wallenberg dying in the early Fifties in Vladimir or in Gorky Internal Prison. These may have been based on the description of a secret Swedish prisoner, presumed to be Wallenberg, but in effect any of these three prisoners. It should be noted that the only other statement of Wallenberg in Vladimir in 1950 came from Bruveris in the name of Shulgin. Here we must ask if the information should read that Bruveris was told by Shulgin in 1950 that Wallenberg was in Vladimir, or if Wallenberg was in Vladimir in 1950 (or both).

12 These prisoners are among a group, some of whom were actually repatriated, who stated they had been held at Vladimir but whose cards were never found. (This list is attached to this Report as Appendix X).

13 According to the testimony of the architect Karl Kosch who sat with them and the numbered prisoner Meiner in quarantine, these three prisoners were brought to Moscow via Krasnogorsk.

14 See, for example, Fredrick Bayer reported a conversation with a Tank Cdr., Lt. Helmut (Last Name Unknown) who had later been working for the Americans in Leipzig. Helmut claimed that he had shared a cell with Wallenberg when he received the charges against him in 1948 and was forced to sign. Bayer’s further testimony alludes to a group of three official looking young men returning from Shatsk (Ryazan Region) with their steamer trunks. In this case, there is no certainty that they are Swedes – because Bayer did not recognize their language -- hence the statement “possibly three.”

15 The Military archivists have emphasized that it is important for me to study the records of those who were sent into the USSR by plane. As effort must be made to identify any Swedes who were flown, as opposed to taken by train, from Central/Eastern Europe (the Danubian region).
Swedes who were part of a ‘common case.’ Tamvelius had told a number of his fellow prisoners of war about these thirteen Swedes while together in camp.

There exist also a number of reports of encounters with single Swedes, including at least one journalist in Vorkuta. Perhaps because of the publicity surrounding the case in the West and even in the USSR, the witnesses themselves may believe the Swede they have encountered to be Raoul Wallenberg. In addition to this, there are reports of a man – of whatever nationality – who was wealthy and traveled under the name of Van den Berg or the equivalent. Clarifying the movements of this Baron is necessary to determine if he is the same man – or different from – the Van den Berg described by Vorobyov-Vorobei when he told Marvin Makinen in August 1963 that Kruminsh “sat with all the important prisoners. He sat with Powers, he sat with you Marvin, and he sat with the Swedish prisoner ‘Van den berg.’”

The discovery and partial identification of the “alternative Swedes” whose profiles are similar to that of Wallenberg enables us to now be more objective in our study. Previously, if a prisoner had a name close to that of Wallenberg, this added considerable weight to the testimony, at least if one believed that this referred only to Raoul Wallenberg. In this light, the request to the Russians for a) their list of Swedes taken and/or lost in the Gulag; and b) for any prisoners whose name is or resembles that of Wallenberg – (such as Van den Berg) -- has considerably more urgency. An important starting point would be any and all information on Rudolf Wallenberg, alleged to have died a prisoner in Vorkuta, whose presence there may have led to Michael Demesco’s friend Helmut Schneider’s statement: “It was common knowledge that Wallenberg was in Vorkuta.” Another such name is that of “Raul Wallenberger” who existed in the East, but whose language abilities did not match those of Raoul Wallenberg.

It stands to reason, from the ideal perspective of full Swedish-Russian cooperation that both sides should provide lists, registration cards and, in the Soviet case, prisoner files so that we can reconstruct the time, place and movements of the various Swedes, especially those by the same or approximate name, enabling us in short order to confine our search to those testimonies which could in reality be Wallenberg.

In addition to those Swedes who are identifiable, we have reports for a number of anonymous missing Swedes – whose physical or biographical description help us to

16 Gerhard Leibnitz refers to a Baron von Vanden Berg whom he meets in Vorkuta. Manfred refers to a Waldenberg and three Swedish officers (as opposed to officials).


18 See the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden’s Final Report for the Swedish-Russian Working Group, Page 177 where it states: Thirdly, it has been noted that there were other prisoners called Wallenberg in the Gulag system, such as Rudolf Wallenberg, who died in Vorkuta.”

19 Presented and to be discussed by Susanne Berger.
establish whether or not they are Wallenberg. In at least eight cases, we have reports referring to an official Swede affiliated either to a particular legation or Red Cross or both.\(^{20}\) Traditionally presumed to be Raoul Wallenberg, these reports now may refer to at least three – and possibly six or seven other Swedes.\(^{21}\) It should be further noted that Vilmos Langfelder, according to Huber, presented himself as a ‘Swedish diplomat’ in 1945 – meaning that he claimed the right to evoke that immunity. To the best of our knowledge, Grossheim-Krisko (the center of the confusion around the Turin/Uibel versus Brugger testimonies regarding Wallenberg’s presence in Vladimir) acknowledged himself as a former employee of the Swedish Legation’s Sector B but did not push himself on others as a “Swedish diplomat.”\(^{22}\) He also gave his ‘name’. The Swedish government’s interpretation that it was Grossheim-Krisko in the cell when Brugger tapped with Wallenberg, First Secretary of the Legation in Budapest does not hold because Grossheim-Krisko was freed in 1953, his presence in Soviet prisons ‘no longer necessary’ – whereas Brugger did not arrive in Vladimir until May of 1954.

There are at least two reports of a Swede held secretly in Lubyanka, one in 1946 prior to the time period we think Wallenberg became Prisoner Number 7 under investigation\(^ {23}\)

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\(^{20}\) These sightings include Kalianski (as opposed to Kalinski), Tamvelius, Pannwitz and Kalous in Inta, Huntildt, Kosch, Spuller, and Klausch.

\(^{21}\) It also should be noted that in documenting reports of Swedes in various camps, I now have compiled a chart which shows camps that do not appear in Shifrin. In addition to those who reportedly arrived in the region around Taishet, the greater number are in different locations in Krasnoyarsk Krai. The recent report from Ludmilla A. Trunova of January 2001 regarding a Swede seen in a psychiatric facility in the Barnaul region in 1975 is of interest, because it is in that same ‘neck of the woods.’ Where previously the sighting might be rejected because we know that Wallenberg was first in Moscow after his arrest while this official presumably had been there since his arrest in 1945, we now are in the potential position of considering and resolving two riddles at once if we consider the latter as an ‘alternative Swede.’ The same could be said of the report of Valentina Bulankina in relation to sightings from the Magadan and Hbarovsk Regions.

\(^{22}\) Grossheim-Krisko, a Norwegian/Russian dual national held as a foreign prisoner in strict isolation under the name Tomsen – the pseudonym assigned him by Per Anger -- fooled his Soviet interrogators for over half a decade as to his true identity. His sentence was extended because of it, and yet he persisted in identifying himself as “Tomsen”, his alias. Was he deliberately using the name by which he was known as an employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest to German/Austrian prisoners in case they were released before him?

\(^{23}\) Michael Demesco, during his detention in Lubyanka in 1946, told of a Swede who was being held under the jurisdiction of the 4th Directorate. This Swede was held secretly, not under his own name but a Russian pseudonym. This should be considered in light of the draft for the Gromyko Memorandum which stated that Raoul Wallenberg was held this way – which I had discounted because Wallenberg’s name appears on his prisoner of war card and in registries at least until March 11, 1947. Who is the Swede to whom Demesco refers? Did Demesco mean to say ‘4th Department’ instead of Directorate – i.e. Kartashov’s department under whose jurisdiction Wallenberg was in 1946? Or did he have privileged information when he said the 4th Directorate, Sudhaplatov’s ‘liquidation’ directorate. Alternatively, was there another Swede who came into Lubyanka prior to Wallenberg – most likely also arrested in Eastern Europe – who was held in secret from the beginning and never allowed to use his name? Did the arrest of this Swede in any way precipitate the arrest of Wallenberg? Was it this Swede, rather than Wallenberg, who died or was executed in 1947 or around that time? Did they have a similar name? In relation to this, it should be noted that Demesco stated that the man he believed to be Wallenberg ‘was killed in 1949, not as a Swedish official but under his Russian pseudonym.’ He does not say where. This testimony is
and the other in 1947-48. In addition to this we have the pseudonymous testimony of ‘ZAD’ who claims to have shared a cell with Wallenberg and Holosko sometime between 1947 and 1949, also in Lubyanka or Lefortovo Prisons. ‘ZAD’ claims not only to have known Raoul Wallenberg by name, but that Wallenberg shouted it in the corridor when he was led away from their cell. We must also acknowledge a growing number of reports of a Swedish diplomat in Butyrka prison starting in 1945 and extending into the Fifties.

Sorting out these different cases, particularly with the help of both Russian and Swedish authorities, could do much to contribute to the objectivity of our investigation. In particular, the existence of such an anonymous, strictly isolated Swede in Lubyanka/Lefortovo is a challenge to the already complicated question of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance, as opposed to execution, in 1947. Was there a man named ‘Walenberg’, first name unknown, date of birth not necessarily the same, who died in his cell – or was shot or killed by lethal injection – in 1947? Was another Wallenberg missing, a more prominent one held as a secret numbered prisoner? Or, are the witnesses encountering another Swede after July 1947 who they later interpret to have been Wallenberg because of the belief that this is the only Swede who is missing?

For our work to be conclusive, we must identify the ‘real Raoul.’

Policy toward Missing Swedes

In short, we are no longer dealing with the disappearance of ‘just one man’ and a host of other reports that were automatically rejected – psychologically because if the same

startling for a number of reasons. Demesco never left the USSR. As a stateless person who was considered an American, he was incarcerated four times and died himself there, separated from his Russian family. As he was adept at many languages and a dual national, Demesco had access both to Russian and foreign prisoners in prison and camps and therefore could gather his own information regarding the lives of other prisoners. It is of note that he does not repeat the testimony of his close friend Helmut Schneider who claimed that it was ‘common knowledge’ that Wallenberg was in Vorkuta, but gives a report of his own.

24 See the testimony of General Moser which states that a guard had told him that down the hall on the same floor three prisoners were being held in secret – one Swedish diplomat, one Bulgarian (questionable whether this is a diplomat from Bulgaria to another nation or, say, a Hungarian diplomat to Bulgaria such as Mikhail A. Jungert, who is said to have died in Vladimir in 1953. The third prisoner was a British intelligence agent, but again – given the Hungarian and Dutch ‘British officers’ such as Clement, van der Waals, Schandl, Pap and possibly Langfelder – we do not know if the person was actually British or serving that intelligence network. In this context, one should consider the report of von Maasburg to Otto Danielsson which states that in Ceklis Castle, Hungary where von Maasburg was held prisoner by the Soviets in a cell for seventeen prisoners, he was joined by the British warrant officer Reginald Barrett who told him there was ‘one Swedish diplomat, probably a Consul’ who either still was or had been in the Castle. While it is possible that Wallenberg had been held there in January when Barrett had already disappeared, by May 1945 Wallenberg was definitely in Moscow. Therefore the sighting was all-but-discounted on the basis of the documents shown us by the Russians, because we didn’t know enough to take into account another possible Swedish ‘diplomat.’
prisoner was reported all over the former USSR none might be true\textsuperscript{25} and investigatively because of conflicts with the documents turned over to us by the Russians which did define Wallenberg’s whereabouts. If we consider the missing Swedes as a group, then reports that conflict with Wallenberg’s known whereabouts enable us to define the movements of another missing Swede. The important thing is to recognize that the majority of these are not just ‘stories’ or, as they have been mockingly referred to, ‘UFO sightings.’ As one witness commented when she acknowledged, upon seeing a photograph of Raoul Wallenberg, ‘\textit{that is not the man}’ she had treated in her clinic in the Magadan Region: \textit{But he must be somebody’s Swede.}

That such a host did exist was not a secret.\textsuperscript{26} In March 1955, Gunnar Jarring as Chief of the Political Section engaging the American government’s support on the question of Wilfred Cumish’s sighting of Raoul Wallenberg as reported by Admiral Voss gave some words of caution to the handling of this case to his American contact: \textit{Jarring emphasized that the Wallenberg case is an extremely delicate one in Swedish-Russian relations and they consider it important that the Russians do not learn that the Swedes are continuing their investigation. He said that in the inquiries that they (the Swedes) make, they never ask directly about any Swede who might be imprisoned – and he hoped that in our inquiries we might do the same.} (Emphasis mine).

The very ‘inspecific approach’\textsuperscript{27} which Jarring described to the Americans in 1955, fortunately, was counteracted in 1956 when the Swedish Government presented the notarized eyewitness reports from the primary witnesses such as Richter, Huber, Hille, Kitschmann, Pelkonen, Supprian, Rensinghoff, Starke, Bergmann, Wallenstein, von Hinkledey, and Di Mohr – with astounding results, namely the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 denying that Wallenberg was to be found on Soviet territory.

\textsuperscript{25} Please note that, in reality, these conflicting overlaps are very few and, at the present state of my work, center around the period from 1948 to 1952, with some further controversy at the beginning of 1960.

\textsuperscript{26} See “Concluding Arguments”, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, page 177. Secondly, Raoul Wallenberg may have been mistaken for other Swedes (or people with Swedish nationality from Finland or Estonia), as happened in Vladimir Prison to Grossheim-Krisko, a former employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest.

\textsuperscript{27} While I am not a diplomat, I know from my experience in the early – and high profile successes of ARK – that with the Russians, one must not hold back, but shoot beyond the mark. In the words of Colonel Peck of the original POW Task Force: \textit{Ask for bones and you will get bones at best.} In my case, I asked for live foreign prisoners and was able to follow through in three cases, including a relink with the family.
Again I return to the question of why the Swedish Government did not continue to present the evidence at their disposal when clearly they had achieved a significant victory in eliciting a Soviet reversal? 28 This leads to a further question: If the Swedish government in 1955 was hiding the fact that they were ‘continuing their investigation’, threw caution to the winds in 1956 when they presented the ‘primary testimonies’, did they quickly bury it again in 1957 with the Gromyko Memorandum? How did this play out in practical and policy terms? Did they revert to ‘generalities’ in placing their requests for information related to all Swedes in the Gulag? Was a decision made to separate the Wallenberg case from that of the other Swedes so that they as a host were soon forgotten? As for the Raoul Wallenberg case, until the Working Group, were eyewitness reports other than Nanna Svartz – presented at all – and if so, via formal or behind-the-scenes channels? Were latter witnesses dissuaded from coming forth or repeating their testimonies because of the manner in which they were handled. These are questions that should be considered by those responsible for evaluating the investigation.

II. METHODOLOGY AND RELATED ISSUES

Systemization of Information:

At the time of this writing, I have entered 210 names/background/eyewitness reports into the computer system, of which 188 refer to actual sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swede or groups of Swedes. Fifteen prisoner files from my original study for the Swedish-Russian Working Group have been included for detailing, information useful for determining transport or sources of other records related to the various types of facilities 29 Seven prisoner files offering some form of analogy for analyzing the information are also included in this system 30. There is some overlap between the latter two groups.

I anticipate that the full group of sightings for 1945-1970 period will be at least 300. I cannot estimate the final total after the sightings for the 1971-Present stage have been added, but will note that the following reports from the classified materials (1970-2001) have already been entered into the system: Remenyi, Hollosy, Toma, Trunova, G. Schmidt, Terelya/Razkalns, Sakayls, and Bruveris. These were brought to my attention

28 Richter’s comment on this, included in my interim report Liquidatsia, makes it very clear that to a prisoner whose testimony had been affirmed by the Soviets as true, the failings of the Gromyko Memorandum were immediately transparent. Now that the Russian note has been presented, the matter has become even more mysterious because the contradictions are obvious. How can a man have died in 1947 when three witnesses confirm they were together with him in one cell in 1950/51.

29 Prison, Camp, transit depots (prisons or camps), isolation facilities, medical facilities, psychiatric prison hospitals, internats or exile communities.

30 Akikusa, Aladzhan-Aladjani, Braun and Jankowski, for example.

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by Hans Magnusson, from working in the Swedish files in May 2000 with the assistance of Daniel Larssen, or from contributions from Dr. Guy von Dardel, Dr. Marvin Makinen and Susanne Berger. Of the overall group to date, at least ten are original ARK sightings including Babko, Demesco (both witnesses), Hamburger and Hamilton (detailing and/or analogies). I have benefited from Susanne Berger’s extensive work in the Swedish SAEPO files and have cooperated with the U. S. Defense Department DPMO Task Force Russia on sightings or archives related to the case/testimony of Oggins, Braun, Stoner, Ulbreba, and Budilov and here have read through the index of their exchange with the MVD and some of their reports to include information on Swedes. (See below).

The template which I am using to prepare this information corresponds to very basic data on a Soviet prisoner registration card, including also death and date/place of repatriation. In addition, further information is presented showing the prisoner’s movements throughout the Gulag where known; related witnesses or in certain cases who placed the report in the name of the alleged source; as well as analysis of the sighting (what’s wrong with it), cross-referencing where appropriate, and instructions on how to complete the sighting and verify it.

The “Alternative Swede”

Where appropriate there is a designation AS for “Alternative Swede,” meaning those who could have been confused for Wallenberg. This includes a number of Anonymous Swedes. At the date of this writing, there are 82 instances out of the 210 entries. These include Swedes, Swedish officials, diplomats or Red Cross workers, Swedish officers or flyers, persons of other nationalities believed to be Swedish but not persons identified as Raoul Wallenberg or Raoul. Please note that my count does not incorporate the names that appear on the Government’s list of Swedes missing in the Gulag. There may be overlaps in that different witnesses offer a similar description for a Swede or group of Swedes in different locations. Until we can accurately identify these Swedes, this will be difficult to sort. Cooperation on the part of both Swedish and Russian authorities could make a big difference in speeding up the process.

General Discussion of Sightings of Swedes by Location

From the list in progress which I have compiled, combined with other sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, I have created a series of tables of prisons or camps by name, where either Wallenberg or other Swedes were seen. I also have prepared a list of camps according to their numerical designation (not always confined to Swedes) for those locations that have no name. Both lists – wherever possible – establish the region. Establishing the appropriate regional authority for each camp is being done on the basis of information in

31 Family name, First Name and Patronymic, Year of Birth if not date, Citizenship/Nationality (including the category of Stateless), Date of Arrest and Sentencing, Charges, Unusual features in their detention such as ‘capital punishment’ changed to ITL, pardoned. In addition further information is presented showing related witnesses or in certain cases who placed the report in the name of the alleged actual source; as well as the analysis of the sightings (what’s wrong with it), cross-referencing where appropriate, and instructions on how to complete the sighting and/or verify it.
the prisoner files, maps at my disposal here with the added help of my team in Moscow. These list have arisen from research materials at our disposal related to the Wallenberg case. A systematic investigation might yield a more extensive result. These tables will be presented in the more final version of this report.

Many of these locations do not appear in A. Shifrin, The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union, (Bantam Books, 1982) so the specialized nature of our research is already beginning to yield a new paradigm. The reason I believe many of these camps do not appear in Shifrin is that they housed foreign prisoners, as opposed to Russians, and/or special units within the camps, heavily guarded and surrounded by barbed wire, to separate their designated prisoners from the more open units. Many of these camps located just outside the growing urban areas were dismantled by the mid-Fifties with special prisoners being moved to prisons, hospitals or more rural facilities. (See testimonies of Babko, referring to a camp outside Perm; Nikitin via Kantorski, referring to a camp or prison outside Kazan; and Ott/Jorgensen referring to a camp outside Omsk. All three of these testimonies refer also to the plainsclothed MGB officials who came in cars with the special prisoners to establish them in the facility, to visit or negotiate with them, and to remove them.)

A third reason for the secrecy pertaining to some of these sites is the nature of their projects and the Soviets’ determination that no word or important information regarding them should leak to the West. A tragic – and extreme – example of this predates the Wallenberg disappearance – but is no doubt of concern to the Swedish Government.

At the end of June – beginning of July 1941, during the massive repression against prisoners by the NKVD (town of Kuybishev), many foreigners were executed. In 1943, there was another wave of arrests and executions, except now it was against foreign specialists....SMERSH (headed by Abakumov)....’cleansed’ the areas of any unnecessary specialists – Americans and Swedes who were utilized from 1936 (on) for the construction of underground industrial complex by the Shigulev Mountains (on the right bank of the Volga River, opposite the town of Kuybishev). All of them were recruited by Soviet representatives in Germany and Great Britain...Once the contract was formed their fates were sealed....During 1941-1943, under the cover of (World War II), SMERSH ‘finished’ its dealings with the Americans and Swedes. They were killed in the transportation tunnels that were labeled “Liter Zero One.” (After the executions) they were taken out of the tunnels and buried near cemeteries of the German POW camps. The actual cemetery was located on the south(ern) border of the ‘industrial zone’ of the Separate Labor Point No. 5 in Kpaisehe (in the area of the Kuybishe railroad). 32

32 Testimony from a prisoner who worked in the complex “Liter Zero One” 1941-43 who states that one witness to this execution was his foreman. Presenter claimed to have a list of those who died prepared by his comrades who knew them (and were also later killed). The list was lost in November 1943. However presenter gave over other lists from other sources he had collected regarding American prisoners of war which in the eyes of the Pentagon, DPMO Task Force Russia, were not only credible but extremely useful. This testimony was transcribed and signed in November 1961, handed over to the Task Force in 1999/2000.
Labor Divisions

Ultimately the template will have to be redesigned to include other relevant information which recurrently has contributed to our analysis, but which wasn’t understood at the point of the original design. (May-October 2001). One example of this came through the file of Rudolph Hamburger and in relation to the Tamvelius report of Wallenberg in Inta as confirmed by Heinz Pannwitz. Hamburger, like Wallenberg, was a trained architect; he was also an Engineer. Special designations were used to show his movements from camp to camp – not in terms of the camps per se, although this appears elsewhere – but the Building and Construction Unit. Similarly, records of the construction-assembly department of the Omsukchan Mining Administration (prior to 1950-Dalstroi Construct Site No. 43) in the Magadan Regions, under ideal circumstances could be used to trace the movements of one Pattersson or Petersson, described by Vasily Zinkin as ‘a foreign diplomat, believed to be in one of the intelligence services, captured at the end of the War.’

In terms of the Tamvelius sighting of Wallenberg in Inta which was confirmed by Pannwitz, Klausch, Kalousa and separately by Kilianski (not Kalinski), two problems had to be solved. Inta, or Special Camp No. 1, was multi-faceted. Some of the prisoners worked in the mines of Vorkuta (hence Kilianski’s brief ‘tour’ in Vorkuta, the date of which he could not remember because it was all part of the Inta experience.) Here as in all the major special camps, it was essential to note carefully different divisions and units within that and where they were located. The second issue was to establish when approximately Tamvelius told the story to his fellow prisoners. This was resolved by Pannwitz’s debriefing to the CIC upon his repatriation to Germany. Pannwitz had originally worked in the mines (Inta I), then been recalled to Moscow for questioning on another case. When he returned to Inta, he did not go back to his original section but to another where he “enjoyed the benefit of having worked in the field of construction for several years prior to his appointment with the criminal police. Thus he knew how to

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33 In part this was because special credit was given for his professional skills which shortened the length of his term and more interestingly because certain Building and Construction details did not permit foreign prisoners on their site. Since Hamburger had been a Soviet NKVD agent, he had Soviet citizenship in addition to his native German/Jewish and his fake Honduran passport which somehow qualified him as an ‘American.’ Therefore he was taken overnight from one detail in Karaganda where he had worked with a Russian witness to a camp reportedly “for foreigners and Americans” registered as a POB. The only way to follow his movements – that he actually went from one authority to the next -- was through the different Building and Construction Group Number details. That is, he might have remained under the same regional authority, which could be vast, but closer watch came from the work detail itself, wherever it was located.

34 “Was ‘Pattersson’ the Same Person as Wallenberg’, English version, states that the prisoner described as ‘British’ (a term which can be used to state that he worked for British intelligence or military) really was nationality unknown. He had been flown to Moscow by plane upon his arrest and when the Soviets realized they had arrested the wrong man sent to this remote area of Kolyma in late 1947 or early 1948. Zinkin gives the name of Major Kisiyakovsky, chief of the Omsukchasnk district department of State Security and a Lt. Bobrov who can affirm the prisoner’s presence.

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read technical drafts which Soviet prisoners in the Vorkuta region were unable to read.”

Tamvelius as an engineer was already working in this division. The fact that Raoul Wallenberg was a trained architect would further support the possibility that he was also assigned to that detail, where he was visited by Tamvelius – as a ‘fellow Swede’ in the hospital. Kilianski in turn confirms the presence of the Swede he believes to be Wallenberg who was already in the hospital barracks when he entered in March 1949. Kilianski states that in January the whole barracks was moved to Abez, the man he believes to be Wallenberg included. As the Swedish government testimonies give a code name of GMOSER for this Swede, it is hard to proceed without further information that specifically refers to the original text. All matters pertaining to this and related sightings should be declassified to further this investigation.

‘Socially Dangerous’ versus ‘Especially Dangerous State Criminals.’

Another tool particularly useful to Transport Studies is the term “Especially Dangerous State Criminal” versus the more common ‘socially dangerous’, implying an influence of ideas without a past criminal or war criminal record. These two categories were frequently applied to foreign prisoners as well as to Russians and could determine mode of transport (open convoy as opposed to ‘enforced’ or special transports for the ‘especially dangerous.’) and degree of isolation. Unfortunately, because of their similarity in name, the two are often mistaken or substituted one for the other, even by clerks in the Gulag.

However, they should not be. “Socially dangerous’, while it can also exist as a ‘type without direction of an article’, is a charge, Article 37-5 – the basis for a sentence. Persons with this charge, such as Rivo, may be sent into exile or to more open labor camps where they are nonetheless monitored for their speech and behavior. If their behavior proves disruptive, further charges might be laid against them, such as anti-Soviet agitation, so that their sentences are prolonged. Among the prisoners of war and interned, both the ‘typing’ and ‘charge’ of socially-dangerous might be given. Rudolph Hamburger who was himself an NKVD agent abroad – i.e. did many favors for the Soviet military – was labeled “Socially Dangerous” simply because of his cosmopolitan mentality, which earned him a lot of trouble with officials and workers in the GULAG system.

“Especially Dangerous State Criminals” is an important category applied in the selection of prisoners and choice of where they would be sent after sentencing to isolate or contain them. In special cases, like that of Jankowski or Konoye, this category might prove to be grounds for prolonging detention even after the completion of term. In extreme cases it might prove relevant to an ‘execution.’ All of the prisoners associated with the

35 NARA, Dept of the Army Detachment (66th CIC Group, 18 June 1956, Pages 7 and 8 were Pannwitz in his debriefing states that from January 1952 to 22 November 1954 was assigned to Camp Inta III. The above quote is from Page 12.
‘contingent’ of which Wallenberg was originally a part were reviewed as potentially “Especially Dangerous State Criminals.” There is yet another distinction between “Especially Dangerous “ and “War Criminal” or “Fascist War Criminal” which was used to explain the ongoing isolation of prisoners who remained in prison isolation after so many especially dangerous and Nazi war criminals had been returned under the Khrushchev- Adenauer treaty. Such prisoners were noticed in the Eighties and early Nineties in places like Perm. Although it could be questioned privately among the fellow prisoners (who did not know the prisoner by name) whether the man in isolation was really on the Fascist side during the War, the guards and the administration behaved as if this were so.

According to the Decree of the Council of Ministers USSR No. 416-159 of 21 February 1948 on “Organization of Camps and Prisons to Hold Especially Dangerous Categories of Criminals,” Special MVD prisons, the Vladimirovsk, Aleksandrovsk and Verkhneuralsk were established to hold spies, diversionists, terrorists, Trotskyites, right-wingers, Mensheviks, socialist revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, White emigrants and members of other anti-Soviet groups considered dangerous. Holding others is forbidden. (Emphasis mine). 36 The prisons, of course, were pre-existing; the shift is in the designation of certain prisoners as ‘especially dangerous’ and the secrecy and isolation that was imposed upon them. By like token, special camps were created through a joint MVD, MGB and General Procurator order 16 March 1948 to isolate “especially dangerous criminals” from the rest of the criminal population. According to General Yu. I. Kalinin, these included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Camp No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>“Mineral’nij” Inta, Komi SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>“Gornij” Noril’sk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>“Dubravnij” Yavach, Mordovskoj ASSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>“Stepnoj” Kazakhskaya SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5</td>
<td>“Beregovoy” Magadan.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These camps, I know from the prisoners files, were vast and included a number of different camps within camps. Spread out over large territories or regions they could incorporate portions of towns, remote villages in addition to their own sprawling infrastructure. For example, in the files of the Polish witnesses, it is very hard to tell the difference in administration between Ozerny and facilities in the Amur region. Even though long transports were required in between, sometimes it appears as if the administration in that portion to the East is one.

According to Susanne Berger in her report of January 2001, Special Camp No. 7 – Ozerny – attained special camp status on March 24, 1949, before Raoul Wallenberg allegedly arrived in Angara/Bratsk (the earlier name of the camp unit) toward the end of that year, as described by Polish prisoners Baj, Chichoki and Kowalski. Ms. Berger also

36 From the UVD Archive for Leningrad Oblast, Executive Committee of City Council File 423, pp. 96-97 quoted by General Yu. I. Kalinin in a response to Task Force Russia, DPMO. 230-4.

37 Ibid., Task Force Russia, 230-4.
cites a letter from a Deputy Commander of Special Camp No. 7, Marin, to the Deputy Commander of the GULAG, Colonel Bulanov dated December 31, 1949 which is especially relevant in explaining the alleged communication which was allowed to develop between the Poles and ‘Raoul Wallenberg.’ Isolation of especially dangerous state criminals from the earlier group of the prisoners has not been fully completed as of now, for reasons I mentioned earlier in my memo.”

Another letter from Colonel Bulanov to the Commander of Special Camp No. 7, Yevstigneev, dated March 23, 1950 states: It is evident from the minutes of the meetings held in Special Camp No. 7 that isolation and regime of keeping especially dangerous state criminals do not meet the requirements of the orders of MVD SSR...Until now the contacts between the special contingent and unguarded prisoners has not been stopped.”

As these two letters would seem to coincide with the arrival and departure of Raoul Wallenberg from Special Camp No. 7, one may assume that lack of proper security is a motive for forwarding Wallenberg toward Special Camp No. 5 (Magadan). As we have Kowalski’s transport slip from his file for the transport East which he claims to have shared with Wallenberg, we can proceed further with this sighting.

III. CLUSTERS AND CONFLICTS

For the sake of clarity and structure, I have generated a series of Tables, designated by regions, with the various eye-witness reports listed in chronological fashion. These tables include key descriptive phrases by the witnesses, with discussion of the more complex or controversial aspects of the testimony listed in the footnotes. There has been as yet no elimination of any of the eyewitness reports at our disposal, first because the issue of “Alternative Swedes” leaves the question open as to whether the witness had met another Swede whom he assumed to be Raoul Wallenberg. I have however made every effort to check the details and correct them where real data is already at our disposal. Secondly, I work on the assumption until proven otherwise that – like Soviet disinformation – there is always a grain of truth to the reports which must be preserved for the system as a whole. Rather than ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ – the sightings stand until access to the necessary records is given to properly evaluate them. Please note that certain of these tables give transport dates as markers relevant to this particular study. Information related to them will be presented in the fuller report in a few months.

As can be seen through a study of these tables, all of whom are ‘in progress,’ there are conflicts not only between individual testimonies but entire clusters of reports which must be resolved. These will be discussed in my later report, after some verification through the transport records has been possible and after we have seen if we can identify another Swede under the jurisdiction of the other region of facility, thus narrowing the search for Wallenberg. For the present time, emphasis rests on the facts that there exists considerably more clusters than had been previously acknowledged and that the existence of such clusters – particularly from diverse sources – would indicate that there is somebody present in that place and time who either is or has been
mistaken for Raoul Wallenberg. This is no longer a hypothetical situation, but one which must be resolved in real terms.\(^{38}\)

1946-1948  **Three sightings** in which Raoul Wallenberg is being interrogated in Lwow, Kiev and Kristy Prison in Leningrad. [Diverse sources]

1947  **Two sightings** from Russians reporting Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in Vladimir.[Could be same source, Shulgin, or both Shulgin and Kutepov who arrived together on the transport from Vladimir and therefore are confirming each other.]

End 1947  **Thirty-six sightings** of Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat or Swede in Moscow prisons. [Very diverse sources].

Spring 1947  **Sixteen sightings** of Wallenberg, (Van den Berg, Wallberg, Waldenberg), a Swede, Swedish Red Cross official, Swedish diplomat in camps in the Komi SSR. [Four testimonies confirming Tamvelius, otherwise diverse.]

1947/1948  **Eighteen sightings** of Wallenberg, a Swede or a foreign diplomat arrested in Budapest at the end of the War for the Ozerny and Magadan regions. [Three sightings an acknowledged group source; the sighting for Pattersson unrelated to the others.]

1952-1954  **Eight sightings** of Wallenberg or a Swede at Verchne Uralsk Isolation prison. [5 diverse reports and related witnesses]

1952-54  **Two sightings** of Langfelder in Vladimir Prison. [Diverse sources]

1954  **Three sightings** of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison [Diverse sources although Cumish appears in both this instance and the above].

1955  **Four sightings** of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison [of which two come from Kalinski. This does not include the report of Larina which could however cover also this time period.)

1955/56  **Two sightings** by civilians in the Ukraine. [Diverse sources].

1960-62  **Three sightings** of Raoul Wallenberg or an unknown foreign national in Moscow. [Unrelated sources]. (NOTE: These may be interpreted in terms of temporary absences from Vladimir which could have begun even earlier, say in the late Fifties.)

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\(^{38}\) The sightings included in this chart are only where the witnesses have given the name Raoul Wallenberg, Wallenberg, Van den berg or the equivalent, Raoul, or speak of a Swede, a Swedish diplomat, or a high ranking Red Cross official whom they believe to be Raoul Wallenberg.
1960-70 Thirteen sightings of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, Van den Berg, or an anonymous prisoner either whose nationality is unknown or a White Russian ‘war criminal’ in Vladimir. Four conceivably could be traced to one source but the rest are diverse. Includes no reports by Kalinski.

1977-92 Thirteen sightings related to closed wards in psychiatric clinics, safe houses and closed community in the former USSR. All diverse.

SEE TABLES ATTACHED.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Methodological and Political:

The Government of Sweden of late has expressed its concern that the various findings not become fuel for yet more hypotheses – i.e. that ‘things be solid.’ While of course one cannot begin a true investigation without some reality or evidence from which to work, one of the chief failings of the older efforts has been that after a critical time – and even before – the UD viewed eyewitness reports as speculative by their very nature. This can be proven by the wealth of reports among the declassified sightings from the 1945-1970 time period which were neither cultivated nor followed up on in the most common sense fashion. It can be established by the failure to pursue the clusters of eyewitness reports and continue to present them as evidence when the reversal of the Vishinsky into the Gromyko Memorandum established the power of such testimonies. And one could go on. The most important point in response to this is what to do NOW. And the answer is to take advantage of the cooperation that seemingly exists and do what should have been done all along during the past fifty-seven years, and without delay. That this process is going to take time can be attributed to the fact that – while the timing is most promising – the ground also had to be cleared from many many mistakes of the past, on a number of sides. That we can make up for lost time stems from the fact that we are already benefiting from valuable computer expertise.

While I speak of this as a ‘methodological’ concern, it cannot be separated from ‘policy’ (or lack thereof) which has been a powerful influence all along in diffusing and deterring the impetus of the effort to repatriate Wallenberg. Is the present commitment to continue with the Raoul Wallenberg investigation a serious one? From a purely practical standpoint, the fact that the investigation wasn’t pursued, from the beginning, in a methodologically correct fashion as befits a ‘missing person investigation’ can be interpreted as a sign of strong resistance to the return of Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden at a time when his life lay before him. Now, however, such a policy would be much more apparent – because of the efforts that have been made
through the Working Group and by the independents over the past year to organize
the information, point to the persons or unidentified numbered prisoners or
‘unoccupied cells’ which might have held Wallenberg and push for the truth. The
fact that these represent a very finite number to be identified is in and of itself a sign
of ‘solidity.’ The fact that there are now other Swedes who fit the profile of
Wallenberg in a number of respects, possibly involved in the same or related
networks, greatly enhances our work and helps us close the gap. For by identifying –
or at least qualifying – those who might have been confused for Wallenberg, we now
stand a good chance for arriving at the trail of the ‘real Raoul.’

The Russians should welcome this new approach involving the anonymous or
alternative Swedes for, in fact, if one can account for sightings of Wallenberg in the
Gulag many years after his alleged death date with proof that in fact it applied to
another Swedish prisoner, we would finally be in a position to shrink down the
possibilities and arrive at a truth of real substance. I repeat, however, that to achieve
this it will be necessary to have lists and information regarding missing Swedes from
both the Swedish side and the Russian.

What Have We Got – or Rather ‘Who’?

Y. Primakov in relation to this case and the Gromyko Memorandum used an interesting
phrase: “If the Soviet authorities are to be believed….” We must begin to say, with
respect: “If the eyewitnesses are to be believed….” That is, if we are to really understand
that the vast majority of those placing the report met someone whom they had reason to
think was Raoul Wallenberg (as opposed to completely making up the story), we must
acknowledge the following:

A. We have at least two Swedish diplomats arrested in Budapest, one Raoul Wallenberg
whom, we know from Langfelder’s cellmates, went to Moscow in late January/early
February 1945 by train, arriving at the Kiem railroad station on or about February 6th;
and the other who was flown to Moscow, some say in the ‘last days of the War’
(which would mean April/May 1945.) The Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg
whom we know through our work with the Russian side of the Working Group was
placed first in Lubyanka Prison, then sent at the end of May 1945 with Willi Roedl to
Lefortovo where they presumably sat together without interruption until the end of
February 1947. The other diplomat was sent to Butyrka – date unspecified – and
may have been there for quite some time. From the actual data we have at present, it
would not appear that the ‘real Raoul Wallenberg’ was held in Butyrka before
March/April 1950—although he could have been in their medical facility or transit
prison. The transport study will be useful for this question. Please note that such a
diplomat was alone – not to be confused with the three arrested in 1944 according to
and including Ericksson.

B. We have, to our knowledge, two and possibly three Wallenbergs – plus those
known as Van den Berg, Waldenberg, Wallberg, Wilborg, Waldermann and etc.
The first is Raoul Wallenberg, the second Rudolph Wallenberg who died in Vorkuta as per the oral report of the Russian side, and the third may well have been arrested before Raoul Wallenberg in Eastern Europe, taken to Lubyanka and Lefortovo where he was held as a ‘secret prisoner’. Whether or not this third Wallenberg is of the actual family remains to be seen – but cannot be ruled out at this point. The discrepancy between Raoul Wallenberg whose name was registered up until March 1947 and the Wallenberg (or ’Walenberg’) whose identity was secret from the beginning must be addressed. This may account for the lack of first name on the Smoltsov document. This question is extremely critical because in fact such a man may have been older, may have died early (of a heart attack or execution because he was not deemed ‘useful’ to the ‘great game’) which cannot be argued successfully in the case of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947. This may account for the Soviet/Russian persistence in holding to the 1947 death scenario, based on the materials at their disposal. As the question of alternative Swedes must be placed on the table, so must the Russians place at our disposal information about all those with the name of Wallenberg or a similar name. This was requested already in my “Interim Report.” I would emphasize that this is an important way to the truth which could free the Soviets from some embarrassment.

C. In regard to the question of 1947, if Raoul Wallenberg did not die or was not executed then, we have a number of possibilities which should be explored through the transport study and are in fact the subject of the pilot study:

1. Wallenberg went out quite early and was sent West to Lwow, Kiev and Leningrad for further questioning during the investigative period. Here he was placed at the disposal of the Central Group of Forces, who was under the Command of Belkin and Raichman who had important oversight at the time of Wallenberg’s arrest in Budapest. In this capacity he was not sentenced nor interned but, under investigation. The Baj testimony for Bratsk would be consistent with this possibility in that the figure identified as Wallenberg comes to their camp after this process in the West has been completed and he has been sentenced in Moscow.

2. He was sentenced early in 1947 and sent East to Komi as so many of the sightings would suggest or, more likely from a secrecy point of view and as supported by Remenyi, he was sent to the Far East – in which case the “Patterson” scenario is a far more likely prospect. If this is the case, then it becomes necessary to sort out who was seen in camps in Komi (which could be Rudi Wallenberg), who was the other Swedish diplomat (not necessarily the same as the one flown into Butyrka in Item 1 above), and who was Van den Berg. The profile of Baron or Count Waldenberg or Wallenberg has to be defined and above all we need routes for all these prisoners so we can greatly simplify our task.
3. Wallenberg moved from being a numbered prisoner under investigation during the March 1947 – July 1947 time period, was sentenced by OSO as a numbered prisoner and sent away, most probably to Vladimir, for an initial period of time – then returned to Moscow for further interrogation. This is the scenario that is most consistent with the extensive number of sightings of Raoul Wallenberg in Lubyanka and Lefortovo after the July 17, 1947 alleged death date.

4. If Wallenberg survived and was sent East – either to camps in Komi, in Bratsk or the Far East, with the controversy attending his case and through the use of the category “Especially Dangerous State Criminal” he would have been recalled from camp, even special ones, and placed in isolation in an MGB prison – most likely in Verchne Uralsk, but also possibly in Irkutsk. From there it would be only a matter of time before he would be sent closer to Moscow, which is to say – to Vladimir Prison. Thus we have the different arrival dates, which I will describe as follows: 1953 from Moscow directly, as per the Remenyi report, which is to say that his usefulness for a show trial in Hungary has expired due to the deaths of both Stalin and Beria. This may account however for his alleged pairing with Goglidze as fellow prisoners since both men are, as I understand it, ‘believed dead.’ 1954: from a transport from Verchne-Uralsk with either Kuprianov or Kovacs, both of whom arrived in June; 1955: on a transport from Butyrka, but previously coming from Irkutsk, most likely as a numbered prisoner but this does not rule out a meeting with ‘Swedish spy’ Wolfin on the transport.

5. While it is much more difficult to check, one must keep one’s eye on the possibility that Wallenberg, because of his innocence, was sent into exile at an early stage. This is represented by the two reports from the Ukraine 1955 and 1956. This exile could be sustained throughout his remaining life.

6. Because of the ‘flag’ sent up every time a prisoner saw or met a “Swede” it would be very reasonable for the authorities to alter Wallenberg’s name (if no longer traveling as a number but under a pseudonym) to a Russian or Baltic one. To justify very heavy isolation in prison where others in the corpus would become intensely curious about the prisoner in question, the added label of White Russian or Fascist War Criminal would be a useful tool. I do not believe this was done in the Forties or even the early Fifties, but sometime around 1954/55 when – as Remenyi and Erzine both observed – Wallenberg’s trail seemed to vanish.

7. The number of medical and psychiatric encounters whether allegedly referring directly to Wallenberg or to a ‘Swede’ or ‘elderly Swede’ must be pursued along with reports of these aging Swedes in closed communities, pensions or safe houses. If we do our homework on the
various Swedes in captivity, particularly those whose profiles resemble that of Wallenberg, I think that these figures will soon be identified – making it clear which ones aren’t Raoul Wallenberg. In terms of the three sightings of RW in Moscow or the Moscow Region in the 1960-1961 time period, these may be worked through a more careful study of the Vladimir Corpus II cell occupancy to determine the dates when the unnamed isolated prisoners went out. This in turn would be matched against records of Butyrka Medical, Lefortovo and Serbsky or other major clinics in the Medical search. This is a far more efficient procedure than just a sweeping medical search. I would also emphasize that by doing it this way (essentially as linked with transport studies) we are not threatening the rights of privacy of the patients – at least not until we can determine a prisoner who might really be Wallenberg, in which case a doctor can review the files. It was my goal to have this prepared and to look at the few files of interest with Dr. David Weisstub in the first week of July 2002 but without the consent of the newly formed Committee, we will lose that very important opportunity.

The Limits of Checking The Above Sightings through Transport Records

As a result of this extensive, and labor intensive work on the part of Susanne Berger and myself to define the sightings and clarify the Swedes who could have been mistaken for Wallenberg, the transport study can now be much more effective. We know who we are looking for an approximately when, and with cooperation from both governments, we could even know who are the other Swedes, define their course and be aware of their presence in making an evaluation.

Here I refer primarily to the camp sightings in Komi, although also a number of different transports related to Especially Dangerous State Criminals will be systematically reviewed. Our problem remains that the transport studies for the different isolateur MGB prisons do not seem to be registered among the vast number of MGB and MVD convoy troops. I do have particular convoy records in mind for 1947/Vladimir/ the transport of a numbered prisoner, in general we have a problem of absence of records. Furthermore, Vladimir is close enough to Moscow that special prisoners – numbered or highly valued – can be transported to and from by van, so that no train or plane is necessary. To pursue this, according to the MVD authorities and those of the Justice Department, requires the cooperation of the FSB – particularly V. C. Vinogradov. I believe that after doing our initial homework, the questions could be phrased in such a way that we could submit our query to the archivist. Ultimately however in the case of a transport study which consists only of names and dates and numbers, we will need lists. The Russians must be ready to cooperate on that score.

Returning to the Vladimir Corpus 2 Study

The good news is that it is conceivable – by returning to the Corpus 2 study and pursing a new level of systematic questions – it will be possible to have a better understanding of
comings and goings (from the corpus, but possibly also from the prison). This needs to be combined, in certain cases, with the original data and – of course – to the study of corpus cards to identify the various unknown prisoners. Corpus cards were maintained by the Corpus Warden and thus accounted for cell occupancy at any given time. These combined with more isolation lists from the Prison Department and further pursuit of the numbered prisoner question should bring us tangible results. We do not need to do this for every day of the two or three decades Wallenberg was believed to have been held in and around Vladimir. To the contrary, the strongest eyewitness reports – which include Brugger and others discounted by Makinen on the basis of new information – will light the way as to where to look, when and why. The additional files which I have requested on the basis of the original Vladimir study are all important to gathering further evidence as to the existence of the prisoner thought to be Wallenberg. Again, and especially now that we know there were at least three other Swedes in Vladimir, sometimes even in Corpus II, this will be a more realistic task.

**Swedes or Russians? Another Look at the Numbered Prisoner Series 14 & 16-20**

As my study of the numbered prisoner series presented in the section on “Disappearance” of my Interim Report and “Liquidatsia: The Question of Raoul Wallenberg’s Death or Disappearance in 1947” makes clear – whole groups of the numbered prisoners, both under investigation and convicted were related to each other. For example, there are the Polish prisoners who were immediately numbered upon arrival and remained numbered until they were sentenced in a public trial, and there are the Baltic leaders of the three nations arrested in 1941 in Kubishev, Penza or Saratov and held as a series of numbered prisoners in Kirov and Ivanov Internal Prisons from that time while under investigation. Once sentenced by OSO – that is, in closed tribunal – in 1952 they were given new numbers and sent, with the exception of those who had died or were in mental facilities, to Vladimir Prison. We also see the series of Stalin’s in-laws who became numbered prisoners 21- 23 sentenced at Vladimir, followed by the three young Hungarians who served as ‘British officers’in Budapest during the War, numbers 24-26.

For Vladimir, the cards of numbered prisoners in the kartoteka go up to Numbers 32, with no name for Prisoner Number 1, Hungarian; no Number 2, and no prisoners 14 and 16-20. Most of these prisoners were eventually released or sent into exile. As I have pointed out, given the extra-ordinary case of the Jesuit priest Aladjani – Prisoner Number 30 while under investigation in Lubyanka/Lefortovo and convicted prisoner Number 15 at Vladimir, and the coincidence of the four blotted names in the Lubyanka registry for 1947 – Aladjani, Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona – a case can be made for the possibility that Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona, rather than dying were, like Aladjani, numbered with their list of possessions shifted to a different registry.

In my reports, I also explained the relevance of the orderly sequence between convicted prisoners’ designated numbers and their date for sentencing by OSO in Moscow. Through these calculations it can be shown that prisoner 14 would have been sentenced on or before June 28, 1947, the date of the sentencing of Prisoner Number 15. The three
Stalin in-laws, numbers 21-23, arrested between October 1947 and February 1948 were sentenced by OSO on May 29, 1948. Therefore the prisoners 16 – 20 would have been convicted by OSO at any time between June 28, 1947 (the same day as Aladjani) and May 29, 1948 to keep the series intact.

In this entire group consisting of 14 and 16-20, we have six unidentified prisoners. Three of these I have postulated to be Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona on the basis of the blots, the sighting of Wallenberg being transported to Vladimir in July 1947 and the fact that Langfelder was alive until March 1948. Now, with the information that Ericsson and two other Swedes were arrested in 1944/45, held in Moscow prisons until “1948 or 1949” when they were sentenced and sent to Vladimir, we must consider the possibility that these three Swedes -- rather than the ‘Soviet prisoners’ identified by the Russian side -- complete a series consisting of four Swedes and two Hungarians. They may, in fact, be a ‘common case’ but we have insufficient information on the investigative level at this time to establish that. The fact that no card appears in the kartoteka for Ericsson or the two Swedes, or for Hunoldt who sat with Ericsson (see table attached), only strengthens the argument that Wallenberg and Langfelder could have been held at Vladimir without their card – or that of their equivalent number – appearing in the kartoteka.

One should now also factor into the equation that ‘Swedish spy’ Isaac M. Wolfin, arrested on July 20, 1946, was sentenced by OSO on March 6, 1948 under his name but sent to Vladimir only on May 7/8, 1948. Wolfin had served at the Soviet Embassy under Ambassadress Alexandra Kollontay in Stockholm (1940-1943) and was fluent in Swedish. There are certain marked coincidences between Wolfin’s movements and interrogations with that of Wallenberg’s in the 1946 – 1947 established time period.

An NKVD agent, Wolfin’s original term was later reduced from twenty years to ten. Presuming certain favors carried out in Vladimir to account for this lessening of punishment, one must explore a number of possibilities: The first is that the delay in his transport was so that his arrival would coincide with that of the three missing Swedes to whom, hypothetically, I am attributing the numbers 18, 19 and 20.

One may further project that having established such a familiarity with the Swedish prisoners, whether in transit cell or actual transport, from time to time Wolfin served as a

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39 As I have requested repeatedly, it is very important to determine that the three with Russian names whom the Russian side of the Working Group have claimed to be prisoners 16, 17 and 18 are of this specific series. Are they definitely convicted prisoners rather than under investigation? Were they sentenced by OSO/Moscow in keeping with this particular sequence? Are these their real names or rather possibly pseudonyms combined with a number for sentencing?

40 As noted by the tables attached, except for the question of Wallenberg’s early arrival in Vladimir in 1947, the eyewitness reports of his presence in Vladimir do not begin to cluster until 1954, growing stronger at certain times over the succeeding years. Langfelder’s presence is only reported by Cumish, which would also appear to be in 1954.
‘fourth’ for cell occupancy\textsuperscript{41} in Vladimir, where his language abilities would be put to good use. This would be reflected, and may be calculated further, through an examination of the periods of time which Wolfin allegedly sat ‘alone’ – a study which Ari Kaplan and I had already begun in June 1998. This shows that from the time of Wolfin’s arrival until the estimated time of Hunoldt’s meeting with Ericsson, Wolfin sat ‘alone’ six times over a period of two years, in all three corpuses – the last for two months in what should be the period immediately following Ericsson’s encounter with Hunoldt.

If, as Hunoldt projects, Ericsson died sometime after their encounter in 1950, say December 1951 when the extended period of Cell II-57’s lack of occupancy ended, then there is ‘room’ for another solitary Swedish prisoner to be brought to Vladimir. The fact that this did not happen until later, it would seem, reflects important changes wrought by the deaths of Stalin and, particularly Beria. If it can be established that Wolfin’s usefulness was exploited as described with the three Swedes --which is again a question of corpus cards and special lists or of a study of Wolfin’s investigative and operational files by the authorities in good faith`--then Kalinski’s report that Wolfin came into Vladimir with Wallenberg on a transport is strengthened.

For, as we know, Wolfin went out of Vladimir twice – February 27, 1955 and January 3, 1956 --before he was released October 13, 1956 -- 10 years before the end of his term.\textsuperscript{42} The dates of Wolfin’s returns from Moscow are potentially also points for the arrival, or return, of Raoul Wallenberg to Vladimir. As Wolfin’s record shows only his return from Butyrka Prison, we can only project as follows: Given the length of time Wolfin was away, he could have been sent further to the East, then returned by transport via Butyrka – acting as an escort/informant, a scenario I would project for the 1955 period. In such a case, they most likely would have passed through Butyrka Transit Prison. However, these dates for coming and going could also indicate calls to Moscow for discussions or negotiations for Wolfin, as for Wallenberg, thus in some capacity making use of Wolfin’s language abilities. Alternatively, Wallenberg could have been sent for medical diagnosis or treatment with Wolfin part of the return transport to ease the transition.

The dates of Wolfin’s returns to Vladimir are 4/2/55 and 4/20/56. In the former instance, there is some ambiguity as to where Wolfin sat – II-15 or III-59, but in either cell it would appear that he was ‘alone.’ The latter instance, January 3 - April 20, 1956 -- as we know -- coincides with the Prime Minister Tag Ehrlander’s visit to the USSR where Wolfin’s expertise could prove useful in its own right. It could also be an indication of Raoul Wallenberg being held in Moscow for ‘safe-keeping’ during that time – or to present him, should the need arise.

\textsuperscript{41} Meaning that two Swedes sat together in one cell as more or less permanent mates, while the third – who is probably Ericsson was alone. The presence of Wolfin from time to time would break the isolation and could conceivably provide new information.

\textsuperscript{42} The Russian’s answers to my Preliminary Report of November 30, 1998 state that Wolfin was given a 20 year sentence for espionage which is confirmed by his Vladimir card. The count begins from July 20, 1946 and should have ended in 1966. Instead he was released October 13, 1956.
This logical hypothesis can be readily tested by examining the records for OSO/Moscow for the period June 20 1947 to May 29, 1948 and, simultaneously, the records of the Prison Directorate and Department A for preparing the transport orders and “naryads” for sending such prisoners to Vladimir Prison. At the same time, a study comparable to the one we have prepared so far on the Vladimir kartoteka for July 1947, sample of which has been produced by Dr. Makinen, would indicate if there are any case or registration numbers missing in the sequence to indicate ‘exceptional case’ prisoner or prisoners for the relevant periods in 1948.

Final “Words of Wisdom”

The application I have presented in the section on Numbered Prisoners 14, 16-20 above is logical. It is not speculative in the sense that these findings were built out of and continue to catalyze real data at our disposal in the determination of Wallenberg’s fate. The addition of the three Swedes in Vladimir only reinforces my original findings in my reports “No Time to Mourn” and “Liquidatsia” presented to the Swedish Government in 2000 and 2001 respectively. The questions which logically attend them by being true to the consistency of the data are becoming increasing in number and all the more specific in time and place. If the Russian side were to cooperate fully at this point, we could go very deep both to separate the trails of different Swedes and to unearth the ‘real Raoul’ and his fate.

In short, I believe it is at this point and concerning these details that we could shift from our wilderness wanderings to the advanced state of research. This depends however, as our search has always depended, upon having access on both the Russian and Swedish sides to complete data, which includes the most basic data of registries and transports, MGB not excluded, as well as the identification of this specific series of numbered prisoners and of specific cells at Vladimir at definite points in time. The data we require, with the exception of questions regarding Wolfin, is of neither an investigative nor operational nature. It makes maximum use of the most basic features of a prisoner’s movements and rest. Not to press for this kind of information and not to give it is, to my mind, an expression of unwillingness “to know” – or to let the world know -- by proceeding further.
If, on the other hand, I am given a ‘full deck of cards’ in terms of the complete sightings that exist for this case; if blessed with full cooperation based on the fact that we no longer are seeking a “ghost” everywhere but a number of real Swedish individuals who fit the profile and who also disappeared and/or of prisoners who could be Wallenberg and related cases under another name – and if I am allowed to pursue this in an organized and synergetic way with respect for the process and not premature judgment of the results: we not only can do this – we will.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

New York City
April 4, 2002.