STUCK IN NEUTRAL

The Reasons behind Sweden’s Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case

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“In the minds of responsible government officials it is a far smaller evil to leave a missing person case unsolved than to seriously question the foundations of the state.”

(Arvid Fredborg)
I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2003 the first independent, non-governmental Commission in the Raoul Wallenberg case presented its findings in Stockholm.\(^1\) Headed by Ingemar Eliasson, a centrist politician and the current Swedish ‘Riksmarskalk,’ the group had the task of examining the Swedish political leadership’s actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1945-2001.\(^2\) After a twelve-month investigation the Commission’s analysis officially confirmed what everyone has known for decades: That the Swedish government in large part mishandled the Wallenberg case, especially through its disturbing lack of initiative during the critical early years 1945-47.

Wide-ranging and impressive in both exposition and analysis, the report nevertheless falls short in a number of ways: It cannot fully explain why Swedish officials in charge behaved the way they did, nor does it clarify why successive Swedish governments pursued the case with so little enthusiasm. That Sweden chose to abandon Raoul Wallenberg is one thing - that the abandonment occurred with relative ease, despite the serious and persistent doubts concerning Russian claims about his fate, is quite another. In its search for Wallenberg over the years Sweden has resembled a car where the driver always has one foot on the brake. Why such excessive caution? Was the mishandling of the Wallenberg case simply a matter of individual ineptitude and indifference or is it symptomatic of deeper problems?

Even though answering these questions would pose a challenge to any commission, other shortcomings are less understandable. The Commission excluded from its deliberations several critical areas of inquiry, among them the full activities of the Swedish Legation [including those of Swedish Intelligence] and the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest in 1944/45, and later, the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s often questionable handling of witness testimonies in the case. It also did not consider the deeper economic and political aspects of the Budapest mission and its aftermath, as well as their associated effects on the Wallenberg investigation. Most importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on the early phase of the Wallenberg case, the Eliasson Commission missed a chance to determine whether Swedish passivity was a unique and isolated phenomenon, or if it fit a more general pattern of behavior. So far, official Swedish criticism, like the Russian, has stayed firmly confined to the past. It has not yet touched the present and with it any individuals who are still living.

Nevertheless, the publication marks a decisive step in the right direction: For the first time Sweden has cast a critical eye on its own behavior in the Wallenberg affair. In doing so, it has firmly established the idea that earlier Swedish approaches to the Wallenberg question were too narrow and that a deeper, broader analysis is necessary in order to come to terms with the case. The report is a 700+ page acknowledgment that in historical investigations details and complexities matter; especially details that, for various reasons, were long ignored or never considered.

The new study did not yield any direct clues about Wallenberg’s fate, but that was never the intention: The truth about what happened to Raoul Wallenberg is surely known in Moscow and, as the Eliasson report emphasizes, a resolution can only come from there. The Report concludes that if Russia has stubbornly kept the Wallenberg secret, Sweden largely has enabled Russia to do so. As for the U.S., the Commission argues it failed Raoul Wallenberg twice. First, by not providing him with adequate protection for an extremely dangerous mission, which the U.S. had co-initiated and financed; and secondly, by not independently insisting on a resolution of his fate after Sweden repeatedly rejected U.S. assistance.

In the Eliasson Commission’s assessment a closer reading of previously released U.S. and Swedish records raises important questions about the nature of Raoul Wallenberg’s assignment, including his association with Allied Intelligence Services during the war. The Report argues that uncertainty about Wallenberg’s mission may in part explain early Swedish passivity in the case because Swedish officials considered Raoul Wallenberg primarily an American problem, not a Swedish one. The Eliasson


\(^2\) The Riksmarskalk at the court of the Swedish King is the nominal chief of the Court’s staff. The Riksmarskalk is responsible for the King’s contacts with parliament and government, and is also involved in the supervision of the Court’s financial affairs.

In July 1944 Raoul Wallenberg, a young Swedish businessman, was appointed as a Swedish diplomat and was sent to Budapest, Hungary to aid the last surviving Jewish community in Eastern Europe. In January 1945 Wallenberg was arrested by Soviet occupation troops and his ultimate fate remains unknown.
Commission sharply criticizes the Swedish position, but stops short of asking why Sweden so readily embraced such an excuse. The Commission also chose not to examine the complex American-Swedish political relationship during and after World War II and its possible effects on the handling of the Wallenberg case.

The Commission’s Report and other current Wallenberg research ultimately leave two key issues unaddressed:

1. Why did Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance evoke such extreme passivity from his own government and his powerful relatives, the Wallenberg family? And

2. Why does Russia refuse to reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate, despite strong indications that it almost certainly knows what happened to him? [It certainly knows much more than it has publicly revealed so far]

The Eliasson Report claims that Swedish actions over the years were primarily determined by the changing ‘pictures’ that officials constructed for themselves from the few available fragments of information about Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance. As the Commission sees it, since this information was often incomplete and contradictory, it further contributed to some of the inconsistent behavior by Swedish officials. Here too, however, the Commission’s analysis does not go far enough. Diplomats do not merely assemble facts: They interpret them in terms of their potential consequences, be it political, economic or strategic. In other words, how the major actors in Sweden and in Russia assessed the associated risks and overarching interests for themselves, how they defined the case through the years against the twin backdrop of neutrality and Cold War politics - therein lies the key to the riddle.

In Sweden this refers foremost to the Swedish government and Foreign Office [Utrikesdepartementet or UD], but also to the Wallenberg Family and the Swedish public, including journalists and historians; in Russia this means the former Soviet government and its successors, with strong emphasis on the Security Services. Their basic definitions and interests determined the early responses to Wallenberg’s disappearance and continue to shape actions today. For most of the major parties involved, with the exception of Raoul Wallenberg’s immediate family, the case remains a hot iron that few like to touch. Consequently, they find the current status quo in the Wallenberg question not only acceptable but in many ways preferable - for very different reasons. There are indications that the basic definitions and, with them, the basic attitudes to the Wallenberg case are changing. However, so far these changes have not been substantial enough to penetrate to the core of the mystery.

What follows is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the most important aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg case as well as the most recent findings of the Eliasson Commission and other current research, and to place the case in a larger framework of reference and analysis than has been provided up to now.

II. THE SWEDISH DEFINITION OF THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

1. The Swedish Public

   a. The not-so-favorite son

Sweden’s relationship with what should be its favorite son has always been a complicated one. His courage and accomplishments are admired but one senses little obvious affection for the man himself. Most often a question about him will earn little more than a shrug: "In Sweden nobody cares about Raoul Wallenberg", followed by "The Wallenberg case is dead." Appearances, however, can be deceiving. While the distance between Raoul Wallenberg and his countrymen is certainly real, the reasons for this distance, and therefore its basic nature, are quite complex. In fact they are both deeply cultural and historical, as well as purely circumstantial.

Despite his background as a member of one of Sweden’s most powerful families, Raoul Wallenberg has stayed very much a stranger in his own country. Surprisingly little is known about him, in particular about his adult life immediately before his departure for Budapest. Wallenberg the person has remained elusive and literally two-dimensional: The public knows him only from three or four black and white photographs. He has left no tangible inheritance in Sweden, very little correspondence, no

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3 Together with a number of other “Stoerfaktoren” [disruptive factors], among them contradictory statements by Soviet officials about the state of Swedish-Soviet relations, as well as the publication of author Rudolph Philipp’s book about Wallenberg in 1947 which publicly revealed Raoul Wallenberg’s association with the U.S. War Refugee Board Representative and OSS agent Iver Olsen.
publications, no wife or child, or even close friends. It has been forgotten that in the early years the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate evoked great sympathy at home. Thousands of Swedes signed petitions demanding Wallenberg’s return. In June 1964, during Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s official visit to Stockholm, the daily newspaper “Expressen” - against advice from the Foreign Office - boldly ran the provocative headline, in Russian:

“Question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?”

Various Swedish governments, however, failed to capitalize on this public support and also did nothing to encourage it further.

Sweden began the critical evaluation of its wartime behavior much later than most European countries. As a result, many of the issues which inevitably affect the Wallenberg case, such as Swedish neutrality policy and Swedish wartime business dealings, including those of the Wallenberg family, remained largely taboo topics until the 1970’s, 1980’s and even the 1990’s. Unwilling or unable to dig in their own backyard, only a few Swedish historians subjected the case to scholarly analysis. Most did not consider Wallenberg a serious research topic and simply assumed that most of the facts were known. Even now one senses a certain reluctance to delve deeply into the subject. It is no surprise that the first in-depth economic-historical study of Wallenberg business affairs during WW II was made by two Dutch scholars and not by Swedish historians or that no full-length biography has been published in Sweden on either Raoul Wallenberg or, for example, Count Folke Bernadotte. The history of the Holocaust and Wallenberg’s role until recently were not part of the regular Swedish school curriculum.

The Swedish public today is clearly weary of the Wallenberg question. Mixed with this may well be irritation at its own helplessness. Unable to pierce not only one but numerous walls of silence, the public simply gave up. But while Sweden has never openly embraced Raoul Wallenberg, there are signs that it is paying attention. The fact that the Press conferences for both the presentation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in January 2001 and Eliasson Commission reports attracted record requests from journalists is just one example.

b. “Proper”

A major reason for Sweden’s reticence in the Wallenberg case may be found in the country’s socio-political history which is rather unique in comparison to the rest of Europe. Most notably, the relationship between ordinary Swedes and their government has been relatively conflict free. Swedish neutrality in WWII further confirmed and even enhanced this trait. As a result, Swedish citizens traditionally have not been inclined to question official rules or to directly challenge the role of the government. In his memoirs, renowned Hungarian cancer researcher Georg Klein recounts his first impression of Sweden when he arrived there in 1947 as a young university student:

“Clean, rich, well dressed, proper, an almost incredible contrast to the war hardened Europe. Is this really a peninsula on Europe’s body? No, this is an island, protected not only from the war, but also from the strength derived from shared suffering, this down-to-earth perspective on life and death.”

“Proper” is the operative word here: Klein recalls how a waiter refused him entry to a restaurant because he was not wearing a tie. Given the state of the world at the time, an almost absurd insistence on formality, with a clear message: Above all, form matters.

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4 Expressen, 22 June, 1964. The article was signed by Per Wrigstad, Expressen’s editor-in-chief at the time. See also ECR, Bilaga 4.

5 Like Hans Vilius, Bernt Schiller and Rolf Karlstrom


7 See for example Rojos, 1991.

8 Klein, p. 89.
And from the very beginning, Raoul Wallenberg’s life has defied those clear forms. He was born a Wallenberg but was raised outside the influential banking family. He was an architect by training but jobbed as a businessman. He was not a real diplomat, not a real spy and ultimately neither dead nor alive. And, like any visionary, he was not afraid to test boundaries and to break the rules. For form-abiding Swedes this has been very difficult to handle. Making waves or rocking the boat - all that is seriously frowned upon in Viking culture. Nordic tradition teaches the value of community and equality through its concept of “Jante”, a set of social rules which stresses the importance of modesty, and above all the idea that no one person should consider him-or herself more important than others.9

### c. The Dangers of Simplification

A certain pique over Wallenberg’s flaunting of this cultural code resonates in the reproach of his former colleagues who have characterized Raoul Wallenberg’s behavior in Budapest as, among other things, “dumb-daring” [dumdristig] and who have wondered out loud whether this attitude may not have been at least partially responsible for Wallenberg’s later fate.10 It implies that Wallenberg’s absolute determination to succeed, while surely idealistic, was also inherently reckless and egotistical; that there was a selfishness in his action for which he now paid the price.

Wallenberg’s colleagues considered his behavior un-diplomatic, in the truest sense of the word. In their minds, rather than having set an example for what a diplomat can be, his impetuous approach seriously jeopardized larger Swedish interests.11 Worse, as Wallenberg’s fellow diplomats saw it, he not only broke the rules but in the process he put their own lives in danger. The net result was a ready reservoir of anger and resentment. Some of his colleagues also objected to the subsequent glorification of his achievements which they considered exaggerated and which did not adequately acknowledge the assistance Wallenberg had received from many quarters.

They are not alone. Swedish historians like Paul Levine and Attila Lajos have argued that Wallenberg’s fame today is due mainly to the uncertainty about his later fate.12 They claim that the post-war “myth making” around Raoul Wallenberg has prevented a realistic evaluation not only of his achievements but of the events in Budapest in general. Levine and Lajos make an important point: In the end “myth making” is always a form of simplification. When it goes too far, when things are over-simplified, the essence of any problem is lost. It is therefore absolutely necessary to place Wallenberg into the correct historical context, because only then can the mechanisms of the Holocaust on all sides - perpetrators, victims, rescuers and bystanders - be fully analyzed and understood.

But the argument misses the larger issue: The possible exaggeration of Raoul Wallenberg’s accomplishments, while certainly of concern, is merely one aspect of a much larger problem.13 Wallenberg’s legacy, after all, ultimately rests less in the number of people he rescued [and he saved many], than in the humanitarian spirit he embodied and the courage he displayed. What he

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9The ‘Jante Laws’ are derived from a novel by Danish author Axel Sandemose. Stability and homogeneity are prized values in Swedish society.

10ECR p. 313-317; also Margareta Bauer. Minnesanteckningar fran krigsaren i Budapest 1943-1945 (unpublished). The accounts make it clear that Wallenberg’s humanitarian section worked in chaotic conditions that interfered with the regular operations of the Swedish Legation. There are contradictory statements as to the degree of corruption, meaning the supply or even the sale of protective papers to German and Hungarian Nazis, by Wallenberg’s staff, and whether or not he knew of or condoned these activities. He certainly knew and condoned the “inflation” of protective papers in circulation as a result of duplication and forgeries. ECR, p.332

11ibid; see also RA, Rudolph Philipp Papers. Letters by Lars Berg to Rudolph Philipp. Although of course mindful of the influence Swedish diplomacy afforded him, Wallenberg chafed at its formalism and restrictions. He expresses himself almost sarcastically in a memorandum from August 1944 in which he asks Per Anger - who was about to depart on a trip to Stockholm - to please urge the Swedish Foreign Ministry to “.. give up the sacred institution of the Provisional Passport and grant us full rights to hand such passports out.” RA, Kalman Lauer papers, “P.M. fuer Gesellschaftssekretaer Anger”, 6 August 1944.


13Wallenberg was certainly not the lightweight Attila Lajos in particular makes him out to be. Eichmann and his staff were so irritated by Wallenberg’s activities that they openly and repeatedly threatened his life. These threats drew a formal protest from Swedish representatives to German authorities in both Budapest and Berlin. see Raeddningen, p. 234 -38.
brought to Budapest was the idea of possibility - that rescue was indeed attainable. It was this attitude, the will to take action and to sustain it, combined with a unique talent for organization and negotiation, which turned a small Swedish protective effort into an extensive rescue operation with safe houses, organized food and clothing supplies and with care offered to orphans and the sick. In the brutal months between the Fascist takeover in October 1944 to the Soviets entering Budapest in January 1945 many living on the Pest side of the city survived only due to the tireless efforts from men like Swiss legation representative Peter Zuercher, Raoul Wallenberg and the aid network they had put in place.

Wallenberg’s official status as diplomat of a neutral country enabled him to be effective and he had the help of many people who have not received adequate credit. But Wallenberg inspired those around him and that will always be his greatest accomplishment. The very real and much more serious problem that remains today, both for Holocaust research and the Wallenberg case, is the overall simplification of events - before, in and after Budapest - on all levels - political, social and economical - which has led to serious distraction from the deeper questions about the origins of genocide as well as those surrounding Wallenberg’s fate.

2. The Swedish Government and Foreign Office

a. “A strange creature”

If the success of Wallenberg’s operation is the perfect illustration of what a man with both the vision and the will to make it work can achieve, then Sweden’s efforts to save Raoul Wallenberg are its direct counterpart. Lack of creativity and imagination run like a red thread through the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Eliasson report chronicles the repeated missteps and half measures taken by Swedish officials in the early phase of Wallenberg’s disappearance, the most critical time to have brought about his safe return. Many diplomats in the Foreign Office did not consider Wallenberg one of their own, plus his mission as such did not necessarily enjoy their full sympathies. Pro-German sentiments, deep seated and longstanding, were prevalent among the Swedish elite which filled the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry during World War II.

The Eliasson report concludes that Swedish officials considered Wallenberg basically a “saeregen foereelse,” a somewhat “strange creature”. Wallenberg was too much of an outsider and in addition he had acquired the stigma of a troublemaker. As an official Swedish representative in Hungary he had been wildly successful, but his success had the flair of an individualistic achievement. It did not really altogether constitute a triumph of Swedish diplomacy. Instead, like his Budapest colleagues, many in the Foreign Office felt that Wallenberg, through his unbridled enthusiasm and impulsiveness, had gotten himself into a mess of his own making which they now resented having to solve it for him.

The notion that Wallenberg in January 1945 had left to contact the Russians without seeking prior authorization from his superiors

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14 Both Raoul Wallenberg as well as British SOE operative, Lt. Col. Howie, noted in their respective reports concerning the state of Jewish rescue in the spring and summer 1944 the general sense of apathy among the Jewish population as a major obstacle to be overcome. As Wallenberg wrote: “The Jews of Budapest are completely apathetic concerning their own fate. and are hardly doing anything to save themselves.” see Raeddingsen, p.151, Raoul Wallenberg’s report from 18 July, 1944. And as British Major G.S. Morton noted in his written debriefing of Howie: “H” said that the treatment of the Jews was most barbarous but at the same time the Jews made no show of resistance whatsoever.” PRO. “Conversation with Lt.Col. Howie, Monday 2nd October, 1944.”

15 Wallenberg based his efforts on already existing aid mechanisms instituted by the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Legation, Budapest in the aftermath of the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, such as the granting of Provisional Passports to Jews with formal ties to Sweden, as well as the efforts of the Swiss Legation under Carl Lutz. Wallenberg boldly expanded this program, introduced the so-called “Schutzpass” [Protective Pass] and managed to obtain, together with the representatives from other neutral legations, assurances from German and Hungarian authorities that these papers would be formally recognized. see Gann, 1999 and Levine, 1996.

16 For further reading on the origins of genocide see for example Simpson, 1995.

17 Richardson, 1996 A number of officials who rose to prominence in the 1960’s and 70’s even had joined a right-wing extremist party in the early 1930’s, the Nationella Foerbundet, among them former Ambassadors Sverker Astrom [1935] and Gunnar Jarring [until 1939]

18 ECR, p. 95
has persisted for years. The Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, wrote in an early telegram to Stockholm that Wallenberg had disappeared while “sneaking over” to the Russian lines. A recently discovered document proves this not to have been the case. Yet none of his Budapest colleagues who knew better bothered to publicly correct this misconception. Consequently, it confirmed the image of Raoul Wallenberg as a slightly reckless, somewhat irresponsible individual.

b. “Moral courage is our only secret weapon”

In stark contrast to Raoul Wallenberg’s all out can-do/must-do approach, Swedish officials never took the position that Wallenberg’s case had to be pursued, no matter how difficult the circumstances or uncertain the outcome. As a result, looking for Wallenberg became a reluctant duty rather than a need. In tens of thousands of pages in the Raoul Wallenberg file at the Foreign Ministry one cannot find a single hint that Sweden ever considered staking anything on Raoul Wallenberg’s return or, as the years progressed, for information about his fate. The Swedish government also never appealed to the international community for much needed support and the implication is that Wallenberg had little to no tangible worth for Sweden. The key problem clearly lies in how Sweden chose to define the Wallenberg question. Most officials saw it strictly as a problem of Foreign Policy, not an issue of principle. As such, Wallenberg never ranked high on the list of priorities. As the years went by, the Swedish Foreign Office placed more and more emphasis on handling the case, not solving it.

Even when doubts crept in, the Foreign Office stuck to its position. And these doubts were sometimes severe. In 1958 new witnesses came forward who claimed to have had contact with Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir prison after 1947. In light of these developments the Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, William Owen, had a conversation with his Swedish colleague Gunnar Lorentzon. According to Owen’s report to the State Department from April 1959, Lorentzon readily admitted that Foreign Minister Unden’s highly legalistic approach to the Wallenberg question had been a mistake. He acknowledged that rather than waiting until Sweden had full proof of Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in the Soviet Union, the Swedish government should have insisted on the truth much more forcefully. In fact, Lorentzon added, Oesten Unden had recently asked him

“whether in his judgment Wallenberg was still alive, to which [Lorentzon] replied that he thought that there was a 75-35 or 65-25 chance that he was...”

Owen continued:

“When Lorentzon was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that Khruschev might produce Wallenberg alive at some future time, he replied that he thought it possible, and that in such an event it would be a major sensation in Sweden.”

But doubts and policy have to balance, and even with doubts this strong, policy always won out. When in 1981 a Soviet U-boat ran ashore in Swedish territorial waters many thought this incident should be used to press the Soviets for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg. Instead, Swedish officials, in this case former State Secretary Leif Leifland, again retreated and invoked once more the arguments of propriety:

“We were then, and I am still of the opinion that a civilized nation should not engage in blackmail.”

Those who were advocating a more activist Swedish position in the Raoul Wallenberg question simply found themselves outnumbered. The memoirs of Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, the Private Secretary of King Gustav VI, make it abundantly clear that Swedish passivity was a general problem and not limited to a handful of individuals. In 1956 Dag Hammerskjoeld, then Secretary
General of the U.N., was supposed to travel to Moscow, but decided not to raise the Wallenberg case. Palmstierna’s anger is palpable:

“Again that damn UD attitude.”

Palmstierna clearly felt that only determined Swedish insistence vis a vis the Soviets, based on the righteousness of its cause, would yield any result. In 1956 he summarized his views in a letter to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, emphasizing that

“moral courage is our only secret weapon.”

The Swedish King Gustav VI also showed little interest in Wallenberg’s fate, remarking to his Secretary:

“You surely understand that Raoul Wallenberg is long dead.”

Palmstierna blamed Unden’s influence for the King’s conviction and commented:

“Would royal interference have been of any use? Maybe yes, maybe no. However, when it is a matter of life and death for a Swede who has been cast out by his own country’s highest authorities into such an adventure, every effort should be made on his behalf. Gustav VI Adolf never took the courageous step he alone could have taken.”

c. Hidden Motives

While the Eliasson report outlines for the first time in full the early actions and attitudes of Swedish decision makers, it only partially explores the deeper motives that may have prompted them. Among basic factors the report cites Sweden’s small size and hence small influence compared to Russia, and the strictly hierarchical authority structure of the Soviet system as a possible explanation for the failure of Swedish officials to bring about a positive Soviet reply in the Wallenberg question. Only the highest Soviet representatives were authorized to provide information on central issues. It would therefore have fallen to Oesten Unden as senior official to demand answers, which he simply did not - not at the formal discussions with his Soviet counterparts at the United Nations in November 1946, nor during the long months of difficult negotiations that had led to the signing of the $300,000,000 Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement in October 1946.

The Eliasson Commission sees these failures as evidence that statements by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, to Stalin and other highranking Soviet officials in 1946 - when he repeatedly expressed his belief that Raoul Wallenberg had died in the chaos of war - did not simply reflect Soederblom’s personal opinion. Instead, the Swedish Minister apparently had been quite certain that the position he presented in those meetings was in general agreement with UD’s ideas on the subject. This assessment is further supported by the fact that Soederblom had returned home to Stockholm for consultations both before his discussions with Alexander Abramov, departmental head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in December 1945 (Soederblom had been on leave in late1945) and with Stalin in June 1946 (Soederblom had just returned from a brief trip to

23 Palmstierna, p. 195

24 Ibid, p. 201

25 Ibid, p. 198

26 On 7 November, 1946 Sweden and Russia signed a Credit and Trade Agreement, the so-called “Ryssavtalet.” It provided credits of about 1 billion Swedish Crowns, approx. $300,000,000 at the time, to the Soviet Union. Gunnar Haeggloeff apparently urged Unden at some point to raise the issue of Raoul Wallenberg as part of the negotiations, but Unden refused to consider it. ECR p. 649. In its analysis of the Swedish-Russian Trade Agreement the Eliasson Commission comes to the conclusion that Soviet interest in the agreement was at its highest by the summer of 1946, precisely around the time of Stalin’s meeting with Staffan Soederbom.
Stockholm in May 1946).

At the very least, Soederblom’s statements appear to have had Unden’s tacit backing. When in the spring of 1946 Soederblom suddenly relays to the Swedish Foreign Ministry his impression that despite all expectations Abramov may well be hinting at a possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg, he receives no answer. In May 1946 he returns to Stockholm for consultations with Unden and from that moment on he does not mention the issue of exchange again. Instead, one month later he conveys to Stalin his conviction that Raoul Wallenberg is dead.

Like his Ambassador in Moscow, Unden appears to have readily embraced the idea that already in 1946 Raoul Wallenberg was either dead or could not be saved. His reasoning remains largely unclear, considering Sweden held in hand a formal “receipt” for Wallenberg from the highest Soviet authorities: Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov’s official note from 17 January, 1945 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg and his possessions had been placed under Soviet protection.27 According to the Eliasson Commission, a partial explanation may be found in Unden’s political philosophy which was rooted in a fervent belief in international law and the values of collective security, born out of the ruins of World War I. This left him almost “reflexively opposed” to any ideas of official government representatives exchanging or bartering human beings.28 Unden considered such a thing unacceptable conduct among states.

The wish to position a small country like Sweden to play a meaningful role between the superpowers further inclined the Swedish leadership against placing any demands on its Soviet neighbor. So did a slight sense of guilt over Swedish actions during the war which in 1941 had allowed German troops transit through its territory from Norway to Finland.29 The extradition of 167 Baltic refugees in January 1946, as well as certain aspects of the negotiations for the Trade and Credit Agreement have to be evaluated against this very background. However, while these surrounding conditions made an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg undeniably difficult, they also offered opportunities. The Eliasson Commission stresses that while it can appreciate the “moral dilemma” the Swedish officials faced over the question of a possible exchange,

“in hindsight it can be stated as remarkable that the Swedish Foreign Policy leadership never appears to have considered the question at all.”30

Instead, as Oesten Unden defined it, in the Cold War era Sweden had to make a choice - to search for Wallenberg or to protect the larger national interest. By March 1957 Unden let it be known officially that for all intents and purposes the search for Raoul Wallenberg was over. Publicly the Swedish government challenged the Soviet assertion of February 1957 that Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in prison already in 1947.31 Behind the scenes, however, Unden gave different marching orders. Only one day after the receipt of the Gromyko memorandum the American Embassy, Stockholm reported to the State Department in a confidential message that

“the [Swedish] Foreign Office indicated to the [U.S.] Ambassador that since it had no proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it is inclined to believe the Soviet story.”32

To his own staff Unden announced that


28ECR, p. 510-512. Swedish Security expert Lars Ulfving argues that Unden’s failure not to pursue the Wallenberg case was most likely not “a conscious strategy.” If so, Ulving argues, Unden would have referred to it in his diary. The diaries, however, were not kept regularly and were often sketchy. Ulfving, p. 135

29ECR, p. 514-16

30ECR, p. 602

31On 7 February, 1957 the Soviet Union declared in an official memorandum that Raoul Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison on 17 July, 1947. Delivered by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the statement is generally referred to as the ‘Gromyko Memorandum’.

32NARA, RG 84, American Embassy, Stockholm to the U.S. Department of State. Foreign Service Dispatch. 8 February, 1957.
“... It appears that Raoul Wallenberg is dead ... One can speculate about other possibilities, for example, that he has disappeared or is in such a state that he cannot be shown. These are theoretical possibilities and not very likely. To maintain or build a relationship with the Soviet Union in a way that this can happen without sacrificing more important values, belongs to our most important tasks in Foreign Policy. We have in my opinion no reason to hold a continuous grudge against the Soviet Union.”

This was the first official formulation of UD’s dualist-pragmatist position that in fact had marked the case from the very beginning: It claimed publicly that the search for Wallenberg’s fate was of the highest priority when in reality it certainly was not.

The Eliasson Commission strongly questions Unden’s framing of the Wallenberg question in terms of an either-or argument, as well as the extent of negative repercussions Unden foresaw for Sweden if it had insisted too forcefully on a resolution of the Wallenberg case. And rightly so, because Unden was not afraid of challenging Russian officials on other occasions. Unden’s biographer Yngve Moeller describes how Unden flew into a rage during a talk with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Rodionov, because the Russians had expressed objections to the so-called “Trondheim Shipping Lane” [Trondheimleden]. The Norwegian port city of Trondheim allowed Sweden to receive shipping merchandise even when the Baltic Sea was frozen. Moeller writes that Unden was so angered by the Russian position, that he threatened to cancel his official vacation in the Soviet Union,

“...but the Kremlin was so perplexed about Unden’s outburst that they buried their objections in deep silence.”

For some reason Unden was not willing to be equally blunt in the Raoul Wallenberg question. In the end the Eliasson Commission can only describe Unden’s behavior as “remarkable.” The report does cast a wide net of criticism: Cabinet Secretary Erik Boheman, Foreign Minister Christian Guenther, Head of the Political Department, Sven Grafstroem and even former Prime Minister Tage Erlander are all singled out for severe reprimand. The report draws the conclusion that the attitudes of Unden and his colleagues had proved devastating for Raoul Wallenberg’s chances of return, yet it clearly considers their behavior a unique phenomenon, unique and unexplained.

The Eliasson Commission report focuses heavily on the time of 1945-47, what the report considers the decisive years. Later years are only sketchily dealt with. One wishes that the same detail were available here. As the Commission sees it, since Raoul Wallenberg’s fate was most likely decided by 1947, later Swedish behavior was not as relevant. Furthermore, the Commission claims that with the presentation of the Gromyko Memorandum, which asserted that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in 1947, the Soviet position was intractably locked down. With that, the chances of winning Raoul Wallenberg’s release in later years sharply declined, according to the report.

It is not clear why the Eliasson Commission considers the Soviet position so entrenched. The Gromyko memorandum was, after all, so vague that it appeared to leave room for future adjustments. In fact, there are indications that the content of the memorandum may have been influenced at least in part in its preparatory stages by the attitude and remarks of high ranking Swedish officials. As the Eliasson Report stresses repeatedly, both Rolf Sohlman and Oesten Unden in 1955/56 had gone so far as to suggest to the Soviets possible explanations for Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. In retrospect, especially Sohlman’s remark to Nikolai Bulganin in November 1955 appears noteworthy. Sohlman directly alludes to the possibility that

33 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Internal Memorandum, 26 February, 1957.

Moeller, p. 404 [Men i Kreml hade man tydligen blivit sa perplex oever de Undenska utbrottet, att man begravde sin framstoet i djup tystnad.]

34 ECR, p.563 and p.577

35 Among other things the statement by the attending physician, A.L. Smoltsov, was not accompanied by an official death certificate or autopsy report, Wallenberg’s personal information was incomplete and the text stated that the information found in Russian archives “might” refer to Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, Smoltsov’s report did not adhere to the very strict rules and channels of communications which governed Soviet bureaucracy; see SWR and Mesinai. Liquidatsia. 2001. Numerous questions also remain about Smoltsov’s service and employment status in July 1947. Smoltsov at the time supposedly was on an extended leave of absence from his job, due to illness. The full facts still remain to be established.
“Beria and his consorts were to blame (for Wallenberg’s fate).” 37

Lack of urgency on the part of Swedish officials to press the case also emerges from a report distributed to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in preparation for Prime Minister Erlander’s impending state visit to Moscow in March 1956:

“... Some people who are close to Erlander told the members of the Soviet Embassy in Sweden that Erlander would not have raised the [Wallenberg] question in Moscow but was forced to discuss it in order to prevent the bourgeois parties from blaming the Swedish government in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections .... for not being active enough ... in .... the Wallenberg case.” 38

While the Eliasson Commission acknowledges that Unden’s reaction to the Gromyko Memorandum marks the full official formulation of Swedish ‘Realpolitik’ in the Wallenberg case, it rejects the notion that Sweden gave up on Raoul Wallenberg after 1957. It cites, for example, the official Swedish demarche of 1959 as an example of continued efforts. 39 It does, however, not explain how such a demarche could possibly have been effective without the appropriate policy in place to back it up.

d. Old mindsets

In the summary of its findings the Eliasson report states that it

“cannot find any substantial fault with the actions taken by the [Swedish] foreign policy leadership during the 1950’s.”40

This may well be its most controversial statement, especially since - by the authors own acknowledgement - their own report in part contradicts this assertion. In light of the many important questions which remain concerning Swedish conduct in later years, such a carte-blanche appears inappropriate or at the very least premature. The following decades also were far from problem free. One example is the decision to officially close the Wallenberg case in 1965. It remained closed for a full fifteen years, until 1979, when a new witness and the efforts of US Congressman Tom Lantos revived the issue. 41 The Swedish government’s approach to the Soviet Union that same year to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Bergling, a former Swedish Security official who had been arrested in March as a Russian spy, was clearly too little too late. 42 The Eliasson Commission strongly questions the wisdom of

37 ECR, p. 597. Unden made similar statements when he delivered a note on 9 March, 1956 to Soviet Ambassador Rodionov. In Soviet documentation Unden is quoted as saying that “the Swedish government would be satisfied with an answer that would hint at Wallenberg’s disappearance being an act of Beria.” see among others Carlbaeck-Isotalo, p. 17 and p.23. Carlbaeck also pointed to Tugarinov’s [of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Information Department] memorandum to Andrei Gromyko from 30 December, 1956, which recommended a quick answer to the Swedes in the Wallenberg case. Tugarinov suggests that Swedish-Soviet relations could hardly get worse, in light of the crisis brought about by the squashing of the civil uprising in Hungary that autumn and that in light of the remarks by Swedish officials a quick reply would result in limiting further damage of bilateral relations. see also SWR, p.113

38 MID, Information about negotiations with Swedish Prime Minister Erlander during his visit to Moscow, March 1956. As the Swedish-Russian Working Group points out in its report, one has to be careful with interpretation of Russian documents, especially in terms of deducing true intentions. As it concerns reports from members of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm, for example, there is a tendency of those representatives to fit the message to what they believed their superiors in Moscow wanted to hear. SWR, 2001

39 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. On 9 February, 1959 the Swedish government formally asked the Soviet Union to investigate whether or not Raoul Wallenberg had been imprisoned in Vladimir prison.

40 ECR, p. 39

41 In 1980 U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress that made Raoul Wallenberg an honorary U.S. citizen.

42 The idea for an exchange had apparently been conceived by Bergling himself who had heard of new testimony in the Raoul Wallenberg case, which stated that he had been alive in the Soviet Union some years earlier.
closing the case for fifteen years, but adds that

“it is not really clear what could have been done.”\footnote{ECR, p. 598}

Yet the decades after 1950 certainly saw a number of opportunities where it may have been possible to learn more about Wallenberg’s fate. However, these were not pursued or if so, rather halfheartedly. One of the most memorable was an apparent Soviet approach in 1966, delivered through a representative of the Protestant Church in Berlin, Carl-Gustav Svingel, which appeared to suggest an exchange, for unspecified compensation, of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem who had been arrested in 1963 as a Soviet agent, The Foreign Office refused to even discuss the offer and never even formally interviewed Svingel.\footnote{UD, P2 Eu I, RWD; see for example P.M. by Leif Belfrage, “ang. Herr Svingels berättelse.” 19 March, 1966. It remains uncertain who initiated the discussions - whether it was the Soviet side, Svingel’s colleague, the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel [as Svingel claims] or Svingel himself [approaching Vogel].} Whatever might have been behind the overture, one fact remains: Sweden captured one of the most important Cold War spies and got absolutely nothing in return.\footnote{After having been sentenced to life in prison in 1964, Wennerstroem received clemency in 1974 and was released from prison.} This issue alone should be worth a closer look.

The question of what type of signals Sweden sent Russia concerning Raoul Wallenberg in later years, and vice versa, also deserves closer scrutiny. While Swedish leaders like Prime Minister Tage Erlander continued to raise the question of Wallenberg’s fate after 1957, all the while earning strong Soviet rebuffs, there are indications that many of these later approaches lacked in both determination and conviction.\footnote{One exception was Erlander’s direct request to Khrushchev to immediately return Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden, following the testimony by Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz.} 46

In May 1964, for example, Swedish and Russian diplomats held discussions in preparation for Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev’s upcoming state visit to Sweden. The political atmosphere at the time was highly charged and the lingering issues in the Raoul Wallenberg threatened to further strain Swedish-Soviet relations. During one of these preparatory discussions Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Jarring indicated to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Kovalyov that Sweden’s main priority was to avoid any negative fallout for the planned visit, especially in the media.

“[Raoul Wallenberg’s] family and the press will never tolerate a missed opportunity for inquiry but it should cause for sure unpleasant publicity.”\footnote{UD, P2 Eu I RWD, Gunnar Jarring to Leif Belfrage, 26 May, 1964}

Jarring was particularly anxious about the testimony of Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz which had not yet been released to the public. In early 1961 Professor Svartz reported that while attending a medical conference in Moscow she had been told by a leading Soviet physician, A. L. Myasnikov that Raoul Wallenberg was alive at the time in Soviet captivity.\footnote{UD, P2 Eu I, RWD, Report by Nanna Svartz, 1 February 1961. Myasnikov claimed that Svartz had misunderstood his comments. A formal face-to-face meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz failed to resolve the issue. Another physician who had been present for part of time during the initial meeting between Myasnikov and Svartz, Professor Grigory Danishevsky, was never formally questioned. It is not known what Danishevsky has reported to the Russian side of this encounter.} In their conversation Jarring explains to Kovalyov that Sweden requires clarification of Svartz’s report. However, far from seizing the opportunity of either Wennerstroem’s arrest, or Khrushchev’s visit to press for answers, Jarring appears to go out of his way to inform the Russians that the Wallenberg case as such is no longer a priority for Sweden:

“We do not doubt the note that was presented in 1957,” Jarring tells Kovalyov, “but .... it would certainly not be inappropriate ... to conduct “a new check or - put differently - a completing check.”
In the following paragraphs of his memo Jarring acknowledges that it is all pretense:

We [Jarring and Kovlayov] pretended to await the results [of the check] and we understood fully well that they could not be ready before Khrushchev’s visit."

According to Kovalyov’s account of the meeting, Jarring was even more explicit:

“... The Swedish side only wants to make the Khrushchev visit a success. Investigation, Jarring added, which the Soviet government would promise, could bring the same result as the investigation in 1957. On my question what additional investigations the Swedes are talking about .... Jarring could not answer. Jarring said that he personally understands the difficulties involved but in this particular case he must take the position as an official representative of Sweden.”

Even with concessions to the often murky phrasing of diplomatic language and the difficult political conditions at the time, the message to the Russians was clear: The Raoul Wallenberg case was by now more than a political irritant and all that was needed were Russian assurances of a “completing check.” When Kovalyov, at the end of the discussions about Wallenberg, casually mentions Wennerstroem’s upcoming sentencing, Jarring informs Kovalyov that

“Sweden does not link these two issues.”

It would be quite interesting to know exactly how and why the Swedish government arrived at this position.

The Eliasson Commission argues that after 1950, with the arrival of Swedish Security Police Inspector Otto Danielsson and Permanent Undersecretary of State, Arne Lundberg, UD’s handling of the Wallenberg case dramatically improved. How far these improvements ultimately reached, however, is open for debate. Oesten Unden was after all still firmly in charge. And when Unden left office in 1962, the Unden mindset remained deeply entrenched, embodied, among others, by his protege, Sverker Astroem. Per Ahlmark, former head of the centrist Folkpartiet and one of Astroem’s harshest critics, points out that although Astroem was present in key decision making positions at all critical moments in the case, he does not mention Raoul Wallenberg with one word in his memoirs:

“The search for Wallenberg was one of the most important issues in UD. Not one word about that in the book. He claims that ‘the different governments after the war used every opportunity to bring forth a positive reply about Wallenberg.’ ... Why such a lie? Perhaps it is because Unden was Astroems boss and idol. Unden’s ideological neutralism between Stalin’s Soviet Union and the Western powers was shared by his pupil.”

It is an open secret that high-ranking UD decision makers, especially Oesten Unden and Rolf Sohlman, bore strong sympathies for the Soviet Union. In 1956 the CIA received information which cast suspicions on Sohlman’s attitudes and CIA officials considered an official investigation. Sverker Astroem, for his part, has been publicly accused of aiding Stig Wennerstroem before his arrest in 1963. If in fact real, what effects did those Soviet sympathies have in practical terms? The Eliasson Commission

49 MID, from Kovalyov’s diary, resolution by Andrey Gromyko, 31 May, 1964

50 Ahlmark. 2002. [Soekandet efter Wallenberg blev det stoersta enskilda aerendet inom UD. Inte ett ord om det i boken. Han pastod dock att de olika regeringarna efter kriget har unyttjat alla tillfaellen att fa fram ett hederligt sovjetiskt besked om Wallenberg. ... Varfoer denna osanning? Kanske foer att Unden blev Astroe ms chef och idol. Undens ideologiska neutralism mellan Stalins Sovjet och vaetmaekterna blev ocksa laerjungens.]

51 NARA, RG 84, [NND 947008], message via Air Pouch from Stockholm, 7 December, 1956

52 Sundelin. 1999. Sverker Astroem is the acknowledged ‘Eminence Grise’ of Swedish politics. He rose to prominence during World War II when he emerged from relative obscurity to accompany Erik von Post to Denmark in 1945 to meet SS Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg in preparation for Schellenberg’s escape to Sweden. He later was assigned to spend time with Schellenberg during his stay at the home of Folke Bernadotte. It was also by his own account Astroem who accompanied Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai on her return to Moscow in March 1945, the critical early phase in the Wallenberg case. He rose to become head of UD’s Political Department, later Kabinettssekreterare, as
Commission does not address this issue in depth. It claims that they had no obvious effect, at least none that can be ascertained in the official record. Nevertheless, as Magnus Petersson, a Swedish Security Policy expert, argues in an analysis written for the Commission report, Sweden’s attempt to balance Soviet interests, its so-called “Politics of Accommodation” [Anpassningspolitik],

“combined with a not insignificant, ideologically determined anti-Americanism among many of the responsible Swedish politicians, could border on or in effect constitute anticipation of Soviet demands or wishes.”

Regardless if accusations of espionage should turn out to be true or not, it is a fact that in the post-war years Astroem saw himself as a critical counterweight to what he considered the false neutralism Sweden had entered into after WWII. While nominally neutral, Sweden had secretly entered a quasi-alliance with the U.S. Astroem’s views have been highly influential, especially in his capacity as key advisor to the country’s leadership, including former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. In the eyes of Ahlmark and other critics, like Unden, Astroem championed a policy of “practical neutrality” as the centerpiece of Swedish post-war neutrality, with devastating consequences. As the critics see it, such a position ultimately draws

“no line between democracy and dictatorship”

and is a major reason behind Sweden’s failure to submit its recent history to a more critical review, including its behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg case.

The key question that is yet to be answered is exactly why Raoul Wallenberg’s fate evoked so little sympathy and so little interest from the people in charge of his case. Sweden’s failure to take advantage of important openings, by not maximizing all efforts, raises questions about possible hidden motives. Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna remarked on this already in 1976:

“I could very well imagine that certain gentlemen in UD were afraid of Wallenberg’s return. Those who had bet for the sake of prestige or career that he was dead, and had hindered the investigation, would then appear in an unpleasant light.”

As time went by, it became ever more difficult to pursue the case, especially in light of new political challenges, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and other crises. Former State Secretary Pierre Schori remarked on this in an internal memorandum in 1985, closely echoing Unden’s formulation from 1957:

“The point in time had to arrive some time where we had to tell ourselves that the likelihood that Raoul Wallenberg lives is so little that it costs too much to continue to drive the [Wallenberg] question. ... I cannot, dare not claim that he could not still be alive.... But I think that after all years gone without us receiving new certain information, the likelihood that he still continues to live has to appear so little that we cannot longer allow that the question will burden - sometimes poison - our relationship with the Soviets...”

well as Sweden’s representative at the United Nations. Astroem has a reputation as a man of power, not distinct ideology. In an interview with DN’s Mats Wiklund in 2002 he emphasized that he was not “a joiner” and that he has never had a “firm political conviction.” Wiklund, 2002.

53 Petersson, 2003

54 see, among others, Ekdal, December 2002.

55 Other observers are less harsh in their assessment. Magnus Petersson, for example, points out that despite his pro-Soviet policies, Unden in 1952 condemned the excesses of Communism as “a fanatical belief system with no tolerance for those with opposing views.” Petersson, p. 92. Astroem was heard by the Eliasson Commission but only briefly, in a two hour interview.

56 Palmstierna, p. 200 [Jag mycket vael kunde taenka mig att viss herar i UD var raedd foer Wallenbergs aterkomst. De som av prestige- eller karriaerskael satsat pa att han var doed och motsatt sig utredningar, komme da i ett obehatligt ljus.]

57 UD, P2 Eu 1, 12 February, 1985. P.M. signed by Pierre Schori.
Today, it can be argued that Sweden has even less incentive to solve Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. It is a fact, that the longer Wallenberg lived in captivity, the more problematic the matter becomes for both Russia and for Sweden. Even if Wallenberg died in 1947, revelations about the background of his case may bear a lot of risks or at the very least involve a number of uncertainties. Other than the satisfaction of having done the right thing, there would be few potential benefits.

III. OTHER DEFINITIONS:

1. The U.S.

a. “Swedish diplomat with an American task”

In the assessment of the Eliasson report, one major reason why the Swedish Foreign Office officials did not vigorously pursue Wallenberg’s rescue was the idea that he had been a de-facto employee of the U.S. government.58 The reasoning was that since Wallenberg had freely taken on the job with the War Refugee Board, he accepted the risks of such an assignment. Consequently, primarily he and his U.S. employers were to blame for his fate. The Eliasson Commission emphatically states that such notions and the neglect to vigorously pursue Raoul Wallenberg’s return were “unacceptable.”

The truly important question the Eliasson Commission does not sufficiently explore is why Sweden’s distancing from Raoul Wallenberg was so extreme. In the Commission’s assessment the U.S. had designed the “content” of the mission - Sweden had simply aided in its execution.59 In reality, however, the facts appear to have been far less clear cut. Wallenberg’s assignment was certainly not driven by American interests alone, but came about as a result of a confluence of various private and public interests.60 Swedish and American interests overlapped in this on various levels.

Aside from its long humanitarian tradition, Sweden had two major incentives why it supported the American efforts in 1944:61 By then it had become clear that the Allies and not Germany would win the war, plus Sweden had received strong US criticism for its economic dealings with Nazi Germany which had gone far beyond the limits set by international [bilateral] trade agreements and the rules governing Swedish neutrality. This concerned in particular the Wallenberg firm’s SKF trade in ballbearings. As the Eliasson Report points out, there are indications of a straightforward understanding: Swedish support for American aims in Hungary would weigh favorably in U.S. consideration of Swedish behavior.62 It does, however, not state the key irony: By a

58 The best example of this notion is the Swedish government’s suggestion in January 1945 to the American Minister in Stockholm, Hershel Johnson, to convey U.S. instructions to Raoul Wallenberg through the American Legation, Moscow, since Wallenberg seemed to be under Soviet protection. ECR, p. 190. As the Commission points out, it would have had to appear rather odd to the Soviets for an official Swedish representative to receive formal instructions from another government.

Another example is head of the UD’s Legal Department Goesta Engzell’s comment to the Swedish Minister in Budapest, Arfwedson on 14 June, 1946 that “the Wallenberg’s action did not take place as an assignment by the Swedish State” and that therefore the Swedish Foreign Ministry would refuse requests for compensation from individuals who had loaned funds to Wallenberg in Budapest. UD P2 Eu/Allmän. Engzell’s argument is strictly legalistic and of questionable validity. Even if it is true that the impetus and financing for Raoul Wallenberg’s mission came from the U.S., Wallenberg’s assignment inherently involved and evoked Swedish governmental authority, plus Swedish citizens and/or their relatives and, as some would argue, the Swedish state benefited from his actions.

59 ECR p. 582

60 The preparation of the Budapest mission involved various individuals and organizations. Kalman Lauer, a Hungarian Jew and Raoul Wallenberg’s business partner, appears to have been a driving force, coinciding with various efforts from the Jewish business community Stockholm, the World Jewish Congress and the U.S. War Refugee Board.

61 Sweden used its neutral status to extend protection to Scandinavian and Baltic Jews, especially after 1942. Its efforts were slow, however and often limited by concerns over absorbing large numbers of foreign populations into the country. As late as September 1944 the official War Refugee Board representative in Turkey, Ira Hirshmann, wrote: “Early in July we were advised that the Swedish Legation in Budapest has declared that it is willing to grant entry to Jewish women and children from Hungary [to Sweden] on condition that an acceptable great power guarantee that they would leave Sweden at the latest within three years for Palestine, the U.K., or the U.S. ...” Ira Hirshmann, Report to John Pehle, chapter 5, p. 17, Hungary, clandestine movements. 11 September 1944.

62 The U.S. applied strong pressure at the time on Sweden to cease it exports of ballbearings to Germany completely. ECR p. 126
strange twist of fate. Raoul Wallenberg’s mission served to compensate not only for the misconduct of his country but for that of his own relatives.  

By the same token, it can be asked why the U.S. did not insist more on pursuing the question of Wallenberg’s fate. The Eliasson Report only touches upon this issue indirectly, by emphasizing the questions that persist about Raoul Wallenberg’s work in Budapest. It points to the high level U.S. approval Raoul Wallenberg’s assignment received, including instructions signed directly by U.S. Foreign Minister Cordell Hull. The Eliasson Commission believes that this raises questions about the true nature of Wallenberg’s mission and those who sent him. In addition, the report points to U.S. documents speaking of an “American program” and that Raoul Wallenberg should be available

“for any task the WRB may assign him.”

In the same breath, the Eliasson Commission raises the question why Sweden had to ‘make’ a diplomat when it had numerous real diplomats readily available to go to Hungary. The Commission’s conclusions base themselves largely on reinterpretation of already available material rather than on new documentation. Even though many questions remain, it appears that the Commission in this instance may have over-interpreted some of the available material. As German researcher Christoph Gann has pointed out, Cordell Hull’s rather general message to Stockholm [via Iver Olsen] hardly qualifies as a full set of instructions. There are also clear indications that if Sweden saw Raoul Wallenberg as an American hire, the US ultimately considered Wallenberg Stockholm’s responsibility. As George Kennan at the U.S. Embassy, Moscow points out to the U.S. Secretary of State, Acheson, on September 25, 1945, in the immediate aftermath of Wallenberg’s disappearance:

“We feel that any action [here] on our part on behalf of Wallenberg, a Swedish national, would serve no useful purpose.”

The U.S. had, however, immediately pursued the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s whereabouts when it learned of his disappearance. Already on 22 May, 1945 General Bonner Key, the U.S. Representative of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, learned from his Soviet counterpart, General Levushkin, that Wallenberg most likely was in Soviet hands. The relative speed with which the U.S. inquired about Raoul Wallenberg has given rise to speculation that it may have been prompted by his possibly formal role with U.S. Intelligence. The currently available records do not support such a conclusion. For several reasons,

63. This point also raises questions about Raoul Wallenberg’s selection for the Budapest mission. As a former U.S. Treasury agent Olsen had worked in the European department of Foreign Funds Control, whose activities were aimed at exposing any direct or indirect financial support for Axis countries. His boss had been John Pehle, who in 1944 became the head of the U.S. War Refugee Board. Both men surely were aware of the irony of hiring a member of the very family they had investigated quite vigorously. Raoul Wallenberg most likely knew of the Allied charges against the Wallenberg Family. Numerous news reports concerning the Wallenbergs’ alleged cloaking of German assets had appeared in the international press as well as in some Swedish newspapers during 1944. In 1944, the Swedish Parliament decided to support the Allied Safehaven Program, which was designed to identify and secure enemy assets, as stipulated by the Bretton Woods VI Agreement.

64. ECR, p.119

65. Christoph Gann. Wallenberg’s commission/The judgment of the activities of Raoul Wallenberg after 1945. Speech to the Raoul Wallenberg Symposium in Budapest, 27-29 September, 2004. Gann emphasizes that Hull’s message was in part a response to official Swedish Foreign Ministry requests for some type of “directive for Wallenberg”. Hull’s communication would then “only be unusual”, Gann writes, “if it had been carried out without the intermediary position of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.”

66. It was in the end Sweden which appointed Wallenberg as a diplomat, although this clearly occurred on the direct request of the U.S. NARA, Hershel Johnson to Department of State, 21 June 1944: "Mr. Boheman made it clear that Swedish Foreign Office and his government are disposed to cooperate as full as possible in all humanitarian endeavors and the appointment of this Attaché Wallenberg is undoubtedly an evidence of official Swedish desire to conform to the wishes expressed in Department’s telegram 1010, May 25, 2 pm. Olsen and I are of the opinion that War Refugee Board should be considering ways and means of implementing this action of Swedish Government ...”

67. The same sentiment is expressed by Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to Senator Vandenberg, 23 April, 1947. ECR p. 617

68. NARA, Records of Interservice agencies, U.S. representative, ACC Hungary 1945-1947, RG 334, Box 38. It is unclear if and how this information was shared with the Swedish government.
however, both the U.S. and Sweden were eager to secure Raoul Wallenberg’s personal papers and made a concerted effort to find them

b. The general definition of the Budapest mission

While the central focus of Raoul Wallenberg’s mission was clearly humanitarian and remained so throughout, two other aspects strongly affected it, one economic, one political: a. the protection of Swedish/Allied business interests in Hungary, as well as the rescue of important businessmen and skilled technical workers. These business interests included in particular those of two leading Hungarian industrialists, Manfred Weiss and Leopold Aeschner. and b. American and British intention [as well as that of some of the Hungarian resistance groups] of limiting future Soviet influence in Hungary. Point a. involved to a large extent Raoul Wallenberg’s connections with the Swedish business community, especially Sven Salen and the Wallenberg Family. Point b. involved the members of various Intelligence Services active in Stockholm and in Budapest in 1944.

The Eliasson Commission hardly mentions any of these implications. Sweden and the Western Allies had a great deal at stake in Eastern Europe and especially in Hungary in 1944. Interests ranged from an extensive mercantile trade in textiles, foodstuffs, and rawmaterials, to light manufacturing industry, to Hungary’s state of the art weapons, munitions and aircraft industry. Major Swedish businesses like SKF and Swedish Match not only had local affiliates in Budapest but enjoyed monopoly status in Hungary. Official Swedish priorities were clear: Aside from the rescue of families and loved ones, the key goal was to save what Kalman Lauer repeatedly refers to in his letters to Raoul Wallenberg as “Zukunftsmenschen” - “People of the Future,” both in political and economic terms. Swedish business was therefore looking for a representative who would have both the necessary authority, i.e. diplomatic status, as well as the necessary skills and experience, i.e. business background to deal with the worsening conditions in Hungary. A regular diplomat would not have fulfilled these criteria. Hungarian businesses too were desperately trying to protect as many assets as they could, especially individuals with critical skills and know-how, plus licenses and patents. This was a welcome development for Swedish businesses, especially those with formal ties to the Manfred Weiss family. And in Sweden this happened to be mainly companies owned by Sven Salen and the Wallenbergs. So it is not by accident that individuals like Henrik [Ritter] de Wahl, managing director of Hungary’s largest industrial concern, the Manfred Weiss Works, [the Hungarian “Krupp”]. and Erik

69 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Hershel Johnson to Stettinius, 14 June, 1945, after the Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson reported to Iver Olsen and Hershel Johnson about events in Budapest. [see also below, c. Intelligence Aspects of the Budapest Mission]

70 Aeschner’s name is spelled “Litpold Ashner” in Hungarian and Russian sources

71 Defeat of Nazi Germany was of course priority and the Hungarian resistance did promote contacts to the Soviets in pursuit of this aim. Anti-communist sentiments, however, figured rather prominently in the various separate peace initiatives of the period. Initially British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was more concerned about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe than the U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. In October 1944 Churchill visited Moscow without the American President in order to press Stalin about his intentions. Sweden had repeatedly advised the U.S. of its fear of an “extension of Soviet Russia’s sphere of power.” General Kellgren to Colonel Rayens, the U.S. Military Attache in Stockholm. NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 443. Boston Series No.147. OSS Sources and Methods File. “Swedish Fear of Russian Power.” Although originally tolerant of Swedish neutrality policies, by late 1943 the Russians had become quite critical of Swedish concessions to Nazi Germany and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov went so far to demand Swedish entry into the war. see Report. State Department Holocaust-Era Assets. Supplemental to May 1997 preliminary study. 06/98, p. 123. www.usis-israel.org.

72 Minerals such as Bauxite, for example, from which light metals like aluminum are won, as well as other important resources such as oil.

73 Among other war machinery, the Manfred Weiss Works produced a light tank, the Landsverk L 60 B and 180 on license from Scania-Vabis.

74 RA, Rudolph Philipp and Kalman Lauer papers. Lauer to Wallenberg, 21 August, 1944 and 24 November, 1944. Appeals for help came from Vilmos Boehm, the former Swedish Minister in Stockholm who was employed at the British Legation, as well as the representative of the Polish government in exile in Stockholm, T. Pilch. As Lauer emphasizes to Wallenberg: “Gustafsson senior [Vilmos Boehm] enjoys the best reputation here. As you know he is regarded as a man for the future who will play a big role in the political life. Therefore I ask you to do all you can for the Gustafsson family.” And later: “At the end of July UD passed on a request concerning approximately fifty people to the Swedish Legation, Budapest and it has requested protection for these persons. These are the most intimate friends of Mr. Gustafsson, but very many of these gentlemen have rather serious connections in Sweden... all are to be considered as “people of the future.”” According to a report from the U.S. Legation, Budapest in 1946, at the end of 1944 Tungsram faced the deportation of thirteen engineers. The report states that their deportation “would have resulted in an immediate standstill of the works and thereby in the unemployment of thousands of working people.” NARA RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Hungary. Budapest Legation 1946, Box 95.
Bjoerkman, head of Skandinaviska Banken and of the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, were closely involved in the planning meetings between Iver Olsen - an OSS man and the U.S. War Refugee Board Representative in Stockholm - and Raoul Wallenberg in June 1944.  

Raoul Wallenberg’s official task was to report on the possibilities of Jewish rescue but he had no Swedish governmental authority to conduct far reaching rescue operations. In fact his mission, at least on the Swedish end, was to be limited in both time and scope. However, from the very beginning Raoul Wallenberg had made it clear that he intended to use the system he and his colleagues were putting in place to save as many people as possible.

“In my opinion the help project should continue on the highest scale“

he writes to Kalman Lauer in late July 1944.

“It would be wrong to assume that Sweden’s part is done in terms of bringing aid to the Jews as soon as the repatriation action is concluded.”

This position put Wallenberg at odds not only with his fellow Swedish diplomats in Budapest, but also with the original Swedish supporters of the Budapest mission.

Lauer warns Wallenberg about this problem already in late August 1944:

“I would like to tell you about the conversation I had with [Norbert] Masur [Swedish businessman and leading member of the Jewish Community in Stockholm]. He asked me if you even had the possibility of helping over there. The ‘Professor’ [codename for the Jewish Community, Stockholm] is of the opinion that only transport here [to Sweden] can be considered helpful; everything else seems meaningless to them. Gratitude for your work you can probably not expect. So be very careful before you throw yourself into any adventures.

Iver Olsen, meanwhile, was pleased with Wallenberg’s approach which reflected the activist line outlined in the official guidelines provided by Foreign Minister Cordell Hull. Nevertheless, Olsen sharply complained that he did not receive enough information from Wallenberg in Budapest and repeatedly threatened to withhold additional funds. It seems that from the outset the initial backers of the rescue initiative - Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish Foreign Office, the Swedish business community Stockholm, the Jewish Community and even Iver Olsen - all seemed to have a different idea about what the mission was in fact intended to accomplish.

c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest mission

Until 1944, Jewish rescue had not been U.S. political priority. One reasons was the relatively strong degree of a Anti-Semitism present in the traditional American political establishment. Even among Jewish leaders there existed differing views about priorities, such as the pursuit of the long-term aims of Zionism, in particular the creation of a Jewish state, vs. the relatively short-

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75 Philipp, p. 5-6. de Wahl also had family remaining in Hungary. Ernst Wallenstein testified that Raoul Wallenberg told him that his task was to save “Jews and others.”

76 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Handbrev Sven Grafstroem to Per Anger, 6 July, 1944

77 The main focus was to repatriate about 649 persons in about two months.

78 RA, Kalman papers. Raoul Wallenberg to Kalman Lauer, 24 July, 1944. See also Letter of 18 July, 1944.

79 Ibid., Kalman Lauer to Raoul Wallenberg, 21 August, 1944.

80 ECR p. 117-118
term goals of rescuing Jews from Nazi persecution. By 1944, however, public pressure had mounted to such a degree, that the issue of saving the remaining Jewish communities in Europe had finally become a major focus of U.S. policy. For his part, John Peble, the head of the U.S. War Refugee Board (WRB), had a very keen interest in humanitarian matters. Peble had argued hard in favor of bombing of the railway lines to Auschwitz, for example. It is equally clear that the WRB and the U.S. Intelligence agencies, namely the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) coordinated their affairs very closely and in many cases sent joint representatives to Europe. However, while the OSS hoped to profit from Wallenberg’s mission in a variety of ways, there is serious doubt that he ever was a recruited agent. In a formal CIA interview in 1955, Iver Olsen adamantly denied any OSS role for Raoul Wallenberg. Unless Olsen is lying or Raoul Wallenberg was recruited by other OSS groups without the knowledge of Olsen, or by the British, again unknown to Olsen, there is little doubt that Wallenberg’s mission was indeed predominantly humanitarian.

Wallenberg and his organization would of course have been an extremely valuable source of information on conditions in Hungary. This especially since U.S. and British Intelligence networks were faced with serious gaps in their intelligence gathering

81 On 17 December, 1938 following “Kristallnacht” in Germany, when Nazi thugs went on a rampage in Germany, wantonly destroying Jewish property - David Ben Gurion, the Head of the Jewish Agency and later Israeli Prime Minister, had summarized the problem in a letter to the Zionist Executive: “If Jews face a choice between ... rescue of Jews from concentration camps and the support for a national homeland in Palestine, then pity will gain the upper hand and all energy will be channeled into the rescue of Jews from various countries. Zionism will be struck off the public agenda in the world and in Great Britain, but also from the public Jewish opinion elsewhere. If we allow a separation of the refugee problem from the Palestine problem, then we risk the existence of Zionism.”


83 Like Iver Olsen and Herbert Katzki. In Katzki’s case there were plans not to inform even the OSS station Chief in Turkey of Katzki’s dual role. So secret assignments were made in some cases. For close cooperation between WRB and OSS see Records of the War Refugee Board at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. Memorandum of Conference in Mr. Peble’s Office, 7 March, 1944; Present: Mr. Irving Sherman of the Office of Strategic Services, Messrs Peble and Lesser [WRB].

84 NARA, RG 226, Memorandum of interview with Iver Olsen, 13 December 1955. OSS officials also interviewed the other OSS agents who had served in Stockholm in 1944 but they were unable to provide any detailed information about Wallenberg’s contacts with Olsen.

85 Marcus Wallenberg had very good contacts to British Intelligence, through his wife’s first husband, Charles Hambro. [see also next page, Raoul Wallenberg’s connection to individuals involved in separate peace talks in Stockholm] At the same time, according to British PRO records, British Intelligence wondered out loud about other possible motives behind Raoul Wallenberg’s appointment, including potential economic and political gains. According to a report by Robin Knight, Senior European Editor of U.S. News and World Report who reviewed the papers and sent a report to the Swedish Embassy in London, the documents are “full of sarcastic remarks about Marcus Wallenberg and war profiteering.” Telegram George Labouchere to A.A. F. Haig at British Foreign Office, 3 July, 1944; including handwritten comments by Haig. see UD, RWD P2 Eu 1, Bilk till handbrev Nilsson-Hallqvist, 9 July, 1996.

On the other hand, Swedish officials made sure that both Henry Caird North of the British Legation as well as Swedish businessman Bo Andren were informed immediately of Wallenberg’s disappearance. Both North and Andren have personal dossiers in the archives at the Swedish Security Police. Andren was a Swedish businessman [Isolas Gruvindustri] who had both business interests and family members in Eastern Europe and who was well acquainted with Raoul Wallenberg and the Wallenberg Family. In the Swedish Police dossier he is described as having close contact with the British Legation, Stockholm. After the war, Andren maintained close ties to various Eastern European representatives in Stockholm. North was considered a British Intelligence man. He was officially a representative of the firm Mather & Platt, but had ties to the Press office at the British Legation which housed the Intelligence Section. The Eliason Commission Report also raises the question whether or not North was associated with SOE, the Special Operations Executive. Raoul Wallenberg’s business partner, Kalman Lauer had had contacts to the British since 1942. Immediately after his arrival in Sweden in 1939 Lauer had drawn the attention of the Swedish Security Police because he and his business partners had established numerous front firms which did business with all sides. Due to these activities and to his Hungarian citizenship he had been blacklisted on the official British Statutory List. In a letter to the Allied High Commissioner’s Office in Germany, dated January 20, 1950, Lauer claims that “in 1942 it came to a gentlemen’s agreement between L.C.S. Barber of the British Legation, Stockholm and myself that AB Meropa should carry on business in the most loyal way and in accordance with the regulations of the war.” see SAEPO, P 2819 Leslie Barber. It is not clear whether this agreement extended to Raoul Wallenberg or if he was aware of this arrangement. Lauer’s name was subsequently removed from the Statutory List [SAEPO Archive, P3030/p41] and he met Barber on a regular basis, including as late as January 1944. Both Lauer and Wallenberg knew Cyril Cheshire, a timber merchant and MI 6 Intelligence man in Stockholm since 1942. see Kalman Lauer Papers, Lauer to Wallenberg, 28, October 1944, and Dorril, 2000. After the war, Lauer stood accused by both American and Hungarian sources of having smuggled valuables from Hungary to South America, which Lauer denied. The precise details of the charges are not known.

86 From 1942-1944 there was in fact a secret intelligence sharing agreement in effect between Hungary and the U.S. see Charles Fenyesi. 2004. Field Marshal Rundstedt, Admiral Canaris, and the Jew who could have saved Europe: How the U.S. bungled three Anti-Nazi Plots in 1943.[a
Iver Olsen himself makes this clear in a message to OSS headquarters in Washington in June 1944:

"... The Baltic operations authorized by the War Refugee Board are also getting under way, as are certain projects in Hungary. In all matters the facilities of the OSS have been used and it is expected that the OSS will reap some advantage...." 88

What he does not mention is the role Swedish Intelligence played in these plans. It had actively supported Olsen’s activities in the Baltics and OSS records show that Swedish Intelligence cooperated with the Americans in matters concerning Hungary as well.89 The Special Intelligence [SI] chief of OSS in Stockholm, Taylor Cole, recalls in his memoirs that one of his key projects in Stockholm was the contacts with the Hungarian Legation to discuss possible Allied military intervention in Eastern Europe.90 The Americans cooperated in this closely with their British and Swedish counterparts. In October 1944, Thorsten Akrell, assistant to the Swedish Head of Counterintelligence Carl Bonde and codenamed “The Kid,” personally smuggled a radio receiver into Hungary through the diplomatic pouch, and other technical equipment was delivered as well.91 Swedish Intelligence also had

87 Secret discussions in 1943 between Allied [especially British] and Hungarian representatives on how to “disengage” Hungary from the Axis had been discovered by the Germans. The head of American Intelligence in Budapest, Samuel Springman, had left Hungary in 1944. A message from August 27, 1944 between OSS headquarters to Stockholm states explicitly why the OSS was so interested in developing its Hungarian connections: “Hope some closer contacts can be worked out between Stockholm and other points, Bari [Italy] in particular, to make more effective use of Hungarian intelligence efforts. This especially necessary in view of complete lack to date any understandable policy on part our State Department or British cousins toward Hungary and toward mobilization any Hungarian Anti-Nazi effort.”

The U.S.’s OSS Budapest City team stood by in Bari but never made it into Hungary. British efforts appear to have been equally limited. A report by head of the OSS Budapest City Team, Major Flues, from 17, April 1945, makes it clear that the intelligence received from Budapest until December 1944 - when MFM leader Geza Soos and a number of other members of the resistance managed to escape to Italy - was “extremely meagre” in all areas. NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 356.

There were some networks like those around Raphael Rupert who worked with British Warrant Officer Reginald Barratt and Miklos Csomoss, a dentist and leader of the Hungarian Communists, as well as a group of Dutch officers who had fled from German concentration camps who became involved in the resistance. This group included Gerit van der Waals. van der Waals had contact with the Swedish Legation, Budapest since it represented Dutch interests in Hungary. Rupert, van der Waals and Barratt were later arrested by the Soviets, together with Karl Schandl, a Hungarian businessman and British Intelligence agent who had close contact with Raoul Wallenberg. Van der Waals and Barratt died in Soviet captivity, Schandl and Rupert were released. Their arrest came despite a letter by the British from early 1945 informing the Russians about which British officers were present in Hungary. [UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Report by Robin Knight, 9 July, 1996.] The apparent orders given to British agents to contact Russian authorities in Hungary have given rise to the question whether the men were betrayed, by Kim Philby or others. Critical records concerning Allied Intelligence activities in Hungary remain classified in England and in Russia, as well as Israel.

88 Records of the War Refugee Board at Hyde Park, NY. Pehle to Lesser [via Olsen to Helms], 9 June, 1944. See also original cable NARA RG 226. Olsen to Helms, 7 June, 1944.

89 Swedish Intelligence aims by 1944 had turned sharply toward the Soviet Union.

90 Cole, p. 84

91 NARA, RG 226, Entry 210 Official Dispatch OSS Stockholm to OSS Washington, October 4, 1944 Box 467, Folder 2. “‘The Kid’ returned safe today. Delivered both packages to Miklos Csomoss.” See also Cole, p. 87. Csomoss was one of Andor Gellert’s [Hungarian journalist and U.S. Intelligence contact in Sweden] resistance contacts, together with Hungary’s former Prime Minister, Istvan Bethlen. Csomoss had close links to British Intelligence; see Reports of the OSS Budapest City Team, 1944, 5 January 1945, Major A. J. Flues to Lt. Col. Howard Chapin. The documentation also hints at planned U.S/Swedish Intelligence cooperation in the future. Akrell and “Becky” [possibly Count Bonde] are to be brought to Washington for further discussions on the issue. Only very few of these communications sent or received through the various radio sets are available to researchers.
devised a signal plan for the Hungarian opposition group MFM [Magyar Függetlensegi Mozgalom] whose leader, Geza Soos, was in touch with the Swedish Legation through both Raoul Wallenberg and his colleague Per Anger. 92 Taylor Cole directly states that

“our Hungarian interests and contacts occasioned a meeting with Raoul Wallenberg,”

indicating that the separation between intelligence matters and other issues was rather fluid. 93

Aside from his contacts with Soos and other leading members of the Hungarian resistance - including the group around former Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen - Wallenberg apparently also served as communication channels for certain circles around a prominent Hungarian exile and Social Democrat in Stockholm, Vilmos Boehm, who was then employed by the British Legation. 94 In the beginning Boehm supposedly did not provide Wallenberg with the names of so-called “illegals” in Hungary, since he did not know if Wallenberg could be trusted. In early August 1944, however, Kalman Lauer received instructions from Boehm which he passed on almost verbatim to Wallenberg in Budapest. Boehm strongly recommends that Wallenberg hire a number of people for his organization, [Lauer writes] and explains that Boehm would be

“very grateful if these people would via the extended circle of friends let him [Boehm] know about the [verbatim: shaping] state of things.”

Raoul Wallenberg is to pass the information on to Stockholm via Lauer. Not only Boehm is interested, but also

“the Swedish friends in the Per A. [sic; Anger] circle would be glad to receive these personal messages.” 95

This appears to be a not so subtle hints to various intelligence groups in Stockholm, including the British, as well as Per Anger’s role in these affairs. 96 All these connections make it quite understandable why both U.S. and Swedish Intelligence were so eager
to locate Raoul Wallenberg’s papers when he disappeared. Contrary to general belief, many Swedish Legation documents were not destroyed in the chaos of the Soviet invasion, but were confiscated by Russian troops.97

Exactly how these Allied/Swedish intelligence operations affected Raoul Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest and Soviet perceptions of them remains only partially understood. Soviet interrogation records, including interrogations of some of Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners who had been arrested in Eastern Europe show that the Soviets were attempting to obtain a fuller picture of Allied activities in Hungary. 98

It may be important to distinguish what the Wallenberg mission was in its conception and what it developed into once Raoul Wallenberg was in Budapest. The key goal of the Hungarian resistance and the Allies obviously was to bring an end to the war as the most effective means to stop the slaughter. In secret discussions the Allied representatives had repeatedly held out the idea to Hungary that resisting Nazi Germany, as well as a strong position on the Jewish question, could pave the way to a separate peace agreement. Raoul Wallenberg communicates about this, however, not directly with Olsen [or with Boehm], but indirectly through Kalman Lauer.99

This indicates that Raoul Wallenberg had only very limited direct communications with Olsen, if any. Nevertheless, practically all his contacts - with people from the Hungarian underground like Count Bethlen, Jewish organization like the Joint, as well as Allied Intelligence representatives and German Nazi officials - could have directly or indirectly linked Wallenberg with several of the separate initiatives in the fall of 1944. The question is to what degree exactly the separate peace issue and other intelligence issues figured in these exchanges and if these contacts served indeed primarily the facilitation of Jewish rescue.100 There have been suggestions, that Wallenberg may have involved himself in the collection of information useful to the American and the British Allies and that he found ways to pass this information on to Sweden. Wallenberg’s photographer, Tom Veres, for example, allegedly was asked to document not only human suffering but also to take photographs of military and strategic subjects in and around Budapest.101 The question remains whether or not any of these activities constituted a formal part of Wallenberg’s assignment that so far has not been disclosed or if he acted on his own accord.

An invitation list to a cocktail party at Raoul Wallenberg’s apartment on 2 December, 1943 shows that he was associating with individuals deeply involved in separate peace discussions, such as the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm, Antal Ullein Revicky.102

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97 A report from the Swiss Legation from the spring of 1945 states: "A big safe of the Swedish Legation which the Nazis had unsuccessfully tried to remove was removed by the Russians with all its contents. This affair will have a diplomatic consequence as the Swedes propose to protest to Russia." see www.historicaltextarchive.com, Hungary: The Unwilling Satellite. Appendix III. Swiss Legation Report of the Russian Invasion of Hungary in the Spring of 1945.

98 Otto Prade, a chauffeur at the Swedish Legation Budapest was asked directly “what the British were doing at the [Swedish] Legation.” UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, testimony by Otto Prade, 16 August 1950; also, P.M., Prisoner of War Gfrorner about the Jewish organization Joint, 9 February, 1995. According to the P.M. Franz R. Gfrorner - an Abwehr agent who had worked for Allied Intelligence - stated to Soviet interrogators that “Sweden, along with other foreign Legation worked for Anglo-American Intelligence, directly or as couriers.” Stalin’s dissatisfaction with Soviet Intelligence Services’ failure to counteract Allied Intelligence efforts led to a major shake-up in the structure of the Intelligence Services in 1947.

99 RA, Kalman Lauer Papers. see for example coded telegram of 22 July, 1944. This was just after Raoul Wallenberg’s arrival in Budapest. Some communications may have also proceeded through other intermediaries and contacts, like Paul Mariassy, for example, who was Gellert’s assistant and whose name appears in Raoul Wallenberg’s notebook. Future research will have to address the question of exactly how, with whom and about what Raoul Wallenberg communicated while in Budapest. This will help to shed light on the question whether or not he had any special assignment beyond his stated tasks [of which Lauer, for example, may have had no knowledge] or if he developed any initiatives on his own as time progressed. One key question is if he indeed contacted the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontai, in the fall of 1944, on behalf of the wife of the Arrow Cross Foreign Minister, Gabor Kemeny, who had helped him on a number of occasions.

100 According to the testimonies of various individuals, Raoul Wallenberg was also involved in aiding British and American Intelligence personnel who were hiding in Budapest. See testimony of Karl Schandl [1958], Les Banos [1996], and Sandorne Erdoes. [1996]. The latter reported that Wallenberg helped Hungarian resistance groups in smuggling information concerning Hungarian conditions to the West.


102 Cole, p. 84; also NARA, RG 226, DARE release, collection of OSS cables. Intensive discussions about Hungary’s “separation” from Germany had earlier been taking place in Istanbul with British Intelligence representatives, some of whom had close personal ties to the
Just the day before he was scheduled to attend Raoul Wallenberg’s gathering, Ullein-Revicky had met with representatives of U.S. Intelligence, including Taylor Cole. The invitation list further includes members of the most immediate Wallenberg family and business circles, such as Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg - who had close connections to a number of Ullein-Revicky’s key British contacts - and Bo Andren, a Swedish businessman with close ties to the British Legation.

American researcher Vadim Birstein has recently claimed that the Russians indeed may have suspected Raoul Wallenberg’s involvement in separate peace negotiations. In 1946, the head of MGB’s Foreign Intelligence section, Fedotov, had promised

“to report to Molotov on the reasons of Wallenberg’s detention.”

As Birstein points out, this fact was known through a memorandum written by A. Plakhin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1952. Plakhin attached a footnote to this statement which cited the testimony of a former prisoner of war, Nikolaus von Maasburg who in 1947 had claimed that

“the Russians arrested Wallenberg because they wanted to find out details of the negotiations he conducted with the British regarding the capitulation of Hungary at an earlier stage”

As Birstein writes:

“Regardless of whether or not von Maasburg’s statement is correct, it is remarkable that Plakhin chose to mention the Hungarian-British secret peace negotiations as an explanation for Fedotov’s (foreign intelligence) interest in Wallenberg.”

Taylor Cole argues that altogether very little came of Allied and especially US intelligence efforts in Hungary because

“our [U.S.] State Department was being excessively careful not to raise Stalin’s suspicions of separate peace negotiations with the Nazis or, in particular, with Nazi satellites in Eastern Europe.”

The British were less shy in their attempts and the Soviets, at any rate, were not convinced. An excerpt from the memoirs of Vasily F. Roshin alias Razin, a Soviet ‘rezident’ at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm during the 1940’s illustrates how the humanitarian mission to Budapest looked in Soviet eyes:

“In general, during the years of the war various separate peace negotiations took place in Sweden. It seems that secret consultations between the World Zionist Organizations and American Zionist Centers on one side, and representatives of Fascist Germany on the other side, about bringing wealthy Jews to Sweden, is the most interesting.”

Wallenberg Family. After the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944 Ullein-Revicky held special ambassadorial status.

103 Informational note on the Wallenberg case, written by Acting Head of the 5th [Scandinavian] Department of MID in June 1952.


106 Cole, p. 84. Cole continues: ”Winston Churchill favored increased efforts to encourage and assist subversive activity in the Balkans. I have often wondered in retrospect if there were not overlooked possibilities in Central Europe along the lines sympathetically considered by Churchill and if under other circumstances Hungary might have played an important role... Certainly my Hungarian informants believed so at the time.”

107 In July 1944, Moshe Shertok, the head of the Jewish Agency, flew to London in a desperate attempt to convince the British government to pursue joint British/Jewish underground SOE operations in Hungary designed to rescue the remaining Jewish population. Despite Churchill’s strong support, the program as such apparently never got off the ground. see Stafford, p. 299-300. Nevertheless, SOE officers and their cells were actively involved in Jewish rescue missions. The precise scale and aims of SOE activities in Hungary remains unclear.

Without mentioning names directly, Razin defines the various humanitarian activities of the period as acts of conspiracy by Western Powers and Nazi Germany aimed directly against Soviet interests. As UD archivist Goeran Rydeberg points out in his report on possible areas of future research in the Raoul Wallenberg case, Soviet agents over the years had collected information that Sweden, and especially the Wallenberg family, had actively supported separate peace talks between Germany and Britain, with the complete defeat or ultimate destruction of the Soviet Union as its ultimate aim.

Against this background, separate peace initiatives which promised rescue of Jews in return for hard currency or war materials “for use at the Eastern Front” were especially problematic. Raoul Wallenberg’s elaborate plans for postwar restitution of Jewish ownership would only have further enhanced that impression. A former Hungarian AVO/AVH official, Karoly Remenyi, has stated that in Hungarian Intelligence circles it was understood that Raoul Wallenberg had

“an intelligence assignment about the future of Hungary.”

Interestingly, the early instructions from Stockholm [Cabinet] to the Swedish Legation, Budapest specifically names possible postwar aid initiatives for Hungary as one part of the “special assignment” [specialuppdrag] for Raoul Wallenberg.

“The American Embassy also pays great attention to this question,”

the text continues.

In fact, at the very time of Raoul Wallenberg’s appointment to Budapest, the OSS was beginning to implement a full fledged economic intelligence program aimed at influencing

“the major industrial and financial centers in Europe”

and in which business men from neutral countries were to play a critical role.

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109 Several Russian analysts have emphasized the importance of Stalin’s growing obsession with renewed German power in the immediate aftermath of World War II, in addition to his increasingly anti-Semitic views. They consider the U.S.’s failure to pursue a strict policy of de-nazification and to dismantle German industrial cartels as one of the decisive factors in ushering in the Cold War; see for example S. Mikoyan’s statements as cited in Christopher Simpson’s book *Money, Law and Genocide.*

110 Rydeberg, p.13. Rydeberg cites decoded VENONA telegram traffic which reported a meeting between Jacob Wallenberg and Count Waldemar von Oppenheim in April 1942. These discussions supposedly considered “... launching a joint attack on the Soviet Union with the aim of destroying it totally.” The reliability of this report and how it was received in Moscow is unknown. Carl Goerdeler, a key figure in the German resistance, stresses in his last letter to Jacob Wallenberg in November 1944 that at that point Russian Communism poses an even greater threat to Europe than German National Socialism and Goerdeler urges that the Western Allies should oppose it with all possible force. See Nylander, 1998, p. 272.


112 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Testimony of Karoly Remenyi, 1984. While his testimony has been released in Sweden, it remains classified in U.S. archives. No documentation has been made available concerning his work in Hungary from Hungarian Intelligence Archives.

113 UD, HP 21 Eu, 21 June, 1944.

114 This program was first outlined in a memorandum by OSS representative William Casey, later head of the CIA, to OSS London from 3 May, 1944 and in part reads like a tailor-made job description for a Swedish businessman: “*Industrial and financial centers have always been close to the seat of political power .... It follows very clearly from this that OSS should be studying the industrial and financial networks of Europe, the relationship between them, the possibility of exploiting them for intelligence purposes as they go into and come out of the wringer of occupation, unscrambling and reconstruction. Some high grade talent should be concentrated on analyzing plans for taking over enemy industrial and financial organizations for operation during the occupation and for turning them back, ... Agents should be placed in key spots in European industrial and financial organizations in the course of unscrambling...*” And earlier in the same document Casey writes: “*Firstly, it’s important to watch enemy business interests and to see how they’re used to get intelligence ... Then, it’s immediately important to tap enemy businessmen for intelligence on enemy war production, in the political and power lineup, in the general state of morale. This can be most effectively done on high business levels and even thru [sic] neutral business men if direct contact proves impossible or undesirable. Similarly seeds of division and doubt and incentive to work for surrender can be spread thru neutral business men without direct contact. The calibre [sic] of business men needed can most readily be recruited on a short term basis .... Therefore, best results would be achieved by top flight businessmen moving in and out,... tapping their sources, each basing his operation on one good smart man who would remain on the job to give direction and continuity, tie
Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts and deals with German and Hungarian Nazis, especially Himmler’s Special Representative Kurt Becher and possibly SS Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg also would have weighed against him in Soviet eyes. According to Wallenberg’s colleague Lars Berg

“Wallenberg received considerable support from the wealthy industrial family Weiss in Budapest. ... Even Himmler’s Special Representative and controller of the Weiss Family apparently helped Raoul Wallenberg in critical situations.”

While Eichmann and his cohorts methodically sent thousands of people to their deaths, Becher with equal effectiveness ransacked Hungary’s material treasures. His true forte was blackmail. By the end of 1944 he was looking for ways to transfer himself and his Hungarian loot to a safe haven abroad. At the same time, with the defeat of the Nazi Germany key economic assets in Hungary were threatening to fall into Soviet hands or were to be sabotaged by fleeing German troops. So the doors for negotiations were open.

Historians like Bernt Schiller and Yehuda Bauer have chronicled the negotiations for Jewish lives in exchange for war materials and hopes for a separate peace. Many questions remain as to how many of these deals were struck, the parties involved and what other concessions might have been rendered. The various links between the neutral countries and their bankers, Hungarian and German industrialists, Nazi officials, the Jewish underground and competing Allied interests in Europe remain among the least explored and most controversial subjects of the post-war era. The Norwegian historian Tore Pryser has pointed out that Iver Olsen’s rescue operations in the Baltic countries may have involved individuals who cooperated with Swedish and German Nazis in establishing secret anti-Soviet organizations. This may have laid the groundwork for post-war Swedish-US-British cooperation and espionage missions in the Baltic countries. The Russians, surely aware of all these things, would probably not have bothered to draw too subtle distinctions as to how Raoul Wallenberg fit into the general equation.

One big problem is the lack of available documentation, not only in Eastern European and German archives, but also those in Sweden. Much of the Swedish material appears to have been lost or destroyed. As the Eliasson Commission discovered, in the
Swedish Military Intelligence archives [MUST], for example, no papers concerning the activities of British Intelligence in Sweden are available at all for the years 1943-1954, for example.\textsuperscript{121} At the same time, despite its far reaching efforts, the Commission’s claim that it has studied all currently available documents of interest concerning these matters is highly questionable. Too many relevant collections that have not been thoroughly examined remain in various Swedish archives, including MUST[Swedish Military Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence, as well as respective successor organizations], FRA [Swedish Signal Intelligence] and the Swedish Foreign Office, including intelligence as well as political and commercial records.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{123} Goeran Rydeberg’s report also makes it clear that there remain many open sources which have so far been underutilized, such as the decoded Soviet cable traffic, VENONA. It is also somewhat surprising that the Eliasson Commission places such emphasis on U.S. records when British archives seem equally of interest.

d. Lack of Swedish-American coordination

If Swedish officials had doubts as to the aim and scope of American involvement in the Budapest mission, one wonders why they did not seek clarification from their American counterparts. Instead, it took a full six years before Sweden placed an official request for U.S. assistance with the Wallenberg investigation.\textsuperscript{124} Even more disturbing is that in 1956 Swedish Prime Minister Erlander aired some of these uncertainties in front of Soviet officials. During his official state visit to Moscow Erlander informed Soviet Prime Minister Krushchev that

\begin{quote}
“Wallenberg was on a mission in Budapest which we believe [my emphasis] began with the idea of saving lives.”\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

This unfortunate formulation cast doubt not only on Raoul Wallenberg’s status as an official Swedish representative, but directly questioned the legitimacy of his mission.

Over the years, Sweden and the United States kept each other informed on the Wallenberg matter and records in both countries show that there was a steady exchange of information back and forth. There is no evidence, however, of a joint approach or a coordinated policy in the Raoul Wallenberg case. In the 1950’s and 60’s the U.S. considered the Wallenberg case mostly an important public relations tool in the Cold War. When Swedish Foreign Minister Oesten Unden informed the Americans on 8 February, 1957, that he was ready to accept the Soviet version of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate, an unnamed CIA official responded immediately. In a strongly worded cable addressed to his superiors he argues that

\textsuperscript{121}ECR p.136 Some of these records should be available in British archives but many collections there remain inaccessible.

\textsuperscript{122} For a vivid description of the difficulties Swedish researchers have faced in gaining access to documentation from the Swedish Intelligence Services even in official investigations see Professor Christer Joensson’s paper “Truth and Consequence” in which he summarizes his experiences in the 1990’s as head of a Swedish government sponsored project to investigate the history of MUST, the Swedish Military Intelligence Services. A number of researchers resigned from the project when it became clear that they could not obtain the access necessary to do their work. Joensson’s paper is available in English on the World Wide Web.


\textsuperscript{124}NARA, RG 263, 8 August, 1951 [refers to 12 June, 1951] “... It seems rather strange that the ... initial request for aid and information should come more than six years after the disappearance of the subject [Raoul Wallenberg] ...”

\textsuperscript{125}UD P2 Eu 1, RWD, P.M. Angaende forhandlingar mellan de svenska och sovjetiska regeringsdelegationerna i Kremlin den 30 mars 1956. [.. under en verksamhet som vi trodde gick ut pa raedda maenniskoliv ..] This formulation was first noted by Swedish journalist Erik Sjoequist. It would be important to determine whether Erlander’s formulation was merely careless or intentional. If it was the latter, one can only wonder what he hoped such ambiguity would accomplish. A small possibility exists that it was in part prompted by testimonies from returning German POWs like Ernst Wallenstein. Wallenstein had testified that Raoul Wallenberg considered his diplomatic status a liability since the Russians suspected him as a spy “due to his diplomatic passport”, as well as the fact that Wallenberg had stayed behind in Budapest. Wallenberg explicitly asked Wallenstein to urge the Swedish Foreign Ministry to issue an official clarification to the Russian side that he [Raoul Wallenberg] was not a diplomat. see UD, P2 Eu 1, Testimony of Ernst Wallenstein, 1955.
“the Swedish government if so inclined should not be allowed to gloss over [the] Wallenberg affair” and “permit [the] Soviets to get away with [the] ridiculous claim [that it is] all Abakumov’s fault.” 126

In light of the 1956 squashed uprising in Hungary, it would be absolutely necessary to

“... counteract [the] Soviet coexistence drive ... [and] awaken [the] Swedish public opinion to [the] Soviet threat ...”

The real practical aim, however, appears to have been the elimination of Swedish opposition to an unnamed American project, and Swedish behavior in the Wallenberg case would serve as a tool for the U.S. to apply the necessary pressure. The relevant portions remain censored. American officials claim that the material which stays classified in U.S. archives concerning the Wallenberg case remains secret largely because it would reveal sensitive issues concerning U.S./Swedish bilateral relations.127

The complex postwar U.S./Swedish relationship, embedded in the politically volatile environment of the Cold War, is perhaps a major reason for the U.S.’s lack of engagement in the Wallenberg question after 1945. Of prime concern for the two countries would be the revelation of details about joint intelligence projects [which also often involved the British] in full breach of Swedish neutrality. Secret agreements ranged from the very basic, like sharing of information obtained by Swedish Intelligence personnel assigned to official Red Cross missions in the aftermath of WWII to the highly sophisticated, like secret provisions for U.S. forces to use Swedish military bases in case of a Soviet attack, joint intelligence missions into the Baltic countries and U.S./British sponsored collection of signal intelligence through Sweden’s DC-3 program.128

Equally sensitive would be information of close coordination of activities in other areas, such as economic matters - such as the development of high end weapons and surveillance technology, designed ultimately to gain a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and therefore posing a potential violation of Swedish neutrality - and post-war political developments in Europe, including Swedish support for NATO sponsored Stay-Behind networks.129 Any information the U.S. may have possessed concerning internal Swedish affairs that would have been relevant for the Wallenberg investigation, such as information about the Wallenberg family or the attitudes of Swedish politicians, would have been evaluated in terms of these larger interests. Both countries have to keep any type of documentation they deem sensitive classified in each other’s archives.130

Through the years some American officials like John Pehle cautioned that direct U.S. intervention on Wallenberg’s behalf could possibly be misunderstood by the Soviet Union and would ultimately prove “counterproductive” 131 It remains a fact, however, that Wallenberg’s mission was part of an American program, sponsored by a U.S. agency, with American funds. Secondly, the


127That the Wallenberg case possibly involved issues both Sweden and the U.S. wished to avoid is made clear by a CIA document from September 1951. The document refers to an inquiry by British Intelligence concerning the testimony of Nicolaus von Maasburg who, in the late 1940’s, had left information concerning British Warrant Officer Reginald Barratt. Barratt had been active in Budapest for British Intelligence and had been imprisoned by Soviet forces at the end of the war. Maasburg had testified that Wallenberg may have been held at the same camp as Barratt. In a dispatch dated July 14, 1955 a CIA official remarks on the fact that a local British Intelligence representative and not a Swedish official requested the Americans to check on the matter. He adds that the Swedish official “… to date … has not mentioned Wallenberg … case or any of its ramifications and we have likewise kept mum on the subject. …” NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS/CIA, 20 September, 1951 [see 14 July, 1955]


129For the close American/Swedish cooperation in the technology sector by companies such as Ericsson, ASEA and AGA, see for example Nilsson, Mikael. Svenskt-amerikanskt samarbete kring utvecklingen av robotvapen under kalla kriget; and Gribbe, Johan. Svensk systemutveckling under det kalla kriget. These reports were issued as part of KTH’s research project called “Teknik, vetenskap och svensk sakerhetspolitik”, which was started in 2001. For information on Stay-Behind organizations in Western Europe after World War II see Ganser, 2001

130Such bilateral agreements surely exist also with other countries with ties to the Wallenberg case, such as Great Britain, Israel, Hungary, Finland, Germany and Russia.

inherent imbalance in the Swedish-Soviet relationship - Sweden’s main fear was Russia, whereas Russia’s first concern was the U.S. - would have made the U.S. Sweden’s principle partner in the Wallenberg question. As the only other global superpower in the postwar years the U.S. clearly took the easy way out.

This assessment holds true even though American offers of assistance to Sweden in the Wallenberg question were repeatedly rejected through the years. It began with Staffan Soederblom’s refusal of U.S. help in 1945. In 1965, Sweden’s former U.S. Ambassador Hitchens-Bergstroem pointedly told State Department officials that

“Sweden wants the US out of the [Wallenberg] affair.”

Yet, in 1980 US State Department and CIA records show that Sweden [through Lars Ake Nilsson] asked for and received US help in the Wallenberg case. The US went on to share certain aspects of its intelligence information with Sweden, some of which was based on still secretive satellite technology. But somehow neither country ever attempted to build a broader coalition in the Wallenberg question. By 1992 Sweden once again asked the US to tone down its efforts. An internal State Department e-mail message from February 10, 1992 whose subject line reads “Swedes Happy w/ cooperation,” states

“the Swedish government has asked the U.S. to ease up on inquiries about Wallenberg, since the Swedes are satisfied with the Russian government’s cooperation in the joint Swedish/Russian Working Group.”

This perception lingered on the American side at least until the year 2000, when on two separate occasions American officials were surprised by Swedish requests to the U.S. State Department since they had been under the impression that

“Sweden did not wish any American assistance in the Wallenberg case.”

Swedish Ambassador Rolf Ekeus immediately tried to correct this notion by pointing out that Sweden certainly wished for American help, although of course in coordination with Swedish efforts. In general, Sweden has made it clear that it considers itself in charge of the Wallenberg case, and that other countries are to defer in their own activities in the question to Sweden.

2. The Wallenbergs

a. Curious passivity

While Raoul Wallenberg received little active help from his own government or his de-facto American employer, one would expect that the Wallenberg family would have been eager to fill the void. If anyone could have forced the Swedish government to take a more activist position, it would have been Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg. However, for sixty years the Wallenberg Family has veiled itself in Garbo-like silence about its own role in the affair. The response of the Wallenberg family to Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance deserves attention because of the prominent role the family held in 1945, both in the area of economy and finance as well as in the political arena. At the time of Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg were among

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132 On 12 April, 1945 then Ambassador to Moscow Averill Harriman reported that the Swedish Legation had declared that it “had no reason to believe that the Soviet authorities were not doing what they could” with respect to the search for Wallenberg, and that the Legation did not feel “that an American approach to the Soviet Foreign Ministry would be desirable.”

133 NARA, RG 59, From Stockholm to Secretary of State, 8 February, 1965. Bergstroem made his remark in connection with the airing of a documentary about Raoul Wallenberg produced by Hans Vilius, which included documents from American archives showing Staffan Soederblom had refused a U.S. offer of assistance in 1945. The equivalent documents appeared to be missing from Swedish archives.

134 The lone exception appears to have been a direct appeal for U.S. assistance from Wallenberg’s mother in the 1970’s which was refused by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger without explanation.

135 U.S. State Department Records, www.state.gov, declassified material, Raoul Wallenberg; message from Edward D. Keeton to Francisco Sainz, reference February 7, 1992

136 UD, P2 EU I, Memorandum by Rolf Ekeus. 9 May, 2000. The two American officials in question were Deborah Graze, head of the Northern European-Baltic Department at the U.S. State Department, and U.S. Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich.
the most influential decision makers in Sweden, despite the problems they faced resulting from investigations into their economic dealings with Nazi Germany. They clearly had the power to set the Swedish agenda in this case.

It is difficult to overestimate Wallenberg influence. In 1943 Enskilda Banken alone held resources of $647, 794,917 and by 1947 Wallenberg firms world wide employed 66,000 workers. In 1999 the ranks had swelled to 600,000 and Wallenberg business assets were valued at roughly 900 billion Swedish Kronor - about $90 billion. By acquisition of a large number of the all important A and [the less important] B or voting shares in a company, the Family could exert control even if its nominal ownership percentage in a particular enterprise was negligible. In addition, many companies were governed by Wallenberg proxies. The Wallenbergs also exert enormous influence through their powerful family foundation - Knut och Amalia Wallenberg Stiftelse - which has tax free status and which holds most of the family’s wealth. It is a key contributor to many public and private Swedish institutions in culture, science, media and business. As for the Russians, they were certainly well acquainted with the Wallenbergs: During the war, Wallenberg firms had been the main supplier of ballbearings to the Soviet Union and in late 1944 Marcus Wallenberg was instrumental in bringing about the Soviet-Finnish Armistice Agreement.

There is no documentary or other evidence that the Wallenberg brothers ever signaled to the Swedish government or to the Russians that Raoul Wallenberg’s return was a key priority. No documentation exists that would show what consultations if any took place between the Foreign Office and Wallenberg Family representatives regarding efforts to win Raoul Wallenberg’s release. Due to the fact that Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance, as a member of one of the most powerful families in Sweden, had a potentially serious impact on Swedish-Soviet relations, it appears unlikely that the Foreign Office would settle on a course of action concerning Raoul Wallenberg before previously sounding out the Wallenberg Family, or at least attempting to do so.

The question of why the Wallenberg Family apparently chose not to negotiate on Raoul Wallenberg’s behalf is an important one and deserves further scrutiny. Among other things, it might help clarify the Foreign Office’s behavior in the question. The question is all the more interesting because the Wallenbergs have a long history of intervention on behalf of their relatives and associates. During WWII they negotiated on behalf of seven employees of the ASEA concern who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland for aiding the Polish underground. In the time from 1942-44 ASEA’s representatives, on instructions from the Wallenbergs, conducted talks with German authorities in Berlin. Walter Schellenberg intervened in the matter as a favor to Marcus Wallenberg. Schellenberg also came to the aid of Jacob Wallenberg’s brother in law, Count Ferdinand Arco-Valley, whom he had had close contact during the war years. Goerdeler, who had been arrested as a co-conspirator in the failed July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life, appealed to Jacob Wallenberg from prison in November 1944 but his letter received no answer. Jacob Wallenberg did, however, offer financial support to Goerdeler’s widow. See Nylander, 1998.

The influence has become so strong that Sweden in recent years has seen an increased debate among Swedish academics about the consequences such donations have for the formation of public opinion, especially at Swedish Universities such as the prestigious - and Wallenberg founded - Handelskogskolan [Economic Faculties] in both Stockholm and Gothenburg. See among others Boethius, 1998.

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139 Rolf Calissendorf, SEB’s head of foreign operations, had visited Moscow twice in 1940, including a month long stay in July/August. Nylander, 1998, p. 254

140 Interview with the author, June 1996. It has been stated in numerous publications that the Wallenberg family rejected an American offer of assistance as early as 1947. No documentary evidence for this claim has been discovered so far.


Jacob Wallenberg apparently decided not to intervene on behalf of German resistance member and Bosch representative Carl Goerdeler with whom he had had close contact during the war years. Goerdeler, who had been arrested as a co-conspirator in the failed July 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life, appealed to Jacob Wallenberg from prison in November 1944 but his letter received no answer. Jacob Wallenberg did, however, offer financial support to Goerdeler’s widow. see Nylander, 1998.
had been arrested by the Gestapo in 1942 and again in 1944.

b. Distant relation?

Over the years the Wallenberg Family has shown a marked tendency to distance itself from Raoul Wallenberg. Due to the early death of his father and his grandfather Gustav Wallenberg in 1937, Raoul Wallenberg’s position in the family was somewhat unclear. He had, however, much more contact than has been previously acknowledged. Jacob Wallenberg’s name appears as a reference in the application for Raoul Wallenberg’s Kabinettpass in 1941 - a special passport which indicated that its bearer was traveling on official business for the Swedish state - as well as for his diplomatic passport in 1941. Jacob Wallenberg’s approval was requested and obtained before Raoul Wallenberg agreed to go to Budapest. In addition, Raoul Wallenberg is careful to list Jacob’s name separately in his 19 June, 1944 letter of resignation from commercial activities during the duration of the Budapest employment.

Raoul Wallenberg’s firm “Mellaneuropeiska” was founded in July 1941 and even though it belonged nominally to Swedish shipping magnate Sven Salen, it operated completely within the Wallenberg business sphere. In September 1940 Jacob Wallenberg had received a request for help through Per Jacobsson, head of the Bank of International Settlements [BIS], from Jewish businessmen in Hungary who were worried about future restrictions of their activities, after a steady tightening of the Race Laws. They were looking to Swedish businessmen for

“the purpose of ‘aryanization’ of their businesses.”

Should Jacob be interested, Per Jacobsson explained, he should send a representative to Budapest. It is possible that Jacobsson’s approach to Jacob and the deteriorating conditions in Hungary were the driving force behind MEROPA’s creation. Attached to the letter Jacob had received was a card by Hungarian businessmen Leopold Aschner of Tungsram. Most of Raoul Wallenberg’s closest aides in 1944 would come from the managerial ranks of just this firm.

There are some indications that Raoul Wallenberg may have been working for Jacob Wallenberg in some capacity before 1941. On 27 September, 1939 Raoul Wallenberg had written to Jacob saying that

“at our last meeting you told me that the war would perhaps lead to a number of problems and

142 It was in fact Raoul Wallenberg’s father, Raoul Oscar Wallenberg, who was supposed to succeed Marcus Wallenberg, Sr. at Enskilda Banken. After Raoul Oscar’s early death in 1912 the succession fell to his cousins, Marcus Jr. and Jacob Wallenberg.

143 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Letter from World Jewish Congress, Stockholm to Tage Erlander, 23 November, 1946.

144 Jacobsson explains that Hungarian businessmen expect this “aryanization” of their businesses to take place with a “return ticket.” SOU 1999:20 Sverige och Judarnas tillganger. Slutrapport från Kommissionen om judiska tillganger i Sverige vid tiden före andra världskriget. Page 198. See also Raul Hilberg. 1985. The Destruction of the Jews. Revised and Definitive Edition, Vol. II. New York. Hilberg explains that due to a number of factors the actual aryization of Jewish businesses in Hungary was small. Companies like Tungsram - a large industrial and electronics concern - were allowed to operate under Jewish ownership since German demand for specialized war materials which required a knowledgeable production and managerial staff was extremely high. Other Hungarian Jewish businesses did not fare so well, however.

145 Raoul Wallenberg’s friend, Bjoern Burchardt, worked in the paper industry and might have been the recipient of this tip.

146 Tungsram’s Swedish subsidiary was called Svenska Orion and had been in business since 1928, so relations to Sweden were longstanding. British and American interests in Tungsram were represented by among others General Electric and British Thomson Houston. The German Osram GMBH and the Dutch concern Philips held minority shares. In the spring of 1944 Leopold Aschner was kidnapped by the SS and spent time in the concentration camp Mauthausen before being released to Switzerland, after payment of a large ransom in December 1944. The negotiations were handled through ASEA [A GE associate; the same group which had handled the negotiations for the Normman Group] and Svenska Orion representatives in Stockholm, as well as Tungsram’s Swiss subsidiary in Zuerich. Raoul Wallenberg had been requested by the War Refugee Board to obtain information who was behind Aeschner’s kidnapping.

147 In addition, the Swedish Match Director in Zagreb, Yngve Ekmark, joined the Swedish Legation in Budapest. It has been repeatedly claimed that Ekmark was unable to return to Stockholm due to war time conditions. This seems to have been not the case, considering other Swedish officials like Per Anger as well as Swedish businessmen traveled from Hungary to Sweden during 1944.
After this, Raoul Wallenberg’s letters asking for employment with the Wallenbergs cease. Documents released by the Wallenberg Family archive show that Raoul Wallenberg had regular meetings at Enskilda Banken since 1938. Most of them are fit in between the dates of Raoul Wallenberg’s military service and his travel abroad. This travel appears to have been related to a variety of issues, including his work later work with Meropa but may have also been in connection with Wallenberg business.149 Kalman Lauer, Raoul Wallenberg’s business partner, in his private papers goes so far as to say that Raoul Wallenberg considered Jacob Wallenberg his “idol” and that he even at times had worked for Jacob as Private Secretary.150 A former Wallenberg employee has stated that Raoul Wallenberg had traveled repeatedly to Estonia during the 1940’s on Jacob Wallenberg’s behalf.151

The Wallenberg family as such, including Marcus Wallenberg, was very well connected in Hungary and a number of his longstanding business acquaintances are listed among Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts in Budapest.152 As Raoul Wallenberg’s private papers show, his contacts with the Wallenberg family also extended into the social sphere. His already mentioned invitation list for a cocktail party in December, 1943 includes members of the immediate Wallenberg Family and business circle, such a Jacob and Marcus, his uncle Axel Wallenberg, his aunt Ebba Bonde, and the head of Investor, Count ‘Ibo’Douglas. 153

For reasons that remain unexplained, after Raoul Wallenberg disappeared all these connections were de-emphasized and in some cases were even deliberately hidden.154 This fact is all the more disturbing since, spoken or unspoken, Raoul Wallenberg’s efforts


149 Raoul Wallenberg on occasion acted as a courier for Jacob Wallenberg, forwarding communications from the Swedish Legation, Berlin, for example. [Raoul Wallenberg to Jacob Wallenberg, 9 November 1942.] Aside from Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg, Raoul Wallenberg also met with other high-ranking Bank officials, like Richard Julin and Rolf Calissendorf. All of January 1942 Wallenberg spent in Paris, France. His stay came immediately after the arrest of Count Arco-Valley’s arrest, the husband of Jacob’s sister Gertrud who lived in Paris. The couple was separated at the time.

The question also persists if Raoul Wallenberg could have been connected in any way to the discussions between the Wallenberg Family and representatives of the Robert Bosch AG from 1939 - 1944. Baron Waldemar von Oppenheim, a banker and intermediary in the Bosch question, offered the Bosch shares to the Wallenberg family in late 1939. The purchase of the shares was made the following February. Raoul Wallenberg’s travel dates and destinations in 1942 - immediately after American entry into the war - coincide on at least one occasion those of Dr. Carl Eugen Thomae [Zuerich, February 1942], the head of the Legal Department of the Robert Bosch Company, and Baron Waldemar von Oppenheim [Paris, January 1942] It is possible that Raoul Wallenberg was used as a go between or as a messenger in some instances. He would not have to have been closely connected to the affair. Both Oppenheim and especially Thomae traveled regularly to Stockholm for direct consultations.

150 RA, Kalman Lauer papers, Wallenbergaktionen, Page 4. “Hans [RWs] idol var farbrodern bankdirektorer Jacob Wallenberg. Han var dennes Privatsekreterare under den tid han var hos Meropa.” Fredrik von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg’s stepfather, writes in a short essay about his son that he was not employed by the Wallenberg Family but that he was hired to do certain “market research.” If Kalman Lauer is correct in his assertion, it would seem that Raoul Wallenberg’s activities would have somewhat exceeded those described by Fredrik von Dardel. It is also possible that Lauer overstated Raoul Wallenberg’s role. SAEPO, Raoul Wallenberg File, P4856, Fredrik von Dardel 1944-1958, p. 2

151 Allegedly on behalf of Baltiska Oljeaktiebolag AB, a Wallenberg company which did business in Estonia. It had been formed out of another Wallenberg business, AB THREE. Baltiska had close ties to Estlaendska Oljeskifferkonsortiet [Estimaa Olkonosortium], which was founded and owned by Finnish and Estonian interests. In 1940, Baltiska Oljeaktiebolaget and other Wallenberg companies, such as AB Industristmetoder [a firm specializing in the acquisition and sale of patents], as well as Estlaendska Oljeskifferkonsortiet, were nationalized by Soviet authorities. Under the subsequent German occupation, Baltiska ceased operations. In March 1944, just ahead of the Soviet reoccupation of Estonia, Baltiska took over the majority shares of Viron Bensini, the original Finnish name of Estlaendska Oljeskifferkonsortiet, placing it in effect under Swedish ownership. see relevant records at PRV, Sundsvall. Finnish journalist Pentti Peltoniemi first collected and described this material.

152 Paul Levine’s review of Marcus Wallenberg’s correspondence E I, 1942. 13 May, 1998, [Joseph Bartha, Bornemissza, etc] SOU 1999:20 Sverige och judarnas tillganger. Marcus Wallenberg on several occasions stated that he discussed Hungarian affairs with Raoul Wallenberg. After Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance, Marcus Wallenberg joined the so-called “Raoul Wallenberg Help Committee”, together with Kalman Lauer, Yngve Ekmark, Sven Salen and Carl Axel Pettersson. The Committee was formed to aid Hungarian refugees arriving in Sweden. see RA, Kalman Lauer papers.

153 Raoul Wallenberg papers, Nina Lagergren and Guy von Dardel private collection

154 see Levai, 1948. It contains photograph copies of Raoul Wallenberg’s letters which have been intentionally edited to eliminate references to
in Hungary served to improve the tarnished Wallenberg Family image, and may have been in part designed to directly compensate for Wallenberg Family economic support of Hitler Germany. It is therefore of some importance to determine how involved Raoul Wallenberg may have been with Wallenberg affairs. Was Raoul Wallenberg a trusted confidante who carried out special assignments of varying importance, perhaps under cover of a rather innocuous business like MEROPA, which provided him with a pretext for access and travel? And was his mission to Budapest in some form a natural progression of his earlier contacts? Or was Raoul Wallenberg indeed kept on the periphery of the Wallenberg sphere, and the Budapest mission offered the long hoped for opportunity to prove himself?

Whatever Marcus and Jacob’s personal attitudes may have been towards their [second] cousin, they do not appear to have taken any serious action on his behalf. Personal matters, including personal tragedies, have always taken a backseat in Wallenberg affairs. Carl Frostell, Jacob Wallenberg’s Private Secretary, experienced this firsthand when in 1974 Jacob was informed that his nephew, Marc Jr, tragically had taken his own life. In his memoirs Frostell writes:

“Jacob’s comment about the suicide shocked me. He said: ‘That was weak’ The emotional life of the Wallenbergs is difficult to comprehend.”

Frostell goes on to say that Jacob was of course deeply affected by his nephew’s death. Nevertheless, he chose the example to illustrate that next to a great sense of humor and true generosity Jacob Wallenberg could exhibit an “emotionally cold, categorical hardness.”

c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary

It would be important to know if the family’s apparent decision not to actively pursue the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate was based on information they had received through private or semi-private channels, which convinced them that Raoul Wallenberg was dead. Perhaps their apparent lack of initiative was due to a sober risk/benefit analysis, or as the Swedish Security Police official Danielsson put it quite succinctly that from the Wallenbergs’ perspective

“...a campaign against ‘Big Brother’ [the Soviet Union] would not benefit business.”

The Wallenberg family as well as many of Raoul Wallenberg’s business colleagues had extensive interests in Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Baltic countries. According to British Intelligence documentation Marcus Wallenberg had explored post-war development opportunities in the Soviet Union and its satellites well before the end of the war. Already in February 1945, Marcus contacted the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai about the pursuit of Swedish business interests in Poland. While

Jacob Wallenberg and Enskilda Banken. At the International Wallenberg conference in Stockholm in 1981, Marcus Wallenberg claimed that Raoul came to see him for a short visit from Budapest. Such a meeting has not been independently confirmed, but if it indeed took place, it would confirm the importance Raoul Wallenberg placed in this contact, even to the point of foregoing a chance to see his immediate family while in Stockholm.

155 Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg both were not political supporters of Hitler. The division of labor between the two - Marcus stayed in contact with the British, Jacob handled Germany - was clearly one of convenience, not ideology. They separated business and politics and this approach resulted in often contradictory behavior. Both men lent their efforts to promote contacts between the Allies and German resistance circles.


157 Frostell, p. 25. Frostell does not mention Raoul Wallenberg.


159 PRO, George Labouchere to British Foreign Office, 3 July, 1944.

the overall volume of Swedish exports to the Soviet Union never rose to more than roughly 3% of total exports, Swedish trade with Eastern satellites served to fill important gaps. According to U.S. State Department and Commerce Department sources, 70 per cent of Swedish exports to Eastern Europe in the late 1940’s/early 1950’s were ballbearings. In his memoirs former Soviet Intelligence official Pavel Sudoplatov alludes to a number of wartime business deals between the Soviet Union and the Wallenberg Family - like the sale of ballbearings for platinum that may have been highly sensitive and so far remain little explored. He appears to have obtained some of his information from the Wallenberg Family file in Soviet Intelligence Archives. So far, no foreign researchers have been allowed to study this material.

The Eliasson Commission raises the important question of Soviet perceptions of the Wallenberg Family at the time of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance. It can at best be described as ambivalent. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia from 1951 lists the Wallenberg Family as

“active supporters of German fascism and wicked enemies of the working class”.

The Eliasson Commission also cites a memorandum from the head of the First [later the Fifth] European [Scandinavia] Department, Sysoyev to Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov from February 1944, which compiled information about the Wallenberg Family. In his memo Sysoyev stated that the Wallenbergs were not “favorably inclined” towards the Soviet Union but due to the size and power of the Soviet Union, Wallenberg business was paying attention. Sysoyev also stresses the contacts with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm of

“a few of their family members.”

As Kalman Lauer’s letters show, in 1944 Raoul Wallenberg was among these family members who made regular visits to the Trade Delegation. In 1944/5 he was, therefore no stranger to the Russians, at least not to the Soviet officials in Stockholm. In fact, according to Lauer, the Soviet Legation

“was informed about his mission which enjoyed their greatest sympathies.”

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161 Aalders and Wiebes, p. 113; ECR, Bilaga 3, Birgit Karlsson. *Ekonomiska Aspekter pa Raoul Wallenberg fallet*. On a smaller scale, in the years after the war some of Raoul Wallenberg’s associates secured exclusive trading rights, for example Fritz Hollander [Baltiska Skinnkompaniet] in furs, for Eastern Europe. Kalman Lauer and Sven Salen continued the profitable business, begun during the war, of providing ships to the Red Cross and other international organizations, [see SAEPO, Kalman Lauer Personal file, P3030]

162 Sudoplatov, p. 266

163 Swedish and especially Wallenberg business activities involving Russia directly or indirectly included numerous high volume currency transactions in Eastern Europe, including Hungary and Rumania, in the 1940’s [which incurred the ire of U.S. investigators], through companies like Josephson & Company [possibly Bendix, Josephsson & Co.]; Wallenberg companies such as Transcandia which conducted business in German occupied territories in the East; as well as a number of business deals with Japan which involved both Soviet institutions and territory - like the sale and transfer of ballbearings.

164 SWR, p. 66

165 ECR, p 215-217; also UD,P2 Eu I, 13 June, 2000. Sysoyev’s memo was in part based on Alexandra Kollontai’s reports about the Wallenberg family, including a report from 21 June, 1941 about Marcus Wallenberg.

166 RA, Kalman Lauer papers. Lauer even kept Wallenberg informed about the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation while he was in Budapest. Lauer also suggested that Wallenberg on his way home to Stockholm go via Moscow so he can “conduct some research there.”

167 The Eliasson Commission raises the question why the Soviet Embassy, Stockholm was never formally informed about Raoul Wallenberg’s mission. As Lauer’s letter makes clear, someone had informed the Soviets, but apparently not in official capacity. The Russians have not presented any records on this issue. How close Wallenberg family working relationship with the Soviet Trade Delegation was in 1944/45 shows an excerpt from a letter dated 23 December, 1944 from Sven Normman of ASEA to Marcus Wallenberg. The letter discusses an unspecified project and the contacts in this connection with Mikhail Nikitin, Soviet Trade Attache at the Soviet Legation and a close Kollontai confidante: “In the last discussion I had with Nikitin before he left for Moscow he told me that he shall take up our proposal as his own during his discussions in Moscow.”
A letter from Alexandra Kollontai to Dekanosov from 29 January, 1945 outlines the discussions she had with Marcus Wallenberg and a number of other bankers about

“wider commercial operations with the Soviet Union”,

including the granting and repayment conditions of credits. The letter is sent to Dekanosov together with the earlier material compiled by Sysoyev which shows that at this point in time the activities of the Wallenberg family are certainly of great interest to him. Kollontai’s letter also underscores the central role Marcus Wallenberg played in the trade negotiations.

Records in the Swedish Foreign Ministry archives show that in 1944 Wallenberg firms and their representatives made at least one controversial deal with Nazi occupied Hungary which later led to Russian protests and threat of legal action. Trade between Sweden and Hungary had essentially come to a standstill following the German occupation in March 1944. In the summer of 1944 a number of Hungarian businessmen sent a formal appeal to the Swedish government to resume trade. The signatories to the letter included both Tungsram and SKF Budapest.

A few months later, in September 1944, SKF [headquarters] Gothenburg suddenly decided to sell its inventories in Europe, including that of SKF Budapest, to Germany, and sent instructions [via the Swedish Foreign Office] to have the full supply of ball bearings shipped on to Schweinfurt. The U.S. in 1944 had steadily increased pressure on Sweden to cease all ball bearing exports to Germany. In Allied opinion Swedish shipments of critical war materials had enabled Germany to prolong the war. Despite an agreement for the U.S. to compensate Sweden for lost income by purchasing some of the ballbearing production for 1943 - worth about $8,000,000 - Sweden only reluctantly met U.S. demands. The U.S. in turn was hesitant to publicly rebuke Sweden for each new violation following the general agreement that had been reached, but did so occasionally. The conflict festered well into the spring of 1945.

It does not appear that Raoul Wallenberg had any role in these events but that the transaction was handled instead by SKF’s director in Budapest, Ferencz Pirkner. Wallenberg’s last name alone, however, would have been enough to link him to the matter in Soviet eyes. Aside from official Wallenberg Bank representatives the Wallenberg Family dealt closely with a number of associated businessmen in Budapest in 1944, including for some time their “confidential man” Lennart Larsson and his son, Lennart Thomas Johan Larsson. The Larssons appear to have acted as intermediary for several Hungarian and Swedish businesses. Both Larssons knew Kalman Lauer and Raoul Wallenberg quite well and had contact with them throughout the Budapest mission.

The German wish to resume trade relations between Hungary and Sweden also led to an offer, however, that may well have directly or indirectly involved Raoul Wallenberg. In mid-August 1944 the German Kommerzialrat Edmund von Pirkner of the Budapest firm Pirkner & Zettner had traveled to Stockholm and relayed a deal offered directly by Edmund Veesenmayer, the SS “Reichsverweser” [Envoy Plenipotentiary] in Hungary: If Sweden were to provide certain trade goods for Hungary, he would

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168 UD, HP 2860, Letter to the Swedish Export Commission [Sveriges Allmaenna Exportfoerening], 10 June, 1944; it had twenty signatories. Sweden was also eager to resume trade, especially for items such as radio parts due to an increased demand from the Swedish Defense Staff.

169 UD, HP 64 Eu, SKF headquarters in Gothenburg to SKF Budapest, 20 September, 1944

170 The Anglo-Swedish Trade Agreement of 1939, followed by the Allied-Swedish Trade Agreement in 1943 governed Allied economic relations with Sweden. On 13 September, 1944 Foreign Minister Cordell Hull formally admonished Sweden that the dangers of a German retaliatory attack - Sweden’s main argument for continuing war trade with Germany - had become minimal. Further research will have to determine what concessions, if any, Germany made for SKF Budapest’s inventory and what type of ballbearings and/or equipment was transferred. The agreement allowed for some continued supply of non-critical types of ballbearings and other materials.


172 Both Lennart Fredrik Laurentius Larsson and the Swedish Trading Company were blacklisted by the American Alien Property Custodian, a decision that was personally protested by Marcus Wallenberg. Larsson was the trustee of Owe AG, a Swiss corporation which held Wallenberg Family assets. The Swedish Trading Company employed a number of individuals with suspected Nazi affiliation, like A. Gruendbock. According to U.S. investigators, the company had among other things stored 17,533 kegs of nickel from Finland at Nitro Chemie in Budapest. It also engaged in weapons trade. DOJ, Alien Property Custodian Records 1945-1950.
permit a number of Jews, picked by Pirkner, to leave Hungary by special train to Germany, if they were allowed entry into Sweden. The Swedish Foreign Office documentation shows that the issue was immediately discussed with the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm [von Nagy] which declared itself in favor of the proposal. The people to be saved were, according to notations on the top of the document, “better people” [baettre folk], meaning higher educated, prominent and/or rich individuals. The notes, initialed by [Head of the Legal Department] Goesta Engzell, show that the Swedish Legation in Budapest was notified by telephone on September 7, 1944.

It is not clear if the transfer of this group of people to Sweden ever came about or if this offer was in any way related to SKF’s transfer of its Budapest inventory. Wartime business can be a double-edged sword and the Wallenberg Family as well as their business partners may have been hesitant to press Raoul Wallenberg’s case too strongly for fear that some of their more questionable activities would have received closer scrutiny or because they stood to lose important postwar economic opportunities.

d. Wallenberg interests and their political effects

How much Swedish business interests and to a large extent Wallenberg Family interests may have influenced political decision making in the Raoul Wallenberg case is an important question. With the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe Swedish businesses suffered great financial losses and faced the threat of nationalization. Some of these were to be offset by compensation agreements and later by at least partial repatriation of Swedish assets. But for Swedish political and business leaders in 1945 the primary focus was the quick normalization of political and economic relations with Hungary and by extension with the Soviet Union. This issue is a recurring theme in the communications between the Swedish Legation, Moscow and the Foreign Office in Stockholm. Wallenberg firms feature prominently throughout these exchanges, especially the interests of the Swedish Match concern.

Former Swedish Match director in Zagreb, Yngve Ekmark, immediately discussed the issue with Swedish Minister Soederblom when he and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest traveled through Moscow on 13 April, 1945. A few months later, in October 1945, the Swedish Match representative for Budapest, Bertil Hallstroem [then stationed in Prague], sent an urgent message to the Foreign Office and his firms headquarters in Joenskoeping to insist that any decision to normalize relations should include an agreement of “reciprocity” to ensure that

“the Swedish interests in Hungary, especially those of Swedish Match, are protected and respected.”

173 UD, HP 2860, 29 August, 1944. Erik Bjoerkman to Swedish Foreign Office. Bjoerkman was the head of Skandinaviska Banken and the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. Veessenmayer’s offer as relayed by Pirkner came at a critical time. Deportations, which had been halted in July, were threatening to resume with full force at the end of August 1944. With the appointment of Geza Lakatos as new Prime Minister on 29 August, the situation once again relaxed slightly until the Fascist takeover on 15 October. Even though trade relations between Sweden and Hungary had officially halted, exceptions were made on a case by case basis.

It is unclear if there exists a family relation between Edmund von Pirkner and Ferenc [Franz] Pirkner, also Kommerzialrat. A “von Pirkner” sent communications via the Swedish Legation, Budapest to SKF headquarters in Goeteborg. Also, on 17 July, 1944 SKF Director Hamberg makes a request to the Swedish Foreign Office to give “von Pirkner”, “Hungary’s SKF representative”, a consular appointment in Hungary. UD HP 2860.

174 After 15 October, 1944, the Hungarian Fascist takeover, it became almost impossible for Jewish citizens to leave Hungary.

175 For example, when the Soviets Union occupied Estonia in 1940, the Swedish government negotiated a 20million kronor compensation payment for lost business in the Baltic countries. Only the first installment of that money was paid. PRV, No. 34850, records of Baltiska Oljekkietbolaget, Styrelseberaettelse [Board meeting] from 20 November 1941. The issue of compensation for lost business in the Baltic countries became part of the Credit and Trade Agreement of 1946.

176 UD, HP 80 Ea, Soederblom to Foreign Office, Telegrams to Erik von Post, 6, 12, and 17 April. 1945.

177 UD, HP 80, Soederblom to Stockholm, 17 April, 1945.

178 UD, HP 64 Eu Hallstroem to Torsten Hammarstroem, 22 October, 1945
Soviet officials were applying pressure to replace the management of both Swedish Match and SKF in Budapest with their own personnel. SKF’s director in Prague, Stenberg, warns about this in November, 1945:

“SKF’s Purchasing Director [in Hungary]... was to be tried in court, because right before the end of the war a number of ball bearings had been handed over to the [Fascist] government at the time.”

The Eliasson Commission argues that although Staffan Soederblom in Moscow had received instructions from the Swedish Foreign Office concerning the promotion of Swedish-Hungarian trade relations, including the protection of Swedish assets, Soederblom was eager to transfer all responsibility for such discussions to official Swedish representatives in Budapest. According to the Eliasson Report, the issue of postwar trade relations, therefore, only had a negligible influence on Soederblom's behavior and Swedish decision making in the Wallenberg case as such.

Such a conclusion, however, is far too general. Although in late 1945 Soederblom encountered difficulties in pursuing the issue in Moscow and as a result referred the matter back to Stockholm [and to the Swedish Legations in Rumania and Hungary], this does not mean that the larger implications of the subject did not interest him or that the matter itself lacked relevance. On the contrary, the issue of improved Eastern European economic and trade relations and, by extension, a positive development of Swedish-Soviet contacts was very much on his mind - and that of the Soviets as well. Soederblom stressed the point in his communications with Stockholm, including a letter to Rolf Sohlman on August 10, 1945:

“It was with considerable interest that I heard about (Mikhail) Nikitin’s [Soviet Embassy, Stockholm] remark to you that on the Soviet side one would be interested in Swedish trade relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. As you know, I have for a long time urged such a development, based on remarks by (Deputy Foreign Minister) Losovsky and (Deputy Foreign Minister) Vishinsky.”

Socio-economic strategies to counter growing ideological tensions between the former Allies became increasingly important and, as Soederblom recognized, the need to develop such strategies offered important opportunities for neutral countries like Sweden. Economic issues as such began to take an increased role in larger Security Policy considerations. There are strong indications that such ideas had an effect on the parallel negotiations in the Raoul Wallenberg question, on both the Russian and the Swedish side. During his conversation with Abramov on 6 March, 1946 - ostensibly about the case of Swedish journalist af Sandeberg and related issues - Soederblom takes the opportunity to remind Abramov of a previous Soviet note about the Swedish-Russian Agreement from 1941 regarding Soviet compensation for lost Swedish business in the Baltic countries. As was clear all along, the planned Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement was to cover a large part or all of Soviet concessions to Sweden on this point.

As for the Russians, the Eliasson Commission emphasizes at the same time the Soviet leadership appeared eager to improve its relations with Sweden and to conclude the Credit and Trade Agreement. According to the Commission, this was evidenced by the fact that despite repeated Swedish inquiries about Wallenberg in Moscow and growing criticism in the Swedish press and the Swedish Parliament, the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Ilya Tchernichev, in his reports home to Moscow states that the Wallenberg case had had no ill effects on overall Swedish-Soviet relations.

There is also another aspect to consider: Due to the unique set-up of the Swedish economic system, ties between government and business are extremely close. In the postwar years, Swedish business and political interests were therefore in many instances

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179 UD, HP 64 Eu, P.M. Betreffend Wien, Bratislava und Budapest, 9 November, 1945.

180 ECR, p. 267-272

181 UD, HP 80 Ea. Already in April 1945 Soederblom had expressed this view in a letter to K. Westman: “It is clear that from the Soviet side our attempts to as quickly as possible normalize the diplomatic relations with the new Hungary are looked upon with approval. In this respect our country is (a) pioneer.”

182 Birstein, An Inconvenient Witness, p. 86

183 ECR, p.438-439
almost indistinguishable, as a handful of families and their extended members held key positions. Numerous Foreign Ministry and
government officials routinely ended up on the boards of directors of leading Swedish companies after retirement. 184

A P.M. from November 1945, signed by Rolf Sohlman and addressed to high-level Swedish economic experts, including Dag
Hammarskjöld, Gunnar Myrdal and Swedish Riksbank Chief Ivar Rooth, forwards a proposal for a Hungarian reconstruction plan
which, according to the members of a private Hungarian business delegation visiting Sweden at the time, should be handled by a
new company. This new company was to hold a sharecapital valued at $50 million. 185 The business delegation included
representatives from leading Hungarian enterprises with Swedish ties and included men like Hugo Wohl and Vilmos Forgacs,
who had been among Raoul Wallenberg’s closest aides.

Taken together, all these factors may well have worked to Raoul Wallenberg’s disadvantage when in fact the opposite should have
been the case. The same people who wielded the most influence and should have been Raoul Wallenberg’s greatest supporters,
also were precisely the ones who not only crafted Swedish post-war foreign and economic policy, but who also may have had
larger Swedish and perhaps also personal interests at stake.

e. Wallenberg intelligence connections

Aside from economic influence, the Wallenbergs may have also provided useful services in intelligence matters, both to Sweden
and indirectly to the British and the United States. An early OSS Telegram from August 1945 makes it clear that the U.S. and
Sweden intended to cooperate closely in intelligence matters regarding Russia and that Sweden’s industry was to have a significant
part in this plan:

“Swedes planning organize their future intelligence eastward, using representatives of large
Swedish companies and industrial firms which have agencies and representatives in Russia,
Baltics and Balkans. Economic Intelligence will be furnished us. They will endeavor collect
military intelligence from Balkans and Turkey via Switzerland and have requested from us
present disposition Russian troops in Europe. Can we supply? Swedes cooperating well local
Japanese but concentrating on Russians. We now receiving information on latter from
them.” 186

Swedish Foreign Office documents also include an account from a witness who claims that the Swedish Secret Police [sic], in
close cooperation with the Swedish Foreign Office, in the 1940’s and 50’s ran an intelligence network in Eastern Europe, which
focused mainly on economic and industrial espionage. 187 The central office for the group dealing with Poland and East Germany
was supposedly found in Berlin,

“camouflaged under the local office of the Ericsson firm.”

Forty-five men had been allegedly trained in Joensköping and then had been sent abroad for espionage purposes. Joensköping

184 Dag Hammerskjöld and Rolf Sohlman were leading officials in UD’s Economic and Trade departments at the time of Wallenberg’s
disappearance. Gunnar Jarring - Bofors; Rolf Sohlman - Nobel Industries and Bofors, also SUKAB [Svenska Utrikeskompensation AB], an
industrial conglomerate which represents Swedish export and import interests; Arne Lundberg - LK AB [Mining Consortium]; Tore and Tage
Groenwall - Groenwall & Söderstroem, AB THREE; Belfrage - SUKAB and SEB, etc.

185 UD, HP 2859, P.M signed by Rolf Sohlman. Includes P.M. signed by “founders” [grundarna] and dated November 1945.
This proposal was forwarded by the Hungarian representatives “off the record”, [under the table] according to Sohlman’s notes.

186 NARA, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 379. Telegram Taylor, Stockholm to Director.

187 UD, P2 Eu I, RWD, 6 December, 1954. Report from Austrian Police authorities to Stockholm, apparently based on the testimony of Marcel
Rohan [alias Hellmann, alias Balcar]. In the document this is referred to as the “Rolf Sohlman Plan.” According to the report, the respective
groups were supposedly headed by Eastern European exiles whose boss was a former Hungarian intelligence expert by the name of Karoly
Palffy. Rohan’s information about Raoul Wallenberg was found to be completely untrue, but Rohan clearly possessed knowledge about
conditions in Eastern Europe and had connections to various intelligence groups. He did, for example, provide information about the capabilities
of Eastern European defense industry, including the production of specific types of ballbearings, information that was of great importance to both
Swedish industry and Western governments.
was the headquarters of the Swedish Match concern and L.M. Ericsson was of course Wallenberg controlled. One interesting question is whether or not such practices were in place during the time Raoul Wallenberg was in Budapest.\(^{188}\)

The question of what connections or contacts Raoul Wallenberg may have had to Swedish Intelligence, as well as who handled Swedish Intelligence contacts for the Swedish Legation in Budapest after the departure of Military Attache Harry Wester in October 1944 needs to be studied further.\(^{189}\)

The Eliasson Commission states that its review of Swedish Intelligence archives has shown no evidence that Raoul Wallenberg had any direct links to Swedish Intelligence ties.\(^{190}\) It can, however, not exclude that certain informal ties existed and that, for example, any information Wallenberg might have possessed or collected could have been reported indirectly, through his family. Carl Bonde, the head of Swedish Counterintelligence in Stockholm in 1944, had been directly involved in Allied intelligence activities in Hungary. He was a stepson of Ebba Bonde. Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg’s sister, who was herself active during the war in humanitarian and intelligence activities. Raoul Wallenberg had frequent contact with her in Stockholm.\(^{191}\) Another sister, Sonja Wallenberg, was married to Carl Bjoernstierna, the head of Swedish Foreign Intelligence until the early 1940’s.

Raoul Wallenberg’s activities before 1944 also deserve closer scrutiny than they have received so far. As Austrian author Rudolph Philipp indicates in his book on Raoul Wallenberg from 1947, Wallenberg during this time traveled regularly throughout Europe. Raoul Wallenberg’s travel in 1942 was conducted with a passport sponsored by Jacob Wallenberg. It also apparently had the official backing of the Swedish state - selling Swedish Ardenner horses for the government’s Horse Export Commission to companies in Vichy, France in exchange for various merchandise, including much needed rubber goods.\(^{192}\) The following year, however, the Foreign Office refused extension of his Kabinettspass. Wallenberg had explained that he intended to travel to Eastern Europe as well as Argentina to purchase foodstuffs. The rejected application carries the notation “Doubtful!” across the top.\(^{193}\) Why did the Foreign Office find such a trip suspicious considering it had supported Wallenberg’s travels just the year before and his trip appears to have been completely in line with MEROPA’s stated business?

G-Section, the predecessor of C-byr, relied heavily on information received from Swedish businessmen returning from their trips abroad. Per Jacobsson, the head of the Bank of Internal Settlements (BIS) and close acquaintance of Jakob Wallenberg, worked as an agent for Swedish Intelligence throughout the war. Also, the head of Swedish C-byr Helmut Ternberg apparently maintained close ties to the Wallenbergs, as did his successors.\(^{194}\) Raoul Wallenberg’s known association with individuals involved in separate peace talks in Stockholm and his alleged travel to the Baltic countries in connection with Wallenberg business - and what the Russians knew about it - needs to be examined further as well. Stockholm during the war was a very small town and people had contact through numerous personal and professional ties. If Raoul Wallenberg, however, worked in some

\(^{188}\)This would mean participation in economic warfare projects. At least one SKF engineer was a high-ranking member of the Hungarian Resistance Group MFM. Arany Balint succeeded Geza Soos in November 1944. He was later arrested and tried by the Soviets. See also activities of the Sven Norrman Group in Warsaw 1940-42 whose members were associated with ASEA and L.M. Ericsson. The nominal majority shareholder of L.M. Ericsson was I.T.T, but the company was nevertheless controlled and operated by the Wallenberg Family.

\(^{189}\)Cipher and code writing were handled by Margareta Bauer and Birgit Brulin. Goeran Rydberg states in his report that he interviewed an unnamed Swedish Intelligence official who testified that he had served in Budapest during the end of the war. The individual handled radio communications between Budapest and Stockholm and states that Wallenberg did not have any role at all in the “practical arrangements” for sending or receiving information. Rydberg, p. 24

\(^{190}\)Lars Ulfving, *Den Svenska Underrättelsesjästenens Befattning med Aerendet Raoul Wallenberg*. Ulfving reviewed the question on assignment by the Eliasson Commission.

\(^{191}\)RA, Kalman Lauer papers

\(^{192}\)UD, P 89 P, Goesta Liedberg to Arvid Richert, 20 October, 1943

\(^{193}\)UD, P89 P, Raoul Wallenberg to Ceremonibyrån 11 May, 1943

\(^{194}\)Rydeberg, p. 25 and David Bartal. 1996. *Imperiet: Hur Wallenbergarna byggde Europas mächtiaste familjedynasti*. Dagens Industri. Ternberg had traveled to Hungary and Rumania in the spring of 1944. Ternberg also appears to have been the Swedish Intelligence representative who assisted Jacob Wallenberg in 1954 in an apparent attempt to contact the Russians [see ‘Signs of Doubt’]. According to Lars Ulfving’s report, Ternberg may have made inquiries into Wallenberg’s fate as early as 1946.
confidential capacity for Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg before 1944, it would raise questions about additional, possibly hidden aspects of the humanitarian mission to Budapest.\footnote{It brings brings up once again the issue of Marcus Wallenberg’s claim in the early 1980’s that he met with Raoul Wallenberg when he returned for a brief visit from Budapest to Stockholm in 1944. Even if this meeting did not take place in 1944, it would appear that the two had at some point discussed the future of Hungarian affairs. According to Raoul Wallenberg’s letters from Budapest, he intended to join Lauer at a flourishing Import/Export firm called Bananompaniet, owned by Sven Salen and Carl Mathiessen. Wallenberg writes to Lauer that his [Wallenberg’s] joining the company, it “it will surely gain some advantages.” He apparently was quite confident of his skills or felt he had important connections to draw on. RA, Kalman Lauer Papers, 29 September, 1944.} It could also perhaps explain the passivity of the Wallenberg Family. Depending on the degree and the nature of Raoul Wallenberg’s involvement in Wallenberg Family affairs, the question that arises is whether or not the Family’s silence in the case was due to a wish to protect him, or due to concern over potentially compounding problems for themselves at a time when the Wallenbergs were already under Allied investigation. 

There have been some suggestions that the Wallenbergs could not pursue a vigorous campaign for Raoul Wallenberg’s release because of reduced Wallenberg influence and reputation in the aftermath of the Bosch affair, resulting in postwar U.S. pressures on the family to abandon business ties with the Soviet Union. Some type of “gentlemen’s agreement” appears to have been struck by the two parties: Despite the U.S. blacklisting of the Wallenberg brothers and earlier orders to freeze their U.S. assets, by 1946/1947 U.S. and British efforts to investigate the Wallenberg family’s activity of cloaking important business assets for Nazi Germany cooled considerably when it became apparent that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were headed on a confrontational course.\footnote{Aalders and Wiebes, p. 119-152. The U.S. side was not united in its approach to the question. There existed serious disagreements on the issue between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury Department, and also with the British government, as had already existed during the war. Some American representatives felt that the Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement would in fact offer useful opportunities for learning more about Soviet conditions, economic requirements, etc. Concern over increased Soviet influence also influenced the handling of the inquiry into hidden assets of Nazi Germany. Russell Nixon, the U.S. Representative in the Allied Commission which investigated Nazi assets abroad, commented in front of the Kilgore Commission: “Certain elements in the foreign ministries of the United States, England and France were trying to undermine the rigorous search for Nazi assets in the neutral countries, because all details of the collaboration of certain interested groups in the allied countries with these governments would be exposed.”} Records of the time show that both Swedish and U.S. officials were increasingly concerned over Soviet influence in Sweden and as a result they pursued a much more lenient line of inquiry regarding Enskilda Banken’s war time activities.\footnote{U.S. Intelligence was particularly worried about the increased presence of Soviet technical personnel and engineers in Sweden. see Aalders and Wiebes, p.147}

This more restrained attitude may nevertheless have come at a price: In 1979 Swedish historian Gunnar Adler-Karlsson suggested in an article in Dagens Nyheter that in return for Wallenberg assets frozen in the U.S., the American government in 1947 apparently had imposed two conditions: Jacob Wallenberg would no longer serve on the Board of SEB and the Wallenberg brothers would support an American embargo policy against the Soviet Union.\footnote{Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. 1979. Dagens Nyheter. “Avsatte USA Jacob Wallenberg? Sverige, Neutralitet och Sovjet Embargot.” 20 February.} Circumstantial evidence seems to support this claim. Jacob Wallenberg’ resignation occurred clearly as a result of SEB’s actions during the war and although the Wallenberg Family had been the driving force behind the Swedish-Russian Trade Agreement, by 1947 ASEA and other Wallenberg affiliated companies balked at filling Soviet orders for goods, citing labor shortages and lack of raw materials. In the opinion of many analysts these were largely excuses and some type of American pressure is believed to have contributed to the Swedish firms’ reluctance.\footnote{see Bartal, 1996 as well as Aalders and Wiebes, 1996} If true, this would have constituted a violation of Swedish neutrality and Soviet officials apparently saw it that way: In 1948 the Soviet magazine Literaturnaya Gazeta openly accused the Wallenbergs and especially the Swedish firm ASEA of
having sabotaging the Swedish-Russian Trade Agreement.\footnote{Aalders and Wiebes, p.115} It also appears, however, that despite American pressures on the Wallenberg Family, Wallenberg firms nevertheless managed to keep its options open with the Soviet Union. During the Korean War [1950-1953] U.S. investigators discovered that Soviet tanks were equipped with SKF ballbearings which had found their way to Russia via Swedish exports to other Eastern European countries.\footnote{Aalders and Wiebes, p. 113.} The Americans estimated the annual value of ballbearing imports to Russia via secondary channels at $20 million and the American Ambassador in Stockholm made it a point to inform Dag Hammarskjöld, then Cabinet Secretary, of the extent of SKF’s Eastern European exports\footnote{ibid. This equals at least $200 million in today’s value. Sweden had many reasons not to offend the Soviet Union, including a need for basic resources like coal which Sweden imported from Poland.}

The Swedish government by no means fully approved of all Wallenberg Family behavior. This was especially true in the Bosch affair, when it became clear that the Wallenberg brothers had not only deceived American officials but also Swedish representatives.\footnote{UD, Herman Eriksson Archive, 19 October, 1945. see also Foreign Minister Oesten Unoden’s statement: “This time, let the Mssrs Wallenberg take the chestnuts out of the fire by themselves.” Olsson, p. 248} In addition, by mid-1945 the internal political climate in Sweden had shifted towards a more radical social-democratic position, led by the new Foreign Minister Oesten Unoden. These combined factors certainly weakened the position of a family that so fully embodied the capitalist ethos. Despite these problems, the political clout of the family was never truly in question. While the Wallenbergs faced serious challenges in those years - including the closing of their direct channel to Moscow with the recall of Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontai, in March 1945 and the loss of reputation in certain U.S. government and business circles - they were hardly powerless and could have easily made their wishes known. In fact, as Ulf Olsson stresses in his biography of Marcus Wallenberg, the Wallenberg network of influential contacts not only remained intact, but actually deepened:

> “Friendships with colleagues in New York financial circles ... were not influenced so easily by political issues. One of the lasting gains of the [Wallenberg] efforts during the war years was [Marcus Wallenberg’s] functioning on the highest peak not only of Swedish but also of international politics. For Marcus Wallenberg the view had expanded.” \footnote{Olsson, p. 223.} On the whole there are no signs that the Wallenberg brothers every seriously attempted to overcome the hurdles that did exist in the Raoul Wallenberg case or to rally others with influence in the Soviet sphere to act on his behalf. There is no documentary evidence that the U.S. government actively opposed efforts by the Swedish government to pursue the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate with the Russians. On the contrary, as discussed earlier, there are some indications that the U.S. considered the Wallenberg question a possibly useful pressure tool in Cold War politics. Important questions also remain about Soviet perceptions of the Wallenberg Family and the full reasons behind Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest. The possibility cannot be excluded.

\footnote{In the post-war years Marcus Wallenberg maintained close ties with important American personalities, among them Alan Dulles, head of the then newly formed CIA. As Wilhelm Agrell outlines in his book on Swedish neutrality, the head of Swedish Military arranged private meetings between Marcus Wallenberg and key American military leaders. see Agrell, 1999. In Sweden, the Wallenbergs and the Social Democrats quickly arrived at mutually beneficial ‘modus vivendi.’ The Wallenberg Family traditionally have maintained close ties to individual representatives in the Swedish Foreign Office. Over the generations several members of the Wallenberg family have held high positions in UD, including Raoul Wallenberg’s grandfather who served as Ambassador to Turkey and Japan. Marcus Wallenberg maintained a close exchange with Erik Boheman and later with Gunnar Straeng. Interestingly, Sverker Astrom appears to have come to Marcus Wallenberg’s attention as early as 1945; see Olsson, p. 247.}
that Raoul Wallenberg was to serve as some form of insurance or pressure vis-à-vis the Swedish government and/or the Wallenberg Family. Access to relevant documentation in Russian archives is therefore a key priority. The Swedish Foreign Office to this day has never made a serious attempt to subject the family’s behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg affair to formal scrutiny.

f. Signs of doubts

In an interview with the Austrian magazine “Profil” in 2002 the current Marcus Wallenberg defends his family’s behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg case:

“what has been rumored publicly and that I have heard in my family make two very different pictures. ...My ancestors certainly supported the many initiatives on Raoul Wallenberg’s behalf. More, than it would appear openly.” 205

If that is indeed so, then very little is known about such efforts. One of these initiatives may have been Jacob Wallenberg’s attempt in 1954 - in the wake of Stalin’s death and new witness testimonies - to contact high-ranking Soviet officials through business intermediaries in Eastern Europe, with the help of a representative of the Swedish Defense Staff. 206 According to these intermediaries the Wallenberg family was willing to “make large sacrifices” for valid information. How far did these contacts go and how did they affect parallel initiatives? And why was this initiative not coordinated with the Swedish Foreign Office? When asked to provide further detail, the Wallenberg archive refused comment and stated that it had no information in the matter.207

Aside from the many interesting aspects of this initiative, it is worth noting that the attempt was apparently made by Jacob Wallenberg. According to Carl Frostell, as a direct fallout of the Bosch affair relations between Marcus and Jacob were tense for years and they were not on speaking terms.208 This dissension was carefully hidden from the public. Were there perhaps also differing views on how to handle the inquiry into Raoul Wallenberg’s fate?

Interestingly, the new Wallenberg generation does not accept the current Russian explanation of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. In the Profile interview Marcus Wallenberg expressed himself this way:

“The number of different versions [of his fate] makes me very skeptical. I do not believe, that the truth has come out yet.” 209

Wallenberg, however, gives no indication that the Wallenberg Family is inclined to actively try to solve the mystery. The

205 Enigl and Kordik, p. 68

206 UD, P2 Eu I, RWD, from Otto Danielsson to Gunnar Jarring, Copy of two internal Security Police memoranda [P.M. for Otto Danielsson] from 15 September and 22 September, 1954 concerning activities of Ernst Natander. In early 1954 the von Dardel family also appears to have had contacts with an unidentified major of the Swedish Defense Staff. In both instances this appears to have been Helmut Ternberg. It could be that the two initiatives were related. see UD P2 EU 1, RWD, P.M. Otto Danielsson, 15 January, 1954.


208 Frostell, pages 120 - 128. See also Olsson, 2000. Also, it is interesting that Kalman Lauer sends a formal report on the background of Raoul Wallenberg’s mission to Marcus Wallenberg in the aftermath of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance. SEHFBF,Raoul Wallenberg in Documents, 20 April, 1945. It is possible that Marcus had not been briefed on the details whereas Jacob Wallenberg occasionally had been in contact with Lauer during Raoul Wallenberg’s stay in Budapest.

Throughout WWII the Americans conducted a vigorous investigation into the Wallenberg family’s activity of cloaking important business assets for Nazi Germany, including those of the Robert Bosch A.G.

209 Enigl and Kordik, 2 December, 2002
Wallenberg archives remain effectively closed to outside researchers, with the exception of a few handpicked individuals.210

3. Russia

a. The Soviet legacy

With little meaningful outside pressure and tough Cold War realities weakening the few efforts that were made on Raoul Wallenberg’s behalf, Russia had no incentive to give up its secret. Even the demise of the Soviet Union has done little to unlock the vault. The formation of the joint Swedish-Russian Working Group in the fall of 1991 had been a promising sign of possible cooperation, and hopes were particularly high when Russia handed over a number of important documents in the case. But things quickly stalled and the flow of material slowed to a trickle. The uncertain political climate after the August 1991 putsch proved too difficult an obstacle. Twelve years of adjustment and transformation of the Soviet state have done little to change that. The current political situation is still not conducive to greater openness or reckoning with the past. Especially for a case where the central question of responsibility involves the Russian Security Services. In a recent interview Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear his views that he regards the Security Services largely as an unwilling tool of the former Soviet leadership, rather than as an active co-conspirator who cemented their power.211 Under his presidency the Security Services have undergone a rigorous process of consolidation and have been given once again a central role in Russian government affairs.

While Putin may not allow a resolution of the Wallenberg case on either tactical or perhaps ideological grounds, there are also strong historical obstacles. Russia lost 20 million people during WWII and about 60 million perished since the Revolution in 1917. Any individual fate pales before these numbers. While some Russian officials privately have expressed understanding for Raoul Wallenberg’s family’s quest, they have consciously blocked the inquiry at serious junctures. In their view one man’s fate does not outweigh a nation’s political interests, nor does it matter more than one’s own relatives.

b. The current Russian view

The official Russian position today insists that Raoul Wallenberg was killed in 1947 without offering any documentary or other evidence in support of this claim.212 While some additional documents may still be found in the future, Russian officials argue, they would cast no light on the question of Wallenberg's fate. The key documents, the argument goes, were destroyed a long time ago. Instead, the circumstantial evidence in the case is presumably so strong that it allows no other conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg was executed. Among the chief reasons they cite Raoul Wallenberg’s presumed lack of usefulness for Stalin once Sweden showed no interest in his return, as well as the absence of any documentation indicating Wallenberg’s presence in the Soviet system after July 1947. The Eliasson Report rejects this position as unacceptable, arguing that in no official investigation, criminal or historical, can absence of documentation ever constitute acceptable proof. This all the more so when, by Russia’s own acknowledgement, additional critical documentation exists in the case that was not made available to the Swedish side.213

While the Report acknowledges the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg’s death in 1947, it stresses that the current evidence does not exclude the possibility of Wallenberg having lived some time beyond 1947, especially if his identity was hidden. The Commission is scathing in its criticism of the poor quality of the official Russian Working Group report from 2001 and stops just short of accusing the Russians of stonewalling. Poorly written, argued and annotated, the main intention of the report, in the words of the Commission,

210 Individual Wallenberg company archives, such as for SKF, Swedish Match or ASEA, for example, remain almost completely inaccessible.


213 Most important among these are the personal/prisoner file and/or investigative files of Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder, as well as Willi Roedel, Raoul Wallenberg’s cellmate in Lefortovo; interrogation protocols for Wallenberg, Roedel, Langfelder, van der Waals, Sandor Katona and others. There is strong indirect evidence that the material exists, at least in part; the file Mikhail Kutzov-Tolstoy in the archives of SVR; the papers of the Soviet ‘rezidentura’ in Stockholm, the Wallenberg Family file, records of the ACC Hungary and its communications with Moscow in 1945, critical administrative and correspondence records from MGB/MVD etc.
"... appears to be ... to transfer as much blame as possible to Swedish authorities for Raoul Wallenberg's alleged death in Soviet captivity, ..."  

The Eliasson Commission rightly emphasizes ultimate Russian responsibility for a solution and issues only very indirect criticism of the Swedish role in the official Swedish-Russian Working Group. Circumstances were undeniably difficult and especially in the early years important progress was made. Swedish officials were constantly forced to maneuver a fine line between open confrontation and eliciting meaningful cooperation and concessions. Overall, however, the Swedish side placed a heavy emphasis on diplomatic discussions and adhered - on orders from above? - to an extremely narrow research focus. When access to important documentation was denied, Sweden often did not effectively protest this failure. Simply put, Russian non-compliance faced few if any negative repercussions. As a result, the work rarely met the generally accepted standards of a formal historical inquiry. For the first seven years of the Working Group’s existence the Swedish side only rarely insisted on full and direct access to documentation, settling instead into a slow moving question/answer format with the Russian side. Swedish representatives frequently appeared more interested in avoiding the various pitfalls of the case than mounting a determined, multileveled quest for the truth. Numerous independent experts argued for years for direct access to records and a systematic framework of analysis, before those in charge reluctantly agreed. The Swedish side also never conducted a systematic study and analysis of the Russian documents it did obtain or of all the oral testimonies it collected. Potentially important background issues of the Raoul Wallenberg case, such as his contacts and activities in Hungary, for example, or the role of the Wallenberg Family were almost completely ignored. No historians served on the Swedish side of the Commission.

c. Early definitions

The key question for the early Russian definition of the Raoul Wallenberg case is: How did Stalin assess the situation, especially after what must have been for him a rather strange meeting with Staffan Soederblom in June 1946, when the Swedish Minister informed the Soviet leader that he personally thought Raoul Wallenberg was dead? Did Stalin want to rid himself of the Wallenberg problem as soon as possible or did he feel there was time, especially since the Swedes had made it clear that they had little interest in Wallenberg? The interrogation registers of Lubianka and Lefortovo show that Wallenberg was only rarely interrogated, which is an indication that the decisive investigative phase of his case had not yet started. Many prisoners were incarcerated for years before the intensive investigative phase of their case began. Most foreign diplomats were sentenced only in 1948 or even later. Wallenberg had been in contact with various intelligence and political groups, and he undoubtedly possessed valuable information. Soviet interrogators could have learned some of this information from his cellmates but it would have been far from exhaustive knowledge.

So Stalin may not have been in a terrible hurry. His growing anti-Semitism and general anti-western paranoia after 1945 would certainly not have helped Wallenberg’s case. However, even if Wallenberg refused to cooperate, there may have been good reasons for hiding his identity. Russian archival records show only five interrogations for Wallenberg. It is possible that additional interrogations took place. If so, these were either not registered or the entries have not been declassified. None of the interrogation protocols for Raoul Wallenberg has been released. If Raoul Wallenberg’s identity was hidden after July 1947 [or perhaps as early as March 11, 1947, the last known date of Wallenberg’s presence in captivity] interrogations would have been registered under this new identity, like a pseudonym or a number.

214 ECR, p.89. [Rapportens syfte foerfaller naermast vara av politisk art, dvs att skjuta oever en sa stor del av skulden som moejligt pa svenska myndigheter foer Wallenbergs pastadda doed i sovjetisk fangenskap, snarare aen att utgoerra ett bidrag till att faststaella sanningen om Raoul Wallenbergs tragiska oede.]

215 In many instances direct access to documentation was limited to the Chairman of the Swedish side, Hans Magnusson. Direct access to documents is necessary for determining authenticity and integrity of the presented material, a vital part of any historical analysis. The question and answer format also forestalls in many instances proper identification and confirmation of cited sources, etc.

216 Most papers were never seen in the original which allows only for limited conclusions concerning the content of these documents. Many documents were also never seen in their original context. In some cases where original documentation was offered, the Swedish officials made no attempt to photocopy them. As for critical background issues, some of these are finally now being investigated in official research projects funded by the Swedish government.

217 Interrogators were mostly focused on preparation of the Nuernberg trials.
arguments for keeping him alive. The Swedish-Russian Credit Agreement was signed in 1946 without Russia having to produce any obvious trump card. Yet Wallenberg’s usefulness would not necessarily have ended there. 1947 would certainly have been very early to give up on him entirely.\(^{219}\) Plus, the continued uncertainty about his being alive or dead may have been utility enough.\(^{220}\)

Interviews with former members of the Soviet Intelligence Services yield a common impression of Wallenberg’s case - that it was special, complicated and in many ways political. As late as 1951 the files of two of his fellow prisoners - Gustav Richter and Grossheim-Krisko - include statements that their ill treatment in captivity was in part due to their association with an “especially important prisoner,” almost certainly a reference to Raoul Wallenberg.\(^{221}\) The full reasons, however, and especially Soviet reasoning behind Wallenberg’s arrest are only partially understood and need to be investigated further. Possible rationales for his detention range from suspecting him of German and/or Allied espionage to the intention of using him as an instrument of pressure to obtain important concessions from the West.\(^ {222}\)

As Wallenberg’s interrogation schedules show, Soviet investigators definitely used his statements to probe political events in Hungary, possibly including Allied plans for the future. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen was questioned on 28 April, 1945, the same day as Wallenberg. And on 17 July 1946 both Vilmos Langfelder and Gerit van der Waals - who had links to both the Swedish Legation and British Intelligence - were questioned. All interrogations were conducted by Danil Kopelyanski, the interrogator who also questioned Raoul Wallenberg.\(^{223}\) Individuals closely linked to van der Waals’s activities in Budapest, such as Karl Schandl, Tibor Clement and Laszlo Pap, were sentenced to long prison terms as British spies in 1950.\(^{224}\)

The last known date for Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in the Soviet prison system is March 11, 1947, when he was called for an interrogation in Lubianka prison. All experts agree that Wallenberg’s fate was decided around that time, during the spring and summer of 1947. The critical information is surely to be found in the letter Soviet State Minister of Security, Viktor Abakumov, wrote to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov dated July 17, 1947.\(^{225}\) The content of this letter has never been released. As for

\(^{219}\) Keeping alive a witness who was not only familiar with Wallenberg business affairs but was a member of the family could have held some attraction for Stalin. In the assessment of Yevgeni Pitovranov, former Chief of the 2nd Main Directorate MGB, Stalin would not have executed Raoul Wallenberg. In an interview with Swedish Television in 1992 Pitovranov stated that “Stalin ...needed him [Wallenberg] for the political game.” In his interview with the Swedish-Russian Working Group Pitovranov testified that he believed Raoul Wallenberg’s death “was a mistake”. He could see no logical reason for an execution. SWR, p. 144

\(^{220}\) Usefulness in the Soviet system appears to have been a relative concept and at times defied common logic. A good example is the case of Boris Menshagin, a former mayor of Smolensk and an unwitting witness to the Katyn Forest massacre. [In 1940, 4,500 Polish officers were executed by Soviet forces in Katyn, near Smolensk]. Menshagin’s imprisonment bore little obvious utility, yet Stalin kept him alive for years. Menshagin’s case also illustrates that strict isolation of prisoners was not only theoretically possible but was practical reality in the Soviet prison system. Menshagin spent the first six years of his twenty-five year sentence in complete isolation in Lubianka prison. [From 1951 on Menshagin was held in Vladimir prison where he occasionally had cellmates. The difference to the Raoul Wallenberg case is of course that Menshagin’s presence at some point became known and could be verified by witnesses.

\(^{221}\) Note by Solovov in the file of Gustav Richter, 1951; note by Smirnitsky in the file of Grossheim-Krisko; see among others UD, P2 EU I, RWD, Report to the Swedish-Russian Working Group by Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky. 28 March 1991.

\(^{222}\) A hint of this can be found in the formal report Swiss diplomat Harald Feller gave to the Swiss Foreign Ministry after his release from Soviet captivity in 1946. Feller stated that his interrogator stressed that Switzerland - like Sweden a neutral country - had repeatedly violated its neutrality and had delivered war materials to Nazi Germany, and continued to do so in the late stages of the war. Similar accusations may well have been leveled against Raoul Wallenberg. see UD, Eu P2 1, “Bericht an das eidgenoessische Departement ueber die Internierung von Legationsekretaer Harald Feller und Kanzleisekretaer Max Meier in Moskau vom Februar 1934 bis Januar 1946.” 11 March, 1946, p. 37

\(^{223}\) Russian documents also list an interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg on 17 July, 1946. This date is in question, however, since the photocopy of the prison registry also lists an interrogation of Isaac Wolfin on the same day. Wolfin was apparently not arrested until 25, July, 1946. The precise date of Raoul Wallenberg’s interrogation for this one instance remains unclear.

\(^{224}\) ibid. Schandl was a lawyer with the Budapest Cooperative Agricultural Bank. He had contact with Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish Legation; very little is known about Tibor Clement and Laszlo Pap. According to records in the British PRO all three held officers rank in the British Army [Lieutenant], see Mesinai. Liquidatsia, 2001.

\(^{225}\) Two references to this letter have been found. One a handwritten notation on the bottom of Vishinsky’s letter to Abakumov from July 22, 1947; the other in an official register in MGB from 1947, showing that the letter was indeed sent. The letter has been missing from Soviet
Wallenberg’s fate, there exist only two possibilities - Raoul Wallenberg lived and became a secret prisoner, or he died, either through execution or torture. Raoul Wallenberg’s name and that of his colleague Vilmos Langfelder are blacked out in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prison registers for 1947. But as American Wallenberg expert Susan E. Mesinai has pointed out, the censoring/purging of names does not automatically mean the prisoner in question has died. For the year 1947 the names of only two other prisoners, Pietro Aladjan-Aladjani and Sandor Katona, were stricken from the records. Aladjan-Aladjani, for example, was not executed, but instead he was placed in strict isolation and later released to the Vatican. Katona’s fate remains unclear - the Russian side has so far not made any of his records available.226

In addition, Aladjan-Aladjani was made a so-called [sentenced] numbered prisoner on June 28, 1947.227 The possibility therefore cannot be excluded that around the same time Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder too were isolated within the Soviet prison system and that their identities were hidden in some form, either by assigning them a different name or registering them under a number.228 In her official report to the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 2001 Mesinai shows that the chronological numbering of secret prisoners in the late 1940’ and early 1950’s includes obvious gaps.229 In fact, for the critical time 1947/48, six numbers remain unidentified.230 It is possible that one of these numbers was assigned to Raoul Wallenberg or Langfelder after July 1947. So far, the Russian side has not revealed the identity of these unknown prisoners nor have their files been made available, despite repeated inquiries.231

Even in Stalin’s time foreign prisoners were not shot or poisoned arbitrarily. In fact, the death penalty was not in force in July 1947 and was only reinstated in January 1951. Execution was also the last stage of a highly bureaucratic process. If Wallenberg was indeed executed, there should be some administrative evidence for this crime. For an execution to take place, a prisoner

226 Susan E. Mesinai. Liquidatsia. 2001. It is not clear when the censoring of names in the prison registers took place. Sandor Katona appears to have been Vilmos Langfelder’s cellmate. According to Russian documentation the two were transferred together from Lefortovo to Lubianka prison on 22 July, 1947.

227 In 1991 the International Commission to establish the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg during their examination of prisoner cards at Vladimir prison found evidence that certain important prisoners had been registered under specific numbers in order to hide their true identity. In some cases, even the local prison administration did not know their real names. Aladjan-Aladjani’s memoir uses the name “Peter Alagiagian.”

228 For the 1945-47 period, Langfelder and Wallenberg were registered under their own name in both Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons. Interrogations with numbered prisoners were noted in the official prison registers only under the prisoner’s number or his pseudonym, never his real name. Danil Kopeljanski, interrogator with the Third Directorate, Fourth Department, stated to the Swedish Russian Working Group that he remembered a Swedish prisoner held in Lubianka for the time in question “under a number.” SWR p. 84

229 For convicted prisoners the system for numbering prisoners appears to have been centralized in 1947, see Mesinai, 2001. Despite repeated inquiries, the Russian side has never volunteered any information about the numbering system, including whether or not similar systems were in operation for different Soviet prison facilities for critical years. Secret prisoners who were still under investigation, awaiting sentencing, also received numbers. When sentenced, they were assigned new numbers, in accordance with the centralized list which tracked convicted prisoners.

230 For convicted prisoners, being taken to Vladimir prison, numbers 14, 16-20 respectively. Prisoner Number 15, Aladjan-Aladjani, was sentenced on June 28, 1947; Prisoner Number 21, E.A. Alliluyeva was sentenced on May 29, 1948. Since numbering occurred chronologically, the unidentified prisoners 14, 16-20 must have been sentenced some time between June 1947 and May 1948. One question yet to be answered is if Raoul Wallenberg’s case always stayed under the Third Main Directorate [Military Counterintelligence], MGB, or if at some point after March 1947 it was transferred over to another Directorate in MGB, like for example the First Main Directorate which would have handled foreign agent recruitment. There are some indications that the First Directorate did indeed play a role in the handling of Wallenberg’s case. [Ptyor Fedotov’s [MGB] conversation with Kirill Novikov [MID] of February 1947.] His case could have also transferred over to the Second Main Directorates [Counterintelligence] or the Department for Especially Important Cases [OVD]. These Directorates in particular used the numbering system, although Wallenberg remaining under the authority of the Third Main Directorate would not have precluded his strict isolation or the possible hiding of his identity. The question does become especially important if Wallenberg’s case lingered past 1947 into the spring of 1948, a time when significant organizational changes of the administrative structure of the Security Services took place.

231 Tibor Clement, Karl Schandl, and Laszlo Pap all became numbered prisoners after being sentenced in 1950. They were numbers 24, 25, 26. Schandl and Pap, like van der Waals, had been held first under the authority of the Third Main Directorate, Fourth Department MGB, which was handling Raoul Wallenberg’s case. In September 1946 their cases transferred over to the Second Main Directorate [Counterintelligence] MGB.
needed to be formally charged with a crime and sentenced. Experts agree that an ‘illegal’ shooting of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947 would have been very unlikely. This leaves death by poison - through methods developed in Grigory Maironovsky’s infamous laboratory - or through torture, as part of the investigative process. According to experts on the workings of the Soviet Security Services’ bureaucracy considerable administrative hurdles stood in the way of sending a prisoner to Maironovsky, but this last possibility cannot be completely excluded. The question is, however, if Raoul Wallenberg really died due to such a cause in 1947, why can this truth not be revealed today?

If Raoul Wallenberg did survive after 1947, there are only a few places where he could have been held as a prisoner, like for example Vladimir prison. In 1954, following Stalin’s and Beria’s deaths, many foreign and political prisoners were transferred to Vladimir to make room at other isolator prisons for scores of new arrestees. Thanks to highly specialized software which enabled them to recreate the full occupancy of each prison cell in various years, American researchers Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan were able to identify those cells which presumably held strictly isolated prisoners in Vladimir at particular times. A cell will appear "empty" if the prisoner's registration card has been removed and his name can therefore not be entered into the database. Makinen and Kaplan’s analysis coincides in a number of cases with testimonies from witnesses who report hearing of Wallenberg in Vladimir after 1947. One of the witnesses even identified Raoul Wallenberg’s picture from a random lineup of prisoner photographs. The Russian side has to now show who - if not Raoul Wallenberg - these prisoners were. The Makinen/Kaplan computer study provides the strongest indication to date that as late as in the 1960’s and 70’s severely isolated foreign prisoners were found at Vladimir prison.

Aside from the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg’s death in 1947 or his isolation in Vladimir prison, Wallenberg may have simply remained a secret prisoner under investigation in Moscow. Another option might have been to place him in a situation that would have made survival almost impossible. Wallenberg could have been isolated away from Moscow, either in an investigative prison like Sukhanovo, for example, or in a secret psychiatric hospital facility like Kazan; or, less likely, in the so-called Special Camp system in the Eastern regions of the Soviet Union. Established in early 1948, special camps housed important political prisoners, many from Eastern European countries. Even though some foreign prisoners were being repatriated as early as 1947, most of the prisoner population in special camps was not scheduled to return home any time soon. Plus, the daily routine inside these special camps was strictly regulated and extended even to limiting conversations among inmates. Some special camps also included special [punitive] subsections within the camp structure to further isolate certain prisoners.

The Russian side argues that as a prerequisite for sending Wallenberg outside of Moscow, he would have to have been formally charged with a crime and sentenced by applicable Soviet authority. There is no indication in the currently available records that such a formal charge or sentence were ever issued. This question, however, deserves further attention. Since no information is

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232 Dimitri Volkogonov Collection, Abakumov to Stalin. July 17, 1947. Describes the methods used to extract information from uncooperative prisoners. It explicitly lists the use of force.

233 see Vadim Birstein. *The Perversion of Knowledge: The true story of Soviet science*. According to Birstein it is curious that Sudoplatov first mentions Maironovsky in connection with the Wallenberg case in his book “Special Tasks” and not in his earlier writings. For experimental purposes, Maironovsky used only prisoners convicted to death. The procedure of providing him with such prisoners was highly bureaucratized. Birstein also points out that the Minister of State Security, Victor Abakumov, did not approve of Maironovsky or his methods and that in 1947 Maironovsky was no longer head of his laboratory [Laboratory Nr. 1]

234 Vladimir prison, located about 150 km North-East of Moscow, is where many of the most important foreign prisoners where held in Soviet captivity.

235 Testimony of Varvara Larina, December 3, 1993; see Makinen and Kaplan, 2001 and SWR, p. 358-62. The photograph of Raoul Wallenberg was one not previously published in the international press.

236 See for example GARF, Fond 9414, opis 1866, 1949/50. “Report on progress of the organization and activities of Camp No.7, as of 1 April, 1950.” Russian documentation shows that although the rules were strict, breakdown in enforcement allowed opportunities for limited exchange among prisoners. Despite these exceptions, special camp life before Stalin’s death in 1953 was very harsh.

See also UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, Testimony of former prisoner of war, Boguslav Baj, 1988. Baj reported that while imprisoned in the Special Camp at Bratsk, he met a Swedish prisoner who had been arrested in Eastern Europe in 1944, and who had later been held in Lubianka prison. The question of other Swedish prisoner in Soviet captivity, some of whom may still be unknown, or foreigners working in official capacity for official Swedish agencies [like the Red Cross] and the possibility of confusion with Raoul Wallenberg is one issue the Eliasson Commission lists as deserving of further research.
available about the handling of Wallenberg’s case after March 1947, no final conclusions can be drawn nor can it be excluded that Wallenberg was strictly isolated while under extended investigation.

e. Different possibilities

While Russia now fervently stresses 1947, over the years one could detect a certain ambiguity in the Russian position. The vague language of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957 is the most well-known example. Why the Russian did not present a more convincing document than the Smoltsov note at that time remains a central mystery in the case. It’s vagueness remains the Achilles’ heel in the Russian argument that Wallenberg died in 1947. More information about both the genesis and the origin of the Smoltsov note must be presented before doubts are laid to rest. It still remains unclear, for example exactly where the document was found. The Swedish Working Group report from January 2001 states that despite forensic tests which do not contradict the potential authenticity of the document, it cannot exclude the possibility that the note was after all a forgery.  

Even if it is authentic, testimonies by former Soviet officials raise questions about its possible meaning. A former Soviet Intelligence official who claims that he had access to Wallenberg documentation in the early 1950’s has stated that the Smoltsov note had been discovered in a special file which had been created at the time of Wallenberg’s death. Another official, a former employee of the First Main Directorate MGB, Fifth Department [Scandinavia] by the name of Stepanov confirmed the existence of such a special file, the so-called “Lefortovo File”, but indicated that it in late 1950 included a separate collection of documents. According to Stepanov, this “Lefortovo file” included a note which created the impression that Wallenberg was dead. The full documentation, however, supposedly showed that Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947 and that he had been held captive under a different name for some time. In Stepanov’s account Wallenberg had been held in isolation in several different prisons and an attempt at Soviet [agent] recruitment had been made in 1950, at a special MGB facility in Moscow. Wallenberg’s fate after 1953 was unknown. If there really was a special file, i.e. “Lefortovo File”, that contained a note that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947, this may have been the Smoltsov note from 17 July, 1947 or a similar note to that effect. It raises the question whether or not this special file was the one used in preparation of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957. It remains unclear what documentation exactly Soviet officials relied on in 1956-57 when the memorandum was drafted. Foreign Minister Molotov at least had some direct knowledge of the events on 17 July, 1947, because MGB Minister Abakumov had personally informed him about developments in the Wallenberg case on that very date. Did Soviet officials in 1956 then find the Smoltsov note in the “Lefortovo file” [or other files] or did they construct it on the basis of the information contained in the material and/or Molotov’s knowledge, and made the date retroactively fit Abakumov’s notification to Molotov from 1947?

Russian officials have always maintained that the Smoltsov note is authentic, if not in fact, [meaning cause of death by heartattack,] then in spirit, [meaning Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 or sometime around then.] In her analysis of Russian documents in 1997 Swedish historian Helene Carlbaeck concludes that Abakumov’s letter to Molotov from 17 July, 1947

“strongly increased the validity of the Smoltsov note.”

If indeed authentic, a question nevertheless remains, based on the currently available documentation, whether or not the [Smoltsov] note about Raoul Wallenberg’s alleged death in 1947 could have been conceived as part of an effort to create a false

237 SWR, p.139

238 SWR, p. 145

239 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Testimony of Sergei Ivanovich Stepanov, 1992. Stepanov bases his statements on his own experiences as well as those of a colleague, identified as “Dzhirkvelov”. This appears to have been either Ilya Dzhirkvelov who had defected to the West in the early 1980’s or a relative.

240 A small chance exists that Abakumov did not tell Molotov the full facts of the Wallenberg case. Soviet experts point out that Abakumov in some cases acted directly on the orders of Stalin, bypassing even the most senior members of the Soviet leadership. In the case of a foreign diplomat, however, some semblance of information sharing appears to have been upheld.

241 Carlbaeck, p. 7
set of documents, a false trace, with the intention of hiding Wallenberg’s fate and/or his identity from certain individuals in the Soviet administration at that time. The circumstances of Wallenberg’s death or disappearance were apparently a matter of great sensitivity and it is known that as late as 1954 even high ranking Soviet officials were not fully briefed. The effort might have been abandoned at some point, yet the documentation survived. The issue attains further significance due to the many unresolved questions concerning the employment status of the physician A.L. Smoltsov in the summer of 1947. Full documentation on this issue needs to be presented by the Russian side.

If two former Soviet Intelligence officials indeed had access to Wallenberg’s case file in the archives of the First Main Directorate of MGB [later KGB], there may be a chance that other individuals with similar access in other years may still be alive and could testify about what they saw. Further research will have to clarify the contradictions contained in their statements. The Soviet leadership’s wish to steer guilt away from themselves and to implicate Abakumov and Smoltsov, both of whom were dead by 1957, may account for some of the vague aspects of the Soviet pronouncements. The Swedish Working Group Report states that by the Russians’ own acknowledgment the Gromyko Memorandum was not supposed to reflect the full truth - it was just to be “a half-truth that would do.” The possibility exists that even if Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947, Soviet control or knowledge of the matter was such that Soviet officials felt reasonably sure that at that moment - in 1956/57 - Raoul Wallenberg was dead. But if that was so, the question remains why they did not choose to convey this fact - if it indeed was fact - more forcefully.

Both Russian and Swedish experts have argued that after a few years Raoul Wallenberg was simply not “exchangeable” because of the sensitive information he would have acquired during his Soviet imprisonment. Beyond that, releasing Wallenberg after years of denying any knowledge about him would have constituted an enormous embarrassment for the Soviet Union and an immense propaganda coup for the West. There would have been little or no chance for Soviet officials to “save face.” Yet, it is equally questionable whether or not a deal could not have been struck if the right offer had come along.

Interestingly, even after the Wallenberg case had not been officially raised by Sweden for fifteen years, the documentation shows that the Russian side, at least in private conversation, did not categorically insist that Raoul Wallenberg was definitely dead in 1947. A good example is the discussion between a Swedish official [Jan Lundvik] and his unidentified Soviet contact in 1979, immediately after the Swedish side had reopened the case. In his assessment of the meeting Lundvik wrote:

"The official position that the case is once and for all closed and that no new information can appear because Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 was not expressed. In fact he [the contact] admitted implicitly that there could in fact come information of such a type that it may cast new light on the case."

242 There were several cases in which false death certificates were produced by Soviet authorities.

243 When Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in October 1954 asked I.A. Serov, the Chairman of the KGB, “when and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died,” Serov gave an evasive reply, referring indirectly to A. Vishinsky’s note from August 18, 1947 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union. In 1954 Gromyko was not yet a full member of the Soviet Politburo. It is not clear what prompted Gromyko’s inquiry.

244 The document carries certain notations such as an apparent page number that it would appear to have been part of a file or set of other documents. As is known from a note written on the side of the document, Smoltsov apparently never sent his report to Abakumov but he supposedly informed the Minister personally of what had allegedly transpired. This notation would then account for why the document was not found in other relevant collections. Some researchers have questioned the authenticity of this postscriptum note in the document’s margin which states that he body was cremated without autopsy. The lack of autopsy is suspicious.

245 The role of Smoltsov’s deputy, a female physician, also needs to be further scrutinized.

246 SWR, p. 141

247 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Jan Lundvik to Leif Leifland. 6 September, 1979. Another example is the formulation used by then Russian Foreign Minister Primakov to his Swedish counterpart, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, in a letter from 17 July, 1997 on the occasion of the supposed 50th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg’s death. Primakov opens the letter saying “If the Soviet authorities can be believed, [my emphasis] today marks fifty years after Raoul Wallenberg’s death ....” see also report by Goeran Rydeberg, 2001.
What then prevents Russia from telling the truth? There are four basic possibilities why Russia insists on 1947:

1. **Nobody knows the truth.** Therefore, the case is indeed purely circumstantial. Russian officials argue that the level of internal secrecy within the Security Services remains so high, that those few individuals who know what happened to Raoul Wallenberg either still refuse to speak or are now dead. Any documentation that does exist is supposedly incomplete and does not shed light on Wallenberg’s ultimate fate. High-level institutional knowledge, however, was available until very recently and to some degree remains available today. Anastas Mikoyan survived until 1978. Sergei Kartashov, [Head of the Fourth Department, Third Main Directorate, MGB in 1947] died only in 1979. Other top members of the Soviet hierarchy lived well into the 1980’s and 1990’s. Vyacheslav Molotov was still alive in 1986 and Georgi Malenkov lived until 1988. Viktor Abakumov’s Deputy, Nikolai Selivanovsky, died as recently as 1997. Yevgeni Pitovranov, the Head of the Second Main Directorate MGB, was alive until 1999, Danil Kopelyanski [interrogator with the Third Directorate, Fourth Department is still living, his colleague Solovov died only recently.

2. **Full knowledge of Wallenberg’s death in 1947 exists, but documentation is withheld by an extremely small circle at the top.** Such a scenario is possible, but it raises questions as to why officials would not reveal details if they have already publicly pondered death by poison and have admitted to Wallenberg’s execution by shooting [Yakovlev]. There may be a reluctance to release the documentation if the cause of death was gruesome or if Wallenberg suffered irreversible physical or psychological damage as a result of mistreatment. The truth may compromise still living officials who either dealt with the case directly or in its aftermath. In addition, it may prove impossible to strictly separate and keep separate the facts of Wallenberg’s fate from other aspects of his case, i.e. reasons of his arrest, etc. The culture of the Security Services may well present an insurmountable obstacle, such as an ingrained unwillingness to acknowledge guilt or to provide essential details to the public. A stalemate then may seem to be the preferable solution.

3. **Wallenberg lived beyond 1947, but not for long.** Wallenberg died but later than claimed by the Russians. The Russian side has steadily retrenched in its position on Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. It has moved from complete denial of Wallenberg’s presence in the Soviet Union [1945-1957], to claim of death in 1947 by heart attack [Smoltsov], to death by Execution [Yakovlev]. Further adjustments or corrections about Raoul Wallenberg’s supposed death, either about the cause or date of death would have serious repercussions for Russia; and particularly so if he was held beyond the deaths of both Stalin and Beria in 1954 and he then died or was executed. So, it may not be considered advantageous to admit to the later death date. Again, only a few people know the facts. This could be a plausible alternative to 1947, especially since some former Soviet officials themselves have raised this possibility.

4. **Wallenberg lived beyond 1947 and for a considerable time.** A less likely scenario, but based on the current evidence it cannot be dismissed. If in fact true, Wallenberg’s survival could not be revealed because it would cast all involved in a very negative light.

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248 Interfax, 6 December 2000. “In the opinion of .... Academician Alexander Yakovlev, Wallenberg was executed by gunfire at Moscow’s infamous Lubyanka prison in the years of Stalin’s regime...”

249 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, see for example testimonies of Remenyi [1984], Stepanov [1992], and Solovov [1997] Most Soviet officials who consider it possible that Raoul Wallenberg lived past July 1947, believe he was no longer alive after the mid- 1950’s. In 1952/53 the Hungarian government, on Soviet orders - apparently in connection with the so-called ‘[Jewish] Doctors’ Plot’ - , prepared a number of show trials which were to expose an alleged “conspiracy” by certain Jewish organizations, [especially the Joint], and American/British interests, charging collaboration with both Hungarian and German Fascists during World War II. In a subplot to this conspiracy it was to be “proven” - by forced testimony - that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered in Budapest already in January 1945. A key question is why Stalin decided to take up the Wallenberg issue precisely at this time. A similar effort to prove Raoul Wallenberg’s death in Budapest in 1945 had been made by the Hungarian High Court already in 1948. The planned trials in Hungary fit the theme of Stalin’s anti-Semitic campaign of the period, exemplified by the ’Doctors’ Plot’, which in turn was connected to the arrest of MGB Minister of State Security V. Abakumov. Interestingly, Abakumov was never charged with Raoul Wallenberg’s murder. One would think that Stalin would have liked to blame Abakumov for this crime. The early 1950’s also saw increased pressure by the Swedish government to obtain clarity about Wallenberg’s fate. After Stalin’s death in 1954 the preparation for the show trials in Budapest continued for some months before they were finally stopped by Beria. see Ember, 2000.

250 For an analysis of the Russian failure to present valid evidence for Raoul Wallenberg’s death in 1947 and for the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg’s longterm survival after 1947 see Mesinai. “Beyond Reasonable Doubt.” 2001
d. More relevant records have to exist

The possibility that Raoul Wallenberg’s fate is not known is minimal. So is the chance that all critical documentation has been destroyed. There are strong indications that at least part of Raoul Wallenberg’s personal file is available in Moscow. This idea appears to be supported by some of the items among Wallenberg’s personal belongings which were returned to his family in October 1989. These consisted, among other things, of large amounts of foreign currencies, his diplomatic passport and his prisoner registration card. Russian claims that these items were discovered by chance in a sealed packet found on a shelf in the FSB archives seem hardly credible. Under the extremely strict Soviet bureaucratic rules items such as Wallenberg’s passport should under normal circumstances have been kept as part of his prisoner/personal and/or his investigative file.251

The existence of the currency too raises questions. Money was held on the prisoner’s behalf, and his belongings traveled with him from prison to prison, where they were stored by the respective prison administration. As Susan Mesnai has pointed out, once the prisoner in question died, under official Soviet administrative rules any currency was permanently confiscated by the State within six months of his death. If Raoul Wallenberg indeed died in 1947, why then was the currency not confiscated?

If, on the other hand, Soviet authorities in 1989 did not return the original bills taken from Raoul Wallenberg, but simply issued authentic World War II bills - from their vast holdings - to reimburse Wallenberg’s family, then the question arises how they knew what amount they should return. A receipt stating the precise amount taken from Raoul Wallenberg when he arrived in prison should have been kept as part of his prisoner file. Therefore, this raises the question whether in 1989 Soviet officials did not in fact take the information directly from Wallenberg’s file.252

Critical records of Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners that have so far not been shown to researchers also appear to exist. In a new documentary on the Wallenberg case former Soviet Intelligence official Igor Prelin on several occasions cites information which he claims come directly from the interrogations with Vilmos Langfelder. According to Prelin, Langfelder made potentially compromising statements concerning Raoul Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest:

“Together with Wallenberg his driver, Vilmos Langfelder, was arrested. He was also questioned, he told us where they drove together and what they were interested in. And he said that in the actions of Wallenberg there were moments which, as you would say, fell outside the framework of his regular duties as a representative of the Red Cross or as a diplomat. That is he did not concern himself only with matters which dealt exclusively with Jewish rescue. He [Langfelder] told us many interesting things.”253

Prelin also claims that according to existing documentation in Russian prison archives, Raoul Wallenberg was called to interrogation the day before his supposed death on 17 July, 1947. No such documentation - if it indeed exists - was shared with Swedish representative during the official ten year investigation of the Wallenberg case.254

There are plenty of other indications that at least some relevant documentation survives. Declassification of official secrets in Russia is, by Russian archivists’ own admission, in a deplorable state.255 Anatoly Prokopienko, former head of the Special Archives, has repeatedly gone on record to say that the current failure to solve the Wallenberg case is due to a lack of political will, not lack of documentation256 Other leading experts, like Nikita Petrov of ‘Memorial’, agree with this assessment.257 It is

251 see UD, P2 EU I, RWD, Memo to the Swedish-Russian Working Group Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky. 28 March, 1991; and Mesinai. 2001. Liquidatsia. Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic passport should have been kept in an envelope attached to his personal file. Addressbooks were in some instances kept as part of the investigative file.

252 see SWR, p. 324, Appendix 44, excerpt from Susan Mesinai’s report “Strict Isolation and the numbering of prisoners.”

253 Klaus Dexel, Bechert & Dexel Gmbh, 2004. Interview with Igor Prelin,

254 Prelin’s statement have proven to be of questionable validity at times. However, the matter deserves to be thoroughly checked.


256 see for example Anatoly Prokopienko. Izvestia, 25 September, 1997. Systematic document destruction in the Raoul Wallenberg case appears to have taken place, especially in the 1950’s. See Rydeberg, 2001. However, most experts, including the late Andrey Sakharov, argue that the critical information about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate was almost certainly preserved.
clear that all critical decisions concerning important foreign prisoners were not made by Stalin alone but were a matter of approval in some form for the Politburo. According to Petrov, Abakumov should have formally reported to Stalin about his actions concerning Raoul Wallenberg and such a report should have been given in writing.  

In his memoirs Vadim Bakatin who headed the KGB for four short months in 1991, expresses his surprise how many Politburo decisions were taken in the Wallenberg case in later years and how little documentation was found which would explains the genesis of these decisions. In addition, no access currently exists to critical correspondence records of MGB/KGB with the Soviet leadership, records of the Soviet ‘rezidentura’ in Stockholm for pertinent years, records of the Soviet side of the Allied Control Council, Hungary or Rumania and its communications with Moscow - the list goes on.

That highly relevant information existed at least into the mid-1950’s is made clear by a remarkable document from the Russian Foreign Ministry collection. The document refers to a letter from a man called “Shiryagin” who apparently in April 1956 possessed important information about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the letter significant enough to forward it to the Committee of State Security [KGB] with the following comment and a direct request to silence Shiryagin:

“\textit{The Foreign Ministry received a letter written probably by I.S. Shiryagin who lives in the village of Vodenino, Charkov region, which contains some information about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Probably Comrade Shiryagin, having a sincere motive to help search for Wallenberg, will reveal the content of his letters to other people and finally the Swedish Embassy would hear about the matter. Probably you will come to the conclusion that it will be necessary to advise Shiryagin - in a very careful manner - through your channels not to spread the news about Wallenberg}.”

It should also be noted that it is almost impossible for a prisoner to be lost in the Soviet system, at least not for extended periods of time. A special Commission after Stalin’s death, headed by Anastas Mikoyan, made a thorough appraisal of all prisoners in Soviet prisons and camps, foreigners and secret prisoners included. MVD [Ministry of Interior] headquarters in Moscow also conducted strict regular inspections and reviews of all facilities, especially of those prison and camp departments which dealt with secret documentation and/or prisoners. This took place in close cooperation with MGB/KGB which oversaw a number of special prisons and camps.

\textbf{e. A possible watershed}

A rather interesting exchange between an unidentified Russian journalist and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, head of the FSB archives, during the presentation of the Russian Working Group Report at a press conference in Moscow on 16

\begin{itemize}
\item [257] ‘Memorial’ is the leading Human Rights Group in Russia concerned with chronicling the fates of millions of citizens who perished in Soviet camps and prisons.
\item [259] Bakatin, p 188, “Sixteen Politburo decisions for approval of the Wallenberg notes between 1952 and 1986! That I had not expected.” These included the Svartz-Myasnikov discussions from 1961-1965 which were presented for Central Committee and Politburo review. Only a few papers about this issue have been recovered so far.
\item [260] No representative of SVR, Russian Foreign Intelligence, was a member of the Swedish-Russian Working Group.
\item [261] MID, Raoul Wallenberg File, Gribanov to KGB, 13 April, 1956. Neither Shiryagin’s original letter nor any other follow up documentation is supposedly available in the archives of the former KGB. It is not clear whether or not Shiryagin’s information did indeed pertain to Raoul Wallenberg or to which time Shiryagin’s information refers, before or after 1947.
\item [262] GARF, Fond 9414, opis 3366, Files of the Control and Inspection Department of the Gulag. MVD SSSR.
\end{itemize}
January, 2001 provides a strong hint that officials know more than they have said and that there may be strong internal factors at play which have so far prevented a full disclosure of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate:

**Question:** It is common knowledge that the Soviet leadership distorted the truth intentionally. ... When did it happen that the Soviet or Russian leadership decided sincerely to find out the truth? Was it in 1985 or 1989?263

**Vinogradov:** It’s an interesting question, but you should address it to the government. You always put me in a tight spot. I have to express my position as a citizen. ...

**Question:** I am asking your personal opinion

**Vinogradov:** ... You know that there are always secrets in a family. Some things can be said, and some cannot be said. When we read the cases, I wish I never read them. These are rather moral and ethical questions. But sometimes they go beyond political considerations, like, for example Russian-Swedish relations. ...

If former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, intentionally misrepresented the truth in 1989 - when he invited Raoul Wallenberg’s immediate family to Moscow where they were presented with his personal belongings - then President Putin could be placed in the unenviable position of exposing a number of former Soviet officials such as Gorbachev or people like former Soviet Premier and Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, to public embarrassment. 265 In the case of Gorbachev and others it could even lead to possible legal prosecution - however theoretical that possibility may be. In a certain sense, Gorbachev’s half-truths may have complicated Putin’s position considerably. The arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London some years ago has significantly and permanently changed the legal landscape in international human rights cases.266 So has the issue of government compensation for victims of slave labor in Nazi Germany. It is clear that the concept of restitution can be transferred to Russia. In more than one sense, the truth about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate could prove to be a watershed event for Russia. Putin so far has not touched the issue of Soviet era crimes. He has publicly condemned them, yet one of Putin’s first acts after he came to power was to lay a wreath at Yuri Andropov’s grave. 267 The symbolic meaning of that gesture was understood by every Russian watching on TV.

IV. DEEPER PROBLEMS

1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report

a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry

The Eliasson report states that due to time restrictions it had to leave out of its evaluation five relevant areas of inquiry, among them important questions about Raoul Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest, those of the Swedish Legation, Swedish handling of witness testimonies in the case, as well as the fate of other Swedish citizens in Soviet captivity. 268 The report provides some indication that the activities of the Swedish Legation - especially its representation of various foreign interests, its secret support of Allied Intelligence and unresolved questions about unofficial contacts with Hungarian and German Nazi authorities - and the

263 1985 marked the beginning of ‘Perestroika’, 1989 the return of Raoul Wallenberg’s personal belongings.


265 President Gorbachev did not meet Raoul Wallenberg’s family personally, but delivered his message through the chief archivist, Rudolf Pikhoya.

266 The British Magistrate Ronald Bartle announced his ruling concerning Spain’s request for extradition of General Pinochet with the words “There will be one law for one world.” London, 8 October, 1999.


268 ECR, p. 64
Swedish Red Cross especially deserve closer scrutiny. The release of excerpts from the interrogation protocols of Hermann Grosheim-Krisko, a German/Russian businessman of dubious reputation, in 1991 offered confirmation that the Soviets suspected the Swedish Legation personnel of both pro Nazi and anti-Soviet activities.

Newly discovered documentation raises questions about the work as well as the attitude of the Swedish Legation personnel and the strains that this may have caused among the staff. According to numerous witnesses, tensions between Valdemar Langlet, the official Swedish Red Cross representative, and Wallenberg ran especially high. The two repeatedly clashed over funding and competency issues. This notion is confirmed by a memorandum from 1962, which recounts a conversation between Swedish professor Nanna Svartz and Hungarian physician Professor Ruszniak [sic]. Svartz writes that Ruszniak had known Wallenberg personally and that he, according to his account, had had frequent contact with him in 1944. Svartz reports that according to Ruszniak it was well known that in his own Legation

"Wallenberg faced great difficulties from different quarters ... especially from Valdemar Langlet.”

Of considerable importance is the question of why Swedish officials never formally debriefed the returning Swedish Legation and Red Cross members. Interestingly enough, the Soviet protocols of interrogations conducted with the Swedish Legation staff in Hungary and Rumania also have never been presented. It would be of some interest to know how exactly Wallenberg’s colleagues portrayed his activities for the Russians. Another intriguing question is why Lars Berg was allowed to leave when he, like Raoul Wallenberg, was clearly suspected of collaboration with the Germans.

Important questions also remain concerning the issue of Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic status. What exactly was his status in the eyes of both the Swedish and Soviet governments, specifically at the time of Wallenberg’s arrest in January 1945? Inexplicably, the Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson handed over official authority to Mikhail Kutusov-Tolstoy, making him, a ‘foreigner’ [a

269 Some of these questions are touched upon in Lajos, 2004. Lajos, however, emphasizes the socio-political aspects of Jewish rescue in Budapest. He does not cover in depth the actions or contacts of particular individuals other than Raoul Wallenberg, both in terms of rescue work as well as the numerous intelligence interests that existed in 1944 Hungary. His essay also does not address any economic issues, including questions related to business or economic warfare.

270 FSB, Interrogation protocol of Grosheim-Krisko from 20 April, 1945, Grosheim-Krisko had worked in Hungary since 1941, including for the German Economic Administration [Deutsche Wirtschaftsdienst]. Through the years he had had business contacts with several Swedish firms. He obtained a position at the Swedish Legation, Budapest through the intervention of Nandor Batisfalvy, the Hungarian Police Chief in charge of foreigners. Grosheim-Krisko was one of the many controversial figured who associated with Swedish Legation, Budapest.

271 In several letters to the Swedish Minister in Rumania, Reuterswaerd, Valdemar Langlet strongly insinuates his criticism of the Swedish Legation’s behavior during 1944 and the handling of issues such as the safekeeping of valuables on behalf of certain individuals. ECR, p. 266; also P57, letter from 24, 28 March and 1 April, 1945 respectively. See also poem by Lars Berg from June 1945. The poem gives the strong impression that the Legation had a fairly restrained involvement with Jewish rescue efforts. Wallenberg is pointed out as the being the only one who is always running around and who does not take time out to relax.


273 ibid. Especially after they had heard the Kossuth Radio report on March 8, 1945 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered by on the way to Debrecen. The member of the Swedish Legation, Budapest also had access to Langlet’s letters to Reuterswaerd in Bukarest, in which he speculates about Raoul Wallenberg possible death.

274 According to Sudoplatov, representatives of Soviet Military Intelligence at the Hungarian front [Smersh] had received information that Raoul Wallenberg was “an established asset of German, American and British Intelligence.” Sudoplatov, p. 268
White-Russian national], and not Raoul Wallenberg the official Swedish representative in Pest. To make matters worse, even though Raoul Wallenberg apparently had explicitly requested permission from his superior Danielsson to contact the Russian troops in Pest, Danielsson claimed as early as April 1945 that Wallenberg had left without seeking prior authorization for such a contact.275

Raoul Wallenberg had been included in the official list handed over by Staffan Söderblom to Soviet authorities in December 1944, requesting Soviet protection of official Swedish Legation Staff. And when Danielsson authorized Wallenberg to contact Soviet troops he obviously asked him to do so in official [Swedish] capacity. Yet in the aftermath of Wallenberg’s disappearance Danielsson repeatedly went out of his way to stress that Wallenberg had not been official Swedish Charge d’Affaire when the Soviets marched in to Budapest, clearly So, precisely at the most critical time, Raoul Wallenberg’s status was left completely undefined. Goeran Rydeberg goes so far to say that this uncertainty, both about Wallenberg’s original responsibility or authority and the work that had been carried out, as well the lack of coordination with the rest of the Swedish Legation and with the authorities in Stockholm, now in January 1945 left the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest open to “blackmail.”276 If there were fears of Soviet aggression, Rydeberg writes, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel from Wallenberg’s activities.

Oddly enough, it was Staffan Söderblom who in the first weeks after Wallenberg’s disappearance not only recognized the danger of Wallenberg’s situation but who urged the Swedish Foreign Office to take action on his behalf.277 The tone of his early communications with Stockholm is businesslike and shows traces of true concern. February 8, 1945:

“Question whether Wallenberg .. - who is registered as Secretary of Legation ... ought to get instructions concerning his status.”

And later:

“My thought .... was that Wallenberg is instructed to take up contact with the new Hungarian government ... in his capacity as official representative... Some information of this kind seems even more suitable since Wallenberg probably has not gotten the least sign of life from home.”278

Söderblom’s attitude toward Wallenberg, however, undergoes a visibly strong shift one day after his meeting with Ivar Danielsson and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest on April 13, 1945 in Moscow. Whereas before Söderblom’s tone had been sober

- “Wallenberg disappeared since January 17 when he intended to depart by car” ,

on April 14, he now suddenly claims that

“Wallenberg snuck on his own initiative over to the Russian lines,”

implying strong personal disapproval and even inappropriateness of Wallenberg’s behavior.

Why such sudden hostility towards Wallenberg? Why did Danielsson portray Wallenberg’s behavior in such a negative light, since he himself had given Wallenberg permission to contact the Russian troops? And why was this impression never corrected once the

275 In addition, Wallenberg’s diplomatic passport which was due to expire on 31 December, 1944 had been only haphazardly extended by Per Anger with a simple handwritten note. Wallenberg also had been issued a regular Swedish passport before his departure to Budapest [Nr. 1044, issued on 14 June, 1944] This passport was not returned by the Russian side in 1989.

276 UD, P2 Eu 1, Telegram Celsing to Stockholm, 19 November 1946.

277 Rydeberg, p. 78

278 see von Dardel. 1997

279 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD
members of the Swedish Legation returned home to Sweden.  

Other important questions remain. One day after the Soviet controlled Hungarian radio had announced on March 8, 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had been killed on his way to Debrecen, Ivar Danielsson on 9 March requested a meeting with the highest Soviet representative in Hungary, General Pavlov to discuss issues concerning the conduct of the Swedish Legation during the previous months.  

No records of these discussions have been made available. On that same day, Margareta Bauer prepared a formal statement concerning the handling of Russian records at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. The issue appears to have been of some concern.

During the half-day stay in Moscow on 13 April, 1945, Danielsson and Soederblom conferred for some time in private. Topics covered, among other things, were the violence and destructive behavior of the Soviet occupation troops, the work of the Swedish Red Cross [and the problem of Valdemar Langlet’s activities], the interests of Swedish businesses, Raoul Wallenberg’s activities and disappearance, as well as the issue of valuables the Swedish Legation had stored on prominent Hungarians’ behalf. This last point in particular Soederblom stresses repeatedly and he also several time emphatically urges Stockholm

“to thoroughly analyze all information the Swedish Legation members have available.”

before he takes further steps with Soviet authorities.

In an interview Per Anger recalls that a visibly agitated Soederblom, with a reference to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries, admonished him

“Remember, when you get home to Sweden, not a bad word about the Russians.”

When Soederblom returned to Stockholm for consultations in November 1945, neither he nor Ivar Danielsson met with Raoul Wallenberg’s parents Maj and Fredrik von Dardel, despite their repeated requests. Soederblom made it clear that his conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg had died was based on information he had received from the returning members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest.

The issue of what exactly transpired in Budapest, during and immediately after the humanitarian mission, the personal attitude of the Swedish Legation members towards Raoul Wallenberg and the information they provided to the Russians need to be examined in depth. Equally critical is it to determine the possible motives behind the Swedish government’s inclination to accept Raoul Wallenberg’s death and who or what considerations may have influenced that decision. Even when word came in the fall of 1945 from a well-placed Hungarian source - the Hungarian National Bank President Takaczy who served at the will of the Soviet occupation power - that Wallenberg had been arrested by Soviet forces, the Foreign Office apparently already had accepted the inevitability of Wallenberg’s demise and conveyed this conviction to U.S. officials. The last line of a telegram from the State Department, addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and signed by the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, explains that

“the [Swedish] FONOFF [Foreign Office] feels that even if the info is true [about


282 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD. Statement signed by Margareta Bauer. 9 March, 1945. In a joint statement written after the war Per Anger and Ivar Danielsson reported that General Pavlov had informed them that he had received orders from Moscow to take charge of the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest and to send them home via Bukarest and Moscow. No documentation concerning Pavlov’s alleged orders or his conversation with Danielsson has been released from Russian archives.

283 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom, 17, April 1945.


285 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, Soederblom to the Foreign Office, 18 December, 1945.
Aside from the understandable limitations of the scope of its research and for all its detail, the Eliasson Report is quiet on several other critical points. One is not only the possible motives behind Swedish behavior, but also the larger implications of this behavior. For example, one should ask what the consequences for the Raoul Wallenberg case would have been, if certain high-ranking members of the Foreign Office sympathized with the Soviet Union, or perhaps even did the Soviets’ bidding. Surely, there would have been very little incentive to drive the search for Raoul Wallenberg energetically. What about the curious passivity of the Wallenberg family? Did it set the tone for UD’s actions in the case? And what would Raoul Wallenberg have reported on his return to Sweden? That the Russians had ample reasons to be concerned about releasing Wallenberg is clear, but were there also problematic issues resulting from Swedish activities - such as Wallenberg business, for example, or the activities of the Swedish Legation/Red Cross in terms of representation of foreign interests and/or ties to various intelligence circles - that can account for the general lack of enthusiasm in Sweden to actively pursue his return?

b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context

Closely related to this is the second problem: The Commission Report evaluates the Wallenberg case primarily against the larger background of Swedish-Soviet relations, meaning Sweden’s general security and economic policy considerations of the Cold War period. The Eliasson Report, however does not focus on the ebb and flow of events within this larger framework or how specific events affected the handling of Wallenberg case as such. This is a critical omission, since the Wallenberg case - as the Commission recognizes but does not outline in detail - did not take place in isolation. Two main aspects characterized Sweden’s behavior: Fear of its neighbor to the East and need for accommodation. These were met by a policy that combined a strategy of deterrence - by making it clear that in case of an attack Sweden would hold out long enough until it received help from Western powers - and “bridge building” between the superpowers, which later turned into a policy of assuring the Soviet Union of Sweden’s commitment to neutrality. By focusing purely on the larger picture, however, the Eliasson Commission neglects the subtlety of the situation.

A mere month after the Gromyko memorandum, on 5 March, 1957 came the formal Soviet complaint over years of Swedish espionage [in conjunction with American and British efforts] in the Baltic countries. Despite its clear guilt, Sweden denied all knowledge. Aside from the obvious intention of wishing to discredit Sweden, the timing of the revelation that the Soviets had penetrated the Allied/Swedish network for the past seven years raised several questions. Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow suggested that “as odd as it may appear” there were in fact signs that the Soviet action was designed as a gesture to Sweden to improve relations. In light of a number of internal and external pressures, like the worldwide condemnation the Soviets had received for the brutal squashing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, there were strong signs that overall Soviet policy was designed to reach out to

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286 NARA, RG 59. Records of the U.S. Special War Problems Office. 20 September, 1945. It has not been possible to trace the source of this comment on the Swedish side. The last line of the telegram is crossed out and a handwritten note states that “Mr. Clattenberg agreed to omission.” Clattenberg was then the head of the Special War Problems Office, which dealt with a variety of issues arising from the war, including refugees and the tracing of lost diplomatic personnel. No additional material concerning the Wallenberg case has been found among the records of this collection. The Special War Problems Office served as a type of liaison to the FBI and OSS/CIA.


288 In his analysis Peterson recognizes four distinct phases for Swedish-Soviet relations until 1960: 1945-1947: Relations were relatively good; 1948-1953 increasing tensions; 1954-1956 lessening of tensions; 1957-1960 relations again more tense.

289 Kadhammar, p. 152-3. *[Det aer med uppriktig foervaning ...Noten innehaller en rad orimliga pastaenden och beskyllningar ... faller pas sin egen orimlighet svenska myndigheter star helt fraemmande foer varje slags agentverksamhet i spionagesyfte pas sovjetryskt territorium ...]*

290 UD, HP 1 Eu, P.M. by Rolf Sohlman, March 8, 1957 and Sohlman to Unden March 12, 1957.
Sweden in the hope that it would continue its official Neutrality Policy. 291

Leaving aside for a moment the question whether or not Sohlman’s assessment of the Soviet action is valid, it is clear that both Sohlman and Unden at this moment define Raoul Wallenberg and the other arrested Swedish agents as the cost Sweden has to incur for detente and not as the price it could possibly exact from the Soviets in return for Swedish assurances of continued adherence to its Neutrality position. 292

In this connection, Soviet attempts from 1956-57 to conduct unofficial talks in the Raoul Wallenberg case between the Finnish diplomat Ake Frey and Soviet official Pavel Erzine and later Viktor Vladimirov also deserve further scrutiny. 293 During these discussions the Swedes not only for the first time received Soviet confirmation [although unofficially] that Wallenberg had indeed been held prisoner in the Soviet Union, they also received a hint that Wallenberg’s background was of some interest to the Russians. On 20 December, 1956, towards the end of a two-year exchange, Vladimirov asks Ake Frey whether it would be possible to discuss “off the record” a Russian draft answer before the Soviets present the official answer in the Wallenberg case. Vladimirov adds somewhat cryptically that

“humanitarian aspects do not have much meaning in Moscow.”

That Wallenberg belonged to a well known family was “more to the point.” 294

However, on 18 January, 1957 the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Political Department at the time, Sverker Astroem, informs Frey that from the Swedish side it would hardly be possible to conduct secret discussions. 295 Eighteen days later, on 6 February, 1957, the Soviets Deputy Foreign Minister presents the Soviet claim that Wallenberg had died in 1947.

Some years later Ake Frey explained that in his mind the negotiations in 1955-57 had been serious but that the Chief of the Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Enckell, had suddenly ordered him to break off contact. 296 Enckell apparently acted in close coordination with the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Frey-Vladimirov contacts were conducted parallel to official preparations of the Gromyko memorandum. In an interview with the Swedish-Russian Working Group Viktor Vladimirov explained that the Soviet leadership wanted to find out exactly what information the Swedish government possessed in 1956. 297

291 He pointed out that Sweden had not been singled out for public criticism in either of the main Soviet newspapers, Izvestia or Pravda and that the general tone of the Soviet protest had been exceedingly polite. Another indication is that Bulganin and Khrushchev through intermediaries expressed the wish to be invited to Sweden for an official visit. They were told this would be impossible in light of recent events in Hungary. see UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, P.M. from 2 July, 1957, Sven Fredrik Hedin reports about his discussion with Soviet official at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, Slabov.

292 In his memorandum Sohlman expresses no concern for the fate of the fourteen men who were arrested seven years earlier, nor does he raise the question of how Sweden might obtain their release. On the importance of the timing of the Gromyko memorandum in light of events in Hungary in 1956 see Barany, 1997. There is also no indication that Sohlman or Unden were considering taking advantage of the arrest in August 1956 - a few months after Prime Minister Tage Erlander’s formal visit to Moscow - of Russian spy Anatole Ericsson, who had been charged with stealing radar secrets from L.M. Ericsson. Ericsson was quickly sentenced to twelve years hard labor in October 1956.

293 For a more detailed account see Berger, 2001.

294 Records about the Vladimirov-Frey discussions are not accessible in Russian archives. These were highlevel exchanges: Pavel Erzine’s superior, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Boris Podtserob, was for years Head of Vyatcheslav Molotov’s Secretariat, including for the critical years of the Raoul Wallenberg case, 1946/47; Pavel Erzine was the Chief KGB ‘Rezident’ in Turkey and later President of Patrick Lumumba University in Moscow.

295 UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, P.M. signed by Sverker Astroem. 18 January, 1957.

296 UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, handwritten P.M. by Sten Aminoff, 30 September, 1964. Frey further claimed that his career was ruined as a result of his involvement in the negotiations.

297 According to Victor Vladimirov, the Swedish/Finnish contacts had been ordered directly by Ivan Serov, the head of the KGB. Sudoplatov [Russian edition], p. 651-653. The Soviets should have actually had a reasonably good idea about Swedish state of knowledge in the Raoul Wallenberg case, through Swedish press accounts, formal and informal contacts in Sweden, etc. Experts generally agree that at the very least Molotov and Serov knew the truth about Wallenberg’s fate. Sudoplatov claims that the true purpose of Vladimirov’s mission was to reestablish contacts with the Wallenberg family. He also states that “Vladimirov had information that the Wallenberg family was definitely interested in
If Molotov and Serov had clear information about Raoul Wallenberg’s death in 1947, such efforts would seem somewhat excessive, especially since the Soviet side should have had a fairly clear idea about the state of Swedish knowledge in the Wallenberg affair from a variety of sources. It is possible that the discussions with Sweden served purely as a distraction and delay tactic before the official Soviet response was to be presented. Ake Frey repeatedly reported his impression that at the time of the discussions Raoul Wallenberg appeared to be dead. Nevertheless, it should be of some interest to determine how much the Gromyko Memorandum is a reflection of the failure of these Russian contacts. In other words, it will have to be determined if it would have been possible to gain further concessions from the Russians in light of their wish for improved relations with Sweden than were reached during those years.

Instead of pursuing the problem from all possible angles, Swedish officials slowly stripped the Raoul Wallenberg case of all relevant complexities and interrelated aspects. In fact, Sweden chose to handle all major Cold War cases - such as the disappearance of a DC-3 spy plane with a eight-men crew in 1952 over the Baltic Sea or the arrest as a Russian spy of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem in 1963 - in perfect isolation from each other. Stig Wennerstroem operated as a Russian agent for almost two decades and he apparently did not act alone. His betrayal of the DC-3 cost the lives of eight men, yet he has been allowed to live out his life in comfort and security in his own country. If he had help, as has been alleged, those who supported him were most likely just as well positioned in Swedish society as Wennerstroem himself. The full impact of his activities and those of his potential helpers on the Swedish government’s handling of various Cold War issues remains essentially unexplored.

The important question is: Were these cases handled separately to increase chances of a resolution or mainly to prevent “cross contamination,” to avoid one issue dredging up related problems in another case? Even when the Russians tried to link them, as happened on at least one occasion in the Wallenberg and Wennerstroem case, Swedish officials did not react.

c. Focus only on early years

The third problem is that, as already mentioned earlier, the Eliasson Report focuses on the early events in the Raoul Wallenberg case. It is vital that the behavior in later years be subjected to the same scrutiny. It has to be determined how detrimental Swedish Minister Staffan Soederblom’s behavior in 1945/46 really was. In other words, one cannot simply assume that there was no chance to rescue Raoul Wallenberg after 1947. The question posed by the Eliasson Commission for the time 1945-47 - What did Swedish officials really know and when did they know it? - is just as relevant for the following decades. Were Swedish officials truly safeguarding “a higher good” [viktigare vaerden], that is the national security of the many, as Oesten Unden claimed in 1957, or were they primarily protecting the special interests of a few? Why, for example, are there essentially no records from the Swedish Foreign Intelligence Service in this case? Even if it was beyond its scope to provide operational advice or intelligence, one would expect it to have provided some type of evaluation in the question. If not, then this lack of referral or exchange between Swedish agencies raises questions about how seriously the case was pursued in later years.

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Sudoplatov’s statements have proved false or questionable on a number of issues and have to be considered with greatest caution. No records concerning Vladimirov’s contacts with Ake Frey have so far been released from Russian Intelligence Archives.

Soviet records from the period show that the Soviet leadership already in the spring of 1956 had decided to delay its answer to Sweden at least until after Swedish parliamentary election in the Fall of 1956, apparently for tactical consideration. According to Aminoff’s P.M. from 1964 Frey stated that the Soviets appeared to not possess information about Wallenberg’s fate after a certain point in time.

Tore Forsberg, a former Swedish Security Police official, questions Anders Sundelin’s theory that Stig Wennerstroem was helped by unidentified accomplices. However, most analysts argue that the issue remains open. see Forsberg, 2003.

Sweden also may have had one spy operating in Russia, aside from agents infiltrating the Baltic states. Isaac Markovich Wolfin, was an employee of the Soviet Legation, Stockholm in the early 1940’s and later served as a Swedish language instructor at a GRU [military intelligence] School. He was arrested in the fall of 1946, on charges of espionage. His prisoner registration card carries the notation “Swedish spy”. Wolfin appears to have agreed to cooperate and seems to have functioned as a cell spy.  [see Makinen/Kaplan, 2001]

So is the state of knowledge in other countries, like the U.S. and Britain.
An archivist once told me that

“the problem with the Wallenberg case in Russia is that everything is closed; and in Sweden, that everything is open.”

He was making an oblique reference to Sweden’s ‘principle of openness’ [Offentlighetsprincipen] which makes it very difficult to keep information secret by placing very severe restrictions on both the length of time and the reasons for which documents may be classified. This has had the unintended effect that officials who may feel very strongly that certain documents should stay secret, see no other option but to take them out of circulation. There are several instances, where former officials handed back documentation they had removed from Swedish archives during their service. So, aside from unknown diaries and memoirs one cannot discount that here and there additional information remains locked away in private attics or basements.

d. No systematic analysis

Out of this grows the fourth problem, namely that the Eliasson Commission does not thoroughly examine how much attitudes and assumptions guided Swedish behavior, especially in later years. Many officials were inclined to believe and not afraid to say so in private conversations that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947 and that any further search was futile. Most officials met the continued insistence of Wallenberg’s relatives to pursue the truth with thinly veiled impatience and downright irritation. Far from a source of pride, for many officials the case became simply a cause for embarrassment. Quite a few let this personal belief influence their official handling of the case. This tendency was so strong that it persisted even when new information was presented. As a result, important details were lost or simply ignored. Ambassador Krister Wickman’s statement in 1972 in Vienna summarized official UD policy for that time:

"For us, the Wallenberg case is a closed chapter." 303

Subconsciously or intentionally - nowhere did assumptions have such a devastating effect as in the handling of witness testimonies. The report states that an effective system of evaluation for testimonies has been in place since 1951 [when Otto Danielsson joined the case]. This is simply not true. One just has to read through the UD materials to ascertain that witness interviews were far from uniform or systematic. Neither was analysis or follow-up of the gathered information. Instead both were often haphazard and incomplete. There are countless examples of testimonies whose most critical points were not adequately followed up despite compelling reasons to pursue the leads they provided. In many cases the witnesses themselves were disparaged. It should be stressed that the problem was never with the rank and file. Many worked extremely hard for years to record and pursue any trace of information about Raoul Wallenberg. The problem is that Sweden’s present-day view and political definition of the Raoul Wallenberg problem is in its essence not very different from Oesten Unden’s definition of 1957. Another is the Swedish Foreign Office’s absolute determination to protect the country’s carefully crafted image which officials fear might suffer irreparable harm if certain facts came to light. 306

302 As can be seen from the diary of Ulla Lindstroem, one of Unden’s closest associates, even in 1956 Unden did not believe that Raoul Wallenberg had ever been held prisoner in the Soviet Union. SWR, p. 107 [Lindstroem’s diary entry dates from 1 April, 1956, the time of Prime Minister Erlander’s official visit to the Soviet Union.]

303 UD, HP1 G/Oesterrike, 14 January, 1971.

304 There were occasional efforts to summarize and analyze accumulated material, i.e. Sjoeborg [1951] and Nystroem [1986], but this is not the same as pursuing a continuous, systematic approach.

305 For example, in the Svartz - Myasnikov question Swedish officials completely ignored the fact that a second physician - Professor Grigory Danishevsky - had been present during parts of the meeting in 1961; no attempts to formally interview Carl Gustav Svingel were made until the early 1990’s; in 1984 Karoly Remenyi, a high-ranking Intelligence officer in AVO/AVH in the early 1950’s, testified that his superior, Sandor Rajnai had potentially important information in the Wallenberg case. Rajnai, a close associate of KGB Chief Yuri Andropov and by 1984 the Hungarian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was never questioned. He died in 1994. Remenyi stated that from his contacts with Soviet advisors he learned that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947, but was presumed dead after 1954/55; in 2001 a witness reported quite detailed information about a Swedish diplomat possibly having been held in a psychiatric facility in Barnaul during the 1970’s. This information was not followed up at all. Independent consultants to the Swedish-Russian Working Group did not have full or unhindered access to all witness testimonies.

306 A big factor also is the UD’s deeply ingrained code of loyalty. Public criticism of UD officials is anathema and even internal disagreements
e. Consequences of the failure to conduct a systematic analysis

Most importantly, many officials failed to acknowledge the larger complexities of the problems posed by the Wallenberg inquiry. Instead of systematically registering, analyzing and crosschecking all details, Swedish officials often handled each witness testimony on its own terms. As a result, they routinely ignored statements which did not fit their expectations. For example, no less than 38 individuals reported having contact or hearing of Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka or Lefortovo prison in the years after 1947. 307 Many of these testimonies were dismissed outright because it was assumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947 and that the accounts echoed Wallenberg’s earlier stay in these prisons. Or it was believed that the prisoner in question was simply another Swede. There were in fact several hundred of them held captive in the Soviet Union through the years.

Not of all these men have been fully identified. In the case of Swedish espionage missions to the Baltic countries in the late 1940’s it is not known how many Swedes or individuals working in official Swedish capacity ended up in Soviet captivity. 308 Questions also persist as to missing individuals from Swedish Red Cross or other missions in Eastern Europe after WWII. 309 For almost sixty years the Swedish government has not had a comprehensive list/database of all Swedish citizens and other Scandinavians held in Soviet captivity - it is finally now in the process of constructing one. 310

Swedish nationals were even reportedly held in Vladimir prison. A witness stated that in the early 1950’s he met a Swedish man named “Eriksson” who, together with two colleagues, had been officially associated with the Red Cross in Eastern Europe in the mid 1940’s. 311 A similar encounter with a “Swedish diplomat” arrested in Eastern Europe in 1945 was related by German prisoner of war, Theodor von Dufving. 312 Based on their very similar case profile, these men could have easily been mistaken for Raoul Wallenberg throughout Soviet camps and prisons. Establishing their full identity and formal tracking when and where these men were encountered, on the other hand, would have made the evaluation of witness testimonies and with that the whole Raoul Wallenberg inquiry much more efficient. Instead, confusion was allowed to reign. What resulted was the wholesale dismissal of testimonies as “unreliable” which might have yielded very useful information, if a larger framework of analysis had been employed. 313

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are to be avoided. As the former U.S. Ambassador to the United States, Jan Eliasson, recently put it in an interview with Dagens Nyheter: “Rifts are destructive for the apparatus.” Cederskog, Georg and Ingvart Andersson. 2005. “Naesta Stopp New York”. Dagens Nyheter. 10 July. Some analysts like Gothenburg Professor Dennis Toellberg worry that this excessive need for preserving stability comes with a high price. Toellberg argues that the problem with the Swedish model is that it “promotes on all levels loyalty towards persons before loyalty towards values, values like courage, honesty, democracy and human rights.” By placing a premium on preserving the status quo, Toellberg argues, Sweden is in danger of “committing suicide in fear of death”. see Toellborg, 2003.


308 See Ezergailis, 2003; see also Schoen, 1999. These individuals should not be confused with the so-called Kiruna Swedes from the northern regions of Sweden bordering of Finland.

309 UD, P2 EU 1, RWD, Testimony of Viktor de Latry, May 1957. de Latry also recounts a situation in Butyrka prison in 1952, when a guard told him that “we even have a Swedish Ambassador here.” de Latry took that to mean a Swedish diplomat or some kind of official representative. And who, for example is ‘Karl Moritz Leuvenhaupt’, a man supposedly arrested on a courier mission to the Swedish Legation, Berlin in 1945 and held in Lefortovo prison in 1948. The name can be a pseudonym.

310 The Russian side has also not provided exact information about which Swedish prisoners were held prisoner, nor have they provided a list of possibly other prisoners with the name “Wallenberg” or similar.

311 UD, P2 Eu 1, RWD, testimony of Ludwig Hunoldt, 14 July, 1957. It has not been possible to identify ‘Eriksson’ and his two colleagues. The man in question may have been a ‘Fredrik Johansson’, whose personal history matches that of the man Ludwig Hunoldt met; see also UD, HP 39. Nothing further is known about Johansson.

312 UD, PS Eu 1, Testimony of Theodor von Dufving, 1982

313 UD archivist Goeran Rydeberg suggests in his report that the basic point of departure for evaluating witness testimonies should be to establish the general credibility of the witness. [Rydeberg, 2001, p. 7.] While this is an essential part of testing the veracity of witness statements, it cannot be the major criterion. As Otto Danielsson has pointed out, even the worst crooks tell the truth sometimes. The information provided has to be evaluated according to the standard rules of historical and criminal investigations.
The sophisticated quantitative prisoner cell analysis of Vladimir prison by American researchers Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan shows how important a systematic analysis of witness testimonies really is. The studies by Makinen/Kaplan as well as Susan Mesinai also underscore the importance of so called “secondary” documentation such as transport records and medical files where entries are much harder to eradicate. Contrary to Russian claims, these collections have not been thoroughly studied. The advantage of such research is that it leads to concrete questions which the Russian side can and will have to answer.

Unfortunately, official Swedish and Russian efforts to follow up these findings have been excruciatingly slow. The issues raised by the Makinen/Kaplan and Mesinai projects deserve to be thoroughly checked since these results are among the most concrete leads to emerge in over fifty years of research. The Swedish Foreign Office spent approximately $200,000 on the Makinen/Kaplan project alone. It knew in advance that the study of Vladimir prison would yield a certain set of questions, questions about seemingly “empty” cells and who may have occupied them. That meaningful follow-up was possible was one of the underlying premises of the research. Yet virtually nothing has been done to bring about Phase 2 [identification of isolated prisoners] of the project. Concrete questions emerge, but they are not pursued because no one pushes hard enough for answers. As a result, focus gets diverted back to more general research.

2. Current Definitions

a. Sweden Today

One who is not surprised by these problems is British historian Tsering Shakya who has encountered similar problems in his research of the complex history of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. His conclusion is that people in general prefer simple solutions:

“...[People] simply don’t want complexities to interfere with their firmly held beliefs.”

And while the reduction of complex events may seem harmless, it in fact is not. As Shakya sees it, the failure to pay attention to details leads directly to a more serious problem, what he calls “the denial of history;”

“a process,” he says, “which necessarily entails the negation of responsibility.”

In short, the willingness or unwillingness to address the details of a problem says a lot about the intentions of the investigator. And this has been the crux of the problem for both Sweden and Russia from the very beginning of the Wallenberg case.

In Sweden the central role of the Foreign Office is to help define and to guard national interests. As a result, Foreign Ministry officials in charge of the Wallenberg case were facing a task which on several levels posed a serious conflict of interests. In other words, the Swedish-Russian Working Group in its basic set-up was clearly not the best vehicle to handle the investigation of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. The Group was accountable only to itself, since there was no independent oversight outside of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. More importantly, the overall approach was once again too reactive, too ponderous, too “proper” to bring about the desired result. The lessons are that diplomats should be allowed to do what they do best - mediate and negotiate. The current state of affairs, with researchers carrying out the research while diplomats smooth the way with Russian authorities is a much more productive arrangement.

One key question remaining is why Sweden has never effectively reached out to the international community for help in the Wallenberg question. It did not do so at the beginning of the case, nor does it do so now. Instead, Sweden has made it clear that it alone considers itself in charge of the issue.


315 In 2002 Mesinai was conducting an extensive study of the transport records in Rosarchive [Russian State Military Archive, Archives of the Convoy Guards.] The project is currently on hold due to internal Swedish administrative disagreements concerning the reporting of results and design of follow-up procedures.


Nevertheless, the overall trend is definitely positive, and the Eliasson Commission is only one example. In January 2001 Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson took the unprecedented step of formally apologizing to Raoul Wallenberg’s family for the country’s early handling of his case. Persson is representative of a new generation and a new thinking in Sweden and in that role he has accomplished a great deal. The Swedish government is the major sponsor of its highly regarded “Living History” [Levande Historia] Project which emphasizes the teaching of history in Swedish schools, with a particular emphasis on the history of the Holocaust. “Living History” supports a host of associated projects designed to build tolerance and reduce prejudice in Sweden’s increasingly multicultural society. Since 1999 Sweden has sponsored and hosted three international conferences devoted to Holocaust and Genocide studies and it has set aside official research funding for a range of historical investigations, including the Raoul Wallenberg case. 318

Goeran Persson’s apology for Sweden’s handling of the Wallenberg case was clearly heartfelt. Yet, it may have also been triggered at least in part by tactical considerations, if not in Persson’s mind, then in the minds of some of his advisors. 319 Persson for some reason did not make his apology to Raoul Wallenberg’s family in person, but conveyed it instead by telephone, even though both of Wallenberg’s siblings were in Stockholm at the time. And while the work of the Eliasson Commission is both welcome and impressive, it stops far short of a complete analysis of the Wallenberg problem. In fact, in some areas it has barely begun to scratch the surface. Most importantly, despite the Commission’s strong condemnation of the Russian conduct in the Wallenberg investigation, neither the Swedish Foreign Ministry nor the Prime Minister have forcefully insisted on full access to the withheld documentation. 320

b. The Neutrality Dilemma

Despite the progress in recent years, there are other signs that the old pragmatist attitude remains firmly in place in Sweden. How else to explain the fact that the selection of Norwegian Historian Hans Fredrik Dahl in 2001 as a member of the Eliasson Commission did not raise any eyebrows or questions whatsoever, either from the Swedish government, the press or his fellow historians? Dahl was a vocal defender of British historian David Irving in 1996, arguing for Irving’s right to be heard as “a competent historian.” He stuck to his position even when Irving was convicted in a British court for denial of the Holocaust in March 2000. Only when the historian Richard J. Evans published a highly critical evaluation of Irving’s work in the aftermath of the trial, did Dahl change his position. 321 On 13 July 2001, he publicly apologized in a column in the Norwegian daily ‘Dagbladet.’ 322

It is a legitimate question whether Dahl’s selection was appropriate given the topic of research - the fate of one of the few heroic public figures of the Holocaust. Regardless of the final assessment - Dahl by all accounts provided an interesting analysis of the media’s role in the Raoul Wallenberg case - this issue should have prompted a lively discussion in Sweden. Dahl is a representative of the so-called postmodern, ‘objectivist’ approach to historical review whose proponents argue for an interpretation of history based purely on what they consider to be historical facts. 323 Consequently, this view assigns only a limited role to moral criteria in the evaluation of historical events. This view has gained more prominence in recent years, as a reaction to what many historians consider an exaggerated emphasis on moral questions in historical analysis.

318I myself have been a grateful recipient of one of these research grants.

319In recent years, at least one prisoner returning from the Soviet Union has petitioned the Swedish government for restitution. In 1993, Evald Hallisk, an Estonian man, sought and received compensation for the fifteen years he served in Soviet captivity after having been captured while carrying out an espionage mission for Swedish Intelligence Services in 1950. Hallisk was granted 500,000 SKr (approx. $50,000) by the Swedish government, plus an additional 160,000 SKr a few years later. No one has tested so far whether this precedent of paying restitution also applies in the cases of other missing Swedes.


321Evans, 2001

322Dahl, 2001. When asked, Johan Matz, the Eliasson Commission’s Main Secretary, stated that he and others were unaware of Dahl’s background at the time of his hiring.

323Objectivism focuses to a large degree on the difficulty of establishing historical facts and the danger of selective interpretation.
Interestingly, the current Swedish neutrality debate runs very much in this vein. In the question over ‘legality’ vs ‘morality’ of Sweden’s neutrality policy during WWII a rather popular compromise position has appeared that strongly echoes the objectivist creed. This position acknowledges Sweden’s missteps but insists that these were fully atoned for later on by the Swedish government’s efforts to ensure stability in the Scandinavian region, as well as Swedish support for various humanitarian actions, like rescuing the Jewish population of Denmark and Norway, the ‘White Busses’ of Count Bernadotte and Raoul Wallenberg’s humanitarian mission in Hungary. Former Ambassador Krister Wahlbaeck, the current head of the Reference Group on Wallenberg Research is a proponent of this view:

“... Was this role sufficient to compensate for the moral ambiguities inherent in a position of neutrality during World War II? Yes, in my view it was.”

In this so-called standard interpretation of Swedish neutrality Raoul Wallenberg becomes representative of larger Swedish attitudes, not the exception to the rule, as he is generally seen. Others, like Swedish journalist Niklas Ekdal, strongly reject Wahlbaeck’s interpretation:

“Sweden’s concessions to Germany in World War II were so troubling, that they had to be balanced by mythology.”

To paraphrase Paul Levine who shares some of Ekdal’s concerns: What is troubling is not simply the fact that Sweden’s effort on behalf of Jewish refugees came very late or that the country maintained economic relations with Nazi Germany - such a blanket condemnation does not do justice to the complex reality Sweden faced in WWII. What is of concern is that by providing critical war materials, such as ballbearings, and other assistance - as in permitting German troop transfers through Swedish territory in 1941 or aiding the German takeover of the Norwegian firm hydro-electric concern Norsk Hydro, - Sweden willfully accepted the risk and perhaps even strengthened the possibility of a German victory. Sweden's position is especially questionable after 1942/3, when the Germany’s decisive defeat at Stalingrad diminished the threat of an invasion and when incontrovertible evidence of masskillings of Jews emerged.

There are also other, associated dangers with this position: By focusing attention predominantly on the bright spots in Swedish behavior, the standard view on neutrality draws a benevolent veil over past deeds, including war profiteering, the harboring of war criminals, as well as the ready accommodation of various questionable economic and political alliances which covered the full ideological spectrum from left to right. In doing so, it discourages a thorough inquiry into the causes of such actions and with it prevents the learning from history. In short, no particularly strong impetus to solve the deeper questions of thorny issues like the Raoul Wallenberg case follows.

The unique political conditions of the Cold War have enabled Russia to keep the veil tightly shut around the Wallenberg question. The U.S., the Wallenberg Family and most of all Sweden had their respective reasons not to lift it. Swedish neutrality and the basic characteristics of the capitalist economy - the exchange of goods and services is, after all, primarily driven by utility and opportunity, not by moral or ideological considerations - further enhanced this fact. In short, for all involved the gains made possible by neutrality outweighed any of the much smaller benefits that could have been potentially incurred by taking action to clarify Raoul Wallenberg’s fate.

Just a few months ago, in April 2004, the editors of the respected Stockholm daily Svenska Dagbladet seized upon this problem when they issued a sharp critique of the Swedish government’s past and current failures in the DC-3 investigation. Their main


327“Eight Swedish Soldiers Dead.” 2004. [Atta svenska soldater diedade].Svenska Dagbladet, 24 April. The article notes that at the time the Swedish Defense Minister had neither visited the recently discovered crash site of the plane, showed any interest in the recovery operations or expressed a need to memorialize the lost crew. [A museum is now under consideration]
criticism focused on the fact that Sweden has continually failed in its responsibility to those who served on the country’s behalf and who were lost in the course of this service, all because Sweden had to maintain the illusion of its neutrality. In the case of the DC-3, Swedish officials quickly declared the crew dead, then for years deceived the public about the true nature of the plane’s mission. Only in the early 1990s the government acknowledged that the DC-3 had been involved in intelligence gathering activities.

“Lie was added to lie”

the editors write and go on to call some of today’s Swedish government representatives to task for clinging to the

“myth of neutrality policy in which the DC-3 should not exist. ...It can be suspected that the government wants to forget the DC-3 and its crew. In the same way as in the Raoul Wallenberg case one wants to leave the problem behind and move on.”

With the declining relevance of neutrality following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Sweden has been quick to carve out a new role for itself. It now defines itself as the primary facilitator of European integration. Sweden has focused its efforts on Russia and Russia in turn relies heavily on Sweden to plead its cause with its European neighbors. For the sake of this mutual agenda, old and new conflicts have been pushed into the background, such as human rights violation in Chechnya and the increasing curtailing of civil liberties in Russian society. As both sides realize, and have realized for sixty years: While the truth ultimately cannot be denied, it can surely be delayed. The rationale is simple: Who knows what the world will look like in ten, fifteen, twenty years from now?

The full facts about the Raoul Wallenberg and other cases may by then barely cause a ripple. But the Wallenberg case was never just about the fate of one man. That would be an insult to the millions of people who perished or who languish today in similar conditions. The threads of the Wallenberg case reach deep into the recesses of the past and run together at the most critical junctures of post war politics. Illuminating these hidden connections and motivations will be an essential task if one wants to draw any meaningful lessons from this tragedy. The question of how one balances the rights of the individual vs. the interests of the state is as current today as it ever was. For this debate alone historic truth is critical and a democratic society has to vigorously insist on full disclosure. One can only hope that this will be one of the lasting legacies of this case.
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### Archive List and Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>SWR</td>
<td>Swedish Working Group Report, January 2001</td>
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<td>UD</td>
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ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Articles of Incorporation of Special Metall Foereeningen, the company Raoul Wallenberg founded with Erich Philippi in September 1939

2. Picture of Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna

3. P.M. by William Owen from April 1959

4. Picture of Sverker Astroem

5. Picture of Sven Salen and Jacob Wallenberg

6. Picture of R. Taylor Cole, Carl Bonde and or Helmut Ternberg

7. Raoul Wallenberg’s invitation list to a cocktail party at his apartment on 2 December, 1943.

8. U.S. State Department internal e-mail message from 7 February, 1992

9. Telegram from SKF headquarters in Gothenburg to SKF Budapest via Swedish Foreign Office, ordering sale of ballbearing inventory to Germany, September 1944.

10. Letter from Erik Bjoerkman to Swedish Foreign Office, informing officials of Veesenmayer’s offer to allow a number of Jews to leave Budapest in exchange for a number of trade goods between Hungary and Sweden, August 1944.

11. Internal report from SAEPO detailing attempts by Jacob Wallenberg to contact Soviet officials via business contacts in Eastern Europe to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg, 1954.

12. Blacked out register entries from Lubianka prison detailing possessions of prisoners. Entries show that aside from Raoul Wallenberg, names of Sandor Katona and Pietro Aladjan-Aladjani were also censored. 1947

13. Pictures of Molotov, Selivanovsky or Mikoyan

14. Letter by Gribanov to KGB, detailing letter by Shiryagin. 1956

15. Picture of Rolf Sohlman, Ake Frey and Pavel Erzine

16. Cell plan of Vladimir prison and/or picture of Larina.

17. Picture of Goeran Persson

18. Poem by Lars Berg, written after the members of the Swedish Legation Budapest returned home to Stockholm in April, 1945.

Copies of all documents mentioned in the text are available by request.