Raoul Wallenberg

Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group

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Preface

Ever since Soviet troops abducted Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in January 1945, his life work and fate have captured the imagination of many people in many countries. Largely because of this, he still attracts as much attention as he ever did.

The fate that befell Raoul Wallenberg became the biggest and most protracted individual case dealt with by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The length of time it has taken is of course extremely regrettable, but no more than fitting considering the considerable efforts made in attempting to solve the case. We owe it, quite simply, to the memory of Raoul Wallenberg and his heroic actions in Budapest. Nor should the efforts of his colleagues be forgotten.

Recent political developments in Russia have enabled us to enlist the help of the Russian authorities in our search to discover the true fate of the Swedish diplomat. We had high hopes that with the help of the new, open and more veracious Russia we would achieve full enlightenment. We have received considerable cooperation. Unfortunately, we still do not have a complete, legally tenable account of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate or the reasons for his arrest, despite the tremendous efforts of everyone involved. Documents appear to have been destroyed, key persons have died or are either unable or unwilling to remember. It is not therefore possible to close the Raoul Wallenberg file. Our attempts must aim to achieve complete clarity in the case. We hope, however, that this account will contribute towards increasing our knowledge about him and lead to suggestions for new lines of inquiry.

We are all aware of Raoul Wallenberg’s achievements. Together with his colleagues, he saved thousands of lives in Budapest. With little time at his disposal, he wasted none of it. The task grew unceasingly and took complete hold on him. Raoul Wallenberg realised the risk of delay, the damage done by not acting in time. Timely preventive action is essentially a matter of respect for life
and human dignity. With this in mind, he and his colleagues drafted a plan during his last weeks in Budapest for the future rehabilitation of the surviving Jews in Hungary. In the midst of his intolerably hard rescue work and the chaos of the final battle, he was making plans for survival, for the future.

Feeling and compassion were needed to be able to do all this. Raoul Wallenberg possessed both in abundance. Despite the abhorrent events in Budapest, his quick-fire humour brought pleasure to his fellow humans and fired them to great exploits.

He did not ask what should be done. He did not need a decision-making process in the face of evil. His unerring inner moral compass indicated the path that he should take.

Raoul Wallenberg thus set an example, showing that action is possible and necessary. He knew that we do not always need to be prepared in order to do what is right. He showed that we are all capable of meeting a challenge.

Hans Dahlgren
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
I Introduction

This report describes the findings of the Swedish-Russian working group on Raoul Wallenberg, commissioned to inquire into his fate in September 1991. The findings are mainly but not exclusively based on what has emerged from Russian sources. Although aiming to reach full enlightenment on what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, it has unfortunately not been possible to achieve, despite the very extensive search of Russian records in particular. The case cannot therefore be finally closed, and this cannot be described as the final report.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to give an account of all that has been accomplished over a nine year period. The arguments put forward are based on discovered documents and recorded testimony, and are best described as more or less likely hypotheses over what happened to Raoul Wallenberg. These somewhat hypothetical arguments and the reality of present-day Russia mean that the character of this report differs unavoidably from that of the 1957 White Paper, which was based on legally tenable testimony. It is namely an absolute requirement that the evidence presented in a definite report on Raoul Wallenberg is beyond all reasonable doubt.

This is not a joint Swedish-Russian report. Each group has written its own account. This was deemed the most practicable in view of the lengthy discussions that have taken place. Nevertheless, Russian comment was sought and largely taken into account, as were Swedish views on the Russian text.

From the beginning, the working group decided on an open approach so that much of what follows is already known. For example, most of the Russian documents that were discovered have already been published. This was not without negative consequences, particularly as many of the people interviewed were unable to separate their own experiences from what they read in newspapers or publications. On the other hand, it would have been difficult to justify classifying the information as secret over a long period of time. Nor did the working group wish to create an impression of secrecy. Some documents,
however, are being made known for the first time, together with the results of a large number of interviews with former members of Soviet security organs.

A great deal has been written over the years about Raoul Wallenberg. His is the individual case that takes up the greatest amount of space in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archives. The Ministry issued White Papers in 1957 and 1965, and published about 90 per cent of the papers for the 1944-1969 period in the Wallenberg files between 1980-1982. In addition, a large number of documents were released in 1997, including all those covering the period up to 1970. The overwhelming number of papers for the period 1971-1991 have been made public in connection with the release of this report. A great many books have been published (vide the Bibliography).

A considerable number of official American documents about Raoul Wallenberg were released in 1994. This year, a great number of American papers with possible links to Raoul Wallenberg have also been released. Their examination has not yet been completed. As the papers are of interest in this context some have been included in this report. A brief recapitulation of Raoul Wallenberg’s efforts in Budapest was also deemed to warrant inclusion although most of the facts are already well known.

The working group wishes to extend their warm thanks to everyone who has helped in the acquisition of material about Raoul Wallenberg. The Swedish group direct their thanks primarily to the Russian members of the working group, as well as to the numerous officials working in Russian archives who have taken great pains with this inquiry. It should be stressed that searching records is a time-consuming process in itself. Moreover, these key people have had a very heavy workload in the past few years, particularly because the work was undertaken during a very intensive and revolutionary period of development in Russian politics. It had, in turn, created the requisite conditions that made this kind of work at all possible. Not surprisingly, therefore, many inquiries were taking place simultaneously, each with the aim of solving a historical enigma, and often with the same archive experts in the main roles. This is further explanation of the protracted nature of the work.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Raoul Wallenberg investigation was something of a pioneer effort in gaining admittance to Russian records. The
insights gained were unique and many of the Russian officials have felt it a point of honour to make a thorough contribution to the work. At a fairly early stage, a Russian head of archives stated that the Wallenberg case was greatly significant for developments in the field of archives. At the same time, it has been no easy matter to obtain sufficient documentation. The case was extremely complicated, a pure mystery and unique in many respects.

Our thanks should also go to all those people in different countries, officials, private individuals and journalists alike, who have contributed to the inquiry in various ways. The assistance given by members of the Memorial Group in Moscow, including Arseny Roginsky, Nikita Petrov and Gennady Kuzovkin, has all been invaluable. Sven G. Holtsmark, of the Norwegian Defence College Institute, has contributed valuable comment and additional references to Wallenberg documents in the records of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States has generously contributed to the financing of the research by the independent experts Marvin W. Makinen and Susan E. Mesinai. Translations into English of the Russian documents attached to the report have been sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the United States Holocaust Memorial Musem and will be published later.

We hope that the publication and dissemination of this report in Swedish, Russian and English may perhaps lead to further progress or the discovery of new information. Chapter XIV contains recommendations regarding follow-up.
II Planning and implementation

The joint Swedish-Russian working group started work in September 1991, about a month after the unsuccessful August coup in Moscow. The background is as follows. Ever since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared, the Swedish Government and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have devoted considerable resources to the investigation of his fate with a particular intensity in the 1950’s. In addition, his mother Maj von Dardel, his brother Guy von Dardel and his sister Nina Lagergren, together with many involved private persons, have made great efforts to shed light on the matter (App. 1). They were in touch with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and on many occasions made representations to the Russian and Swedish authorities. For many years, the Raoul Wallenberg Committee with Sonja Sonnenfeld channelled the unofficial efforts to gather information about Raoul Wallenberg.

By 1989, the advent of the perestroika and glasnost policy in the USSR resulted in more transparency in Russian mass media reporting concerning the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. His photograph appeared on Soviet television and resulted in a large number of witnesses coming forward from inside the Soviet Union. Many were former military personnel who came across Wallenberg in January 1945, at the time of the invasion of Budapest.

It was also becoming easier to discuss the case in an unbiased manner with official Soviet representatives, although many still upheld the 1957 version, i.e., that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in Lubianka Prison on 17 July 1947, as Smoltsoy, the prison doctor, reported to Abakumov, the Security Minister.

In October 1989, high-ranking officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the KGB invited representatives of the Wallenberg family and the Wallenberg Committee, to Moscow. Several items once belonging to Raoul Wallenberg were handed over, including his passport, diary (containing an interesting list of
addresses in Budapest) banknotes of various denominations and a prison registration card. According to the Soviet officials, they had recently been found during the refurbishment of a basement containing KGB records. The Swedish visitors were also shown the original Smoltsov report. While in Russia, Guy von Dardel and Sonja Sonnenfeld were given an opportunity to visit the Vladimir Prison.

Through the courtesy of Bakatin, Minister of the Interior, an interesting development took place in 1990 when an international commission under professor Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg’s stepbrother, was given the opportunity of examining the card filing system and the files of some foreign inmates at the Vladimir Prison. Cards of interest were video filmed and systemised. Although no card was found relating to Raoul Wallenberg, it was possible to confirm that the testimony of several witnesses, mainly from the 1950’s, had been largely correct with regard to details about their cells and dates of imprisonment.

Several contacts between Swedish and Soviet authorities occurred in 1990 and early 1991. Kryuchkov, then head of the KGB, received Örjan Berner, the Swedish Ambassador, and undertook to release all KGB employees with some knowledge of the matter from their pledge of secrecy. At a meeting with the Swedish Ambassador in the spring of 1991, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the KGB proposed to set up a joint working group comprising official representatives from both countries. The purpose would be to obtain more information about Raoul Wallenberg based on specific and carefully formulated questions.

Events moved rapidly after the coup of 19-21 August. The new head of the KGB, Bakatin, met Swedish officials a few days after his appointment. He was able to hand over new documents that had probably been found much earlier. He gave instructions to intensify the investigation and agreement was reached on the constitution of the joint working group. Work on the Russian side later received the support of a decree from the president of the Soviet Union and mandates from the executives of relevant authorities. The Russian president later reaffirmed these instructions. Several officials from the authorities concerned have confirmed that the instructions were definitely issued and contained orders to contribute towards complete enlightenment. An example of this was the order
from President Yeltsin’s administration to the Ministry of Security in 1993 to intensify the investigation. The working group also has evidence that President Yeltsin kept himself informed during the course of the investigation.

The Russian representatives of the working group consisted of officials from the Foreign Ministry, hereafter abbreviated to MID (from the Second European Desk and Records), the KGB and the organisations that succeeded it, MB and FSK/FSB, the Interior and Defence Ministries, Sergey Zhuravlyov, Vladimir Sokolov, Viktor Tatarintsev, Konstatin Kosachov and Vyacheslav Tuchnin (MID) (each chairman in turn), Vladimir Vinogradov, Andrey Ziborov and Alexander Kozlov (FSB), Valery Filippov (Defence Ministry) and Konstantin Nikishkin (Ministry of the Interior). Other officials also took part periodically, together with Nikolay Arzhannikov, an “independent” representative of the Russian Federal Assembly and the Memorial Group.

Close contact was also maintained with General Dmitry Volkogonov, President Yeltsin’s former colleague, (now deceased), Rudolf Pichoya, head of the Russian archives service, and Anatoly Prokopenko, former head of the special archives.

The Swedish group comprised officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Hans Magnusson (chairman), Martin Hallqvist, Jan Lundvik, Björn Lyrvall, Krister Wahlbäck and Lage Olson) and from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow; also professor Guy von Dardel and, as consultant, Carl Persson, former National Police Commissioner. In addition, Dr. Marvin W. Makinen, USA, has participated at most meetings as an expert. From the start, Sweden reserved the right to call in independent experts, and the contributions from Susan E. Mesinai of the ARK project, Susanne Berger and Ari Kaplan (computer expert) should receive special mention. On one occasion, history professor Kristian Gerner assisted by going through papers from the Russian Foreign Ministry. Daniel Larsson has assisted in the final editing of the report.

The idea was discussed on a number of occasions to allow the Soviet/Russian public prosecution authority to deal with the case. The first time this happened it was pointed out that the KGB possessed the appropriate investigative authority and that the offence in question was statute-barred. Later, other considerations were discussed, but it was decided that little or no advantage would be gained from a different mode of procedure. The Russian military prosecutor-general has
nevertheless initiated an inquiry into rehabilitation on the private initiative of Guy von Dardel. Furthermore, it was also discussed whether the inquiry should be wholly or partly taken over by one of the committees established after 1991 for the rehabilitation of victims of repression or human rights issues. This was also shelved for various reasons. Nevertheless, the working group received support in its first year from Sergey Kovalyov’s Committee for Human Rights and Alexander Yakovlev’s Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repression. The fate of Raoul Wallenberg was of course taken up with every high-level bilateral contact. The joint declaration signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Carl Bildt in February 1993 declared that they would work to reach full clarity in the case. Moreover, both President Clinton, USA, and Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany have shown their commitment, as has Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, and leading Israeli representatives.

Since its inception nine years ago, the working group has held a total of 15 formal meetings. A large number of informal meetings in small groups has also taken place.

From the start, the working group agreed to pursue three principal lines of inquiry. First, relevant Russian records were to be examined. Papers from Swedish records were also made available to the Russian side, and in due course access was given to other archives, including American records. Second, several former officials from the Soviet security services were to be found and interviewed. These interviews were conducted jointly in a small group. In addition, talks conducted mainly by the Swedish representatives were held with other key persons, such as former officials and politicians. The third line of inquiry consisted of reporting at the working group’s meetings on the results of interviews and record searches, analysing the various hypotheses and drawing up guidelines for future work. A large proportion of the work was undertaken on the basis of specific questions and witnesses’ testimony submitted from the Swedish side. Bearing in mind the allegations sometimes made in public debate, it should be emphasised that this work was pursued in a completely unbiased manner. No evidence, hypothesis or suggestion was discarded in advance. Some testimony was set aside only after thorough examination. In principle, the inquiry was based on testimony from witnesses and other information for the entire period from 1944 until about 1990. Because of Soviet claims that Raoul Wallenberg died in
1947, special care was taken in examining material relating to the 1945-1957 period, with particular attention paid to 1947. The years 1956 and 1957 were also closely examined as this was when the Soviet government took up a new position regarding the fate of the Swedish diplomat, at variance from their previous statement.

During the past three years, the work has partly taken a new direction. With the assistance of the above-mentioned independent experts, we have first and foremost investigated the hypothesis that Raoul Wallenberg was isolated under a number or another name after July 1947. This proved to be particularly complicated, and resulted in the review and computer analysis of a large number of registration cards from the Vladimir Prison, examining even more files and other more or less analogous cases.

The inquiry was not restricted to examining documents and other information about Raoul Wallenberg. We also endeavoured to obtain material about his driver, Vilmos Langfelder, and fellow inmates, chiefly Willy Roedel, who was his cellmate for the longest period of time, together with the people who testified in the late 1940s and early 1950s about Raoul Wallenberg's sojourn in Soviet prisons and camps. In addition, the case of the Swiss diplomats whom the Russians also arrested in Budapest in 1945 has proved to be an interesting analogy.

**Examining the records**

Records were examined during a period of dramatic change in the former Soviet archives system, both with regard to access and organisation. In some cases, names were changed and organisations altered more than once. The archives listed below were specially scrutinised, as a rule mainly by Russian archive officials. Access for members of the working group and experts has varied from archive to archive; at best it was possible to order files from archive registers, at worst, not even files known to exist were handed out (this happened relatively rarely). Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind when considering the working group's report. However, some archives allowed a reasonable amount of direct access. Furthermore, the head of the KGB/FSB archives between 1992-1995 assured us afterwards that there had been absolutely no restrictions on handing out material about Raoul Wallenberg. Clear instructions had been issued to search
for and make documents available. Upon request (occasionally refused), the Swedish investigators were able to study original files from FSB records as well. They were also in touch with independent Russian archive experts who, at least in the early stages, had access to the more restricted records. In the case of records held outside Moscow, both the KGB/FSB and the MVD wrote repeatedly to all local authorities, prisons and camps requesting that they make a thorough search of their records. In the cases of Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder, researchers were charged with looking both for their correctly spelled names and for similar and possibly wrongly-spelled names.

The following is a list of the relevant archives, with their present designations.

1. The Federal Archival Service of Russia (Federalnaya arkhivnaya sluzhba Rossiyskoy Federatsii). The authority responsible for several state archives.

2. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenny arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoy istorii Rossi). Formerly the Central Committee archives, it contains material from the Communist Party Secretariat and departments of the Central Committee for the post-1953 period. Some older material is also held there.

3. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenny arkhiv novoyshoy istorii). Previously the Central Party records, with archival groups from the Communist Party Central Committee - secretariat, departments, personal material from prominent communists, the international communist movement, State Defence Committee etc., for the period from the Russian revolution until 1953.

4. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, formerly known as the Kremlin Archives (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii). The most important material from the two archives mentioned above has been transferred here. It also contains top secret material in sealed envelopes which the Russian side examined (D. Volkogonov) at the request of the Swedish group. Apart from being told that these envelopes did not contain anything about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish group has not been informed about their contents. More recently, archival groups from the President archives are being transferred mainly to the State Archive of the Russian Federation.
5. **State Archive of the Russian Federation (Государственный архив Российской Федерации)**. Contains material from the Council of the Peoples’ Commissars, Council of Ministers, social organisations, central ministries including the NKVD, NKGB etc., but only such material that these organisations considered suitable to hand over.

6. **Russian State Military Records (Российский государственный военный архив)**. Contains prize material from Germany, including German confiscations from France, Austria, Holland and other countries during the Second World War. It also contains records from the Prisoner of War Board (ГУПВО), about repatriation cases and convoy troops’ records. Above all, it contains material from the operative committee collection no. 451 at the NKVD / MVD Executive Committee of matters concerning war prisoners and internees (see report in App. 2).

7. **Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Архив Внешней Политики РФ МИД России)**, i.e. records and material from the Foreign Ministry for the post 1937 period. The Swedish group has to a great extent been given direct access to this archive.

8. **Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence (Центральный архив Министерства обороны)**. Special files for the second and third Ukrainian Fronts, the political committees of the relevant units, cipher communications and material from the military commander in Budapest have been examined.

9. **Main Information Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Головной информационный центр МВД России)**. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) centre for the rehabilitation of victims of political terror and archive information. Also holds the ministry’s central records, including those of the NKVD and MVD with subordinate departments. The ministry was also responsible for operative card index registers containing details of every person subjected to criminal investigation in the Soviet Union, all regional MVD records and the card index registers for individual camps and prisons.
10. Federal Security Service (FSB) central records (Tsentralny arkhiv FSB Rossi), i.e. the records of the former KGB and subsidiary records. These are located in several parts of Russia.

11. Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) i.e., formerly part of the KGB records.

The Swedish group also inquired about the indictments against L. Beria, the former NKVD chief, and V.S. Abakumov, minister of state security, at the time of their arrest and later execution. According to the GRU military intelligence records, no information about Raoul Wallenberg or his case was found among these papers.

In the collection of papers to be made available to interested persons following the publication of this report, archive material was divided into five sections for the sake of simplicity. This corresponds more closely to their source at the time the documents were acquired (mainly in 1991 or 1992):

A. Former KGB records  
B. Former Central Committee records  
C. Defence Ministry central records  
D. Foreign Ministry records  
E. Records of the President  
F. Others

Appendices 3 and 4 contains lists of documents examined from the former KGB records and the Foreign Ministry. The most important have been reproduced in this report. In all, some 200 documents were obtained from Russian archives (apart from the thousands studied on the spot). American archives have also handed over a considerable number of documents (see Chapter VI). Hungarian, British, Swiss, Finnish and Israeli archives have also been investigated, the former through the kind assistance of Peter Bajtay. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry contained little of interest and the Hungarian security services’ records appeared to have been largely destroyed or were difficult to access. Some material was however obtained through unofficial channels. The remaining material has been transferred to a newly established historical authority - Történeti Hivatal - for thorough examination. Some papers concerning Raoul Wallenberg have already been found, and further discoveries may come to light in due course. Material
found in British records bears witness to considerable British interest in Raoul Wallenberg and his activities in Budapest. Following an application to Finnish National Records, a search was made in Helsinki regarding the degree to which Raoul Wallenberg was mentioned in the interrogation reports of war prisoners returning from the Soviet Union. A Finnish group examined the records of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the Finnish Police Investigation Department and State Police.

The Wallenberg files at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs were of course a constant source of reference. The records of the Swedish Security Service were also examined. It mainly contained papers (inquiries, hearing of testimony), which are also to be found in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Wartime records, the National Archives, Swedish military intelligence records and the archives of the National Defence Radio Centre were also examined on behalf of the working group, as were those of the Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise (the Wallenberg Archives).

It is possible that some foreign archives may still contain unreleased documents which would bring more light to bear on Raoul Wallenberg’s deeds and fate. With regard to the Russian archives, it should also be pointed out that a number of papers and files known to have existed have not been found. They include some KGB documents which should have been drawn up in the post-1945 years and in the 1950's. With few exceptions, the files contained no note to the effect that material had been destroyed which was normal procedure. There were however several indications that this had taken place.

A personal or prison file (the same thing) was created for each prisoner following his/ her arrest and imprisonment. A so-called investigation or inquiry file was first opened with the issue of a ruling to arrest a person or when a sentence was passed. Investigations could take an appreciable time before such rulings were issued. As some prisoners were never sentenced (alleged to be the case with Raoul Wallenberg), no investigation file exists for them. Many of the most important war prisoners were first sentenced in 1950-1951, usually to 25 years. Not only was Raoul Wallenberg’s personal file missing but those of most of his fellow prisoners as well. It is known that personal files for these prisoners once existed.
Operative files (written during the course of an investigation or preliminary inquiry) which once existed, or perhaps still exist, would undoubtedly have made very interesting reading. This category includes the “liternye dela” (roughly, on-going cases) which, according to the Federal Security Service representatives, were examined insofar as they had been preserved. It should also be remembered that certain cases were dealt with orally, particularly at the highest political level.

The best preserved records appear to be those of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. They were also examined by the Swedish group, with the exception of the separately held coded telegrams for which permission to examine them was not given. They comprise some dozen files belonging to the then Fifth European Department (Scandinavia), the Third European Department (consular matters), the Foreign Secretary’s office and relevant Deputy Foreign Ministers and relate to Raoul Wallenberg. According to a written assurance from the Russians, the coded telegrams between the Foreign Ministry and the embassy in Stockholm for the period under investigation contained nothing about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate that was not already known to the working group. The Russian side has also studied the Foreign Ministry collection of records relating to Hungary, Rumania and the work of the Allied Control Commission.

At the same time, some documents were preserved which should have been destroyed according to archive regulations. Some were found in unexpected places, sometimes accidentally. Although not perfect, the archive records were on the whole in good order.

References to Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder had been blotted out with black ink on some KGB documents - exclusively entries in some kind of registration ledger. This unique procedure was found to exist in only two other cases. Modern techniques have made the text legible again except where some form of mechanical erasure also occurred.

The Swedish group requested that independent experts assist in the search of the relevant central archives, to compare copies that had been obtained with their originals in the context of the archives. This request was complied with only insofar that individual original papers could be examined in cooperation with the Memorial organisation (App. 5). On the other hand, a large number of personal and investigation files relating to Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners were made
available from former KGB records, together with all the relevant original files in the MID records.

Further comments on issues concerning records are given in Chapter X, which deals with the way in which the Soviet authorities handled matters.

**Interviews**

Although the greatest importance must be attached to documentary evidence in an investigation of this kind, the working group made considerable efforts to seek out people who formerly served in the Soviet security organisations or the Soviet Foreign Ministry. As a result, probably almost everyone has been identified who was in direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg. Some 40 former MGB/ KGB officials were interviewed in all, and talks were also held with a number of former diplomats, politicians and key members of the Central Committee.

Nearly everyone in the first category was interviewed by a joint so called interview group, with representatives of the former KGB, the Swedish Embassy in Moscow and, sometimes, even a member of the Russian Parliament participating. A dozen key persons of interest were identified already at the first meeting of the working group. However, during the course of the work, several other former security officers were identified through discovered documents or through information from somebody being interviewed. By the time the inquiry began, the high ranking security officials directly responsible for Raoul Wallenberg’s case and the responsible politicians were already dead. Several others of interest also died during the course of the inquiry before they could be heard. It should also be mentioned that a number of former KGB chiefs or their deputies refused to meet representatives of the working group on the pretext that they had no new information to offer.

Those who gave evidence included officers who took part in the conquest of Budapest, officers and other investigators at Smersh and the MGB between 1945-46 and 1946-50, prison staff at the Lefortovo, Lubianka, Butyrka and Vladimir prisons, former officials of the Scandinavian and archive departments of the KGB up to the 1960's, some of the former most senior chiefs of the KGB and the international section of the Central Committee and even some former KGB
officers no longer living in Russia. Talks were also held with former Foreign Ministry officials, particularly those who had served in Molotov’s secretariat.

Renewed talks took place with a couple of the surviving German fellow prisoners of Raoul Wallenberg. In addition, a number of people from various parts of the former Soviet Union have testified about Raoul Wallenberg.

Most of the interviews were taped and then transcribed as part of the minutes of the interview. They will not be made public. Nor, with few exceptions, will the names of the interviewed former security officials be revealed; most agreed to talk on the express condition that they would remain anonymous. On the other hand, this report will of course contain details of all items of interest that emerged during the talks.

As will be seen later, the interviews produced a number of varied and somewhat conflicting versions, making them difficult to evaluate, and they must therefore be treated with caution.

In several subsequent chapters, a more or less logical classification of information has been made based on whether it originated from archive documents or a oral source. The report may be difficult to read or grasp here and there as a result. However, it was deemed that the weight carried by the two types of sources varied and that they should therefore be treated separately.
III Political background  
- The USSR 1944–1957

As a contribution to a better understanding of the line of reasoning used later in the report with regard to Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest and the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with it, the following brief outline traces the development of political constellations among Soviet leaders - particularly those in the security organisations - mainly from the end of World War II until 1957, when the so-called Gromyko memorandum was handed to the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow.

The most significant political body during the war years was not the Politbureau, which met relatively seldom, but the State Defence Committee, led by Stalin. This committee took all the crucial decisions about the conduct of the war. From its inception, members included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Bulganin and Abakumov were later additions. Next to Stalin, Molotov held the strongest position, which he retained for some of the post-war years. In a recently published book, Alexander Yakovlev, a former member of the Politbureau, stated that Molotov was able to order arrests and executions during the war and subsequent years. Documents have also confirmed this. He sanctioned the arrest of many Soviet and foreign citizens as late as in 1949.

The powerful security organisation under Beria was split in three in April 1943; the NKVD (still with Beria as its chief), the NKGB (headed by Merkulov) and the counter espionage organisation later known as Smersh which was placed under the army general staff. As head of Smersh, Abakumov was no longer subordinate to Beria or Merkulov, thus reducing Beria’s formal power as head of the NKVD. Nevertheless, he continued to exercise considerable influence through Merkulov and his first deputy, Bogdan Kobulov, one of Beria’s henchmen. Another of Beria’s men, Dekanozov, became Deputy Foreign Minister in 1944. Moreover, Beria had considerable power from having been a
member of the State Defence Committee from the outset and its vice chairman from 1944.

Beria handed over as head of the NKVD to his deputy, Kruglov, in January 1945. A year later, the NKVD and NKGB were renamed MVD and MGB respectively, as part of the transition from a system of commissariats to ministries. During that year and for some years to come, Beria was also chiefly responsible for the project to produce the first Soviet atomic bomb. However, as vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, he still supervised the police and intelligence establishments. Beria and Malenkov also became full members of the Politbureau in March 1945, making Beria the third most powerful person in the country.

Abakumov succeeded Merkulov as Minister of Security, i.e., head of the MGB, in the summer of 1946. Some months earlier, Smersh had been dissolved and integrated into the MGB. This decision could be seen at least in part as the effect of Stalin’s efforts to curb Beria’s influence over the intelligence service. We know that Abakumov later had an almost permanent assignment to collect incriminating information about Beria. Beria’s and Abakumov’s relationship was not entirely clearcut but mainly perceived as being filled with conflict and competitiveness. However, as Khrushchov pointed out, Abakumov hardly ever undertook anything important without first ensuring Beria’s support, although this could not have been the case throughout the entire period between 1945-1951.

As an effective counterfoil to the recently established CIA, Stalin decided to merge MGB and GRU military intelligence in the autumn of 1947 to form the Information Committee (KI), under which even the foreign ministry came to be partly incorporated. Molotov was its first head, followed by Vyshinsky, with Fedotov as deputy head. However, all GRU personnel were withdrawn from the KI the following year and Abakumov launched an unsuccessful campaign to obtain control over the rest of the organisation. KI was dissolved some years later.

Molotov’s position was undermined from 1948 when Stalin ordered the arrest of his Jewish wife. Officially, he remained second in the hierarchy even in 1949, but was forced to resign as Foreign Minister and was replaced by Vyshinsky, one of his deputies.
Beria still retained some supervision over the security services in the early 1950s but Abakumov often reported directly to Stalin, by-passing Beria. However, Abakumov’s turn came in June 1951. He was arrested, accused of having known about but kept secret a Jewish bourgeois plot linked to the CIA. The exact reason for Abakumov’s arrest was of course known only to Stalin. In any case, this was the prelude to the great rigged trials in Eastern Europe and the so-called Jewish doctor’s plot in the winter of 1952-53. The trials contained strongly anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic elements.

Beria ignored Abakumov’s plea for help from prison but he himself suffered a setback when Stalin appointed Ignatyev to succeed Abakumov. By 1952, the increasingly paranoid Stalin began to suspect everyone, including Beria. Khrushchov encouraged him in his intrigues against Beria, and also started placing his protégés in the security services, including Ignatyev, the new head of the MGB.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the MVD and MGB merged under Beria’s leadership and Ignatyev was dismissed. Kruglov, Serov and Kobulov became the first Deputy Ministers for Security. The following year, after Khrushchov had had Beria arrested and executed (summer 1953), Kruglov became head of the new MVD but was soon replaced by Serov, one of Khrushchov’s men, when the KGB was established. From then on, the security services came under more rigorous party control than hitherto. Abakumov was executed in December the same year, following a trial at which the chief accusation against him was that he had fabricated the Leningrad affair (at which Zhdanov and his faction were eliminated). This accusation was really aimed at Malenkov, whom Khrushchov was trying to outmanoeuvre with the aid of Bulganin and the KGB under Serov.

The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 meant that Khrushchov made his general attack against Stalinist repression as well as the anti-party group, i.e., Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov, who opposed a far-reaching revision of Stalin’s policies. Molotov once again become Foreign Minister in 1953, continuing there until June 1956. This meant that he and KGB chief Serov were in control during the first phase of drafting the new Soviet position on the Wallenberg case. This took place after the visit of Erlander and Hedlund at the end of March-April when they handed over some very convincing testimony
from German and other former war prisoners. Molotov remained a member of
the Presidium (i.e. Politbureau) and Deputy Prime Minister even after Shepilov
had succeeded him as Foreign Minister. However, Khrushchov’s decisive success
came in June 1957. He exploited the fact that although Molotov and his group
were in the majority in the Presidium, they had no support in the Central
Committee. With the help of the army and KGB, he quickly summoned a
meeting of the Central Committee which resulted in the Molotov group being
forced to stand down.
The military counter intelligence agency Smersh ("Smert' spionam" - death to spies) played a key role in the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg and the first phase of his imprisonment in Moscow. Smersh was set up mainly to collect information about morale in the army and war industry and the situation in occupied territories. A Smersh unit accompanied all advancing Soviet troops and combed occupied areas for war criminals, spies, or simply for anyone thought to possess interesting information. In Hungary alone, at least 100,000 people certainly passed through the Smersh machinery.

Colonel Kartashov was head of the Second Department \( \Pi \) of the Smersh Third Main Directorate, and responsible for the Raoul Wallenberg case. He was probably the security officer under the head of Smersh Abakumov who knew most about Raoul Wallenberg. He was in any case chiefly responsible for him.

Kartashov died in 1991. One of his deputies was alive at the start of the inquiry and was interviewed in 1991. Abakumov and several of his closest colleagues were executed in 1954 but his chief bodyguard is still alive, and has provided some interesting information.

Kartashov had several heads of section under him, together with authorised operatives (low-ranking security officials) who took care of the routine interrogation of war prisoners. At the same time, a number of operatives also acted as interpreters. Their task was to ask certain questions and they also dealt with individual cases. However, higher ranking officers were responsible for the investigations, or the department investigating particularly important cases was

\[ ^1 \] The Third Main Directorate was responsible for counter espionage, the First for foreign intelligence, the Second for general counter espionage and the Fourth for searching for collaborators etc.
responsible. This department otherwise had special responsibility for Abwehr and Gestapo prisoners and for preparing the Soviet participation in the Nuremberg process. A summons to interrogation was recorded in a special ledger, giving the name of the chief interrogator and containing a receipt signed by the prisoner. It appears, however, that the most senior chiefs sometimes wrote the name of a subordinate or interpreter in the ledger. This seems to have been the case particularly when the Minister of Security himself led an interrogation. Minutes were normally taken, although not infrequently the order was given to leave them incomplete.

The working group managed to interview several rank and file members of Kartashov’s department. They included the two best interpreters into German who were usually assigned to sensitive cases, such as interpreting for Security Minister Abakumov when he was leading an interrogation. Some details connected to Raoul Wallenberg emerged but nothing decisive enough to solve the mystery. The interpreter/authorised operative who, according to the ledger, twice interrogated Raoul Wallenberg, claimed not to remember any such interrogation. Several of those whom the working group interviewed clearly remembered a great many circumstances, although their recollections became vaguer the closer we approached the essential issue. However, the group interviewed one interpreter called in from another department who claimed to have participated in an interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg in the spring of 1947.

The rigid working discipline that prevailed appears to be one of the main reasons why researchers have been unable to obtain more substance from these interviews; everyone had been kept strictly to their own work assignments and discouraged from interesting themselves in the work of their colleagues. Traces of this spirit from Stalinist times and their strict loyalty to the security service can still be discerned today.

With the disbanding of Smersh in 1946, Kartashov’s department transferred to the MGB, still under Abakumov, and became Department 4 of the Third Main Directorate. The following year, cases involving important foreign war prisoners were transferred to the investigation department of the MGB / KGB Second Main Directorate (counter espionage), and there they remained. The working group talked to some of the officials employed there in the 1950’s, who had been in contact with the Raoul Wallenberg case. None was fully conversant with his fate,
however, which would have been known only to the very top ranking chiefs, although even at this level the knowledge may gradually have been lost.

Smersh/ MGB also maintained rigorous secrecy towards outsiders and the Foreign Ministry in particular. Not until the end of 1946 did the latter receive private confirmation that Raoul Wallenberg was detained in prison (although Molotov himself may have known about him from the start). According to available information, the intelligence service dealing with foreign affairs (First Main Directorate - PGU) does not appear to have been involved in the Swedish diplomat’s arrest. Nevertheless, it is strongly suspected that it probably supplied information which contributed to the decision to arrest him, mainly from the residenatura in Stockholm and possibly from agents in Budapest as well. Written applications to the foreign intelligence service (SVR) resulted in the reply that no such material existed in their archives. There are also those who maintain that the PGU made efforts to persuade Smersh/ MGB (Abakumov) to hand over Raoul Wallenberg in order to recruit him in some way.

Abakumov had four deputy ministers, one of whom was interviewed in 1991 when he was over 90 years old. Unfortunately, his responsibility had been military counter espionage (i.e., surveillance of the armed forces) so there was little he could contribute to the Raoul Wallenberg case. He also stressed that Kartashov’s department reported direct to Abakumov and not through intermediaries.

Then as later, important war prisoners went through a phase of being investigated, mainly at the Lubianka, Lefortovo (a notorious interrogation prison) and Butyrka prisons in Moscow. Prisoners ended up in the Vladimir prison outside Moscow only after they had been sentenced, except for some prisoners known only by a number. They were sent to Vladimir before sentencing. Most of the more important war prisoners were first sentenced in 1950-1951 when it was decided that no war prisoner would be held unless sentenced. Some prison guards and medical staff from the above-mentioned prisons were interviewed, although unfortunately none of higher rank. Only one remembered Raoul Wallenberg with any certainty. Security was also rigorous in the prisons and each employee had carefully restricted tasks, making it impossible for him to acquire a full picture of a prisoner, his identity or his situation. The system was not perfect, however, and the human factor sometimes allowed staff to acquire more knowledge about an important prisoner than was intended. Lubianka was the
most important prison while having the mildest regime. Prison director Mironov was under the direct and personal command of Abakumov, reporting only to him on everything concerning Lubianka Prison.

Conditions in Lefortovo Prison were distinctly worse and even foreign prisoners appear to have been subject to at least some mental torture, including noise (voices in loudspeakers), lights and possibly the use of drugs on some prisoners. Individual cases of physical torture cannot be eliminated (it was common practice on Russian prisoners) but was not the rule. The system of having spies and microphones in the cells appears to have been common everywhere.

It should be noted that the system of designating the most important prisoners by a number only was primarily designed to shield their identity from prison staff. Stalin’s son, Vasily, was one such prisoner, and the regulations were exceptionally harsh for them. Guards were strictly forbidden to talk to them. However, Raoul Wallenberg was imprisoned in his own name between 1945-1947 although otherwise surrounded by a high degree of secrecy.
V Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest

It was not the foremost task of the Russian-Swedish working group to examine Raoul Wallenberg’s achievements in Budapest in detail, except where they had significance for his fate later on. Very little has emerged that was not previously known. This is not to say that a future search in some archive may throw further light on the events in Budapest. Nevertheless, it is important to the report as a whole that it includes a brief recapitulation of the course of events in Budapest and the background to Wallenberg’s assignment.

Background to the assignment

President Roosevelt decided to set up the War Refugee Board (WRB) in January 1944. It came to be part of the presidential Executive Office, run by ministers of the Treasury Department, War Office and Foreign Affairs. John Pehle was its first executive director and its aim was to combat Nazi attempts to exterminate ethnic groups on the grounds of race, religion or political conviction. In other words, to try to save as many threatened people as possible, especially Jews, in the occupied territories in Europe. The Americans contacted several governments and organisations, including the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, requesting help in obtaining more information about the refugee situation and in organising rescue procedures. The project of saving Jews in Hungary was one of half a dozen similar operations although it became one of the most spectacular. The World Jewish Congress (WJC) was also involved and proposed that the Chief Rabbi in Stockholm, Dr. Marcus Ehrenpreis, look for a suitable person to lead the campaign to rescue Hungarian Jews. However, the man who suggested Raoul Wallenberg was Kálmán Lauer, a Hungarian Jewish director of the Central European Trading Company Inc., where Raoul Wallenberg was employed as the company’s foreign trade representative and later as a partner. He had already visited Hungary and other countries once or twice in this capacity between 1941-
1943 (using a so-called cabinet passport issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This was a normal practice during the war for Swedes travelling abroad on public business who were not ministry employees). Although sceptical at first, Ehrenpreis later became convinced of his suitability.

Herschel V. Johnson, the Minister at the American Legation in Stockholm and Iver Olsen, special representative of the War Refugee Board at the same legation, the US Treasury Department and the Office of Strategic Services (precursor to the CIA), assured themselves of Raoul Wallenberg’s suitability and then gained the acceptance of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the arrangements for his work in Budapest. These included providing Wallenberg with a diplomatic passport and rank of Legation Secretary at the Swedish Legation in Budapest, and the assignment of saving Hungarian Jews. However, Wallenberg would not receive specific instructions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; these would come from the World Refugee Board. The WRB and JOINT (Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) would provide him with the necessary financial resources via an account with Stockholm Enskilda Bank. In practice, not all the money reached Budapest and in the early days Wallenberg complained about insufficient resources.

The WRB gave Raoul Wallenberg general guidelines rather than detailed instructions. They included an account of the financial arrangements, a description of various escape routes from Hungary and a list of contacts in the Budapest area. Raoul Wallenberg was not to act openly in the name of the WRB but, if necessary, could state that he was in direct communication with Stockholm where a WRB representative was stationed.

The Hungarian social democratic politician, Vilmos Böhm, later the first Hungarian envoy to Sweden after the war, met Raoul Wallenberg in Stockholm before his departure, and gave him details about reliable collaborators in the Hungarian capital.

Wallenberg wrote a letter on 19 June to Erik Boheman, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stating that he had received the approval of the board of the Central European Trading Company Inc., the Pacific Trading Company (a Wallenberg family-owned company) and Jacob Wallenberg, to place himself at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The latter information
implies that Raoul Wallenberg had some direct or indirect assignment for the Wallenberg group of companies at the time, although it has not been possible to ascertain its nature or duration. Be that as it may, Raoul Wallenberg indicated in the letter that he would not be able to take on any business assignment while serving in Budapest. On 21 June and 6 July, the Ministry informed the legation in Budapest that Wallenberg was to be attached to it in order to ‘follow developments in the Jewish question and report to Stockholm’. He was to propose suitable and realistic humanitarian initiatives as well as requisite measures for post-war assistance and was to ‘report in the usual manner as a Secretary at the mission’. It was also emphasised that while there, Wallenberg would ‘work under the head of mission’. Raoul Wallenberg left Stockholm on 6 July 1944 and arrived in Budapest on 9 July.

It should be noted that no documents have been found in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archives referring to the earlier history about Raoul Wallenberg’s appointment.

**Operations begin**

When Wallenberg arrived at the Swedish Legation in Budapest it was already issuing provisional passports and certificates to Jews with links to Sweden. The workload was heavy and the request of the Minister, Ivan Danielsson, for reinforcements coincided with negotiations between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the War Refugee Board and the WJC. In early July, the deportation of Jews from the countryside had already been completed while the majority of Jews in Budapest had not yet been affected.

The newly appointed Swedish Red Cross delegate to Hungary, Valdemar Langlet, had also been trying to help the Jews for some time, inter alia, by issuing letters of protection.

Other attempts were also made to save Hungarian Jews. Probably the most spectacular was the negotiations in the spring of 1944 between the WAAD representative, Joel Brand, and Adolf Eichmann whereby a million East

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2 The Zionist Relief and Rescue Committee in Budapest
European Jews would be spared in exchange for 10,000 trucks. The affair was thwarted by the British and Russians and nothing came of it. In point of fact, the Americans and British would have agreed to delaying tactics to forestall deportations to Auschwitz, but Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky told the Allies in June 1944 that in the view of the Soviet Government, it was undesirable to undertake any negotiations at all with the Germans regarding the Jewish question. This remained their attitude throughout the war and they applied it to various proposals for a separate peace.

Wealthy Jews, such as the Weiss family, succeeded in buying a free passage by negotiating direct with Himmler’s SS. Kurt Becher was an SS officer who organised the German takeover of the Manfred Weiss concern. In due course he met Raoul Wallenberg, who later employed many former employees of the concern in his rescue organisation.

Shortly after his arrival, Raoul Wallenberg quickly organised his relief work under the leadership of the head of the legation and financed by the WRB (in reality JOINT), funds raised in Hungary and a one-off contribution from President Roosevelt’s secret funds. The work was done by a special department at the legation under Raoul Wallenberg with mainly Jewish volunteers, who numbered over 300 in the last months of the operation. From the start, Raoul Wallenberg had the idea of using ‘protective’ passports to complement the earlier provisional passports, visa certificates and Swedish Red Cross letters of protection. The circle of Jews furnished with ‘protective’ passports was constantly widening, far beyond the relatively limited group with some link to Sweden. The total number of Jews in houses under the protection of the Swedish Legation gradually rose to between 15-20,000 persons. In all, foreign missions and the International Red Cross rescued at least 50,000 Hungarian Jews, with Raoul Wallenberg saving at least half of them. It is possible that they rescued as many as 100,000, if those in the ghetto are included; some 50,000 Jews were still living there when the Soviet troops marched in.

It is well known that with the situation worsening Raoul Wallenberg was forced to negotiate direct with Eichmann and the worst of the Hungarian fascists. It was therefore unavoidable that he made use of bribes on a number of occasions.
Together with several other co-workers at the legation, Raoul Wallenberg was in touch with sections of the Hungarian resistance movement, which was very natural under the circumstances. The historian József Antall states that the Swedish and other neutral countries’ missions were extremely willing to make arrangements with the Polish refugees who fled to Hungary in 1939 or later, particularly with regard to taking diplomatic material out of the country to the Polish government in exile in London.

Raoul Wallenberg wrote ten reports, or memoranda, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the Hungarian Jews’ situation, the last dated 12 December. They were sent by diplomatic bag to the Ministry in Stockholm which forwarded them to Iver Olsen at the American Legation. British records have indicated that the United Kingdom was also well informed about Wallenberg’s actions and they received copies of his reports. Wallenberg had of course a large number of documents in Budapest dealing with the rescue operations which probably fell into Russian hands if they were not destroyed. Raoul Wallenberg’s correspondence with Stockholm was carefully detailed in the dispatch lists that have been saved, and totalled 13 in the second half of 1944. The last diplomatic bag was sent to Stockholm on 9 December. His final report must therefore have been carried by someone travelling to Stockholm. The legation was also able to communicate with the Ministry by telegram (coded and plain text).

Wallenberg also corresponded with Kálmán Lauer, mainly about financial transactions that were relevant to the Budapest operations (partly in code), and these letters were of course also forwarded to Iver Olsen.

Despite his inhuman workload during the late autumn, Raoul Wallenberg began discussing with his close staff already in November the establishment of a network to help rehabilitate Jews who survived at the end of the war. As mentioned earlier, this rescue plan originated at least to some extent from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. It developed even further in December, with the idea of launching a major international action along the lines of the Nansen Plan. Raoul Wallenberg had even drawn up an organisation plan which would help deportees with the work of reconstruction and find them employment under the supervision of the Hungarian government. Raoul Wallenberg had a copy of this plan with him when he left for the Soviet military headquarters in Debrecen. Some of the legation’s documents had been deposited
in the vaults of the Hungarian Central Bank together with valuables from protected Jews.

Raoul Wallenberg informed Ivan Danielsson early in January 1945 that he intended going over to the Russian lines. Danielsson replied that if Wallenberg felt that his position was untenable, he should do so.

**Protective power assignment**

The fact that the Swedish Legation in Budapest had undertaken to protect Soviet interests was another factor relevant to relations with the Soviet Union and Raoul Wallenberg’s capture. On 20 June 1941, Vilhelm Assarsson, the Swedish minister in Moscow, was summoned to meet Lozovsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister who requested Sweden to safeguard Soviet interests in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia. He wanted an immediate reply which he assumed would be positive. The next day the Swedish Government decided to agree to the request and informed Moscow straight away. On 15 July, the Soviet Foreign Ministry asked the Swedish Legation in Budapest to take over ‘for safekeeping’ all property belonging to Soviet diplomatic, consular and trade representatives.

The Swedish Legation was also looking after the interests of two other countries as well, this being the responsibility of B Section. The head of mission had ultimate responsibility but Lars Berg was head of B section. Following the employment of a Russian-speaker known as Thomsen (or Grossheim-Krisko), the Russian unit appears to have begun work in earnest on 18 October 1944 with some other staff of Russian origin assisting. Although allegedly Norwegian by birth, Thomsen was in fact born in Rostov in Russia, although this did not come to light until after he had spent six years in Soviet prison camps. Apart from Raoul Wallenberg, he was the only employee of the Swedish Legation who was arrested and taken to Moscow.

The main tasks of the Russian unit were to issue letters of protection and certificates in Russian and to translate signboards into Russian. The latter were useful when the Soviet Army advanced into Budapest. Between 18 October and 1 December 1944 some 14 protective letters were issued to Soviet citizens. Many applicants were refused, however, usually because they were Russian emigrants. B
Section also ran a prisoner-of-war hospital for wounded Soviet soldiers. The person directly responsible was Michail Tolstoy-Kutuzov, a resident of Budapest. The fully operative hospital was handed over to the Russians in January 1945. Work at B Section ground almost to a halt after being plundered by Arrow Cross followers on Christmas Eve 1944.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Sweden assisted in the evacuation of Soviet personnel from Hungary after the Hungarian declaration of war in June 1941. However, Sweden did not pass on any information from Hungary after September 1941.

Did Raoul Wallenberg visit Stockholm in late autumn 1944?

The alleged visit of Raoul Wallenberg to Stockholm in the autumn of 1944 is shrouded in mystery. While giving a talk at a Wallenberg hearing in Stockholm in 1981, Marcus Wallenberg asserted that the last time he saw Raoul Wallenberg was at a lunch in his (Marcus') home while on a visit from the diplomatic mission in Budapest. Not everyone present realised how sensational this was. Baroness Kemeny-Fuchs is another source. The wife of the last Hungarian foreign minister before Budapest fell into Russian hands, she has said that Raoul Wallenberg assured her of having spoken to Mme Kollontay, then Soviet Minister to Stockholm, about “you and the child”. The Baroness had helped Raoul Wallenberg in his work of rescuing Jews and he may therefore have wished to let the Russians know so that they would treat her well. This information presupposes that Raoul Wallenberg visited Stockholm in 1944, or at least talked on the telephone to Mme Kollontay. Finally, shortly before his death in 1995, SS officer Kurt Becher stated in a telephone conversation with Susanne Berger that he had heard that Raoul Wallenberg tried to arrange a flight to Sweden in a German plane in the late autumn of 1944 but that he tried to dissuade him from doing so. Becher died before he could be asked whether the journey really took place. A German visa, dated 13 October 1944, and valid for a return journey until 29 October is stamped in Raoul Wallenberg’s passport. Finally, a British document mentions that the Swedish diplomat was in any case expected to visit Stockholm at the end of September 1944.
No trace has been found of Raoul Wallenberg having visited Stockholm. It seems most unlikely that he would not get in touch with his mother, brother and sister if he were there. Nor is there any record of his having contacted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His colleagues in Budapest have never mentioned any such journey. Searches made in archives for details of landing permits etc., have been without result. Marcus Wallenberg may also have expressed himself somewhat imprecisely and perhaps referred to a lunch with Raoul Wallenberg during a previous trip from Hungary. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely ruled out that the journey may have taken place, and the brevity of the visit explained by the use of a regular German courier plane. But for what purpose, and why was it kept secret? If it did take place, the most likely time for such a visit would be the week between 17-23 October where there is in fact a blank space in Raoul Wallenberg’s diary.
VI American papers on Raoul Wallenberg – was he an undercover agent for OSS?

A large number of American documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg were released in 1994 and handed to the Swedish group. They came mainly from the State Department (i.e., the American Foreign Ministry), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and CIA. Most of the OSS and CIA papers came from the National Archives and the Roosevelt Library. The State Department papers dealt mainly with the American follow-up of the testimony of various witnesses and related newspaper articles. In the past five years and this year in particular, further American papers have been made accessible.

Most press coverage has been given to the question of whether Raoul Wallenberg undertook some form of intelligence work for the OSS.

The fact that Iver Olsen represented the WRB and US Treasury Department as well as the OSS has aroused considerable interest. As OSS representative in Stockholm, his three assignments were: financial responsibility for OSS missions in Sweden, to interview refugees arriving in Sweden and to obtain intelligence reports from and send agents to Norway, the Baltic states and the Balkans. An internal CIA document from 1955 indicates that when asked whether he had ever had operational contact with Raoul Wallenberg or used him operationally, Olsen repeatedly and categorically denied having done so. His contacts with Raoul Wallenberg had been only in his capacity as WRB representative. ‘Olsen was extremely emphatic on this point’.

At the same time, it is a fact that the WRB and OSS worked together closely. Experience gained from the latter was employed when the WRB was launched. WRB reports were regularly passed to the OSS. WRB communications were classified as secret. However, none of the WRB dealings with Raoul Wallenberg reveals any direct links to intelligence work.
The conclusions in another CIA memorandum from December 1955 are equally definite. ‘A thorough search of our files and contacts with former OSS employees show that Raoul Wallenberg was never employed in any capacity by the American intelligence service’.

Nevertheless, other documents raise minor doubts over this conclusion. A CIA paper from 1990 summarised the organisation’s knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg’s indirect connections with the OSS. This was the first time that Iver Olsen was officially acknowledged as also working for the OSS. This document drew the same conclusion about Raoul Wallenberg as that mentioned above. Thereafter followed a proposal for two alternative courses of action for the US government: 1) to say nothing beyond what had already been said in previous official statements. To say more would embarrass Wallenberg’s supporters and family by suggesting that Raoul Wallenberg may have been undertaking intelligence-related assignments despite Olsen’s statement in 1955 to the contrary; 2) to initiate unofficial contact with the Soviet Union and be more forthcoming about Iver Olsen. The main advantage of this would perhaps be to discover how the Russians came to suspect Raoul Wallenberg. The author doubted whether much would be gained from the latter alternative.

A quotation from the same paper stated unequivocally, ‘Strange as it may seem to the present generation of intelligence officers, the document (from 1955) confirms Olsen’s belief that he was working for three government agencies simultaneously ... that his contacts with Raoul Wallenberg had nothing to do with undercover activities but took place under the supervision of the WRB’.

A paraphrased/decoded OSS telegram, dated 1 July 1944 commented on information received from “Garbo” (code name for WRB) about Wallenberg’s assignment, and noted that due to the subject’s (i.e. Raoul Wallenberg) personal background it might be supposed that his usefulness ‘to our activities’ was in doubt. ‘However, we assume that you have consulted 799 (code number for Iver Olsen) on this matter and considered whether there was any chance of utilising the assignment to our benefit’. It is not clear to whom the telegram was addressed. Although indicating that the idea of using Raoul Wallenberg for intelligence purposes had at least been considered, it appeared as though officials did not believe that it would be meaningful.
A cryptic CIA document, dated 23 November 1954, about Hungarian contacts in Sweden and Finland, noted under the heading GEIGER, Kalman (probably referring to Kálmán Lauer) that as director of the Central European Commercial Company, he had assisted the “informant” to infiltrate Raoul Wallenberg (first name misspelled) into Hungary during the Second World War as an OSS agent. The context in which this document was drawn up is not known.

An OSS paper from March 1944 concerning the WRB stated that the State Department had already approved the ‘overall plan’. Furthermore, it pointed out that the reason for OSS participation in this matter was because to a certain extent it guaranteed rapid and effective communications in exchange for which the organisation can obtain important advantages.

Another OSS document, dated March 1944, sent instructions from the WRB to Iver Olsen, to the effect that the WRB agreed to one of his proposals and that this “something” would be a preliminary, explorative action in cooperation between the agencies which could extend into new (geographical) areas.

The documents at least tell us that the WRB cooperated closely with the OSS, the State Department and the War Department and that the WRB used OSS communication channels.

Raoul Wallenberg is mentioned in a coded OSS message on 7 November 1944. It in fact dealt with an official at the Hungarian foreign ministry, Géza Soós was a leading member of the MFM resistance movement that was loyal to Horthy. According to the message, Soós could only be contacted via Per Anger at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Raoul Wallenberg was said to be in the picture if Anger was not in Budapest. It also stated that Soós had a schedule of Swedish signals\(^3\) and that Nagy, formerly a secretary at the Hungarian Legation, should get in touch with Captain Thernberg in Stockholm regarding the schedule.

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\(^3\)A signals schedule contains details of the regulations/arrangements required to establish communications between two radio stations, i.e., frequencies/bands, times, call signs, frequency changes, codes etc.
It is correct that Swedish military intelligence was active in Hungary. Capt. Thernberg of C Bureau and Technical Office, visited Hungary in 1943 and 1944. He probably deposited a transmitter in Budapest which could also act as a reserve link for the legation.

This signals schedule was also mentioned in a note dated 14 December 1944, from the British Embassy in Moscow to Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov. It informed the Russians that several men from the Hungarian resistance under Géza Soós had landed at an airfield in Italy. They represented the MFM resistance movement organised on the orders of Admiral Horthy. MFM wanted to coordinate its action against the Germans with the advance of the Red Army. Soós was said to have with him a schedule of signals and codes in order to communicate with Budapest, and maintained that six hours after receiving a message, the MFM would be able to take control of all public buildings.

An OSS document dated 30 December also tells us that Soós had asked for a message to be forwarded to the Soviet Union. It mentioned, inter alia, that on 23 October the MFM passed a message to the Swedish Legation in Budapest in its capacity as representative of Soviet interests in Hungary. No trace of it has been found in Swedish source material. Soós wanted to hear from Moscow how the resistance should act and the kind of treatment Hungarian military units might expect to receive if they went over to the Russians. The message also included the frightening information that the Gestapo had arrested almost the entire military leadership of the MFM following a secret visit from a Soviet(?) liaison officer to Budapest for a few weeks in November to meet MFM representatives. It is easy to conclude - and there was a parallel in events in Poland - that the Soviet Union was unlikely to be interested in a resistance movement playing a prominent part when not under its own control.

How else could the above message be construed? First of all, we know that the Swedish Legation and Per Anger in particular were in touch with Hungarian resistance movements (there were several, including some under communist control). This was very natural in view of the situation and the Russians’ imminent final offensive; rather, it would have been a dereliction of duty not to have such contacts. We also know from Captain Thernberg’s memoirs that Swedish military intelligence succeeded in establishing illegal radio links with Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Hungary and the Baltic countries. The links with
Hungary were certainly established with the assistance of Nagy, and Gellért, former secretary and counsellor respectively at the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm. They were in close touch with allied diplomatic missions in the Swedish capital. It is in this context that the signals schedule should be considered. However, Raoul Wallenberg does not appear to have played a prominent part in this connection.

A cipher telegram from Allied Headquarters in Italy, dated May 1945, probably originating from Brigadier General Bonner Key of the OSS, stated that he had asked the Soviet military authorities in Budapest for information about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swiss diplomats Meier and Feller. It further stated that the Soviet authorities might have convincing evidence that Feller, and perhaps Meier and Raoul Wallenberg as well, had cooperated with the Nazis.

**Conclusions**

The conclusion cannot be drawn from the above documents that Raoul Wallenberg was involved in any undercover assignment on behalf of the OSS, although probably the organisation had considered the idea. There is no authoritative paper to tell us that such was the case, while the ambiguous documents need to be interpreted with great caution; they may well be based on the misunderstandings of individual officials. On the other hand, it is clear that the OSS was informed about Raoul Wallenberg’s reports from Budapest and may have found some value in them even though they were primarily intended for the WRB. It is also clear that the OSS and WRB cooperated closely with each other and that Iver Olsen represented the OSS first and foremost. His other assignments were mainly to give him ‘cover’. According to the CIA, Olsen sometimes mixed his OSS duties with his WRB activities. It cannot be ruled out that some OSS agents also perceived Raoul Wallenberg as an agent. On the other hand, the CIA has not found material anywhere that indicates that Raoul Wallenberg was aware of Olsen’s links with the OSS (It is another matter that the Russians certainly suspected him of spying for the USA on the grounds of what they knew about his links with Olsen. More of this later.) It is conceivable that some recently released CIA papers and documents may cast light on these issues. It should also be recalled that some of the released papers contain deleted
sections. It is clearly imperative to obtain all available papers, including those from the Americans.
VII Circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s detention and arrest in Budapest

Documentation

The activities of the Swedish Legation in Budapest were first mentioned in a Soviet document in October 1944. The head of the political section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, von Post, wrote to Chernyshov, counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, telling him about the legation’s efforts to rescue the Jews and the matter of protective passes. Wallenberg was not mentioned by name. Reporting home, Chernyshov wrote that he did not reply to von Post’s question regarding Moscow’s interest in the Swedish efforts to help the Jews in Hungary.

The next item, from Russian Foreign Ministry archives, is the note from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow dated 31 December 1944 (App. 6) containing a list of the members of the legation in Budapest and Sweden’s request for them to receive Soviet protection when the Red Army finds them. A copy of the note has also been found at the Defence Ministry. The same day, Foreign Minister Dekanozov passed the information to General Antonov at general staff headquarters so that orders could be issued to the front line command.

A cipher telegram dated 2 January 1945 was sent from Major General Slavin, assistant to the chief of the Red Army general staff, to Malinovsky and Tolbukhin, commanding the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Front troops respectively, ordering them to give protection to the besieged Swedish diplomatic mission in Budapest, said to have gone underground, when they find them. They were then to inform the general staff. Raoul Wallenberg’s name was listed among the other
Raoul Wallenberg’s detention and arrest

names. A note on the telegram stated that army commanders should be informed. Similar orders to a number of subordinate units have also been found.

A report to the chief of the 30th Army Corps has been recovered containing the information that Raoul Wallenberg voluntarily called on the Soviet side on 13 January. The Russians captured 16 Benczur Street (location of the International Red Cross transport unit) on 13 January. It was here that they found Raoul Wallenberg. A report from Dimitrenko, of the 151st Rifle Division, was sent to the head of the political section of the 7th Army Guards. It stated that Raoul Wallenberg and his driver had been found at 16 Benczur Street and that he handed over a telegram written in German requesting it to be forwarded to Stockholm. A note written on Dimitrenko’s report reads: ‘18= to Afonin: do not send telegram anywhere for the time being’.

On 14 January, Kupriyanov of the 7th Guards Army, ordered the 30th Rifle Corps to escort Raoul Wallenberg straight away, with due attention to his security and comfort, from the 151st Rifle Division where he then was, to Major General Afonin, commander of the 18th Rifle Corps. Moreover, Raoul Wallenberg was not to have any contact with the outside world. A note written by hand on the telegram stated ‘Detained on 13 January at Benczur Street; other embassy officials in western part of the city; he refused to leave the front after explaining that he was responsible for the protection of 7,000 Swedish citizens in the eastern part’.

On 15 January, Zakharov, 2nd Ukrainian Front chief of staff, telegraphed to Antonov, chief of the general staff, and to the chief of staff for the 3rd Ukrainian Front, informing them that Raoul Wallenberg had been found at Benczur Street and had said that the rest of the legation staff were in the western part of the city. Raoul Wallenberg and his property were being looked after.

These reports were the basis of the message from Dekanozov, the Deputy Foreign Minister, to the Swedish Legation in Moscow on 16 January, stating that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and was in the care of Russian troops in Budapest.

Defence Ministry archives contained papers which included a warrant for the arrest of Wallenberg, signed by Bulganin, the Deputy Defence Minister, on 17 January, addressed to Malinovsky, chief of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and copied to
Abakumov, head of Smersh (App. 7). Bulganin ordered Raoul Wallenberg to be sent to Moscow and stated that the requisite instructions had been passed to Smersh, the counter espionage organisation. No reason for the arrest was given. Zakharov wrote a message on the warrant to a comrade Povetkin to the effect that he and comrade Korolev were to organise the journey to Moscow.

The same day, 17 January, Bulganin issued another arrest warrant (App. 8). This was for the Swiss diplomats Max Meier and Harald Feller, and the Slovak envoy Jan Spišák. They were to be sent to Moscow ‘in the same way as Wallenberg’, and Smersh was to carry out the order. On 20 January, Zakharov asked for instructions concerning not only Feller and Meier but the Swedish lecturer and Red Cross delegate Valdemar Langlet and his wife as well. No reply has been recovered to the enquiry about Langlet.

A Smersh report, dated 22 January 1945, contained a list of diplomatic addresses in Budapest drawn up by major Petrovsky, assistant to the chief of the Smersh second division, 2nd Ukrainian Front, and addressed to the chief of the Smersh operational division at the same headquarters in Budapest. It claimed that the list was based on information, inter alia, from the apprehended (or detained = zaderzjan) secretary from the Swedish Legation, Wallenberg.

A report, dated 23 January, about Smersh arrests of ‘agents from the opposite side’ at the 2nd Ukrainian Front between 1-20 January, stated that they included three representatives of the diplomatic corps, two of whom were from the Swedish Legation in Budapest. However, it emerged that only one was Swedish (the other was probably Thomsen/Grossheim-Kriso, or Langfelder).

A message from the above-mentioned Zakharov to Bulganin, the Deputy Minister of Defence, reported that the detained Raoul Wallenberg had been sent to Moscow on 25 January, and Zenkov was leading the convoy (App. 9).

Other messages indicate that the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg happened on 19 January and that of the Swiss diplomats on 10 and 16 February respectively. The prison registration card from Lubianka Prison records Raoul Wallenberg’s arrival there on 6 February, the same day as his driver, Vilmos Langfelder (App. 10). Feller and Meier first arrived in Moscow on 4 March, via Lvov and Kiev.
Other NKVD reports also exist about the Swedish Legation (without revealing any new facts) and a copy of a note from the minister Ivan Danielsson denying press reports that Soviet troops had badly treated members of the Swedish Legation. The reports of Swedish legation employees have otherwise indicated that the legation was subject to extensive and repeated looting. This was also confirmed in an internal MID memorandum from Vetrov, the head of section, to Dekanozov on 24 May 1945.

No other material covering this period has been found in the archives. It is not impossible that some intelligence reports from Budapest were removed at some point.

**Oral information and comments**

As a source, oral information about the last weeks Raoul Wallenberg spent in Budapest and the experiences of other members of the Swedish Legation until their repatriation in March, was considerably more varied than the brief documents described above. The following information may be of interest.

**Russian military reports**

The chief of the 2nd Battalion, 581st Rifles Regiment, Shkred, stated that his subordinates on one occasion stopped a car containing two foreigners who proved to be Raoul Wallenberg and his driver. Shkred ordered them to be escorted to staff headquarters, but the two passengers refused to leave the car until machine guns were aimed at them.

The political chief at the same regiment, Chapovsky, informed Dmitryev, formerly of the MVD, that instructions had been issued to treat the Swedish diplomat humanely and not to interrogate him. His immunity was to be respected and he should receive assistance while he was escorted to senior staff quarters.

The evidence of other officers at the same regiment indicate that Raoul Wallenberg was taken to staff quarters on 14 January. He spoke to Golub, the regimental commander, and asked to meet Marshal Malinovsky. One of Golub’s
colleagues was ordered to ensure that Raoul Wallenberg was sent to senior staff quarters from where a captain from Smersh had arrived. Raoul Wallenberg was taken to Colonel Kislitsa, chief of Smersh at 151st Division. He was accompanied this time by Jakov Valakh, political officer at the same division. A few days after 14 January, the latter was told that two members of the Swedish Legation had called at regimental staff quarters. He was sent to escort them to divisional staff quarters where divisional commander Podshivaylov received Raoul Wallenberg, at his request. Wallenberg gave a fairly detailed account of his activities and stated that he wanted to talk to Soviet military commanders in Budapest about measures for rescuing the ghetto. He carried with him a bulky briefcase containing important documents that he was prepared to hand over to the military commanders. According to Valakh, Raoul Wallenberg appeared trustworthy, despite the grave suspicions of the front line troops, who were trained to see spies everywhere. The following day, i.e., 15 or 16 January, officers from the 7th Guards Army and 2nd Ukrainian Front arrived to fetch Wallenberg and Langfelder. A colonel emphasised that nobody was to say anything about Raoul Wallenberg.

According to information given to Helene Carlbäck-Isotalo, a staff intelligence official of the 30th Rifle Corps, Mikhail Danilash, spoke to Raoul Wallenberg some time between 8-14 January in the building where he was held. Raoul Wallenberg complained inter alia that his official car had been taken from him and demanded to see Marshal Malinovsky. Danilash also stated that some mention was made at staff quarters that Molotov had ordered Raoul Wallenberg to be brought to him.

A witness claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was seen on 17 January in a car together with major Demchenko (who has said that he encountered Raoul Wallenberg as early as 13 or 14 January) with two soldiers en route for Debrecen. Demchenko was the assistant political chief at a regiment, and has not been traced.

According to a Hungarian witness, Raoul Wallenberg spent a night in the prisoner-of-war camp at Gödöllő, after which he was taken back to Budapest and placed in a house in the suburb of Rákosszentmihály, at the approach from Gödöllő.
Statements from Raoul Wallenberg’s colleagues

The office clerk Dr György Gergely worked for Raoul Wallenberg. In April 1946 he stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been under Soviet surveillance from 12 January (does not therefore correspond with the details above), and accompanied by Soviet officers. Raoul Wallenberg had been well treated and attempted to get in touch with Marshal Malinovsky in Debrecen. He intended to negotiate issues involving the return of Jewish property. Gergely wanted to go with him but Raoul Wallenberg refused his offer. On his departure on 17 January, the Swedish diplomat took three suitcases, a rucksack and a large amount of money with him. Before leaving Budapest, he handed over 300,000 pengö to Gergely to pay for the upkeep of the Jewish welfare shelters.

Béla Révai claimed that on his departure on 17 January, Raoul Wallenberg said that they would first go to ‘Stadtwald’ (Városliget) and then on to the Soviet headquarters in Debrecen.

A Hungarian aide of Raoul Wallenberg, László Sulner, stated that when Raoul Wallenberg visited some of the Swedish houses accompanied by Russian officers on 17 January, he spoke about his post-war plans. However, the Russians did not share his ideas about this humanitarian action. When the Russians began looting the international ghetto on 20 January, one of Raoul Wallenberg’s colleagues who was fluent in Russian (probably Thomsen) tried to contact the Russian command. He was taken to the NKVD, after which a Soviet officer came to the legation and pointed out that unless a person could confirm his identity, he would be promptly shot as a German spy. According to Thomsen himself, he was interrogated for the first time on 21 January, but that his name was missing from the list of legation staff forwarded to the Soviet military authorities. Another officer stated that Raoul Wallenberg was not escorted to Malinovsky but arrested as a spy. On the other hand, the Hungarian Red Cross arranged for Valdemar Langlet of the Red Cross to be received by the new Hungarian government in Debrecen.

Colleagues at the Swedish Legation were repatriated in March-April 1945. They have provided fairly comprehensive descriptions of the events during those days in Budapest, in the reports written by Lars G:son Berg and Per Anger for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in their books. There is no note of any questions being asked about just Raoul Wallenberg. In a telegram to the Ministry
in April 1945, after the Swedish diplomats in Budapest had passed through Moscow on their way home, Söderblom wrote that he considered it imperative that Anger wrote a detailed report about all that had happened. On their arrival home, Raoul Wallenberg’s colleagues were called in to Foreign Minister Günther, but he took no notes and no other ministry official was present. Günther had, however, been told that Raoul Wallenberg was being looked after by the Russians. It is true that the legation had lost touch with him for at least a week before his capture by the Russians. However, Margareta Bauer has stated that when the legation staff in Budapest were getting ready to travel home a Russian officer had said that Raoul Wallenberg was in their care and that they had sent him to Debrecen. He may well be home in Stockholm before the rest of the staff, the officer had added. Once home, Per Anger wrote a report of the legation’s experiences in Budapest which Ivan Danielsson signed (the latter appears never to have been questioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

Per Anger wrote, inter alia, that on the whole members of the legation staff who remained on the Buda side were treated correctly by the Russians, despite the absence of identity papers in Russian. It was distinctly worse on the Pest side. Both the Soviet and NKVD/Smersh units were different on the Buda and the Pest sides; the former were under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin (3rd Ukrainian Front), the latter under Marshal Malinovsky (2nd Ukrainian Front). Soviet suspicions against the Swedish action to rescue Jews was never actively expressed in Buda, while the Swedes on the Pest side were subject to rigorous interrogation.

Berg described how after a while the Russians began to arrest former (locally employed) colleagues at the legation, one after the other. Those who worked with Raoul Wallenberg and employees in B Section were specially selected. Most were released after a while although others did not return (Berg did not specify; as far as is known, only Thomsen was sent to Moscow). We know definitely that the Russians interrogated Berg, Tolstoy-Kutuzov and Thomsen. Regular interrogation records were found only for the latter, on his investigation file in the Federal Security Service archives. They contained no more than some passing reference to Raoul Wallenberg.

Strangely enough, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs appears never to have questioned the Red Cross representative, Valdemar Langlet, about his
experiences. He was allowed to stay on in Budapest two months after the other Swedes.

In 1955, SS officer Kurt Becher stated that Smersh/NKVD questioned him about Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1945. No trace of these interviews has been found in Russian archives.

**Soviet actions**

The Soviet military leaders remained very suspicious of the activities taking place in the name of the Swedish Legation, particularly towards all the protective passports and other documents that were in circulation. Their confidence was partly restored following the legation announcement that all protective passports issued before a certain date would thenceforth be invalid unless reconfirmed by the mission. In any case, military leaders were soon demanding that both the legation and the Red Cross should wind up their activities and that Swedish subjects should leave the country.

An account of the situation at the front line during the Second World War has been written by the war historian Galitsky, who has occasionally served as a member of the working group. Every detainee with some connection to the front was taken to military intelligence. Detailed instructions existed to this effect. Sometimes detainees were interrogated by the special propaganda unit as well. Some were later taken into Smersh custody for interrogation. They were then often sent to prisoner-of-war camps at the front while detainees of special interest were taken to Moscow. The most interesting of these ended up in the hands of Smersh and a so-called register file was opened. Each and everyone was interrogated according to a special list of questions and the most important of them were held in prison despite their prisoner-of-war status.

With the Soviet capture of Budapest, the rear area of the front line was cleared, i.e., all men capable of bearing arms were rounded up and checked. According to the 2nd Ukrainian Front records, some 100,000 men were later released after such checks.
Smersh had no residentura in Budapest before the Soviet liberation. They appeared to have begun collecting information in the winter of 1944-1945, at the time of the Soviet troops’ advance. Moreover, only Smersh had received instructions to take Raoul Wallenberg into custody, arrest and send him to Moscow. Although the MGB’s 4th Administration under Pavel Sudoplatov sent agents behind the German front line, nothing has emerged to show that such agents were active in Budapest. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence that the regular foreign intelligence branch of the NKGB took any part in the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. However, reliable reports exist about Soviet reconnaissance and intelligence activities in Budapest before December 1944.

What part did Tolstoy-Kutuzov play?

Mikhail Tolstoy-Kutuzov was chairman of the Russian club, socially active and was acquainted with Ivan Danielsson, the Swedish Minister. Was he also a Soviet agent before the Red Army entered Budapest? Did he choose, or was coerced into cooperating with Smersh after the Russians had taken control of the city? His war time activities before being employed at the Swedish Legation are to some extent shrouded in mystery. According to Sudoplatov, Tolstoy was recruited into the intelligence service early in the 1920’s. Berg reported Tolstoy’s comments to him in February 1945 on seeing him again in the office of General Chernyshov, the Soviet commander of the city. At that point, Tolstoy had already been appointed head of the bureau to which all foreigners in the city had to report thereafter. According to Tolstoy, at first the Russians had not accepted his story of working in the prisoner-of-war hospital. Instead, he was arrested and questioned several times although treated well. The Russians ordered him to tell them all about the work and private lives of Berg and Raoul Wallenberg. Tolstoy had then given a detailed account of the legation’s efforts to protect Soviet interests (see also the chapter below dealing with the reasons for Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest). We also know that earlier there was a report in KGB records in which Tolstoy described the work of senior members of the Swedish mission. This was destroyed in 1959, however, according to a note in the records.

Following an enquiry, the foreign intelligence service (SVR) stated that Tolstoy was arrested by Smersh, and supplied some information about the staff of the Swedish Legation. The minutes of the interrogation were not found in SVR
records, only a paper stating that it had taken place. Unfortunately, SVR did not accede to the Swedish request to study Tolstoy-Kutozov’s file for the period from July 1944-June 1945, maintaining that it contained no evidence about his work in Budapest that indicated any links with Raoul Wallenberg’s activities.

In view of Tolstoy’s later activities (some years later he attempted to convince the Swedes that Raoul Wallenberg had in fact been killed in Budapest), we are able to establish that he cooperated fully with Moscow, at least from the time of his employment under the city commander.

Who really ordered the arrest?

Raoul Wallenberg was arrested on the order of the Deputy Minister of Defence Bulganin. Abakumov was also a Deputy Minister of Defence, directly under Stalin, the Supreme Commander. However, Abakumov did not normally issue orders direct to front line commanders.

In recovered papers relating to the Swiss diplomats Meier and Feller, it appears that the order must have originated from Stalin direct, and that the latter were to be sent to Moscow, ‘as in the case of Raoul Wallenberg’. As far as can be judged, therefore, it was Stalin who decided to arrest some of the diplomats from neutral countries who were still in Budapest, and send them to Moscow. A memorandum from Abakumov to Molotov dated 6 December 1945 said, ‘Smersh arrested Feller and Meier in Budapest on 4 March (incorrect date) in accordance with Stalin’s instructions’ (App. 11).

Statements from Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners

The accounts of war prisoners in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons between 1945-47 supply a number of ‘missing links’ for the period from 17 January - 6 February 1945 and are reproduced in the White Paper published in 1957.

Gustav Richter stated that after Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder reported to the Soviet military authorities they were sent from one instance to the other before
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being finally arrested. Willy Bergemann told Erhard Hille that Raoul Wallenberg wanted to negotiate with the Russians about improving conditions for the Jewish population and to secure the diplomatic area from further shooting. However, the military staff whom he met explained that they were unable to give this kind of order and advised him to apply direct to Marshal Malinovsky. He and Langfelder were then arrested by the NKVD. Ernst Huber mentions the incident when the two were stopped in their car and Soviet soldiers slashed the tyres.

All sources agree that Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder were then taken by train to Moscow via Rumania. Huber provides most detail. For a brief period both were confined in a temporary NKVD prison in Budapest. An officer and four soldiers guarded them during the journey. They were allowed off the train when it stopped at Iasi (Rumania) station, and visited the Luther restaurant. They had been told both in Budapest and in Moscow that they should not regard themselves as prisoners but were in protective custody. Among other things, they were shown the underground system in Moscow and walked on foot to Lubianka Prison. In a conversation a couple of years ago, Richter stated that Raoul Wallenberg was writing a detective story during the trip to Moscow.
VIII Reasons for arresting and imprisoning Raoul Wallenberg

Introduction

Nothing is known for certain about the real and complete reasons for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. We are however able to obtain a fairly good picture of the underlying motives from the small amount of direct evidence and the larger quantity of indirect information available. But without full documentary evidence it is not easy to strike a balance between the significance of the different motives. A reservation: the possibility of disinformation should not be eliminated with regard to one or two of the motives disseminated over the years.

As mentioned earlier, Lars G:son Berg, attaché at the Swedish Legation in Budapest 1944-45, described on his return home how the Russians had questioned several non-Swedish employees about the work of the mission and the Swedish diplomatic staff. They were accused of espionage and issuing false documents and protective papers to non-Jewish Hungarians, some of whom were fascists; further that the mission did not have control over the humanitarian activities, nor had it been sufficiently active in safeguarding Soviet interests in Hungary. Raoul Wallenberg and Berg were identified as German spy chiefs. The Soviet side maintained that it was ‘impossible’ that Raoul Wallenberg would have risked his life to save Hungarian Jews. According to Tolstoy-Kutuzov’s comments to Berg, Smersh had also shown interest in whether Sweden in any way represented American or British interests in Hungary. While the main theory was that the Swedish Legation was involved in German espionage against the Soviet Union, there were also early indications of their being suspected of spying for the Americans and/or British. Although the Soviet Union was an ally of the USA and Great Britain, Stalin was already deeply suspicious of these countries.
In an emotional outburst once in 1979, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov told the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow that Raoul Wallenberg had been spying for the USA and that the Americans privately admitted this.

These were the indications available from the Soviet side before the working group began its activities.

**Documentary sources**

Some guidance into the reasons for Russian interest in Raoul Wallenberg can be found in the Smersh and MGB interrogation of Grossheim-Krisko (alias Thomsen). The interrogation report dated 26 May 1947 shows that Thomsen confirmed earlier evidence that the Swedish Legation had employed ‘fascists’ (supposedly Italians, Hungarians and a White Russian emigré). Thomsen also mentioned cases of Jews who sold their protective passports, although without the mission’s knowledge. He also claimed that ‘as far as is known’ the mission never accepted bribes to draw up documents and he was unwilling to admit that he himself had gathered information about the Soviet Union.

However, in a previous interrogation in March 1945, Thomsen alleged that protective passports were issued to people fleeing from the Soviet powers and to others in hiding because of the ‘criminal activities’. He also claimed that the mission had given protection to anti-Soviet emigrants, ‘fascists’ who were very rich and business-owners. Altogether more than 5,000 people in the former category had been provided with protective documents. He claimed that the minister, Ivan Danielsson, and Berg were in touch with the German Embassy and negotiated by telephone the matter of protective documents for people who had come to the embassy. The interrogation leader then asked whether the Swedish mission’s activities had been hostile to the Soviet state. Thomsen had replied ‘yes’. He made no direct accusations against Raoul Wallenberg. The discrepancies noted in Thomsen’s statements emphasise the importance of treating them with great caution.

Interrogation reports found in Federal Security Service archives - which do not appear to provide any direct link to Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish mission in
Budapest other than showing that Raoul Wallenberg had also been questioned by the same interrogator - include several interrogation sessions with a member of the German Abwehr, Gfrorner, accused of espionage and having contact with the Anglo-American intelligence centre in Turkey via JOINT in Budapest. Asked whether he knew Thomsen, Gfrorner replied that he did not. On the other hand, he was well acquainted with Joel Brand whom he believed was head of JOINT in Budapest (Brand represented WAAD). The JOINT office in Budapest was said to act as the residentura of the American intelligence service. Furthermore, Budapest was something of a transit point for the delivery of espionage material and agents from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Istanbul. Gfrorner stated that in 1940, Jewish nationalists had invited the American authorities to use the JOINT organisation as a network for mass espionage in exchange for USA support in setting up an independent state in Palestina. However, a member of the JOINT staff had offered German agents access to some of the JOINT offices if Germany would release 2-5000 Jews a month in return. According to Gfrorner, Himmler rejected this proposal. Nevertheless, the Germans succeeded in controlling a large amount of the post sent to JOINT. Gfrorner was alleged to have worked for the organisation in Budapest and received money from it, at least until 1943 when these activities came under threat from Gustav Richter, German police attaché (Gestapo) in Bucharest. The following passage is found in Gfrorner’s interrogation report: ‘It was established in Budapest that employees of the Turkish and Swedish missions etc., worked for the Anglo-American intelligence services or as couriers’. Interrogated early in 1949, Gfrorner was not asked about Raoul Wallenberg, although according to the interrogation records he was questioned several times by the same person who twice interrogated the Swedish diplomat. Finally, it is interesting to note that Gfrorner told an Italian fellow prisoner in 1949 that he knew Wallenberg from Budapest.

A Smersh report from February 1945 (App. 12) stated; ‘Instead of protecting the interests of the Soviet Union and Hungary, the Swedish Embassy and Swedish Red Cross are giving protection to the enemies of the Soviet Union and Hungarian people and providing them with refuge and sanctuary’. Several other accusations were also directed towards individual members of the Swedish Legation (although Raoul Wallenberg was not mentioned).

The Central Committee rejected a draft from Foreign Minister Molotov and Serov, head of the KGB, in April 1956. It had thrown the entire blame for Raoul
Wallenberg’s death on Abakumov, stating that he had accused Raoul Wallenberg of espionage on behalf of Germany (this was not included in the Gromyko memorandum which was handed to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, on 6 February 1957).

An analogy to the arrested Swiss diplomats provides some indication. As mentioned earlier, it appears that Stalin personally ordered the arrest of diplomats from neutral countries who were in Budapest. However, the Swiss met a happier fate than Raoul Wallenberg. On the basis of a Smersh interrogation, Abakumov wrote a memorandum to Molotov on 6 December 1945 (App. 11) describing Fellers and Meier’s activities in Budapest in fairly positive terms. He pointed out that both had explained that ‘they did not deal in politics or intelligence work’ (an explanation that justifies their release). Molotov decided to free the Swiss in exchange for some Russian internees in Switzerland. It should be noted that the interrogation leader did not ask Feller any questions about Raoul Wallenberg. The overall impression of the Swiss diplomats’ activities in Budapest is that from the Soviet point of view they were less controversial than Wallenberg.

The Slovak envoy, Spišak, was handed over to Czechoslovakia at their request in February 1947, to stand trial in Prague.

So far, the documentary information submitted is very meagre and far from demonstrates the reasons for arresting Raoul Wallenberg, especially as the material does not appear to pay much attention to the Swedish diplomat.

On the other hand, a great many more or less loosely-based theories were generated in oral interviews, or in some other way.

**Oral sources and comments**

These vary and are all unconfirmed, stemming mainly from former employees of the Soviet security services.

The most unspecified reason for arresting Raoul Wallenberg was that everyone of any interest to military counter-espionage was arrested in the wake of the Red Army offensive. This was also pointed out by a Soviet military historian and
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archives expert who was associated with the working group at an early stage. Thus, all German diplomats were of course arrested as well as Swiss, for example. Enormous numbers of people were detained and investigated behind the front in the Budapest area. Not much was needed to become a suspect. A former KGB official pointed out that the Smersh officials were not particularly well qualified and suffered from a considerable degree of ‘spy-mania’: As soon as a war prisoner had spent some time in the British occupation zone, for example, he was accused of spying for Great Britain (Raoul Wallenberg had a great many official contacts with the Germans). It is clear from various Smersh and MGB interrogation reports that their interests were all-embracing; prisoners were ‘vacuumed’ for information. In the case of Raoul Wallenberg, however, we should take into account the explicit order for his arrest that came from a high level in Moscow. In other words, some specific grounds must have existed for arresting him. It is by no means certain that the apparent underlying reasons for interrogating Thomsen and other members of the legation in Budapest were the primary ones. Moreover, the interrogations paid strikingly little attention to Raoul Wallenberg yet he was the only one sent to Moscow, apart from Thomsen.

The principal, conceivable reasons put forward for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg are as follows:

1. Raoul Wallenberg was employed by the War Refugee Board to rescue Jews from the Nazis in Hungary. However, in the eyes of Moscow the WRB was regarded chiefly as an international network of more or less underground links and intelligence work (which may have been equated with a spy network in Soviet eyes, particularly as WRB cooperated closely with OSS). The Russians probably found it hard to believe (as indicated in the interrogation of Berg, above) that humanitarian motives were sufficient for establishing the WRB and for Raoul Wallenberg’s mission.

2. All communication between Raoul Wallenberg and Washington and vice versa went through Iver Olsen, the WRB representative in Stockholm. He also represented the American intelligence organisation OSS, had been fairly successful in rescuing Jews from the Baltic states and had attracted the attention of the Soviet Union. Olsen had also been involved in negotiating with Himmler’s representatives for the release of Latvian Jews in exchange for money. The communist press, for example, tried to discredit him. Moreover, Olsen’s agents
had infiltrated into the Baltic states. Without doubt, Moscow was aware of Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts with Olsen and the latter’s OSS affiliations. Accordingly, they must have strongly suspected Raoul Wallenberg of working for the OSS as well.

3. The Swedish diplomat received funds from JOINT for his assignment. Their representatives participated in a great many negotiations with the Nazis in efforts to save Jews from extermination. The interest shown by the security services in JOINT emerges in the above interrogation of Gfrörer. After the war, JOINT grew to be an ‘all-world Zionist power’ in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, supporting ‘a global Zionist plot’. A great many Jews and non-Jews were arrested and sentenced on the charge of having contacts with JOINT both in the Soviet Union and the satellite states in Eastern Europe.

There are thus several variations on the espionage theme. Thomsen maintained that Smersh officials in Budapest tried to force him to confess that the Swedish mission was prepared to create an anti-Soviet spy centre during the forthcoming Soviet occupation (an accusation that recurred some years later during the preparations for a show trial in Hungary). Even in Moscow, the MGB attempted to make Thomsen say what he knew about the Swedish mission’s preparations in Budapest for espionage - including during an interrogation held by National Security Minister Merkulov (the minutes of which have not been found). In an interrogation in the autumn of 1945, Weindorf, the interrogation leader, asked for details of Raoul Wallenberg’s activities in Budapest. Thomsen described his humanitarian efforts but Weindorf laughed and explained that he wanted to know about Wallenberg’s spying activities. The Russian side were well aware that both Raoul Wallenberg and Thomsen were spies. They have evidence to that effect’. Not until 1951 were accusations of spying dropped against Thomsen.

Sudoplatov maintains that General Belkin, chief of the Smersh Front Directorate towards the end of the war, told him some time in the 1950’s that it was widely known that Raoul Wallenberg was in contact with German intelligence. Belkin also said that all Smersh residentura received basic data in 1945 showing Raoul Wallenberg to be an ‘established asset’ for the German, American and British intelligence services. He also indicated that Moscow planned to exploit Raoul Wallenberg’s alleged cooperation with the Abwehr to persuade him and his family to cooperate.
A former employee of the Soviet intelligence service claimed to have seen an agent’s report dealing with Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts with the Gestapo and Abwehr. On the other hand, he was unable to recall any details of contacts with American intelligence.

If nowhere else, Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts in Budapest were very clearly indicated in his pocket diary which the Russians confiscated on his arrest. Moreover, Raoul Wallenberg probably told the Russians himself about his plans for assistance and the reconstruction projects, primarily for the Jewish population. The security services must have regarded these plans with suspicion and they definitely did not fit in with what the Soviet Union had in mind for Hungary.

One official who for a long time was centrally placed in the international department of the Central Committee maintained that Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest was chiefly due to the belief that he organised intelligence operations on behalf of the Americans. He was perceived to be one of some ten American agents in Hungary and his humanitarian activities were merely regarded as cover. In Moscow’s opinion, Stockholm had been an important centre for American intelligence operations aimed at the USSR, with Iver Olsen in a key role. Moreover, Swedish intelligence was seen as contributing material.

4. Raoul Wallenberg represented the Wallenberg family, the wealthiest and most powerful family of financiers in Sweden. Moscow was probably interested in the family’s affairs and contacts. Their intelligence agents in Stockholm, particularly the legendary Rybkin couple (alias Jartsev), were certainly given the task of obtaining as much information as possible about them. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to study the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) archive in order to obtain a firmer impression of the part they played. Even Mme Kollontay reported on some Wallenberg activities, and memoranda were drawn up about them (Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg in particular) at the MID. In early 1944, Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov was astonished over a report from Stockholm that Marcus Wallenberg had been in touch with Linderoth, the Swedish communist leader.
They probably had a somewhat equivocal attitude to the Wallenberg family. On the one hand, we have the excellent relations between Mme Kollontay and Marcus Wallenberg, who played a key role in discussions on a peace agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1944. Mme Kollontay is alleged to have said that she would very much like to see Marcus Wallenberg as the Swedish minister in Moscow. The Wallenberg-owned SKF concern supplied ball bearings to the Soviet aircraft industry. On the other hand, we find a more ideologically negative attitude to the foremost representatives of capitalism in Sweden. This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the 1951 edition of the Great Soviet encyclopaedia in which the Wallenberg family are referred to as being active supporters of German fascism and wicked enemies of the working class, and were attempting to subordinate Sweden to American imperialism. Moscow must have known about the Wallenberg and Enskilda Bank efforts to save German company assets in the USA from being confiscated by the American government, as well as their transmitting feelers about a separate peace from the German anti-communist opposition. The Soviet Union was generally extremely keen to share in the assets of German companies.

Moreover, perhaps they expected Raoul Wallenberg to possess information about the Nazi plunder of Jewish wealth, currency smuggling etc. It is quite clear that Raoul Wallenberg knew what was going on in Hungary in this field.

5. With regard to the various negotiations for a separate peace, it is possible that Raoul Wallenberg’s contacts with high-level Nazis in Budapest, such as Adolf Eichmann and Kurt Becher in particular, aroused Russian suspicions of the part he played in this context. Bernt Schiller made this his main theory in his book Why the Russians Captured Raoul Wallenberg. He contended that Wallenberg was arrested in the belief that his rescue action was part of an international anti-Soviet political conspiracy between the Nazis and capitalist powers that aimed at unilateral capitulation in the west. Although the Russians may well have had suspicions along these lines, there is no evidence that this was the main reason for arresting Raoul Wallenberg. Budapest and Raoul Wallenberg could hardly have been regarded as the centre of the spider’s web in this context. Furthermore, the Allies kept Moscow fairly well informed about the various negotiations that aimed to buy freedom for the Jews, which the Germans (Himmler) at least also believed might increase the chances of a separate peace. The Soviet was also well provided with information from its own agents, particularly those in the British
intelligence service. The negotiations between Joel Brand and the Nazis for the release of a million Jews in exchange for 10,000 trucks came to nothing inter alia because Vyshinsky vetoed the plan in June 1944, i.e., before Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest. However, the fact that the Russians were partly informed did not necessarily mean that their suspicions were allayed.

6. It may be assumed that the above motive was mainly associated with the Soviet interest in obtaining as much information on important issues as possible from Raoul Wallenberg. It is perplexing, therefore, that Raoul Wallenberg was so seldom questioned (to judge from the interrogation reports). After the first, fairly lengthy session a day or two after his arrival in Moscow, he was only questioned on four occasions, and only once for longer than two hours. The last session took place in March 1947, and was described as a “control interrogation” by the interpreter who claimed to have been present. It was after this session that, according to a fellow prisoner, Raoul Wallenberg said that he was told by the interrogation leader that his case was political (on another occasion, another interrogation leader had said that for political reasons he would never be sentenced). Thus, obtaining information from Raoul Wallenberg does not appear to have been a priority after his arrest. Nor were the other prisoners from Budapest closely questioned about Raoul Wallenberg. This brings us to another principal theory, that Stalin/ the Soviet leaders intended to use the Swedish diplomat for one or more specific purpose.

Stalin must have been attracted to the idea of exploiting the close contacts of Raoul Wallenberg and the Wallenberg family with influential western political and financial circles, provided Raoul Wallenberg could be made to cooperate. Sudoplatov, for example, maintains that Stalin and Molotov wanted to blackmail the Wallenberg family, and through Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest exploit the family’s connections in order to obtain advantageous agreements with the West, perhaps even to acquire international capital for reconstruction (a similar argument put forward by Soviet leaders, although in reverse, was mooted in Molotov’s memorandum to the Central Committee of 2 April 1956). A Swede or anyone with a western background would find such calculations somewhat unrealistic, but it is well known the Soviet leaders saw the world with different eyes and another realism.

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4 See p. 87 of the 1957 White Book
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The Jewish question is in some respects another variation of the same theme. In 1944 and early 1945, Stalin wanted to exploit this issue as a bargaining point in order to obtain international capital, especially Jewish, for the reconstruction of the Soviet Union and to influence events in the Middle East. Beria urged Solomon Michoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of the Soviet Bureau of Information (founded by Stalin in 1943) to establish widespread contacts with American Jews with the aim of encouraging them to invest in the Soviet Union. Stalin also discussed with visiting American senators the possibility of setting up an autonomous Jewish republic in the Crimea. Sudoplatov claimed that he was assigned to plant this idea on the American Ambassador, Averell Harriman. Raoul Wallenberg’s network of contacts in Hungary may well have been of interest in this context.

The idea of a Jewish republic in the Crimea was soon abandoned (in fact, Stalin was never serious about it). Instead, in the latter half of 1946 in particular, Stalin concentrated on penetrating the Zionist movement and the future Jewish state in Palestine. With Molotov’s agreement, Vyshinsky wrote an article under a pseudonym emphasising the necessity of creating a democratic Jewish state on British Mandate Territory. Stalin also permitted a large number of Jews from eastern Europe to emigrate to Palestine. Shortly afterwards, Stalin launched an anti-Semitic campaign which included the murder of Michoels and the Jewish Deputy Foreign Minister S.A. Lozovsky in 1948. It gradually culminated in the rigged trials in eastern Europe in the early 1950’s. Although Stalin’s anti-Semitism appeared to be more of an instrument than a conviction, it could hardly have been advantageous for Raoul Wallenberg during the initial stages of this campaign to be the chief symbol of rescuing the Jews from the Nazis.

The well known former Soviet intelligence officer, Pitovranov, already a high-ranking MGB official in 1946-47, put forward as his hypothesis that the Soviet leaders’ motives were financial because of the Wallenberg family’s financial contacts, and also because of Stalin’s Middle East policy which was initially geared to creating a counter balance to a strongly united Arab bloc. In Pitovranov’s view, it is possible that Moscow did not know very much about Raoul Wallenberg at first, but retained him to find out more and to decide how best to make use of him.
7. Some speculation existed as to whether Polish refugees in Hungary had informed Raoul Wallenberg about the Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Forest massacre, and that he was also in receipt of documents to that effect which were kept in the legation archives. They were deposited in the Central Bank vaults and later ransacked by the Russians. A Hungarian resistance man, Vilmos Bondor, has described how, after he and his chief, Zoltán Mikó were captured, they were questioned by the NKVD about these documents and their knowledge of Katyn. No interrogation records have been found to confirm this version, and there are also other reasons to call it into question.

Another, equally speculative explanation is that Raoul Wallenberg knew about Beria’s secret contacts with Himmler and was therefore eliminated on the former’s orders. Beria appears in other scenarios as well.

8. The idea of recruitment - in the broadest sense - cannot be completely dismissed; far too many people with insight into the methods of the security services at the time have given it as a reasonable hypothesis. Attempts to recruit war prisoners were fairly commonplace. However, they would hardly have tried to recruit Raoul Wallenberg as a regular agent. A former head (Sinitsyn) of the PGU Scandinavian department between 1945-46 wrote in his memoirs that his superior officer, Fitin, tried in vain to persuade Abakumov to hand over Wallenberg to the PGU for recruitment, which might have led to his release. According to oral information, Sudoplatov alleged that Fitin also wrote to Molotov in his capacity as head of the Information Committee, asking to take over Raoul Wallenberg from counter espionage. Abakumov is said to have replied that Smersh itself could recruit him but only after he had confessed to being a spy. Although it is not certain that Raoul Wallenberg would tell his fellow inmates about such attempts, it must be said that none of them has even hinted that an attempt to recruit him took place. The hypothesis cannot therefore be said to rest on firm grounds although it is popular among Russian commentators with links to the security services. Nevertheless, if attempts were made to recruit Wallenberg, they are likely to have happened during the final phase, i.e., after the last interrogation in March 1947.

9. Finally, the Russians may have had as an ulterior motive, or even as their main motive, to use Raoul Wallenberg in an exchange, as they did with the Swiss. A priority of Soviet foreign policy at the end of the war and the following years was
to repatriate the many Soviet citizens who found themselves abroad as a result of the war. In this context, even individual cases were considered important, as can be seen inter alia in the lengthy analysis on Swedish-Soviet relations that Chernyshov, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, sent to the MID on 15 March 1947. Under the heading ‘Negative facts’, he listed the circumstances which in his view had a negative effect on relations. Foremost among them were the Makarova and Granovsky cases, the five deserted seamen and the German and Baltic military personnel who were not handed over because of their ill health.

This could naturally be combined with several other reasons. In conversation with a Swedish diplomat in 1947 and in his report, Feller stated that at the time of his arrest the Russians told him that it was not because he was objectionable but in order to make use of him at a later date as part of an eventual exchange.

A careful study of the way in which the case of Feller and Meier was dealt with, and of Swedish-Soviet diplomatic talks about Raoul Wallenberg during 1945-46, strongly confirms that an important motive for seizing all three was the intention to use them in exchange for Soviet citizens in Switzerland and Sweden. Bulganin gave orders that Feller and Meier were to be captured and taken to Moscow, ‘in the same way as Wallenberg’. Feller’s remarks above clearly indicate that the Russians originally planned to hold the Swiss diplomats as hostages in future negotiations with the Swiss government. According to Feller, a Soviet interrogation leader took it for granted that negotiations would precede the release of prisoners. Moscow, however, left it to the Swiss to initiate the bargaining for which they were prepared. The Swiss received no direct reply to their request for the release of the two diplomats. Instead, Moscow sought to have two (later on, more) Soviet citizens extradited from Switzerland. After considerable hesitation in the one case, the Swiss agreed, and the way was clear to send home Feller and Meier.

It was hardly Soviet practice to give something away free. Usually, Swedish démarches concerning Raoul Wallenberg were met with Russian queries about the repatriation of Makarova and Granovsky, the five deserted Russian seamen and the 40 German and Baltic military personnel who were allowed to remain in Sweden for health reasons when other Balts were being extradited in 1946. Makarova and the five seamen were already in Sweden in the autumn of 1944. Some examples of the occasions when the subject was brought up include: the
talk between Dekanozov and Söderblom on 26 January 1945 (App. 13), between Abramov and Söderblom on 30 April 1946 (App. 14) and between Sysoyev and Barck-Holst on 12 December 1946 (App. 15). Barck-Holst was the only Swedish diplomat who grasped that this was possibly the Soviet way of proposing an exchange. Conversely, when Chernyshov spoke with Ingemar Hägglöf in Stockholm on 17 December 1945 about two Swedes interned in the Soviet Union (Raoul Wallenberg was not mentioned by name) he also mentioned the Makarova case. A hint of some preparedness to consider a serious Swedish proposal may even be detected in Stalin’s conversation with Söderblom in June 1946, when the latter was asked whether he had any request to make. Stalin was certainly aware that Mme Kollontay had passed on the message about Raoul Wallenberg being in the Soviet Union (from which followed his question: ‘You have received a message from us, have you not?’).

The most strenuous and persistent Soviet efforts concerned the seaman Granovsky, who defected some months after Söderblom’s conversation with Stalin. According to contemporary sources, Granovsky was an NKVD agent, and he later published a book confirming this.

In this context, one must be aware that at this stage it was not customary for the Soviet Union to make a direct proposal for an exchange; that was left to the opponents. With Barck-Holst the only exception, the Swedish side chose not to understand. This lack of insight, together with Söderblom’s conviction (or his desire to be convinced) that Raoul Wallenberg died in Hungary, may have been decisive, or at any rate an explanation of why the Swedish diplomat was never set free, unlike the Swiss. (This is further discussed later in the report). Naturally, it by no means excuses Soviet actions.

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The comments of Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners regarding the accusations made against him and Langfelder (see the White Paper of 1957) are perhaps worth recapitulating.

Gustav Richter stated that Raoul Wallenberg told him that the interrogation leader accused him of espionage and noted that he came from a family of Swedish capitalists.
Karl Supprian also reported that Raoul Wallenberg was accused of espionage, based on information from Willy Roedel. The same thing was said by Ernst Ludwig Wallenstein, Willy Bergemann and W. Mohnke (adding ‘on behalf of the Germans’).

Erhard Hille heard from Jan Loyda, who shared a cell with Raoul Wallenberg, that the interrogation leader could not believe that a wealthy Swedish capitalist like Raoul Wallenberg would work to safeguard Soviet interests in Budapest.

Ernst Huber shared a cell with Langfelder who, at the time, said that he and Raoul Wallenberg were accused of spying for the Americans or, possibly, the British.

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Following this review of various possible motives, it may be appropriate to attempt to formulate a more coherent and credible hypothesis of what took place. Perhaps a complete version of the deliberations of that time has never existed, or been put in writing. More likely, various items of intelligence in combination with Stalin’s plans in particular, led to the arrest and detention of Raoul Wallenberg.

It should perhaps be pointed out that the motives described above may be too circumstantial and therefore misleading. In reality, a few, not necessarily profound motives may have sufficed. Compared with other major issues involving the final stages of the war, Stalin and the other leaders probably did not spare more than a passing thought for Raoul Wallenberg. It must therefore be regarded as somewhat remarkable that Stalin nevertheless appears to have involved himself in the case now and then. In any case, the line of reasoning given below should be hedged with reservations.

The foundations were certainly laid with the reports from Mme Kollontay and the intelligence residentura in Stockholm, concerning Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the importance of the Wallenberg family to the Swedish economy and politics and their excellent international contacts. Moscow was also almost certainly informed about Raoul Wallenberg’s assignment in Budapest. The head of the political section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on 20 October 1944 about the
Swedish Legation in Budapest and its efforts to rescue Jews. Wallenberg was not mentioned by name but Moscow naturally knew about him, was also aware of the identity of his employer and the part played by Iver Olsen. Moscow was perhaps already convinced in the autumn of 1944 that Raoul Wallenberg was undertaking intelligence work for the Americans, but this has not been clarified. The Allies also passed information to the Soviet about various negotiations in Budapest aiming to buy Jews free as well as about Swedish Legation contacts with the Hungarian non-communist resistance movement. On 31 December, the Soviet Foreign Ministry received a request from the Swedish Embassy in Moscow asking that the Red Army take the staff of the Swedish Legation in Budapest under their protection.

The decision to arrest Raoul Wallenberg, and perhaps the Swiss diplomats as well, would have been taken at the highest level, perhaps by the Defence Council, some time between 13 and 14 January, as it was then that the order went out denying Raoul Wallenberg any contact with the outside world. Possibly the order to hold him isolated was made while awaiting a high-level decision. Nevertheless, on the basis of information from army units in Budapest, Dekanozov managed to inform the Swedes that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and taken into custody on 16 January. This may have been an error; Dekanozov was known to react quickly and firmly and perhaps had not been informed about what was happening at the top. However, in view of his NKVD background, Dekanozov’s message may just as well have been intentional; in a conversation with Söderblom ten days later, he took up the question of repatriating five Soviet seamen after the Swedish minister had mentioned Raoul Wallenberg. Bulganin first sent an arrest warrant to Budapest on 17 January. As mentioned earlier, Bulganin appears to have played only an instrumental role in this case. After that, Moscow put the lid on. On the other hand, Mme Kollontay continued to give soothing assurances to Raoul Wallenberg’s mother and to the wife of Foreign Minister Günther in February and March respectively, saying that he was in the Soviet Union and in good shape. To Mrs Günther she added that it would be advisable for the Swedes to keep calm. Some Russians are of the view that Mme Kollontay only repeated Dekanozov’s message to the Swedish Legation. In point of fact, she went further than Dekanozov, which she would hardly have done without instructions from the top. It should be added that Mme Kollontay’s message to Raoul Wallenberg’s mother was also published in the Swedish newspapers.
Apart from Stalin, there is reason to suspect Molotov of having been a strong advocate of sending Raoul Wallenberg to Moscow. Although Foreign Ministry papers give the impression that Molotov was not at all informed about Raoul Wallenberg before 1947, it seems more than likely that he was in the know from the start, particularly considering the involvement of both Bulganin and Abakumov and that it was a matter concerning a foreign diplomat. Moreover, Molotov received a copy of Dekanozov’s message on 16 January. Molotov sometimes summoned Abakumov to him, and Abakumov turned to him regarding the fate of the Swiss diplomats. In the late spring of 1947, Molotov was also involved in Stalin’s decision which was based on Abakumov’s proposal, to eliminate Oggins, an American citizen imprisoned in a Soviet camp.

As far as can be judged, the Russians were convinced in 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had undercover assignments, at all events ran errands for the Germans and, they strongly suspected, cooperated with American intelligence as well. The Russians were certainly convinced that the Jewish rescue action was only a cover for espionage. Colleagues of Abakumov have emphasised that Stalin suffered from spy-mania. As Wallenberg had to be accused of something, what better than to charge him with being a spy? This was perhaps sufficient cause for arresting and imprisoning diplomats from neutral countries even if it was of course contrary to international law. At one point, some effort was made to find evidence linking Raoul Wallenberg to espionage. However, as mentioned above, the Soviet leaders had political or other reasons for keeping Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow. The main purpose may have been to use him in an exchange, as happened with the Swiss (this is further discussed below). Furthermore, there may not have been any clearly defined purpose from the start. Other cases are known where prisoners were held more or less without any action being taken because Stalin had issued no orders, which in turn was due to his not having made up his mind.
IX Circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment in Moscow 1945-1947

Archive documents

The information obtained from German war prisoners about the time Raoul Wallenberg spent in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons between 1945-47 was confirmed in papers found in archives. However, considerable effort had been expended in eradicating traces of his stay in prison. References to him in interrogation or transfer records had been thickly blotted out. Once or twice, however, mention of Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder was overlooked and their names left untouched. Using modern technology, the blotted out texts have been restored, except where mechanical destruction also occurred. No personal or investigation file has been recovered. If, as it is claimed, he was never sentenced, no such file would have been opened. However, the Russian side has also stated that an investigation file could be drawn up as soon as compromising material existed, and a crime investigation begun on those grounds. Be that as it may, a personal file must have existed at one time. According to Russian experts, the fact that his belongings were not confiscated is a clear indication that he was not sentenced. This also applies to his driver, Langfelder. Nor has a personal file been found for his last cellmate, Roedel, while papers which would originally have been included in a personal file have been discovered in files of correspondence between various authorities etc.

Only in the case of two other prisoners in Lubianka and Lefortovo were their blotted out names encountered in records of interrogation summons and ledgers

microscopy, luminescent analysis and spectral characteristics
over belongings. They were Sándor Katona, driver at the Hungarian Legation in Sofia in 1944 who shared a cell with Langfelder for a while, and the Armenian-Italian Jesuit priest, Aladjan-Aladjani.

No blotted-out items were found in the registration ledgers from Lubianka and Lefortovo for the period after July 1947. The originals have been examined. It has not been possible to find confirmation in recovered documents and files that Raoul Wallenberg was also seen in Butyrka prison as well as Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons after July 1947. On the other hand, the greater part of Butyrka’s card index for the 1940s and 1950s is alleged to have been destroyed.

The following is known about Raoul Wallenberg’s time in prison, based on documents now available.

A registration card was found indicating that Raoul Wallenberg arrived at Lubianka Prison on 6 February 1945. It was alleged to have been found in 1989 among Raoul Wallenberg’s personal belongings in the KGB basement, i.e., not in the archive card index register. He was described as a war prisoner on the card, and the day of his arrest was given as 19 January. On the line for details of occupation was written: ‘diplomat.supervisor/ overseer (diplomatitj. nadsmotr)’ followed by his passport number. The term is difficult to interpret; no normal interpretation of supervisor/ overseer can be made in this context. In the view of an analyst with a KGB background, a reasonable interpretation could be that the writer of the card wanted to describe Raoul Wallenberg as a diplomatic observer on the grounds that there was a time limit on his diplomatic assignment. According to his cellmate Jan Loyda, he was once told by an interrogation leader that Raoul Wallenberg was not a diplomat. Roedel, who was adjutant to the German Ambassador in Bucharest, was described as a diplomatic official (diplomat. rabotnik).

Langfelder arrived on the same day as Raoul Wallenberg, according to a note indicating receipt of his suitcase. His registration card has not been found.

During his first stay in Lubianka (first in cell 121, with Gustav Richter and Otto Schlitter alias Scheuer, then in cell 123 with Jan Loyda and Willy Roedel), Raoul Wallenberg was interrogated twice. The first occasion took place on 8 February, two days after being registered. It was a typical night session lasting three and a
Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment in Moscow

half hours, from 01.05 to 04.35. Sverchuk (now deceased) led the interrogation. Langfelder was questioned the following night for just over two hours, from 01.30 to 03.40, by Kuzmishin, head of a section in Kartashov’s department.

The same man led the next interrogation with Raoul Wallenberg although not until 28 April. Much shorter this time, it lasted from 15.35 to 17.00 hours. On 29 May, Raoul Wallenberg was transferred from Lubianka to Lefortovo prison, to cell 203, together with Roedel.

Langfelder had moved to the same cell for a short time on 18 March. A receipt dated 20 March is registered for a large number of his personal effects.

The latter was interrogated for the second time in Lefortovo, between 14.00 and 15.00 hours on 10 April 1945. (Yendovitsky, now deceased, led the interrogation). Two more brief interrogations took place in 1945, between 14.50 and 15.45 on 16 August, and 14.30 to 15.00 on 15 December, led by Bubnov and Livchak respectively. Bubnov claims not to remember Langfelder, which may be true. It was a brief session and may have taken place at Langfelder’s request, to ask for or complain about something. The interrogation leaders normally dealt with a large number of cases.

It should be interposed here that the Swiss diplomats Feller and Meier arrived in Moscow on 4 March and were interrogated for the first time on the same day. Feller’s second interrogation took place on 23 March and the third on 10 April. The fourth and final occasion was in January 1946, just before the two were released.

Both Wallenberg and Langfelder were in Lefortovo throughout 1946 and were questioned twice, and on one occasion partly together. Langfelder was questioned by Weindorf on 3 July between 14.50 and 15.35. According to the interrogation report, Wallenberg was questioned for two and a half hours on 17 July by Kopelyansky, between 10.30 and 13.00 hours. This was the first time in 15 months. Langfelder joined him for the last 40 minutes, which was unusual. Kopelyansky questioned Raoul Wallenberg again on 30 August, between 10.40 and 12.20.
Kopelyansky has denied that he interrogated Raoul Wallenberg. He alleged that a high-ranking official, possibly Abakumov, signed the interrogation report in his (Kopelyansky’s) name but conducted the interrogation himself.

If this were the case, Abakumov must have used an interpreter. Among his colleagues in the security service, Kopelyansky was considered the best interpreter into German (further details below).

According to a letter from Kartashov dated 24 February 1947 (App. 16), to the directors of Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons, Raoul Wallenberg and Willy Roedel were to move from cell 203 in Lefortovo to cell 7 in Lubianka. The registration ledger indicates that the transfer of Roedel took place on 26 February. Raoul Wallenberg’s name had been crossed out although he was listed to be transferred that day. Something must have happened to postpone the move and a new note shows that it finally took place on 1 March (App. 17). It is not clear whether he was still taken to cell 7, but no order to the contrary has been found. Another registration ledger noted that Wallenberg’s belongings were received at Lubianka on 2 March. (This note had been erased by mechanical means and it has only been possible to restore the initials of Wallenberg’s first names. See App. 18). The last recorded interrogation with Raoul Wallenberg took place on 11 March 1947 between 14.15 and 16.00, led by Kuzmishin.

For his part, Langfelder was moved (once more to Lubianka) on 23 July.

A reservation should be made here that Raoul Wallenberg may have been interrogated more often than the interrogation reports show. On the other hand, his cellmates have confirmed that he was not often questioned.
Oral statements

Statements from people returning from imprisonment in the USSR

Already in the 1950's, German and other war prisoners provided interesting information about Raoul Wallenberg’s captivity. A detailed account was published in the 1957 White Paper. A summary follows.

Gustav Richter: Early in February 1945, Raoul Wallenberg wrote a letter in German addressed to the prison director in which he protested about the treatment he received and his detention. Raoul Wallenberg also requested that as a Swedish citizen and diplomat he should be put in touch with the Swedish mission in Moscow. His petition was handed to the sergeant on duty on the ground floor of Lubianka Prison.

Heinz-Helmut von Hinckeldey: As a Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg repeatedly made strong protests against his detention. As a diplomat of a neutral country, he was said to have demanded to be put in touch with a representative of the Swedish Legation in Moscow. When questioned, he was said to have refused to reply and referred to his diplomatic status.

Ernst Ludwig Wallenstein: Towards the end of 1945/46, Raoul Wallenberg intended to write a letter of protest but was not entirely sure to whom it should be addressed. By tapping on the prison walls, Wallenstein and Raoul Wallenberg discovered that French was the most suitable language in which to write personally to Stalin. The letter was written and forwarded through the prison guard (Wallenstein knew from his own experience that letters of this kind were usually forwarded).

Willy Bergemann: Raoul Wallenberg (in Lefortovo) repeatedly asked the commissar to tell him what was to happen to him. He had then been comforted with the excuse that a conference was to be held in Moscow in March 1947 to decide what should be done with prisoners⁶.

⁶ The interrogation leader was probably referring to the Allied peace conference about prisoners-of-war and war reparations held in Paris in 1946. This led to the peace agreements in
Bernhard Rensinghoff: Raoul Wallenberg wrote a letter in French referring to his diplomatic status and asking for an interview. The letter was addressed to Stalin in the summer of 1946, and asked that he be put in touch with the Swedish Embassy in Moscow.

Shortly before he and Roedel were transferred from Lefortovo Prison on 1 March 1947, Raoul Wallenberg was taken for questioning (no report recorded for this session). He was interrogated once more on 11 March, when again in Lubianka Prison. After the session referred to by Rensinghoff, Raoul Wallenberg said that the commissar had told him that he was quite clearly ‘a political case’. If he considered himself innocent, the onus was on him to prove it. The best proof of his guilt was the fact that neither the Swedish mission in Moscow nor the Swedish Government had done anything on his behalf. Raoul Wallenberg had asked the commissar leading the interrogation to be put in direct touch with the Swedish Legation in Moscow or the Red Cross, or in any case to be allowed to write to them. The commissar refused, saying that ‘nobody takes any notice of you. If the Swedish Government or its mission had been at all interested in you, they would have been in touch a long time ago’. Comment: This could be regarded as a devastating comment on the Swedish mission's lack of commitment, and of Söderblom in particular. On the other hand, it should be noted that only a month later, Vyshinsky observed that Sweden had approached the Soviet Union a great many times on Raoul Wallenberg’s behalf. Vyshinsky probably wrote this because the MID were nevertheless becoming irritated by the many Swedish approaches, and he wanted to find a solution to the case.

On another occasion, Raoul Wallenberg announced that he asked an interrogation official whether or not he was to be sentenced. He was told that ‘for political reasons you will never be sentenced’.

In recent years, the working group has had a further opportunity of talking to Gustav Richter. This time he briefly described the environment during Raoul
Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment in Moscow

Wallenberg’s first weeks in Lubianka. Sometimes a blond officer of Scandinavian appearance would come into the cell to survey the situation. He spoke excellent German. Raoul Wallenberg was once taken for questioning around midnight, returning to the cell about six o’clock in the morning, looking pale. The interrogation leader had been the blond officer, and Raoul Wallenberg called him a ‘terrible man’. He was referring to Sverchuk.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, it also became possible to interview Jan Loyda for the first time as he lived in the former GDR. This happened twice. Previously, only information at third hand existed about him.

Loyda described how Raoul Wallenberg was moved into the cell which he (Loyda) shared with Willy Roedel (counsellor at the German Legation in Bucharest) in March/ April 1945. Raoul Wallenberg explained that he had come to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet authorities about Soviet shelling of Swedish Legation property, inter alia, and to obtain protection for the Jews (Loyda’s was somewhat unclear over the way in which Raoul Wallenberg expressed himself on this point). Raoul Wallenberg was convinced that his capture was an inexplicable mistake. During the six to eight weeks that the three men shared a cell, Raoul Wallenberg was convinced that the mistake would be cleared up and the intended negotiations begin. No interrogation took place during this period. Raoul Wallenberg was in good health, exercised regularly and often used to sing. He made a sketch of a victory monument in honour of the Red Army (sic). Loyda gave Raoul Wallenberg lessons in Russian and he learnt English from him in return. After Raoul Wallenberg was moved elsewhere, Loyda and Roedel shared a cell with Vilmos Langfelder, who introduced himself as Raoul Wallenberg’s assistant. He, too, was convinced that their capture was a mistake. (Loyda’s memory was at fault on this point. Roedel was transferred to Lefortovo at the same time as Raoul Wallenberg).

During an interrogation in Lubianka Prison, the leader asked Loyda with whom he had shared a cell. With two diplomats, he had said. The interrogation leader had replied that Raoul Wallenberg was not a diplomat but a Swede who helped rich Jews in Hungary. Another time, Loyda gave a slightly different version of the interrogation leader’s remarks: ‘The German is a diplomat but the Swede is not’.
Loyda stated that the MGB later forced him to sign an undertaking not to mention to anyone what he had seen or heard during his stay in prison, on pain of severe punishment.

Interviews with former security service officials

The working group also interviewed a number of former employees from Smersh, MGB, the Lefortovo and Lubianka prisons, and obtained information of more or less indirect interest in forming a picture of Raoul Wallenberg’s experiences in Moscow between 1945-47.

According to one of Kartashov’s colleagues, the first culling of information from a newly-arrived prisoner was made by whichever member of staff was available. The head of department/section then decided who would deal with the case. Specially important cases were passed to the investigation section. Kartashov could only have worked through an interpreter, and the first choice would have been Kopelyansky although there were a couple of others who were very good. Furthermore, Kartashov was alleged not to be very knowledgeable about international issues or western espionage.

One interrogation leader held the view that Raoul Wallenberg would only have come in contact with a narrow circle of officials, as his role was clearly ‘decided by someone in command’. The fact that a diplomat from a country not at war with the USSR was being held in captivity would have been kept very secret. It is perplexing that the Swiss diplomats did not meet any other prisoners, while Wallenberg and Langfelder were given prisoner-of-war status and put with other war prisoners, mainly German or Austrian.

The designation ‘particularly important prisoner’ given to Raoul Wallenberg by officials in command at the MGB was otherwise given to intelligence personnel, diplomats etc.

A prison guard remembered Raoul Wallenberg from Lubianka (1946 or 1947) and that he was in cell no. 116 or 117. He regarded Wallenberg as German and remembered that he was seldom taken for questioning.
Two investigators from the section dealing with particularly important cases, whose special assignment was to prepare for the Nuremberg Process, said that they should have known about the Raoul Wallenberg case at the time but did not in fact do so. However, like many of those interviewed, they pointed out the two authorised interpreters/operators who were most fluent in German and who would therefore have been involved in the most important cases. Others pointed out some other interpreters. One of the two interpreters referred to above claimed that he first heard about Raoul Wallenberg in 1947, and considered that it must have been his colleague who interpreted at the interrogations (this was later confirmed by the interrogation report). He stressed that both Abakumov and Kartashov preferred to use his colleague.

Kopelyansky was the colleague singled out, and the working group interviewed him several times. He is alleged to have interrogated a great number of German intelligence officers. He, too, had heard about a Swede arrested on Voroshilov’s orders and held in prison under a number. However, he was unable to recollect whether he had participated as interrogator or interpreter, in interrogating Wallenberg. He claimed not to understand the notes on the interrogation report. He thought that some chief had questioned Raoul Wallenberg instead, but had signed his name on the report. As all the chiefs needed an interpreter, someone else must have been summoned; it was also possible that a Swedish-speaking official from intelligence had been called in. In one interview, Kopelyansky recollected that he may have participated as an interpreter but did not remember anything about it. He had a vague memory of a prisoner in civilian clothes. On one occasion Kopelyansky recalled that the course of events may possibly have been as follows: A chief told him to bring in a prisoner. Kopelyansky was to sit down for a while and invite him to take tea and sandwiches with him, ask how he was and chat for a while. Kopelyansky did not need to take any further interest himself as he, the chief, would see to it that the prisoner was taken care of....

The working group came no further in their talks with Kopelyansky. Moreover, he could not recall questioning Gustav Richter, although he had done so according to the interrogation report. It was also interesting to note his very strong reaction on seeing a photograph of Roedel; even his face grew pale and he temporarily lost the faculty of speech. According to the report, Kopelyansky questioned Roedel on 18 July 1946, the day after the alleged interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg.
Kopelyansky also interrogated Gfrorner, the man from Abwehr mentioned earlier. As proof that he had not dealt with the Raoul Wallenberg case as well, Kopelyansky pointed out that he had not asked a single question about Raoul Wallenberg while interrogating Gfrorner. On another occasion, he stated that Gfrorner did not once mention Raoul Wallenberg's name. Kopelyansky's memory appeared to be very clear on this point. The interrogations with Gfrorner occurred in 1949 and later, i.e., at a time when Kopelyansky ought to have known what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg.

At the time in question, Pitovranov had only heard from the deputy head of section, Utechin,' that the Raoul Wallenberg case was very important and complicated'. Utechin was also one of the heads of counter espionage at the front and would certainly have known more. He appears to have been responsible for transferring Raoul Wallenberg to Moscow. A case of this importance must have been reported direct to Stalin. The reason for Raoul Wallenberg being interrogated so seldom was certainly because of Stalin's order to the MGB not to do anything without special instructions. Perhaps Stalin had something particular in mind for Raoul Wallenberg which he did not mention to anyone else? This theory would fit in well with the fact that Raoul Wallenberg was considered a political case who would never be sentenced. In Pitovranov's view, Raoul Wallenberg was kept under special conditions and treated well. The latter is later alleged to have told the war historian and journalist, Lev Bezymensky, that shortly after Raoul Wallenberg returned to Lubianka on 1 March 1947, he was transferred to the MGB governor's building and provided with particularly good rations.

Kondrashov, an official at the MGB 2nd Main Directorate, was sometimes called to other sections as well as to Abakumov, although mainly to translate papers. He did not participate in interrogations very often. However, some time in the spring of 1947, he was ordered by an officer who was unknown to him, to interpret at the interrogation of a prisoner in civilian clothing at Lubianka Prison. He understood later that it must have been Raoul Wallenberg. It was some kind of control session, going through information already obtained and involving papers containing lists found on the prisoner when he was arrested. The interrogation leader was also interested in Raoul Wallenberg's contacts with Germans and Americans. The interrogation took place calmly in daylight and lasted about 1 ½
to 2 hours (confirmed in the report which noted that the session lasted from 14.15 to 16.00 hours on 11 March). The interrogation leader was Kuzmishin. Kondrashov has given different versions of Kuzmishin’s ability to interpret from German or English. According to colleagues, he spoke poor German (only one maintained that Kuzmishin spoke German fluently). According to Kondrashov, no report was made of the proceedings.

Very few new, definite facts have emerged in recent years about the time Raoul Wallenberg spent in prison between 1945-1947, even if ‘the other side’, i.e., the security services, have shed more light on the period. The most obvious aspect of the emerging picture is that during the first two years the treatment meted out to Raoul Wallenberg was not noticeably different to that of his fellow prisoners. The change began at the end of February and early March 1947, for reasons that remain partly shrouded in mystery.
X How the Soviet authorities and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs dealt with the Wallenberg case

Since September 1991, the Soviet/Russian side has handed over a large number of documents with a direct or indirect bearing on Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. Most illustrate the actions of Soviet authorities from January 1945 until primarily 1957. The choice of papers from later years is more selective, however, although some released documents illustrate events after 1957 as well. As recently as this year (2000), a collection of papers from the President’s Archive reflects how the case was dealt with at top level during the final years of the 1980’s and the early 1990’s. It should be pointed out that the papers by no means provide the whole truth. As far as can be judged, a great many are missing, particularly from former KGB records. Besides, a considerable amount of contact between authorities may have taken place over the telephone. It is also obvious that some documents contain a revised version of events. The attempts to suppress the real truth run like a main thread through many of the papers. It should also be pointed out that the authorities involved were those which prepared the cases, i.e., the Foreign Ministry (MID) and KGB. The Central Committee (and its secretariat) and the Politbureau had no hand in preparatory work. They dealt with questions put before them and took decisions that were based on proposals submitted by the authorities.

Very little material was released prior to September 1991, but from papers handed over in recent years it is apparent that an internal sifting of material took place at least during 1989-1990.
Documentation

Detailed reports of the way in which the Soviet authorities handled the case in the 1940's and 1950's are contained in some of the Foreign Ministry's memoranda that were handed over to the Swedish side. The following quotations emanate from just such a memorandum from 1952 (App. 19).

The Soviet authorities first dealt directly with the case on 31 December 1944 when Staffan Söderblom, the Swedish Minister in Moscow, handed a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID) containing the names of the members of the Swedish Legation in Budapest and stating that they were threatened with forced evacuation by the local authorities. Söderblom sought assistance for the Swedes when they were encountered.

The same day, Dekanozov, Deputy Foreign Minister, informed Antonov, chief of the general staff, and asked him to issue suitable appropriate instructions to the front command. This was done in a cipher telegram to the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Front troops on 2 January 1945. The instructions read that any member of the mission whom they encountered should be placed under the protection of the Red Army and the general staff informed.

The orders issued in January are described in Chapter V.

Once again, Dekanozov's letter of 16 January to Söderblom should be recalled in which he stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been found. Interestingly, copies were sent immediately to Molotov, Vyshinsky and several Foreign Ministry departments. On the archive copy was scribbled 'Wallenberg's file' (delo V allenberga). Several Foreign Ministry files dealing with the Wallenberg case have 'Relating to Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg' written on the covers.

It should also be noted that one of the above-mentioned internal MID memoranda referred to Alexandra Kollontay having informed Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel, in February 1945 that her son was in the safekeeping of the Soviet Union. The MID paper does not indicate how she obtained the information nor the instructions relating to it. The only item on record is that Mme Kollontay later (in July 1947) received approval for her draft
It should be mentioned that in 1998, Emmy Lorentzon, who was Mme Kollontay’s confidante in Stockholm for many years, talked to representatives from the Swedish mission in Moscow at a home for the aged where she was living. She said that on her return to Moscow, Kollontay began inquiring about Raoul Wallenberg. She was soon told to stop, and in 1948 was informed that the Swedish diplomat had died in prison of an illness in 1947. Lorentzon was not able to provide any further details.

On 17 March 1945, Vetrov, the head of a section of the MID, wrote a memorandum to Dekanozov. He stated that the Swedish mission had sent three notes requesting that Ivan Danielsson and Wallenberg receive items addressed to them from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as a ‘consignment of goods’ that was addressed to Danielsson. As the question of evacuating foreign diplomats from Hungary, including the Swedes, was resolved and they would soon be leaving, Vetrov proposed 1) not to reply to the notes and not to send anything to Budapest, 2) to inform Söderblom orally, when the Swedish mission arrived in the USSR, it was decided to evacuate them.

Söderblom proposed in somewhat cryptic wording in February 1945 that through Soviet channels, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should confirm Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic status and instruct him to get in touch with the provisional Hungarian government in Debrecen. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied by asking Söderblom to inform Ivan Danielsson as soon as possible that he should make contact with the new Hungarian government. Wallenberg should attach himself to Danielsson. A note on the file copy indicates that Söderblom’s proposal was shown to the Foreign Minister, ‘who was most inclined to instruct Wallenberg to travel home if he did not feel that Swedish interests required his remaining there and contacting the Debrecen government. In view of the uncertainty with regard to Danielsson’s fate, no instructions should be issued. The Debrecen government will probably not now be recognised.’ Söderblom appears to have been aware that his initiative could be interpreted as a desire to keep out of the case by making it a Swedish-Hungarian issue. In a personal letter.
to von Post on 30 April, he pointed out that his proposal for a démarche to the Hungarian government was not at all aimed at ‘relieving this mission from continuing to deal with the case, but rather to seek by means of parallel efforts in other channels, to achieve the best possible results. As I pointed out earlier, it is unfortunately probable that the matter may remain an unsolved mystery.’

As mentioned earlier, Mme Kollontay told Wallenberg’s mother and Mrs Günther in February and March that Raoul Wallenberg was in Soviet safekeeping. On 9 February, the Swedish Legation in Moscow received instructions to ascertain what had happened to the staff in Budapest. This was repeated on 17 February. Enquiries were also made at the legations in Rome (in the event that the Vatican knew something), Bucharest and Berlin. On 2 March, the legation in Bucharest announced that everyone except Raoul Wallenberg was safe at the mission. Raoul Wallenberg was said to be planning a car journey to an unknown destination. The message was forwarded to Berlin and Moscow. On 17 March, the mission in Moscow received instructions to ‘request information energetically’ because of conflicting rumours regarding the whereabouts of Danielsson, Anger and Raoul Wallenberg. Two days later, Bucharest was instructed to seek information from the Hungarian government and through other channels. The Bucharest legation announced that the staff from Budapest had arrived there on 27 March. Instructions sent to Moscow the same day stated that in view of the others’ arrival in Bucharest it was particularly urgent to find out about Raoul Wallenberg. The American Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, offered Söderblom American assistance on 12 April, which he refused (and did not mention in his report to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 19 April while at the same time writing misleadingly about American actions). Söderblom also reported to Stockholm the same day that ‘I am afraid that with the best will in the world the Russians are unable to shed any light on what happened ... possible that Raoul Wallenberg has been killed in some kind of car accident or murdered, ... in fact he has disappeared without a trace’. Two days later, Söderblom received very definite instructions from Stockholm: ‘You are hereby firmly instructed to call on Dekanozov’. On 24 April, some time after all the legation staff except Raoul Wallenberg had arrived in Sweden from Bucharest via Moscow, Söderblom sent a letter to Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov. He asked the Soviet side to take urgent action to find Raoul Wallenberg, but without mentioning Dekanozov’s announcement of 16 January. An internal Soviet memorandum noted that as he handed over the letter, Söderblom remarked, inter alia, as follows: ‘It is possible
that he (Raoul Wallenberg) has been in some kind of accident'. Not only did the Soviet-controlled Radio Kossuth in Hungary spread this disinformation but Swedes were told about it from Jews arriving in Bucharest from Budapest. Even Langlet said something to this effect. 'In replying to a question from Dekanozov, Söderblom presumed that Raoul Wallenberg may have died in a car accident'. Söderblom said this in spite of the announcement of the self-same Dekanozov on 16 January that Raoul Wallenberg was in the hands of Soviet troops in Budapest. It cannot fail to be noted that the Russians had borne Söderblom’s assumptions in mind when replying (Vyshinsky’s note to the Swedish Mission) in August 1947.

As a result of this and one or two subsequent approaches, the MID (then NKID) wrote to the NKGB asking for news of Raoul Wallenberg in order to reply to the Swedish Government. The NKGB (Merkulov) replied on 8 August 1945 that they had no information about the Swedish diplomat (who was in the hands of Smersh just then).

Sweden then made a number of approaches and official calls during the remainder of 1945 and 1946 concerning Raoul Wallenberg (see the Chapter 'Chronology of the first phase of the Raoul Wallenberg case'). Further evidence was handed over on some of these occasions, giving the names of Soviet soldiers said to have escorted Raoul Wallenberg out of Budapest on 17 January 1945, and also sightings of him in prisons in Moscow. The first definite testimony in the latter category came from Edward af Sandeberg on his return home in the spring of 1946. He stated, inter alia, that a German he met in Butyrka Prison had encountered Raoul Wallenberg in other Moscow prisons. The Foreign Ministry referred the matter to Abakumov, head of Smersh, and to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), which then forwarded it to the head of MGB archives, explaining that Raoul Wallenberg was not to be found in the MVD camp system. No reply was received from Smersh or the MGB despite several reminders from the MID, including one on 3 February 1946 in which Abakumov asked for a speedy reply because it was needed for a top level presentation. An internal MGB document dated 12 August 1946 indicates that the enquiry was referred to the MID 3rd Main Directorate. Kuzmishin was one of the names mentioned.

A very remarkable conversation took place on 26 December 1945, between Staffan Söderblom and Abramov, a head of department at the MID. According to the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s notes, Söderblom gave an account of what he
knew about Raoul Wallenberg’s last days in Budapest, but added: ‘I would
genuinely like to give you my personal opinion on this matter. I know of course
that my opinion cannot be of a personal nature, but in this case I would like you
to consider it as personal. I take it that Wallenberg is not alive. It is possible that
he died in a German air raid or in an attack by some Hungarian or German
military unit operating behind the Soviet troops. The Red Army began an
extensive attack shortly after Wallenberg was taken to Debrecen. As a result, staff
and archives were being moved out and at that point it appeared to be impossible
to obtain any information on Wallenberg’s fate. It would be splendid if the
mission were to be given a reply in this spirit, that is to say, that Wallenberg is
dead. It is necessary first and foremost because of Wallenberg’s mother who is
still hoping her son is alive. She is wasting her strength and health on a fruitless
search. I have consulted Mme Kollontay about this in the past few days. She
agrees with me and recommended that I spoke to you openly about it, which is
what I am doing. I stress once again that my request for a reply from the Soviet
government, and the contents of this reply is a personal request and my personal
opinion’. Abramov replied that he would forward Söderblom’s information to the
competent Soviet body, that possibly it would facilitate the search for Wallenberg
although they did not have any information at present, either about where he was
located or whether he was dead.

Söderblom’s report to Stockholm about his conversation with Abramov gave no
indication of its personal message. The report is attached to Appendix 20.

The question now arises over the reliability of the Soviet notes on talks with
Swedish representatives. After a large quantity of documents were made available
from the Russian foreign policy archives, it can generally be stated that the
reports of Soviet Embassy talks held in Stockholm were often rearranged to suit
what the writer expected they wanted to hear in Moscow, or what the writer
wished to achieve. It was not easy for the Soviet Foreign Ministry to control the
exact words used in talks of this kind. However, notes written in Moscow about
talks with Swedish representatives probably show a greater degree of reliability.
The Soviet representative was seldom alone, and there was thus more risk in
manipulating the text; discipline was strict. In this context it should also be
pointed out that the most serious of Söderblom’s remarks were reproduced in
quotation marks in the Soviet notes.
Swedish minister calls on Stalin

Stalin received Söderblom on 15 June 1946. At a meeting with Molotov on 6 June (at which the Wallenberg case was not specifically mentioned), Söderblom attempted to arrange a meeting with the Soviet leader. In his own words, his intention was to point out for the benefit of Soviet bureaucracy and Stockholm the excellence of Swedish-Soviet relations, and (implicitly) Söderblom’s own position. Interestingly, a Politbureau meeting was held on 13 June at which most members participated together with three top officials from the Foreign Ministry (Molotov, Vyshinsky and Dekanozov), which was very unusual. The presence of Zhdanov indicates that matters concerning Finland were on the agenda, but it is not far-fetched to believe that the issue of Raoul Wallenberg was also touched upon. No Soviet notes have been found on the talk with Söderblom, nor any trace of any order that Stalin may have given. It appears not uncommon that notes on Stalin’s conversations were not preserved; after being copied, they were returned to his own office. A footnote in the above-mentioned MID memorandum from 1952 noted that ‘according to Swedish information’, Stalin received Söderblom on 15 June 1946, and thereupon promised to give orders for a search to be made for Raoul Wallenberg. The only person present was Lozovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister, who became assistant head of the Information Bureau shortly afterwards. He was later murdered on Stalin’s orders, together with Michoels, chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

According to Söderblom’s own report (App. 21), Stalin made a note of Raoul Wallenberg’s name. After Söderblom remarked that Raoul Wallenberg had disappeared without a trace, Stalin pointed out that the Soviet side had given orders to protect the Swedes. This proves that Stalin was acquainted with the case (making a note of Wallenberg’s name was probably mainly for show). Although Söderblom referred to Dekanozov’s announcement on 16 January, he expressed his personal conviction that Raoul Wallenberg had fallen victim to an accident, or had been kidnapped. Stalin then asked, “Did you not receive a message from us?” The question is whether this does not allude to Mme Kollontay’s message a year earlier (about which Söderblom did not appear to be aware and therefore answered in the negative). The Swedish minister said that he assumed that the Soviet authorities had no information on Raoul Wallenberg’s fate but that he very much wanted to receive an official statement to the effect that all possible steps were being taken to find him. Once again, Söderblom spoke of his belief that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. Nevertheless, Stalin promised to take up the
Wallenberg case and see to it that it was investigated and cleared up (if Söderblom’s notes are to be believed). Söderblom’s conversation with Stalin lasted just five minutes although Stalin had reserved a whole hour for the visit, according to his appointments diary.

The diary also showed that Stalin’s assistant, Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky, remained almost a whole hour alone with Stalin. The Russians were very likely perplexed by Söderblom’s behaviour. The question of the Soviet perception of Swedish actions is dealt with later in the report. However, it should be noted that Söderblom’s often repeated conviction that Raoul Wallenberg had been killed did not give rise to any comment in the Soviet record of the conversation, and was not mentioned in the summarised memorandum on the case. This can probably be explained by the fact that the MID were only responsible for official contacts with Sweden. On the other hand, Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest and imprisonment and possible exchange fell under the jurisdiction of the security services and did not concern the MID. Experienced officials ought not to have found it difficult to imagine the true situation, but their actions could only be grounded on a formal decision received from Smersh.

Lozovsky received Ulf Barck-Holst, Counsellor at the Swedish Legation, on 13 December, who enquired about the results of the investigation promised by Stalin. Lozovsky claimed not to have anything to do with the case. Nevertheless, notes of the conversation were sent to Abakumov with a request from Molotov and Dekanozov for a report and presentation.

In November 1946, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Östen Undén met Molotov in New York but did not raise the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate.

More about Russian exchange proposals

An interesting conversation took place on 12 December 1946, when the chargé d’affaires, Ulf Barck-Holst, called on Sysoyev, head of the 5th European Department of the MID. Sysoyev went to counter-attack by raising the cases of several Soviet defectors to Sweden, and describing them as being the real problem in Swedish-Soviet relations. Ulf Barck-Holst interpreted this as if the Wallenberg case was being used as some kind of basis for negotiation. The Soviet
notes on the conversation (App. 15) show no explicit support for this interpretation, but a Soviet hint was hardly ever expressed in clearer terms.

About six months earlier, on 30 April, Söderblom reported a conversation with Abramov, a MID official; ‘In this context Abramov let slip the comment that Mr af Sandeberg (the first to give testimony about Raoul Wallenberg) had been found and was probably back home by now. This might be perceived as a hint that Raoul Wallenberg was still alive after all...’ However, Abramov may have mentioned the return home of af Sandeberg in order to make it appear credible that Raoul Wallenberg would also be sent home if found. Abramov also asked Söderblom to procure the return of the Makarova girl to her father. The Soviet notes make no mention of af Sandeberg. On the other hand, Abramov did make a direct connection between Raoul Wallenberg and Makarova, as follows; ‘I replied that the search for Wallenberg continued and reminded him in this connection of Lida Makarova’s fate. Despite her father’s requests, despite repeated approaches from our Ambassador to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, she has still not been returned to the Soviet Union’ (App. 14).

Notwithstanding all the hints about an exchange in these and other conversations, a member of the MID College, Novikov, wrote letters, on 28 November 1945, 3 February and 20 March 1946, requesting that Smersh hasten their reply about Raoul Wallenberg, because Sweden had handed over photographs and testimony from witnesses in Budapest.

Discussions at prime minister level took place in the autumn of 1946 about the case of a Soviet citizen, Granovsky, seaman and self-confessed NKVD agent, who defected to Sweden some time after Söderblom’s talk with Stalin. Tage Erlander wrote in his diary that he had a ‘truly dismal conversation’ with the Soviet minister about the case of the seaman, the minister being ‘extremely obstinate, even making allowances for his poor knowledge of the language; the way he formulated his words make them appear so naked and abrupt that one is completely taken aback. I became quite curt and unsympathetic.’ Chernyshov let it be understood that Swedish-Soviet relations were endangered by Sweden’s refusal to extradite Granovsky, Makarova etc. Erlander, on the other hand, maintained that a matter of repatriation should not be allowed to have such an effect. No Swedish notes on the conversation have been found, and in the days that followed a dispute broke out between Chernyshov and Westman, the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, on exactly what was said. However, internally at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the foreign minister, Östen Undén, was in favour of handing over Granovskiy to the Russians (although not in exchange for Wallenberg), an issue that was not touched upon at all. Both Westman and the head of the political department, Grafström, were opposed to this.

The passivity with which Staffan Söderblom dealt with the Wallenberg case was remarkable. It should be seen in the light of his appointment as envoy to Moscow in the summer of 1944, after his predecessor had been declared persona non grata. His assignment was to improve Sweden’s relations with the USSR. At the same time, he was certainly aware that the Soviet Union - as well as Swedish critics of the coalition government’s policy - considered him partly responsible for concessions made to Nazi Germany between 1940-1942 while he was head of the political department. This was no sound base on which to firmly uphold Sweden’s interests. Nevertheless, his remarks to Abramov in December 1945 appear extremely peculiar, particularly in view of his experience as a professional diplomat. Unless he had obtained support from leading politicians during his talks in Stockholm immediately prior to his meeting with Abramov - of which there is no evidence - his remarks raise a question mark about his judgement. The same is perhaps also true of his mental health which six years later had deteriorated so much that he had to leave active service at the age of 51.

It was also strange that although the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm was aware of the lack of energy with which he pursued the Wallenberg case, it did not appear to have resulted in his being admonished. Not even the leading officials at the Ministry, who were otherwise critical of the Soviet Union and distrusted Söderblom’s judgement, appear to have reacted. However, it should be noted that it has not been possible to determine the extent to which the most obvious of these signs - his remarks at his farewell audience with Stalin in June 1946 - was known to anyone other than the foreign minister; the original despatch, initialled by those who had read it, has not been found in the Ministry’s archives.

The meeting between the new Minister, Gunnar Hägglöf (Söderblom was transferred from Moscow in the summer of 1946) and Novikov, a member of the MID College, on 30 January 1947 is worth noting. Novikov pointed out that
although the Soviet inquiry had been continuing for a long time without success, he felt that it should be taken into account that ‘Raoul Wallenberg landed in the arms of the Red Army in a period of fierce fighting in Hungary; anything could have happened, such as Raoul Wallenberg escaping, enemy air attacks etc.’. Hägglöf replied, according to Novikov, that he did not discount this but hoped for the best possible outcome. According to Hägglöf, Novikov also mentioned that there were certainly still camps in the USSR which had not yet complied with the order to search for Raoul Wallenberg, but later asked Hägglöf to disregard this remark.

MID informed that Raoul Wallenberg is in Moscow

The security service had still not replied to the Foreign Ministry’s enquiries at the beginning of 1947. However, in December 1946, Sysoyev of the 5th European Department of the MID stated in a memorandum about a conversation with Ulf Barck-Holst, ‘Some time ago Burashnikov, head of Section 2 of Smersh, telephoned to Chebotarev (MID) saying that it would be desirable if Vyshinsky telephoned Abakumov on this matter”. This must be regarded as the first clear hint in an MID document that Raoul Wallenberg might be in the Soviet Union (record of conversation submitted to Abakumov).

Fedotov of the MGB spoke to Novikov in February 1947, telling him that Raoul Wallenberg was held by the MGB. Fedotov promised to let Molotov know the reasons for Wallenberg’s arrest (zaderzjka) and to submit proposals for further action on the matter.

A reference was made to Novikov’s conversation with Fedotov in a memorandum from Vetrov to Molotov in which the former originally reproduced Novikov’s remarks to Hägglöf, i.e., that Raoul Wallenberg may already be dead in Hungary. Novikov replaced this in the draft copy with handwritten information obtained from Fedotov (App. 22). He also asked Vetrov to rewrite the letter in one copy only and hand it personally to Podtserob, head of Molotov’s office. Vetrov was not to use his own secretary when rewriting the memorandum but get it done at the office of Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky. This indicates that Fedotov’s information was treated with great caution and probably circulated to only a very small group.
Fedotov’s oral statement was also mentioned in an agenda that Vetrov prepared for Vyshinsky on 2 April 1947 (App. 23). The records do not show whether the intended presentation of the case to Molotov ever took place. Probably not. Vetrov’s memorandum to Vyshinsky of 2 April 1947 mentioned that Fedotov was working on the matter but had not yet presented it. Clearly, the MGB (Abakumov) did not know how to deal with Raoul Wallenberg.

The head of the Soviet Red Cross, Kolesnikov, received a letter about Raoul Wallenberg from Folke Bernadotte in May 1947. As a result, Kolesnikov passed the enquiry to Vyshinsky and to the MVD Main Directory for war prisoners and internees whose representative, Kobulov (a confidant of Beria), asked the MID what they knew about the matter on 11 June. He received an answer by telephone the following day. (Kobulov’s enquiry could be interesting as it perhaps indicates that Beria and his closest colleague were not fully informed about Raoul Wallenberg. However, it was more likely that they wanted to know how to formulate their reply).

Vyshinsky wants to settle the Raoul Wallenberg case

After Vetrov drafted the memorandum for Vyshinsky on 2 April 1947, the latter wrote a memorandum to Molotov on 13 May (App. 24) in which he stated that Sweden had made eight written and five oral approaches concerning Raoul Wallenberg since 24 April 1945. He also attached importance to the fact that questions on the subject had been raised in the Swedish Parliament as well as what he described as a press campaign in Sweden. Vyshinsky further mentioned that the MID had repeatedly asked for information from Smersh and MGB to no avail, except for a promise from Fedotov of the MGB to talk personally to Molotov about the case and to propose further action. As a result, Vyshinsky wanted to ask Molotov to prevail upon/order Abakumov to ‘give a report on the substance of the case and propose a “termination”’. The expression in Russian means “liquidation” which can be construed two ways, alluding to the case as well as the person. However, it is not very likely that it refers to anything other than the case. Molotov wrote on the memorandum on 18 May 1947, ‘To Abakumov. Please report to me’. (Molotov was deputy head of government at the time).
The next important document is a letter dated 7 July 1947, from Vyshinsky, the Deputy Foreign Minister, direct to Abakumov (App. 25). Vyshinsky referred to an enquiry from Henry Wallace, the US Secretary of Trade, about Raoul Wallenberg, and also specifically mentioned that the Swedish Embassy in Moscow was told on 16 January 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had been taken into safekeeping by Soviet military authorities in Budapest. He stressed that the Swedes had pursued the matter intensively ever since, approaching the MID a number of times ‘for at least some kind of answer’. Then follows the key sentence, ‘In order to solve the matter of a reply (to the Swedes) and its contents, it is important to receive information about the place where Wallenberg was taken into protection by Soviet military forces, his present whereabouts, the places to which he was sent and whether any fighting or bombing occurred at these places, whether Wallenberg had freedom of movement or was under constant surveillance and whether at this point in time he is in contact with or met members of the Swedish mission in Vienna (sic) or other foreigners’. The letter concluded by asking Abakumov to write or send a report on these matters.

In considering the contents of the letter, it should be borne in mind that at this stage Vyshinsky knew that Raoul Wallenberg was being held in a Soviet prison (probably most of the MID officials concerned had understood this much earlier). He was urging Abakumov to provide background material for a reply which would attempt to convince the Swedes that Raoul Wallenberg had disappeared in Budapest, which was also strongly hinted at in the official reply a month later. The contents of the letter was thus fatal - in practice it meant that a solution to the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s future had to be found (Vyshinsky had earlier demanded a proposed settlement of the case) in a manner that did not undermine the credibility of the version under preparation. Vyshinsky thus assumed that an official acknowledgement of Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in an MGB prison was out of the question. Clearly, further informal contacts had taken place between the MID and MGB which were not reflected in the records. Or did Vyshinsky quite simply have prior knowledge of what was in store for Raoul Wallenberg?

The new minister, Rolf Sohlman, met the MID official Vetrov on 16 July (Gunnar Hägglöf had already been posted elsewhere). Once again, the Soviet side anticipated what was to come. In a personal comment, Vetrov wanted to point out that fighting had been particularly bitter around Budapest towards the end of
January 1945. There was much that indicated that Raoul Wallenberg had died even though no evidence had been found.

Vyshinsky sent a brief reminder to Abakumov on 22 July 1947 (App. 26), asking him to expedite his reply to the above letter, on the grounds that ‘the matter has been activated in Sweden’ (a petition signed by a number of Swedish organisations was handed to the Soviet mission in Stockholm on 15 July).

The bottom left-hand corner of this letter contains one of the most important notes found in the entire archive material handed over by the Russians. The head of MID’s Scandinavian section wrote on 23 July 1947, ‘Ab (Abakumov) replied on 17/ 7 1947 in a personal letter to Molotov under reference no. 3044/ a’.

The memorandum so often referred to also pointed out that an accompanying briefing note mentioned the receipt of a letter from Abakumov to Molotov at the latter’s office. The letter was addressed to Molotov in his capacity as vice chairman of the Council of Ministers.

A copy has also been obtained of the KGB register of outgoing letters (App. 27) showing that the letter was despatched on 17 July 1945. It also showed that it concerned Raoul Wallenberg and had been drafted at the MGB 3rd Main Directorate under which Kartashov’s section was previously placed. The actual letter has not however been found. The Russian side’s explanation for this is that the letter was personal and particularly sensitive in character.

One of the chief tasks of the working group has of course been to try to find Abakumov’s letter. Every conceivable archive has been searched, including those of the MID and KGB. Moreover, enquiries were instituted at the President’s archives, where very top secret material is kept. Contact there was with Pichoya, former head of the Committee of Russian Archives, and General Volkogonov, both of whom have personally looked through over two thousand sealed envelopes between 1993-1994, where for a long time it was hoped to find the letter. One of the envelopes was found to contain, inter alia, the decisive paper relating to the Katyn Forest massacre. However, this search met with little success, and both Volkogonov and Pichoja reported that the letter was not in the archives.
The exact contents can therefore only be a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, it comprised a reply to Vyshinsky’s request, endorsed by Molotov, for a report concerning the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and a proposal for concluding the case that would serve as the basis of a reply to the Swedes. One hypothesis is that Abakumov told Molotov that something serious had taken place, such as death (independent of the circumstances). Another that Abakumov announced what they intended to do with Raoul Wallenberg and gave his comments on drafting a reply. Yet another, favoured by several high-ranking KGB representatives but which is perhaps more improbable, is that Abakumov asked Molotov for instructions on how to deal with Raoul Wallenberg.

The extreme importance and sensitivity of the communication can be seen from the fact that Molotov had not yet told Vyshinsky about the contents even after five days (22 July), and that it has not been found. If the letter only contained a reply to Vyshinsky’s questions it is difficult to see any reason for treating the letter differently from other papers. Furthermore, according to a former official in Molotov’s office, it was not uncommon for Molotov not to keep Vyshinsky fully informed; their relationship was somewhat strained.

Sweden informed

According to the Foreign Ministry’s archives, not much happened until 9 August when Vyshinsky sent a brief message to Molotov referring to Rolf Sohlman’s approach to Malik, the Deputy Foreign Minister on 12 June and suggested that a reply to the point at issue might be appropriate. He enclosed a draft reply, indicating particularly that it contained ‘the draft of which you are aware, together with an additional paragraph relating to the conversation between Novikov and Hägglöf on 30 January this year’. Vyshinsky was referring to the passage in which Novikov pointed out that Raoul Wallenberg fell into Red Army hands during fierce fighting in Hungary and that anything could have happened; escape, enemy air attacks and so on.

Molotov noted his agreement to Vyshinsky’s proposal, making some minor changes to the text.

Vyshinsky sent a personal note to Rolf Sohlman (App. 28) on 18 August 1947, containing the first official Soviet reply about Raoul Wallenberg. He maintained
that it had been established as a result of careful investigation that ‘Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and is unknown there’. Vyshinsky could certainly not deny that the MID had received a brief message on 14 January 1945 ‘based on indirect information from one of the commanders in Budapest to the effect that Wallenberg had been found. However, the information proved impossible to verify because of the bitter fighting taking place in the city. The officer who sent the message had not been found, nor had Raoul Wallenberg been found in a camp for prisoners-of-war and internees’, to quote the note (Raoul Wallenberg was in prison). He then referred to the earlier hypothesis, that Raoul Wallenberg may have fallen prey to the fighting. This only leaves the assumption that Wallenberg died during the fighting in the city of Budapest, or that he was captured by members of the Arrow Cross’.

It should be observed that Vyshinsky did not say outright that Raoul Wallenberg had never been in the Soviet Union, only that he was not there and that he was unknown (i.e., at that time). This is a typical Soviet formulation, which in any case looks like a lie to a Swede. It should be specially pointed out that Vyshinsky’s note was circulated to the entire Soviet leadership.

Nothing much happened on the Soviet side regarding the Raoul Wallenberg case for the next five years, and far fewer approaches were made to Moscow than between 1945-1947. However, one odd occurrence is worth a comment. A former member of the Arrow Cross was sentenced to death in a Hungarian court in 1948 for killing Wallenberg in Buda just before his departure to meet Marshal Malinovsky in Debrecen. The sentence was reported without comment in the above-mentioned MID memorandum, except to state that Swedish newspapers had completely dismissed the story.

New testimony and new Swedish approaches

The 1950's were characterised by more forcible Swedish action under the leadership of Arne S. Lundberg, the new Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. New and more reliable testimony about Raoul Wallenberg’s time in prison began to appear in 1951 and thereafter. Among the first was the testimony of the Italian diplomat, Claudio de Mohr. This resulted in Östen Undén, the Swedish Foreign Minister, handing a note to Rodionov, the Soviet
Ambassador on 1 February 1952, in which he requested inter alia the return of Raoul Wallenberg to Sweden.

When asked to comment, S.D. Ignatyev, the Minister of State Security, replied on 26 February to Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister, that the MGB did not consider it appropriate to alter in any way the nature of the reply given to the Swedes in Vyshinsky’s note of 18 August 1947 (App. 29). (It should be noted that by this time Abakumov had been arrested).

Three weeks later, Vyshinsky, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, sent a memorandum (App. 30) direct to Stalin, giving the history of the case but without revealing any other facts than those already mentioned in the Foreign Ministry’s document. One may ask why Vyshinsky could not explain more clearly what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg, even in an internal top secret document such as this. However, according to Russian experts, it was not uncommon to maintain the fiction, i.e., reproduce the official rather than the true version if the latter was felt to be extremely secret and conspiratorial. The truth also lay within the KGB remit and it was perhaps inappropriate for Vyshinsky to reveal it. It should be noted that Vyshinsky’s memorandum also drew Stalin’s attention to the Hungarian court judgment against members of the Arrow Cross in 1948. Vyshinsky fully agreed with the MGB recommendation not to alter the reply from 1947. After the Politbureau gave its approval, the reply handed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April also stated that the Soviet authorities had no further information about Raoul Wallenberg beyond that provided in 1947.

Following another Swedish approach in May of the same year, it was decided not to respond at all, unless the Swedes renewed their enquiry, in which case a oral reply would be given referring to the one given in April. Nevertheless, after the approach in May an exhaustive memorandum on the case was drawn up by the MID Scandinavian department (to which we refer several times in this text). This resulted in another memorandum from Vyshinsky (App. 31) addressed to Stalin in which he stated that ‘Raoul Wallenberg is alleged to have saved Jews in Hungary’. Once again, it is surprising that Vyshinsky does not give the true version even in an internal memorandum.

Both the above quotations were formulated by the Politbureau and therefore communicated only to Molotov and Vyshinsky.
The two Swedish approaches reported here were thus based on new, reliable testimony from witnesses and gave rise to the submission of two reports to Stalin. The Soviet side thus regarded them with some seriousness.

The Soviet firmly rejected further Swedish approaches made in 1953 and 1954; although Stalin was dead, Molotov and Vyshinsky were still at their posts, and I.A. Serov was the head of the KGB in 1954.

On 13 October 1953, Gromyko as Deputy Foreign Minister asked Serov for details about when and in what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg had died (App. 32). This was because a new presentation in the form of a memorandum was again being prepared for the Central Committee. Some weeks later, Serov replied that the KGB had nothing to add to their statement of 3 March 1952. (It is questionable whether Gromyko was on the whole allowed to know more about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate).

Sweden made further efforts to discover the truth in 1955, including a visit by the Swedish Ambassador, Rolf Sohlman, to Bulganin while President Voroshilov received a delegation of Swedish parliamentarians. The Soviet attitude was becoming slightly less dismissive - Voroshilov spoke of extensive inquiries taking place throughout the country. Sohlman told Bulganin that he was fully convinced that if found, Raoul Wallenberg would be returned to Sweden at once. Bulganin regretted that he had nothing new to say, declaring that in wartime both individuals and groups disappear. According to Sohlman’s report, Bulganin also mentioned that Raoul Wallenberg would be allowed to return home if he was found. Bulganin had made the case his business in the government, and had read Vyshinsky’s and others’ notes (and signed the arrest warrant, as mentioned earlier).

Clearly some inquiries, or at least discussion, took place at this time with a view to providing Sweden with new information. An interesting KGB paper was found in MID records, dated December 1955 (App. 33). It concerned a letter from the 1st Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) of the KGB to the head of the MID Scandinavian department regarding a proposed report to the Central Committee about Raoul Wallenberg. It referred to a paragraph in the proposed report which was enclosed but which has not now been found. The wording was
to be altered so that ‘the absence of information about Wallenberg is explained by his having been in the Soviet Union under a different name from the first post-war days until his death. This has been successfully established by meticulously checking the information obtained from the Swedes’. No equivalent reply has been found in the archives from other authorities to which it was sent on referral at the time.

Erlander and Hedlund in Moscow; new, irrefutable testimony presented

The turning point in the Soviet attitude to the Wallenberg case was drawing closer. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, and Gunnar Hedlund, Minister of the Interior, planned to visit Moscow towards the end of March 1956. The Russians realised that Wallenberg would be high on the agenda. Molotov sent a memorandum to the Central Committee on 29 February 1956 stating that Erlander had told the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm that the issue would be raised, ‘so that the Swedish bourgeois opposition would have no cause to blame the Government for their lack of energetic measures’ (the Swedish notes on Erlander’s talk with Rodionov no longer exist). Molotov pointed out that Raoul Wallenberg was a member of the largest Swedish monopolistic family and repeated the then official version. He considered it good tactics to give the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm the task of making it clear to Östen Undén before Erlander began his visit that the Soviet side had nothing to add to their earlier ‘comprehensive and definitive statement’. The Soviet Foreign Minister appeared to believe that such a step would indicate to the Swedish Government that little would come of a new approach.

In his meeting with Ambassador Rodionov on 10 March Östen Undén commented on the possible role of Beria and the state security organisation regarding Raoul Wallenberg’s fate and that perhaps they had concealed some of the facts for top level officials at the Foreign Ministry. Undén put this forward as a hypothesis after Rodionov pointed out that the Soviet could have no reason to retain a person of such great interest to the Swedish Government. The Soviet side interpreted this to mean that the Swedes would be satisfied with a reply in which Beria was blamed for Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance. In this respect, the Soviet notes on the conversation differ from the Swedish (Appendices 34 and
35 respectively). Deliberately or otherwise, Rodionov appears to have distorted Undén’s remarks.

As late as 19 March, a note from the MID was handed to the Swedish Legation stating that Raoul Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that earlier statements were definitive and comprehensive.

During the visit of Prime Minister Tage Erlander, the testimonies of a number of German and other war prisoners were handed over, showing indisputably that Raoul Wallenberg had been in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons at least between 1945-1947. Other testimony referred to a later period. Molotov sent the material to the Central Committee and advised that the Foreign Ministry would make proposals (for action) within the next couple of days.

New Soviet version prepared

Molotov’s new memorandum to the Central Committee on 2 April gave details of the earlier official Soviet replies to Sweden. After calling attention to the new testimony, Molotov noted Erlander’s and Hedlund’s comment that the Wallenberg issue was such an irritating element in Soviet-Swedish relations that it might have a negative effect on them. ‘Erlander persistently asked us to find a solution to the situation in order to settle the matter’. Molotov seized on this and, typically, presumed that Erlander had in mind the considerable influence exerted by the Wallenbergs in Sweden as one of the largest Swedish monopolistic families. Thus, the Wallenberg question could be exploited in certain circles in Sweden to the detriment of Swedish-Soviet relations, particularly prior to the parliamentary elections in the coming autumn.

Ulla Lindström was the cabinet minister who was closest to Undén in government circles. In her memoirs (I regeringen; Ur min politiska dagbok 1954-1959, Stockholm 1969, page 100), she describes Undén’s view of the Wallenberg case as follows: Undén spoke to Vyshinsky and Molotov about this; afterwards he reported the conversations together with his personal impressions. He himself believes that the Russians really do not know where W. has gone, that W. probably died in the chaotic conditions existing at the end of the war and, if he was found the Russians would have more reason to return him to Sweden for the goodwill it would get them than hiding him and denying his existence. The diary, kept at the National Archives, shows that the entry was written on 1 April 1956 and the quotation in the memoirs agrees with the original.
In these circumstances, it was suggested to the Central Committee that Molotov should tell Hedlund that the Soviet had nothing new to add over and above their earlier reply before Erlander departs. Nevertheless, the relevant organisations were ordered to examine and verify carefully the testimony handed over by Sweden, with the intention of letting the Swedish Government know the outcome.

This was also the decision taken at the Central Committee Presidium, and the KGB and Interior Ministry were ordered to examine the material during a two week period and propose a reply. A statement about Raoul Wallenberg was included in the joint Swedish-Soviet communiqué following the visit and was published in Pravda, which meant that it could be read by all those interned in every prison camp and prison in the Soviet Union.

While this was taking place, a passing mention should be made of a letter received at the MID from Shiryagin in the Charkov region, probably inspired by the Pravda communiqué about the visit of the Swedish Prime Minister.

The exact contents of Shiryagin’s letter are not known, as no trace of it was found in either MID or KGB records. Nor has it been possible to trace him although the working group made every effort to do so. The letter must have contained something interesting because the MID head of section brought it to the notice of the KGB (App. 36), pointing out that it contained facts about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg but warned that Shiryagin’s misdirected zeal in helping in the search for Raoul Wallenberg could lead to the information spreading, even to the Swedish Embassy. It was proposed, therefore, that the KGB should use its channels to advise Shiryagin cautiously not to spread his knowledge about, not even to family or friends.

Molotov received a message on 16 April from Gribanov, head of section, referring to the task of drafting a proposed reply to Sweden within a fortnight. The KGB chief, Serov, now announced that the KGB had drawn up a proposal and asked for an appointment with Molotov at a suitable time in order to present it in person.

The Swedish evidence was also passed for comment to the 1st Special Department of the Ministry of the Interior. They attached special importance in a
memorandum to the testimony of Gustav Richter, Karl Supprian, Willy Bergemann, Ernst Wallenstein and Bernhard Rensinghoff because they appeared to have been in direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka or Lefortovo. At the same time, it was noted that the MVD did not have access to any material concerning ‘the missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg ... in Budapest’ (App. 37).

No documentary evidence of Serov’s presentation to Molotov has been found. However, the high level at which the matter was dealt with by the heads of both organisations indicates the sensitivity and extreme degree of secrecy surrounding the real truth. The outcome of the deliberations of these two people can be seen in a joint memorandum dated 28 April which, together with appendices and various rough drafts, they addressed to the Central Committee (App. 38).

The actual memorandum referred to the testimony of several prisoners of war that was contained in the material handed over by Sweden. It noted that the information ‘largely’ tallied with the actual circumstances of Wallenberg’s arrest and imprisonment in the Soviet Union.

In view of the importance of regularising the Wallenberg issue, and that Sweden never ceased to bring the matter up, Molotov and Serov felt it appropriate to ‘inform the Swedish Government about Wallenberg, although not straight away’. The parliamentary elections in September were an important consideration, and it was considered tactically more suitable to broaden the inquiry into the Wallenberg case, giving a final answer two or three months after the election. Molotov’s and Serov’s plan contained the following elements.

- Early in May, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm ought to speak personally to Östen Undén, the Foreign Minister, asking for specific clarification of some testimony, photographs of Raoul Wallenberg (sic), etc. This is calculated to induce the Swedes to believe that the request is proof that the Soviet authorities were really carrying out a thorough examination of the submitted material.

Still according to the memorandum, a couple of months later, in July, the embassy in Stockholm would tell the Swedes that the submitted material had been carefully scrutinised, that people were being questioned with possible
involvement in the circumstances referred to in the material, and that the Swedish Government would be informed of the outcome.

Finally, as mentioned above, it was proposed to provide the final information some two or three months after the parliamentary elections.

The above proposals are to be found in the appendices to the memorandum and were later approved by the Politbureau (or presidium as it was then called). It should be noted that this document has the highest top secret classification of all the documents from the former Central Committee records. It belongs to a "special file", which meant that those with access to the paper had to return it to the presidium office within 24 hours.

The first Soviet enquiry to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was made in May, concerning the Austrian war prisoner Scheuer/ Schlitter. He spent some time in the same cell as Raoul Wallenberg and was suspected of cooperating with the prison management.

However, the third appendix to Molotov’s and Serov’s memorandum to the Central Committee is the most remarkable. At the end of April, it already contained a draft of the final reply which was later delivered to Sweden. It stated that the Soviet had undertaken a thorough examination of the evidence submitted. Furthermore, records belonging to the counter espionage committee and former commander had been searched and some people questioned so that Raoul Wallenberg’s whereabouts between 1945-47 had been successfully established.

It further stated that Abakumov had ordered Wallenberg to be transferred from Budapest to Moscow whereupon he was arrested without the government being informed, in contravention of Soviet law, and that Abakumov had accused him of spying on behalf of the Germans against the Soviet Union and their allies in the war against Hitler Germany. An examination of the records of the ‘former commander of counter espionage’ had established that Raoul Wallenberg was held in Lefortovo Prison on the personal orders of Abakumov under special conditions so that prison staff were unaware of his name. ‘Raoul Wallenberg died in the prison hospital (in Lefortovo?) and his body taken for cremation.’
It then stated that to avoid responsibility, Abakumov destroyed direct documentary evidence which, inter alia, was obvious from the fact that Raoul Wallenberg's interrogation file was missing (on the other hand, no mention was made of his personal file). The reference to an interrogation file is illogical. Such a file was opened only when a prisoner was sentenced, or a criminal investigation initiated on the basis of ‘compromising material’.

Finally, it related what had happened to Abakumov (that he had been sentenced and executed), and expressed sympathy with the Swedish Government and Raoul Wallenberg's family.

It is not clear why this version did not meet with Politbureau approval, perhaps because Lubianka Prison was not mentioned (several witnesses had mentioned Raoul Wallenberg spending time in Lubianka) and because of the reason given for his arrest. The MID and KGB were then assigned the task of presenting the final proposal instead, by early October at the latest. It should be recalled that Molotov and Serov already knew what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg. There now remained the matter of fabricating a version for the benefit of the Swedes. A former KGB official (Vladimirov) with some connection to the case stated that in 1956 they were looking for a version ‘that would be half true’.

The document did not make it entirely clear whether any real inquiry took place in April or later, or whether Molotov and Serov knew everything that was necessary to know from the start, but there is much to indicate that an extensive inquiry was hardly necessary. The subject is dealt with in the chapter on oral information.

It can be noted in passing that an MID memorandum of 5 April 1956 referred to the testimony of a Finnish citizen, Mäntynen: ‘According to information from the Interior Ministry of the USSR and the KGB, Mäntynen did not meet Raoul Wallenberg while imprisoned in the USSR between 1948-1955 and was therefore unable to provide Swedish representatives with any material worthy of note on Raoul Wallenberg’.

Although unlikely to be answered, the question obviously arises of how to interpret the word “meet”. Does it mean that Mäntynen did not encounter Raoul Wallenberg because the latter was imprisoned elsewhere, or because he was dead?
The MID (Foreign Minister Shepilov) and the KGB presented a new draft reply on 22 October 1956 (App. 39), now stating that ‘no document’ had been found concerning Raoul Wallenberg’s stay in the Soviet Union and that the inmate was not known to prison staff under his correct name. Nevertheless, questioning had established that after his arrest Raoul Wallenberg was taken to Moscow on Abakumov’s orders and imprisoned in ‘Lefortovo and Butyrka prisons’. It further stated that Raoul Wallenberg died suddenly on 17 July 1947 (the first mention of this date) and his body cremated. Moreover, it stated that incorrect answers in response to MID enquiries had been given on Abakumov’s instructions.

One wonders at the sudden mention of Butyrka Prison - none of the more reliable witnesses say that Raoul Wallenberg was seen there. According to a Russian expert, Butyrka is a euphemism for Lubianka Prison and even in 1956 was still surrounded by great secrecy.

This draft did not find favour either. Deputy Foreign Minister Semyonov himself wrote, ‘This is not good enough (as a reply)’. No reason was given.

Chronologically, a presentation in the form of a memorandum dated 30 December 1956 comes next. The author was Tugarinov, Deputy Head of the MID Information Committee, and it was addressed to the Foreign Minister Gromyko (App. 40). Tugarinov expressed some thoughts on the Wallenberg case and their connection to the matter of the continuing development in Soviet-Swedish relations. He dwelt in particular on the political pressure in Sweden concerning the Raoul Wallenberg issue, and pointed out that some Swedish representatives had emphasised the desire of the Swedish Government for an exhaustive and definitive reply, even if Wallenberg were no longer alive. He recalled Undén’s talk with the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm when he let it be understood that Sweden would be satisfied with an answer containing some reference to the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg as being ‘Beria’s work’.

As mentioned earlier, this was probably an over-interpretation of Undén’s remarks.

Tugarinov also pointed out that the Swedish Government was considering publishing a White Paper and concluded that the unresolved case would
thenceforth be used in various Swedish circles to kindle anti-Soviet campaigns. A reply was essential in order to avoid serious damage to bilateral relations.

It further stated that

- These relations had deteriorated substantially as a result of the events in Hungary, i.e., the Hungarian rebellion (probably a sufficiently important reason for not replying in October).
- The anti-Soviet campaign would probably decline within two or three months, when the situation in Hungary became more normal.
- Leading Swedish government representatives had said that good neighbourly relations could certainly be re-established towards the end of 1957. The source of this information is not given.

According to Tugarinov, a delay of several more months before sending a reply would be exploited in ‘reactionary circles’ to mar any incipient improvement in relations.

An early reply would cause a brief stir but have scarcely any further consequence apart from removing a serious obstacle to improved relations.

His final argument was that a speedy reply would facilitate the work of the new Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm.

The Gromyko memorandum

Tugarinov’s advice was followed. Deputy Foreign Minister Zakharov sent a revised draft to his chief, Shepilov (appointed foreign minister six months earlier), on 7 January 1957, which had been prepared with the help of KGB colleagues. However, he pointed out that it had not yet been seen by the head of the KGB.

A week later, a new draft was submitted to the Central Committee, signed by Shepilov and Serov. Apart from some minor adjustments, it was similar to the final reply that came to be known as the Gromyko memorandum. The only difference was that it had been found appropriate to omit a passage describing the search through various records, ‘including records at Lefortovo and Lubianka Prisons and the Vladimir Prison’.
The draft was approved at a presidium meeting on 2 February. Thereafter, Bulganin, Molotov, Shepilov and Serov were given the task of finally editing the text.

The final text was approved at a new meeting of the Central Committee presidium on 5 February. It became known as the Gromyko memorandum and was handed over to Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador, on 6 February (App. 41).

In retrospect, now that we have access to Russian records, the following points in the Gromyko memorandum were especially noteworthy.

- It states that no facts were discovered about Raoul Wallenberg’s stay in the Soviet Union, despite careful investigation of various records and after hearing the testimony of many people who might have known about the circumstances referred to in submitted evidence. It also emerged that none of those questioned knew of a person called Wallenberg.

- Only while examining documents at some of the prisoners’ aid organisations in the medical department of Lubianka Prison was a paper discovered ‘that it is reasonable to assume refers to Raoul Wallenberg’. This is the so-called Smoltsov report. There was nothing in the records to show when the document was found nor if it really was discovered in Lubianka Prison medical department. There was no reference to it in any draft prior to January 1957.

We should also bear in mind Molotov’s proposals to the Central Committee in April 1956. It mentioned a two-week long search which, if it ever took place, resulted in a draft with a different content. Besides, Molotov and Serov drew up the first draft themselves. The question arises whether a new search was instigated because of the dismissal of Molotov that autumn. The point is not made clear.

- According to the memorandum, no further proof was found and that Smoltsov died on 7 May 1953. ‘In the light of this, it must be concluded that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947’.
- Wallenberg’s imprisonment and the incorrect information submitted to the MID over a number of years was the result of Abakumov’s criminal activities.

No accusation of espionage remained in the final version, probably because the Russians would have found it difficult to prove. There was also a risk that it would lead to long drawn out discussions with Sweden, thereby counteracting the desire to settle the matter.

The caution with which the Soviet side drew its conclusions on Raoul Wallenberg’s fate is striking. More on this follows later.

The Swedish reaction to the memorandum was handed over on 19 February. It expressed considerable surprise and incredulity that the Smoltsov report was the only documentary evidence unearthed. Furthermore, the Swedish side requested that any new material that was found should be passed to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet reaction to this and later approaches was that the information handed over was all that had been discovered, and no other material existed. This reply followed a decision taken by the Central Committee presidium.

Langfelder’s fate

A report on Langfelder’s whereabouts was received from the Soviet Embassy in Hungary on 7 May 1957 and originated from the Hungarian foreign ministry. The Hungarian report referred to details in the Swedish and, above all, the international press concerning Langfelder and stated that Langfelder’s family understandably waited in suspense for news about him.

About a month later, Lunyev, the deputy KGB chief, suggested to the MID a way of replying to the Hungarian report (App. 42). He considered it appropriate if the reply paid heed to the information that had been passed to the Swedes concerning Raoul Wallenberg. As in the MID instructions later sent to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary, the proposal stated that archive records for both Langfelder and Raoul Wallenberg were probably destroyed by the former leaders of the KGB. However, they had succeeded in determining that Langfelder died on 2 March 1948. Lunyev’s draft was dated 12 June although the MID
instructions were not issued to Ambassador Andropov in Budapest until 17 September. In contrast to the KGB draft, the instructions (App. 43) mentioned finding a note on Langfelder’s death among a list of inmates at Lubianka (the list has not been preserved). It is the only record that mentions Langfelder’s fate. In the view of the Russian side, the information about finding a list mentioning Langfelder’s death is pure invention, implying that his fate had already been decided in the summer/autumn of 1947.

Later testimony

The Swedish side handed over new testimony from several witnesses in February 1959 showing that Raoul Wallenberg had been in Vladimir Prison after 1947 and including a request for a new inquiry to be carried out in the Soviet Union.

In a memorandum to the Central Committee, Foreign Minister Gromyko and KGB chief Shelepin noted that full information about Raoul Wallenberg was contained in the memorandum of 6 February 1957, and that renewed inquiries had not confirmed the new testimony referred to in the Swedish note. The Soviet reply was sent following the approval of the Central Committee presidium, and pointed out that no new facts had emerged on the case.

It has not been possible to ascertain the manner in which the alleged inquiries were conducted.

In June 1959, the Soviet side considered that the new testimony had triggered a renewed campaign in Sweden, inspired by some anti-Soviet circles in order to create an unfavourable atmosphere prior to Khrushchov’s visit to Scandinavia. A memorandum to the Central Committee on 18 June 1959, from Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, proposed that the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow should be reminded of ‘the fully established fact that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947, as shown in the memorandum of 6 February 1957’. Kuznetsov thus elected to ignore completely the vagueness that characterised the Gromyko memorandum. He also suggested calling attention to the fact that the new testimony was a complete ‘fabrication’, and was of the opinion that such a statement would largely deprive the Swedes of any reason to continue making approaches.
The next noteworthy occasion was a conversation between Khrushchov and Sohlman on 25 February 1961. Sohlman obtained an audience in order to hand over a letter from the prime minister, Tage Erlander, concerning Raoul Wallenberg. Khrushchov countered immediately by asking, ‘Mr Ambassador, can you explain to me the circumstances under which Charles XII attacked Peter the Great?’ He then asserted that the Swedish Government had repeatedly received replies about the ‘Wallenberg case’, and asked what it was that made them keep returning to the matter. Khrushchov refused to read the letter, saying that the Foreign Ministry could do that. He pointed out irritably that no new circumstances had arisen, and the Swedish Government was pursuing an unfriendly line. Nevertheless, Sohlman requested the right to request once more for an inquiry into the facts of the case. After a long harangue, however, Khrushchov stated firmly that he had given an exhaustive and final reply.

Nanna Svartz’ statement

Erlander’s letter contained a statement from professor Nanna Svartz. She declared that while talking to the Soviet professor Myasnikov she received confirmation that Raoul Wallenberg was in a mental hospital in the Moscow area. He asked Khrushchov straight away for permission to allow professor Svartz to travel to the Soviet capital and, together with her colleagues there, resolve the question of sending Raoul Wallenberg home (see also the 1965 White Paper).

How did the Soviet authorities handle this? An internal MID memorandum on 23 March 1961, addressed to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, shows that the KGB were asked to investigate and had reached the conclusion that it (i.e. Nanna Svartz’ statement) ‘did not correspond with reality’. For safety’s sake, reference was made to Khrushchov’s very definite rejection of Erlander’s approach. The matter was over and done with as far as the MID was concerned. No further reply need be given, and if the Swedes raised the matter again, it was proposed merely to refer to Khrushchov’s statement. No action was therefore taken regarding the letter Dr Svartz addressed direct to Deputy Foreign Minister Semyonov.

Although several approaches were made as a result of Nanna Svartz’ testimony, nothing happened for the next three years except that Dr Myasnikov wrote to her insisting that she had misunderstood him. Prior to Khrushchov’s visit to Sweden in June 1964, the Swedish Ambassador, Gunnar Jarring, discussed the matter with
Kovalyov, the MID chief for Scandinavia. Professor Svartz’ testimony had not yet been made public, and Jarring proposed two alternative attitudes to take in connection with the visit:

1) That Khrushchov expresses himself in such a way so that he gives the impression of there being some hope for the future in this case, and holds out the prospect of yet another inquiry.

2) That well ahead of Khrushchov’s visit, an announcement would be made that the two foreign ministers had discussed the issue, and the Soviet side had promised to look into the matter again.

Jarring emphasised that the proposals should be perceived as being inspired by the desire to contribute towards a successful visit. However, Kovalyov replied that the Raoul Wallenberg case must be regarded as concluded. The Soviet side preferred that Sweden also declared the matter closed in advance of the visit. Jarring stressed that this was out of the question, particularly in view of professor Svartz’ testimony.

According to Jarring, the Swedish proposals were intended to remove the matter from the agenda of the forthcoming meeting, and he added that a Soviet inquiry could very well lead to the same result as in 1957.

Jarring’s visit resulted in Gromyko proposing to the Central Committee that the MID reply orally to the Swedish Ambassador to the effect that the Soviet rejected Swedish efforts to raise the matter of Raoul Wallenberg again.

This reply referred to the Gromyko memorandum of 1957 and pointed out that statements about Raoul Wallenberg being alive after 1947 were either based on a misunderstanding or reflected efforts in some circles to complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. It was also emphasised that Raoul Wallenberg had not been, nor could be, in either a medical institution or prison after 1947. The Soviet side had no doubt that Raoul Wallenberg died in Lubianka Prison on 17 July 1947. Finally, it concluded that relations would only be harmed if the question were raised again.
The Swedish side, however, continued its efforts to shed light on Nanna Svartz’ testimony. Attempts were made to arrange a meeting between Jarring and Myasnikov and between professor Svartz and the Soviet doctor, and in February 1965 Tage Erlander requested a new inquiry.

The MID and KGB therefore proposed that the Central Committee agree to the first meeting. This took place on 11 May 1965 before a reply to Erlander’s letter (drafted on 29 April) was handed over in Stockholm. The reply stated that although every document in the case had been carefully examined, it did not alter the fact that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947. The information concerning Dr. Myasnikov’s remarks was based on a misunderstanding; Myasnikov himself definitely denied the allegation about what he was supposed to have said. It was regrettable that Sweden had again raised the matter.

Jarring’s talk with Myasnikov resulted in the latter reluctantly agreeing to meet professor Svartz. The meeting took place on 10 July 1965, with the outcome that both maintained their own version of the affair (further details in Chapter XII).

* * *

A cipher telegram from the embassy in Stockholm on 7 July 1964, reported a talk with C.H. Hermansson, the Communist Party leader, who is alleged to have said that further Soviet measures on the Wallenberg case were necessary in order to ‘knock the weapon out of the hands of anti-Soviet circles’. He proposed that the Soviet should provide a detailed description of their inquiries, as they had done in the case of the missing crew of the ship Bengt Sture.

Svingel - an exchange proposal?

One of the more mysterious features in the long history of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate came from Carl-Gustaf Svingel, a Swedish representative for Lutheran aid organisation living in West Berlin, and might be regarded as though the Russians were prepared to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for the spy Stig Wennerström. According to Svingel, he had repeatedly talked to one or two East Berlin contacts over a couple of years, and towards the end of 1965-66 they expressed interest in an exchange of Wennerström. Svingel who liked to say that he had been a personal friend of Raoul Wallenberg in Stockholm, had then brought up his name in the conversation. The East Berlin contact (said by some to be the resident
KGB man in East Berlin) had then said that Wallenberg did not exist. However, he encouraged Svingel to ascertain whether there was any Swedish interest in an exchange. When visiting Sweden, Svingel was given the opportunity of speaking to Torsten Nilsson, the Foreign Minister, on the matter. This was later discussed under great secrecy at a meeting with the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, the other ministers concerned and representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The meeting decided to reject outright any soundings mediated by Svingel, and the latter told his contact of the decision.

During the following two or three years, Svingel claimed to have further talks with his contacts, who again enquired about the possibility of exchanging Wennerström. It should be noted that even Svingel himself admitted that he was the only one to have mentioned Raoul Wallenberg; none of the contacts openly intimated that he was alive. Nevertheless, Svingel interpreted some of their remarks as indirect confirmation that this was so.

The ambiguity surrounding Svingel’s contacts was not cleared up 25 years later, when representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the working group talked to him. He was still reticent about the identities of his contacts, and however motivated this might have been in the 1960’s, it was difficult to understand in a situation when neither the Soviet Union nor the DDR existed any longer. Furthermore, he now made some obviously incorrect allegations about the Russians having asked him to act with regard to an exchange of Stig Bergling (see below).

The Russian side has been unable to obtain any indication that would confirm Svingel’s information. It is possible that talks of this kind took place, that it was some kind of Soviet ‘game’ but that Svingel over-interpreted or even created the impression that it was a Swedish probe.

New testimony - from Kalinski and Kaplan - results in Swedish approaches

Very little happened in Swedish-Soviet relations concerning the case until 1979 when the Swedish side again raised the matter, this time on the basis of Kalinski’s testimony. Abraham Kalinski was a Polish Jew who spent several years in Soviet
prisons and camps, including the Vladimir Prison, but later succeeded in emigrating abroad.

According to Kalinski, Raoul Wallenberg was imprisoned in the USSR at least until 1975. In a memorandum to the Central Committee on 22 January 1979, Deputy Foreign Minister Maltsev wrote that it would be appropriate to confirm to the Swedes the substance of the standpoint developed earlier. Moreover, an announcement could be made that a supplementary inquiry had revealed that the new testimony did not correspond with reality. KGB chief Andropov agreed. The draft reply further referred to the review of documents undertaken in August 1965.

In August that year, Ola Ullsten, the Prime Minister made a further approach on the basis of testimony from Jan Kaplan (through the intermediary of Kalinski), a Soviet citizen. Gromyko noted irritably in a memorandum to the Central Committee on 7 September that a new approach had been made notwithstanding the Soviet reply in January. He stated that Kaplan was serving a prison sentence, and that despite the ‘personal character’ of Ullsten’s démarche, it had already been published in the Swedish press and ‘exploited for hostile purposes in the election campaign’. In Gromyko’s view, they should reply that the Raoul Wallenberg case was finished. Nevertheless, the reply given by the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm stated that all the evidence had been carefully reviewed. At the same time, it was regretted that the Swedish Government preferred to question Soviet sincerity rather than reject fabrication and speculation.

An exchange with Bergling?

More spectacularly, in 1979 Sweden made informal soundings in Moscow regarding the Soviet attitude to a possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for the Swedish spy Stig Bergling (a suggestion originating from Bergling himself). The Soviet side, however, showed no interest. It was in this context that a KGB contact told the Swedish embassy representative in Moscow that while nothing changed the fact of Raoul Wallenberg’s death, it was regrettable that there were no further documents, probably because records had been destroyed.
A further approach came in 1986, when the prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson, visited Moscow. After due Politbureau consideration, it gave rise to the reply that, as stated in 1957, 1965 and 1979, renewed inquiries had shown that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947, ‘probably’ as a result of a myocardial infarction.

During a visit to Sweden in 1988, Prime Minister Ryzhkov was also asked about Raoul Wallenberg. According to the minutes of the Politbureau meeting to which he reported, he replied ‘that he had not seen any documents but only used details obtained from some organisations, and was therefore unable to provide any information although he was prepared to study the request’.

It should be mentioned here that according to Russian information, complete shorthand reporting of Politbureau meetings was introduced only after 1965.

Recent years

We have now almost reached the present day, i.e., 1989/90, when it became possible to obtain new material from the Soviet side. The first manifestation of this was during the visit of the Wallenberg Committee in October 1989, at which time Raoul Wallenberg’s belongings were handed over.

The original intention had been to show only the original Smoltssov report. However, on 22 September, some weeks before the Committee’s visit but after the invitation had been issued, Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic passport, cigarette case, motor registration certificate, prison register card, foreign currency and diary came to light in the basement of the KGB headquarters at Lubianka Prison.

The KGB themselves claimed that the belongings were discovered when the KGB archives were to be refurbished early in 1989 and wooden shelves were to be replaced with metal ones. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to examine the files stored there, as part of the recent rehabilitation work. After going through the main archive, a storage area for office material and out-of-date objects was next in turn. It was in a chaotic state and was to be tidied. A parcel fell down from among the files and broken boxes kept on the top shelf. Had it not been for a cigarette case falling out, no notice would have been taken. The parcel had been stuck together at one time and traces of glue still existed. On closer inspection of the contents, a passport in Raoul Wallenberg’s name was
found and recognised by the archivist. The objects were repacked and handed to a senior official.

Storing things in this manner was of course against current archive regulations. It is difficult to give credence to this version in view of the oral testimony of employees in the KGB archives between the 1950's and 1970's. They maintained that listed belongings were kept together with papers in a special file. Normally, a note on the file indicated if belongings were kept elsewhere. If the belongings had really come to rest in the cellar, it must have happened at a relatively late date. When space allowed, normal personal belongings and papers were attached to the investigation file; on release, they were returned to the prisoner. When prisoners died, the objects were retained on file. When no file had been opened, personal documents could also be saved in the files for the special correspondence.

The report to the Politbureau about the meeting with the family and the Wallenberg Committee in October 1989 stated outright that the purpose of the meeting was to persuade the guests that Raoul Wallenberg was no longer alive.

The Russian side also handed over a copy of KGB chief Kryuchkov's report to the Politbureau concerning a meeting with Ambassador Berner in Moscow in the spring of 1990 (in the document collection) together with a letter from KGB chief Bakatin dated 8 October 1991. This was addressed to the chief of the President's office, and Bakatin asked for all archive documents that mentioned Raoul Wallenberg by name. On receipt of them, Bakatin wrote direct to Gorbachov on 1 November, proposing that the latter should hand over the documents to the Swedish Ambassador in person (Gorbachov did not accept the proposal; the papers were handed over at a meeting of the working group in Stockholm in December).

The question of missing documents

The report so far has demonstrated the often unique manner in which the Raoul Wallenberg case was handled, contrary to current regulations. This was especially

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8 Pages 28-30 of Susan E. Mesinai’s report *Strict isolation and the number of prisoners* describe the regulations for dealing with a prisoner’s belongings (App. 44)
the case with regard to the way documents were handled and other archive-related issues.

If documents really were destroyed, when did it happen and on whose orders? This can only be a matter of guesswork. With few exceptions, no record has been found concerning their destruction (see Chapter XI). The following arguments are therefore somewhat speculative.

The first hypothesis is that Abakumov ordered the destruction of documents in 1947 and almost presupposes that he conspired against Stalin, and attempted to conceal from him what was happening to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947. The working group considers it unlikely that Abakumov would act independently and go behind Stalin’s back, although some of the older officials from the security service did not rule this out entirely. (They also pointed out the sinister role Beria may have played). If, as we assume, Stalin was in the picture and gave orders about the case, there would not be any real need to remove documents. And internal Soviet documents would not need to be destroyed in order to keep Raoul Wallenberg’s fate secret from Sweden. However, it is possible that Stalin deemed the case to be domestically sensitive and ordered the removal of at least some documentary evidence.

Quite apart from this, it is not impossible that at the time of his arrest in 1951, or in premonition, Abakumov ordered the destruction of these and other papers which might incriminate him. According to the former head of the Russian archive system, an explanation of this could be found in the somewhat chaotic preliminary investigation of Abakumov in which the prosecution looked for compromising material against him. Cases which damaged Soviet foreign relations, such as that of Raoul Wallenberg, could have been used against Abakumov and his closest colleagues, irrespective of whether Stalin had given the orders about the case. This may have been the reason for the removal of some papers. It is difficult, however, to find this a convincing train of thought. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Raoul Wallenberg case was significant enough to cause Abakumov any concern. Nevertheless, some weeding took place in archives at this time. A former head of the special archives (relating to prisoners-of-war) stated that older archives employees recalled the time when Beria was in power, and even shortly after his fall, ‘burly fellows’ came to weed
the files. And with the appointment of each new head of the KGB, the order would go out for more weeding to take place.

Other Russian experts see little reason for destroying any important records prior to 1953 (the year Stalin died), and claim not to be aware of it happening. We focus our attention instead on the period between 1954-1956.

Khrushchov ordered a survey of the central records and some weeding to take place at the time of the revelations about Stalin’s personality cult. A security service officer claimed that he often found that documents went missing. It is very likely that the KGB took the opportunity to destroy other compromising files. It is known that Khrushchov ordered the destruction of many (but not all) papers relating to the Katyn Forest massacre. The head of the KGB, Serov, may have destroyed papers about Raoul Wallenberg, particularly in April-May 1956, perhaps on Khrushchov’s orders and in any case with Molotov’s consent. These were decisive weeks during which a new Soviet position needed to be drawn up, and Molotov in particular had a strong personal interest in ensuring that papers relating to his own part in the affair did not come to light. Several Russian experts stress the part played by Serov, and a Russian journalist maintains that shortly before his death in 1990, Serov conceded that he had allowed documents to be destroyed. It should be noted that the missing papers came almost exclusively from the KGB while Foreign Ministry files appear to be intact, apart from the crucial letter of 17 July 1947 from Abakumov to Molotov.

Valery Boldin, head of the Central Committee’s general section under Gorbachev, and responsible for the safe containing the Soviet Union’s most guarded secrets, stated in conversation some years ago that a former Central Committee secretary, L.F. Ilyichov, told him that Stalin had Raoul Wallenberg’s interrogation report in his safe where it was discovered on his death. It is not known what happened to it.

Despite the above line of argument, it is by no means easy as far as the Swedish side is concerned to be convinced that some decisive document has not been preserved somewhere.
Oral statements

The manner in which the Soviet authorities dealt with the Raoul Wallenberg case emerged during interviews between the working group and mainly former KGB and other officials. They shed further light on events during the important period between 1956-57. But first follows an account of events that took place after 17 July 1947.

One of the two interpreters/authorised operators mentioned earlier in the report stated that he first heard about Raoul Wallenberg some time in 1947 (he had previously been very involved in the Nuremberg Process). This was when Kuleshov, head of section under Kartashov, drew up a list and diagram indicating the prisoners who had been Raoul Wallenberg’s cellmates. Every detail of their cell numbers etc., was noted on the diagram, so that their paths need not cross those of other prisoners who did not know Raoul Wallenberg.

At that time the case was creating quite a stir. Kuleshov gave the above-mentioned informant a parcel and told him to take it personally to Gertsovsky, the head of MGB archives. A handwritten note on the parcel said, ‘Contains material relating to detainee no. 7. Not to be opened without permission from the head of MGB’. The parcel contained some papers and personal documents (but no personal file) relating to Raoul Wallenberg. The informant knew that ‘detainee No. 7’ referred to Raoul Wallenberg. Nevertheless, we know that he was not held as a numbered prisoner but under his own name. Furthermore, the numbered prisoner No. 7 has been identified as a Russian. Thus the words ‘detainee No. 7’ were used on this occasion as a temporary description, and quite simply referred to the number of Raoul Wallenberg’s cell. In the case of some of Raoul Wallenberg’s and Langfelder’s fellow prisoners, i.e. their cellmates, a note was made in their files to the effect that they had shared cells with a particularly important prisoner. Thereafter, most of them were held largely in isolation from other prisoners until about 1954.

Private Finnish-Soviet diplomatic talks about Wallenberg

In the autumn of 1956, Åke Frey, a Finnish diplomat, sent a particularly interesting report direct to Arne S. Lundberg, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and also
How the Soviet authorities…

through the Swedish Embassy in Helsinki. Frey had spoken to Vladimirov (KGB), Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, who claimed that the Soviet Union wanted to wait for the arrival of the new Soviet ambassador in Stockholm before giving exact information about Raoul Wallenberg. This would give him something favourable to say when he assumed his post. Vladimirov also said that he would appreciate receiving some new arguments from Sweden, i.e., regarding the great importance attached to resolving the matter. Vladimirov had been enthusiastic over Frey’s idea that it ought not to be impossible to agree in advance with the Swedes about formulating a reply. The Swedish replied through Frey to the effect that Sweden was hardly in a position to enter into advance discussions over the Soviet reply. Sweden expected a truthful and exhaustive reply (App. 45). When questioned about this conversation some years ago, Vladimirov explained that the reason for proposing private talks before replying was because Moscow had difficulty in deciding exactly how to word its reply to the Swedish Government. The MID and the PGU branch of the KGB (i.e. foreign intelligence) to which Vladimirov belonged, were not fully in the picture regarding Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. Moscow was uncertain about just how much the Swedes knew. They therefore took their time in formulating a suitable text that would at least serve as a half-truth. According to Vladimirov, the impression was that the Second Main Directorate (counter-espionage) withheld or destroyed important papers at the start of the more energetic inquiry which began in April 1956. In any case, it was more likely that papers were destroyed at that time than under Beria and Abakumov. A key person had been Gribanov, chief of the Second Main Directorate. Vladimirov did not know when and how the Smoltsov report was found.

It should be added that the Russians could not have known that Frey was operating on his own, but must have counted on the possibility of his being a Swedish emissary. As a result, they were interested in drawing out whatever it was Sweden might be after.

Before the above discussion took place between Frey and Vladimirov, some contact took place between Frey and Erzin, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, between autumn 1955 - spring 1956, in Ankara where Frey was then stationed. The talks did not lead to any significant outcome, however, and the only Soviet document found on the subject contained scanty information. Frey took the initiative in this case and Erzin promised to look into the matter while on holiday.
How the Soviet authorities…

in Moscow. However, according to Erzin’s own report to the MID, he told Frey on his return that he had been unable to obtain any definite information about Raoul Wallenberg. Frey’s report to the Finnish Foreign Ministry contained slightly more detail (although described as inadequate by Frey’s chief in Helsinki). The most far-reaching item was that Erzin was reported to have said that the Soviet side would be prepared to hand over Raoul Wallenberg if he were alive.

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Over the years a number of comments have been made on the reply given in 1957. Farafonov, head of the Scandinavian department of the MID, said to a Swedish embassy official in 1979 that although the 1956 files had been searched with a fine toothcomb, the Smoltsov report was the only clue found. He also pointed out that Sweden had never asked to see the original (which is true, perhaps because the reply as a whole was considered unsatisfactory and that it was deemed very easy for the Soviet Union to have constructed a false report).

In the same month, a special KGB contact hinted to an embassy official that the 1957 reply was perhaps less categorical than was upheld officially. Nevertheless, he firmly maintained that there was no other document due to the destruction of the archives.

A common feature of the information obtained from former KGB officers, only one of whom had direct dealings with the Raoul Wallenberg case, was their conviction that Raoul Wallenberg was dead and that they did not believe his death was due to natural causes.

According to an official working in the Scandinavian section of the KGB during the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s, it had been considered very unlikely there that Raoul Wallenberg just died in prison; he was so young. The normal practice when somebody died was to go through and summarise that person’s file. It had not happened here. It also appeared as though it was forbidden to hand out the file. The memoranda written about the case were never completely truthful, nor was any oral summary ever made. The section in which this official worked was involved in drafting memoranda of this kind but also collected material from other sections which possibly had more dealings with Raoul Wallenberg. Draft replies that were prepared followed earlier stereotyped replies. Nobody had...
access to any material that touched upon the reasons for his arrest or how he
died. The chiefs probably had access to such papers. Not before 1956 was any
serious effort made to collect more material and take an interest in details. Even
so, the decisive documents were not made available to ordinary officials.

Some time in 1956 another KGB official received orders to investigate hospital
records at Lefortovo (and Butyrka or Lubianka; his memory was not entirely clear
on this point) to discover whether Raoul Wallenberg had suffered from any
illness. The prison was told to produce records for the years before and after
1947. It appeared that Raoul Wallenberg had sought medical help on two or three
occasions, for trifles such as toothache and a cold. However, his name did not
appear anywhere in the records after 1947. A report to this effect was compiled
for the official’s chief. Following a top-level discussion, he was told to draft a
reply together with the archive section, which he did. This stated that Raoul
Wallenberg had died of pneumonia (it was not customary to give the real cause of
death, particularly if a person was executed). The same official also recalled a
reply that was drawn up later concerning Langfelder. He never saw any file
concerning Raoul Wallenberg. A colleague in the archive section with whom he
worked never claimed that obtaining papers from the archives was difficult. He
recollected a large volume containing evidence from German war prisoners but
was never instructed to examine it. He knew nothing about the Smoltsov report.
‘It must have turned up later’. The KGB chiefs were certainly aware of the true
course of events, and the order to search hospital records was only given for the
purpose of selecting the most acceptable form of concealing the real events.

A representative of the FSB questioned the colleague referred to above from the
archives section. Although his memory was somewhat hazy, he recollected that
while no file remained on Raoul Wallenberg there was a folder containing various
papers and personal belongings, including a cigarette case and a passport. None
of the papers contained any direct information on what had happened to him.
There was no separate file on Langfelder; only a few papers about him in the
Raoul Wallenberg folder. He had handed over this folder to his successor in
1963.

Another official who had worked in the KGB archives since 1965 was also
questioned. He was once told to go through all documents from 1945 concerning
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Raoul Wallenberg. He had found interrogation reports with the name blotted out, some internal correspondence of no great interest and the Smoltsov report.

Preparations for a show trial in Hungary, 1953

A singular feature in the history of the Wallenberg case, unconfirmed in any rediscovered Soviet documents but confirmed by witnesses and some papers from the Hungarian security service (AVO) records, concerned preparations for a new show trial to take place in the autumn of 1952 and spring of 1953, this time in Hungary. The main purpose was to show that JOINT was an undercover organisation for extensive American terrorist and espionage activities against the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies. A subsidiary objective was also to introduce evidence that Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered in Budapest in January 1945 at the instigation of JOINT. The process was to substantiate that American intelligence had been so farsighted that well before the end of World War II it was planning in detail future espionage against the Soviet Union (cf. Thomsen’s statement, earlier). The preparations for this process were thus a continuation of similar trials occurring in Czechoslovakia and a couple of other people’s democracies. They should also be seen in the light of Stalin’s accusations against Jewish doctors in Moscow, the so-called doctors’ plot (in which doctors were accused of being part of an espionage and terrorist group with close links to JOINT).

The chief witness had been in touch with the Swedish Embassy in Vienna in 1957. He was Dr. László Benedek, a well known Jewish doctor in Budapest, formerly medical adviser to JOINT and supervisor at the Jewish Hospital in Budapest. His testimony described how interrogations went hand-in-hand with ill-treatment and were conducted under the close and continuous supervision of Soviet security officers. There is good reason, therefore, to repeat his story in some detail.

The background to the interrogation was that when leading officials in American intelligence became convinced that the German defeat was imminent, they began building up an extensive network of spies against the Soviet Union even before the end of hostilities. As the Americans foresaw that Soviet troops would soon occupy Budapest, they had prepared a network of agents based in the Hungarian capital and aimed at the Soviet Union. However, a neutral country was essential for the implementation of the plan, and Sweden’s cooperation had been ensured.
The first agents in Budapest were recruited by Dr Valdemar Langlet, Reader in Swedish and Red Cross representative. He had been considered suitable to be temporarily in charge of intelligence activities until an American officer took over.

Under interrogation, Benedek was urged to account for his connections with Sweden (he received a Swedish protective passport in 1944). He was accused of receiving instructions from and submitting espionage reports to Langlet on the orders of JOINT in New York, and of recruiting new agents. Material had been sent to the USA via Sweden. After Langlet left Budapest, Benedek was to report to an American Colonel, Mac Clain. Strictly speaking, there was no coherent account of the accusations and he was mainly asked leading questions.

A new major in the Hungarian security service took over the interrogation after 10 March (some days after Stalin’s death), and the Soviet advisers disappeared. Benedek would now confess to complicity in instigating the murder of Raoul Wallenberg on the grounds that the latter was on the track of some dirty business. Paul Szalai (member of the Arrow Cross who actually helped Raoul Wallenberg) was supposed to have been assigned to murder Raoul Wallenberg between 15-17 January. The interrogation leader never claimed that Raoul Wallenberg was spying for the USA but described him as an imperialist agent and base person who received large sums of money from the State Department. So although suspected of espionage, Raoul Wallenberg was not openly accused of spying; it would have been difficult to propound the theory of his being murdered by JOINT while at the same time leading their intelligence activities. Clearly, it was more important to the Russians to prove that Raoul Wallenberg was murdered in January 1945 than that he was a spy.

In August 1953 a Soviet colonel appeared to announce that the process was cancelled. According to Khrushchov’s report at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, it appears that as long as he was alive, Stalin probably supervised the preparations for the process personally.

Benedek’s testimony was confirmed in 1984 when Károly Remenyi, a defecting Jewish AVO official, stated that he was given a special assignment in January 1953, to analyse certain investigative material prior to a Zionist trial that was planned. It was not clear how Wallenberg was to be made use of at the trial.
Remenyi questioned a dozen people who had known Wallenberg in Budapest between 1944-1945, including Benedek. He was also able to name the Soviet advisers, although they were probably under assumed names and not their real ones. One of the advisers showed copies of the minutes from an interrogation in Hungary about Raoul Wallenberg's activities there. It has not been possible to identify any of the Soviet security advisers.
XI What happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947?

Documentation

The only paper from Soviet/Russian archives that contains any reasonably definite information about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate is the Smoltsov report (App. 46). Signed by Smoltsov, chief medical officer at Lubianka Prison, and addressed to Abakumov, the Minister of Security, it referred to a prisoner called ‘Valenberg’, who died in the night of 17 July 1947, ‘probably as the result of a heart attack’. The report stated that Raoul Wallenberg was known ‘to you’ (i.e., Abakumov) and, pursuant to the latter’s instructions to keep ‘Valenberg’ under his personal care, Smoltsov sought approval to make an autopsy in order to establish the cause of death.

A note written diagonally across the bottom left-hand corner of the report says: ‘Have personally notified the minister. Order issued to cremate the corpse without postmortem examination. 17.7. Smoltsov’. The report was thus never sent but became a document for Smoltsov’s own use. It is not clear exactly where it was kept (more of this later). The pages were numbered 1,5,9 (possibly with faint dots after the figures) in the top right hand corner; it has not been possible to determine the sequence of which these pages were part.

The Gromyko memorandum pointed out that ‘a certain former leader of the state security organisation furnished the Soviet Foreign Ministry with incorrect information over a number of years’.

This is not true, as the document shows. The Foreign Ministry received nothing at all from the MGB before February 1947, after which it was told that Raoul Wallenberg was in MGB custody. Moreover, it is absurd that nobody knew about
Raoul Wallenberg in 1956 even though most security officials who had been in touch with, or even responsible for, him were still alive. Once again, the only reasonable explanation must be that no proper investigation actually took place, quite simply because it was unnecessary; a narrow circle of leaders at least were fully aware of what had happened.

The Swedish side noted immediately that the Gromyko memorandum was by no means categorical and its conclusions were marred by some uncertainty in consequence. There are two alternative ways of explaining this; either the manner in which it was worded was due to a lack of documentation, because everything had been destroyed, or the Russians were uncertain as to whether the Swedes had more testimony up their sleeve. Molotov asked Gunnar Hedlund specifically during their talks in March 1956 about period covered by the German war prisoners’ testimony, and later noted it himself in the material he submitted. Hedlund himself replied that it extended up to 1947 or 1948.

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In the previous chapter some variations of the version delivered in the Gromyko memorandum were noted in the margins of the preliminary drafts. All the versions, however, laid the blame for Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment and death on Abakumov.

An internal memorandum dated 28 April 1956 from Foreign Minister Molotov and KGB chief Serov to the Central Committee noted that the testimony from witnesses presented by the Swedes was correct regarding the real circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest and imprisonment in Soviet prisons. Molotov and Serov therefore felt that the Swedes ‘ought to be told about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate’. A draft exists from April 1956 of another version than that used for the Gromyko memorandum. Here Raoul Wallenberg was supposed to have died in a hospital cell in Lefortovo Prison (although Lefortovo was not specifically named in the sentence).

Foreign Minister Shepilov sent a memorandum to the Central Committee in October 1956, enclosing a draft reply to Sweden which maintained that Raoul Wallenberg was held at Lefortovo and Butyrka (sic) and that he hastily/suddenly died on 17 July 1947 ‘in prison’ and the body was cremated. Additionally, it stated that the information in the memorandum originated from several persons who
may have been associated with the circumstances referred to in the Swedish material.

It should be recalled that Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote asking the KGB chief in 1954 about the date and circumstances of Raoul Wallenberg’s death. He was told that it was not appropriate to deviate from the reply used since 1947.

The Swedish White Paper of 1957 reported on the evidence of a number of Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners about the interrogation that took place in the evening of 22 July 1947, following which they were isolated (see below). The fact that these interrogations took place has been confirmed in most cases as well as by means of notes in the personal files of the prisoners concerned, showing that they were called for questioning. On average, the interrogations lasted for 20 - 30 minutes. One or two took longer and were primarily carried out by Kartashov and Kuzmishin. In addition, Langfelder was questioned by Kartashov for 14 hours on 23 July. It has not been possible to establish the name of the interpreter. No written report exists for the interrogation.

A ledger (App. 47) listing prisoners’ belongings/valuables is of great interest. The note concerning Raoul Wallenberg was blotted out but has been restored. It listed those of his belongings which went with him when he was transferred from Lefortovo to Lubianka in February-March 1947. No mention is made of what happened to them later on. This space was left empty, which is unique. The ledger indicates what happened later on to the belongings of all the other prisoners listed there.

No other documentary evidence has been discovered which indicates what may have happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947.

A list of prisoners who died in Butyrka Prison in 1947 has been preserved, but Raoul Wallenberg’s name was not among them. The only crematorium in Moscow at the time was the Donskoy Crematorium, which did not record the individual names of victims of the repression (it has been determined that the former Hungarian prime minister, Bethlen, who died in Butyrka in the autumn of 1946 was cremated there). Normally, prisoners who died in Lubianka were sent
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to the graveyard at Suchanov Prison, but no trace of Raoul Wallenberg’s name has been found in any register there.

**Oral statements and comments**

Irrespective of how one chooses to interpret all the information available about Raoul Wallenberg in and around the month of July 1947, there can only be full agreement on the fact that important decisions were taken about him at that time or, alternatively, that something serious happened. This can be clearly seen from the available documents, the oral testimony that has been reported and in the account in Chapter X of the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with the case.

The Russian experts who were interviewed appeared to assume that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947. Most considered that his death was not due to natural causes but induced in some way. A few did not discount that he may have died naturally. If he did not die, there remains only one fairly reasonable hypothesis; that he was ‘hidden away’ in a Soviet prison or concentration camp (more on this in the next chapter).

In the past ten years, a number of Soviet diplomats, often with presumed links to intelligence, have hinted or asserted in confidential talks with Swedish colleagues, that Raoul Wallenberg was in fact executed. This theory, and others, have also been suggested in interviews. It has not been possible to find any proof.

**The Smoltsov report – analysis and comment**

As the Smoltsov report is the only document that has something definite to say about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate, further analysis and comment is necessary. In the first place, a representative of the working group from the Russian Ministry of Security talked to the prison doctor’s son, Viktor Aleksandrevitch Smoltsov (who refused to meet the interview group on the grounds that he had nothing further to add to the details given below). The son was 23 years old in 1947 and already employed in the security service. He stated that his father was unexpectedly called to his work on an evening in July 1947. This was unusual
considering that he suffered from heart disease, did not therefore work full-time and was preparing to be discharged. His father did not return until the following morning and then said that a Swede had died in the MGB inner prison (Lubianka). This story must be treated in the same way as every other oral communication; it comprises a version which is not sufficient proof in itself.

In an effort to determine the authenticity of the Smoltsov report, it was decided at an early stage to have the handwriting analysed by experts and to subject it to a technical investigation. The Russian side undertook to do this at an institute of forensic expertise at the Soviet Ministry of Justice (App. 48). As far as the technical analysis was concerned, their conclusions were that the report could have been written on the date mentioned, i.e., 17 July 1947. It was not possible to determine by means of a chemical analysis (of ink and paper) the exact point in time on which the report was created because there is no method of determining the absolute age of a document based on changes in the material due to its age.

An analysis of the handwriting (App. 49) was made by comparing two other documents said to have been written by Smoltsov. The Russian experts concluded that the same person had written the texts. Differences in the speed of the writing and structure were said to be due to the greater care given to the report, which was written more slowly, than the more careless and the comparative documents which were written at greater speed.

The National Laboratory of Forensic Science undertook the Swedish analysis (App. 50). As far as the style of writing was concerned, they concluded that their observations during the investigation do not give direct reasons to doubt that the report and the comparative material were undoubtedly written by the same person. However, they pointed out that there was no absolute guarantee that the comparative material (a curriculum vitae and a formula from 1940) had really been written by Smoltsov. A new investigation in which a medical certificate was also included confirmed and consolidated the National Laboratory’s earlier observations. Furthermore, it partly strengthened their earlier evaluation of the significance of some of the similarities as an indication of identity. To sum up, it was concluded that the same person had written the Smoltsov report and the comparative documents. The National Laboratory also noted that the Russian method of handwriting analysis differed somewhat from the Western European, and particularly the Anglo-Saxon approach. The greatest difference lay in that the
Russian method allowed a more categorical conclusion to be drawn than the Swedish.

A reservation in the National Laboratory’s final report concerned a newspaper article concerning the discovery of a forgery unit on the premises of the former Central Committee. Ink and paper were found there, inter alia, carefully dated according to their various years of origin. The National Laboratory also assumed that the staff had access to people who were proficient in imitating other people’s handwriting.

The National Laboratory technical analysis (App. 50) was not particularly comprehensive but was principally based on the Soviet investigation. Some samples of writing in ink were taken and saved for future analysis as the present method of age determination was not felt to be sufficiently advanced. Nevertheless, the Soviet observations were deemed to be reasonable. The National Laboratory reached a slightly different conclusion regarding the fibrous composition of the paper, but found the Soviet conclusions fully reasonable and not refuted by their own investigation. Thus, although there is much to indicate that Smoltsov was the author of the report, it cannot be one hundred per cent scientifically proved. In the Swedish view, the possibility of a forgery cannot be entirely discounted.

We must now consider a number of problems relating to the Smoltsov report. First of all, it should be said that the report by no means fulfils the formal requirements for documenting a prisoner’s death in a Soviet prison. Susan E. Mesinai made an exhaustive analysis of the report’s shortcomings on pages 16-17 of her report No Time to Mourn.

The first question at issue is the likelihood of a prison doctor writing a report of this kind direct to the Minister of State Security. According to security officials of the period, the normal procedure would have been for Mironov, the director of Lubianka Prison, to report to Abakumov. Smoltsov was far too subordinate. On the other hand, most of the people whom the group interviewed did not discount that Abakumov may have personally assigned Smoltsov to keep an eye on Raoul Wallenberg, and to report immediately to him if anything happened. What does this kind of assignment tell us about the treatment Raoul Wallenberg received?
It was clearly not a normal situation. If Raoul Wallenberg was in good health and well-treated, as several of his fellow prisoners stressed (at least in 1945 and 1946 and in March 1947 as well, according to Kondrashov), there would be no need for a special arrangement of this kind. According to a heart specialist who was consulted, there is a million to one chance that a healthy 35 year-old without any history of heart disease would suddenly die of a heart attack (or cardiac infarction as the report described it). A sure diagnosis of cardiac infarction can only be made on the basis of an autopsy carried out within 24 hours after death has occurred (see pages 22-23 of the above-mentioned report by Susan E. Mesina). Even in the event of such a death taking place, the prison doctor would not need to ask for instructions, but could decide for himself whether to carry out the normal procedure of a post-mortem examination.

One theory is that Smoltsov immediately suspected that Raoul Wallenberg’s death, if he died then, was not due to natural causes and therefore asked Abakumov for instructions on how to deal with the body. This presupposes that Raoul Wallenberg was either poisoned or received such harsh treatment for a while that he died. In this case, the wording of the report may in some way be genuine, i.e., written by Smoltsov and reflecting his superficial observations even though he suspected that there was more to it than met the eye. On the other hand, had Raoul Wallenberg been shot by a firing squad, the report would have been composed differently. Smoltsov would probably have been ordered to write the report as a cover up, for use as required, i.e., to have ready in case the official version, published later, did not hold up. Cardiac infarction was otherwise one of the causes of death frequently used to conceal unnatural death, i.e., death by execution or ill-treatment. Finally, the report may have been fabricated at a later date. Perhaps the misspelling of Wallenberg’s name argues against this theory, although the idea of a deliberate spelling mistake cannot be ruled out as a means of adding credibility to the document. If this were so, the report could of course conceal anything and everything, including Raoul Wallenberg being kept in isolation somewhere.

To return briefly to the Gromyko memorandum of 1957. As emphasised above, the Soviet side treated the Smoltsov report with noticeable caution in the memorandum. Were they genuinely uncertain about the value of the report as evidence, or were they afraid that the Swedes had more information up their sleeve with which to refute this version? Is it reasonable to assert that the report
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may have been fabricated in 1956 (Smoltsov died in 1953)? Would they not have arranged to put forward much more convincing evidence of Raoul Wallenberg’s death, drafted according to all the formal rules. It would have created a greater opportunity for putting an end to the whole case. However, there was still a risk that Sweden could refute it with evidence which they had not yet submitted - for example, from one of Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners - which could disprove even this evidence. It was therefore better to present a slightly vaguer version from which retreat was possible. It has been satisfactorily proved that the reply they desired to give to Sweden in February 1957 was not the whole truth but, at best, ‘a half truth that would do’. Their uncertainty regarding the tenability of the reply is particularly evident in their efforts to hold advance discussions with Swedish representatives about drafting a reply.

Little credence can be given to the interpretation that those drafting the memorandum were unaware of whether Smoltsov’s note was genuine or dictated by Abakumov, and that they wanted a line of retreat if it was later proved that Raoul Wallenberg was executed or hidden away. To someone like Molotov, who certainly had a hand in the dark deeds of 1945-47, it may have appeared simpler, though risky, to confess to Raoul Wallenberg’s execution, if this were true.

In an internal memorandum dated 8 February 1957, Arne S. Lundberg, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote that it was unlikely that Smoltsov, who was personally responsible for Raoul Wallenberg, did not receive orders to destroy this evidence as well (i.e., the Smoltsov report) if it were true that other evidence had also been destroyed. The reply could have been drafted as it was even if Raoul Wallenberg had been lost, or was in very poor condition. The death certificate was issued to put an end to the matter. As Lundberg pointed out, it was strange that there was no reference to any witness, nor was one ever found. The Smoltsov report could be said to contain everything the Russians desired; it explained how, when and where Raoul Wallenberg died, and laid the blame on Abakumov. The result was both ideal and educational. It might be suspected that the document was falsified, and the reason for this was partly educational and partly the need to explain the long delay. Lundberg also felt that the Russians could easily have provided an absolutely definitive statement, had they so wished. If they had lost Raoul Wallenberg, or he was in poor condition, they may well have reasoned as follows: Should the Swedes
turned up evidence of Raoul Wallenberg being alive after July 1947, we can always get away with it by referring to the vagueness of the reply.

Even if the Smoltsov report was not forged in 1956/57, it is in any case unclear exactly where, how and when it was found. The Gromyko memorandum mentions the prison medical service’s records at Lubianka Prison. No such records exist, or have existed, according to the FSB deputy head of archives and member of the working group. On the other hand, special journals existed for recording details of prisoners visits to the doctor. The prison medical service material was included as part of the prison records, and most of the material relating to prisoners was kept in their personal files. The former Foreign Ministry official mentioned below once said that at the time of the 1956 inquiry, he suggested taking a look at the medical service records where the report was later found in material left behind by Smoltsov, the prison medical officer. Nevertheless, it is not exactly clear where and how it was found. A KGB official assigned to search prison records in 1956 for evidence that Raoul Wallenberg suffered from some illness, has said that he did not find any Smoltsov report. "It must have turned up there later on", he said.

The head of the Foreign Ministry archive thought that theoretically the Smoltsov report could have come from the so-called ‘extraordinary events’ file which has a limited archive life. The report could have been removed from this file and saved since the time of the inquiry. Lubianka Prison’s ‘extraordinary events’ file for 1947 has in fact survived. It was examined without finding anything remarkable for the month of July, with the exception of a female prisoner who attempted to commit suicide.

The FSB also state that since 1956 the Smoltsov report was kept as an individual paper in a file or folder containing correspondence on the Raoul Wallenberg case.

In an official document delivered to the working group in 1992 (App. 52), Zhubchenko, head of the central archive of the Russian Ministry of Security, assured us that:

1) The Lubianka and Lefortovo prison nomenclature files for 1945-53 (in which reports, notices and certificates concerning extraordinary events - including deaths - were entered) contained no note indicating that the Smoltsov report had been removed (from Lubianka and Lefortovo); 2) Other Lubianka files for 1947
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in which the Smoltsov report might have been placed, were destroyed according to a document dated 12 August 1955, viz.,

- correspondence about prisoners with departments and prisons,
- copies of accompanying letters to memoranda and files on prisoners’ health status,
- top secret correspondence about prisoners with the investigative and sentencing authorities,
- general correspondence.

Differing versions of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate in July 1947

Once again it should be pointed out that the oral versions of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate are inadequate as proof and that several of them rule each other out. Nevertheless, they ought to be reported since they appeared during the course of the inquiry.

A former official at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, now deceased, had closely followed the Raoul Wallenberg case since 1946. He surmised that Raoul Wallenberg had succumbed to hardship and inhuman treatment - mental and physical strain - to which he was certainly subjected. In his view, Molotov and Vyshinsky tried to establish what happened, but preferred to lay the blame on Beria and Abakumov, who were deceiving Stalin. This tendency to shield Stalin was noticeable among several of the older officials whom the working group encountered.

An older security service official who was high-ranking already in 1946-47, maintained that Raoul Wallenberg died on 17 July 1947, although he appeared to think that his death was an accident. This had greatly alarmed Abakumov in view of Stalin’s reaction, particularly if the latter had special plans for Wallenberg. In the official’s view, this could have been the reason why Abakumov reported through Molotov, in order to defuse the impact. According to the official, Abakumov could not have ordered an execution; only Stalin was able to do so. However, the execution theory conflicted with his view of what happened, such as, for example, the small number of interrogations; an execution should have been preceded by more intensive interrogation. If Abakumov received an order
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from Stalin he would definitely not report back through Molotov. The security official could not see any logical reason for executing Raoul Wallenberg.

The most common theory about Raoul Wallenberg's fate is that he was shot.

Alexander Yakovlev spoke of a Politbureau meeting held in the autumn of 1989 at which Kryuchkov reported on the Raoul Wallenberg case after his belongings were discovered. They discussed whether the items should be returned to the family or not. Kryuchkov's report agreed with the official Soviet version from 1957 and was based on the Smoltsov report. Yakovlev gained the impression that most Politbureau members had their doubts about this version. After the meeting, he stood together with Kryuchkov for a while and asked straight out what had actually happened. Kryuchkov replied that Raoul Wallenberg was shot in 1947 but that no documents had been kept about it, nor was there any direct witness still alive.

This version generally agrees with the statement of Kondrashov, the former KGB official quoted above. Some months after Kuzmishin's interrogation in March 1947, he contacted a colleague in the investigation department, asked what had happened to the person he had interrogated and was told that he had been shot. Asked why, the colleague said that there was reason enough, implying contact with several of the intelligence services. Kondrashov did not grasp that the person in question was Raoul Wallenberg until later the same year. This type of transparency was in itself contrary to the high level of security and rigid discipline maintained by the security service. On the other hand, Kondrashov was already highly placed and known as a brilliant analyst.

A person in the KGB service during the 1950's and 1960's stated as follows. He talked to two colleagues from the 2nd Main Directorate in 1960/61. One was called Nedosekin, who was responsible for Swedish matters. He appeared to be in a bad temper and when asked why, replied that the Swedes were again asking questions about Raoul Wallenberg. They would get the same answer as before, he said; there were no new facts. Our informant then asked what had actually happened to Raoul Wallenberg. Nedosekin replied in a low voice that he had been shot as a German Abwehr agent but no information was available about it; all documents had been destroyed. Asked why the Swedes should not be told,
Nedosekin answered that there was nothing to say because there was nothing on paper.

Yelisey Sinitsyn worked in the Scandinavian department of foreign intelligence service in the years following the Second World War. In his recently published memoirs, he wrote that in the autumn of 1947, Fitin, his boss learned that Raoul Wallenberg had been shot.

A former intelligence officer who defected to the west claimed to have worked in intelligence archives in the late 1940’s and to have seen a file on Raoul Wallenberg that was created at the time of his death. He recalled that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1946 or 1947, possibly as a result of a heart attack, but not from natural causes. The heart attack had been induced by various forms of mental torture (including sound and light), and medical experiment. The reports of cell spies and microphones hidden in the cells were detailed in this operative file, but no compromising information about Raoul Wallenberg activities was unearthed. According to this source, it was possible that Sudoplatov’s special unit was involved, including the so-called Mayranovsky laboratory. This was a toxicological research unit working under the Minister of State Security. It was also usually assigned to organise the execution of particularly important victims using, inter alia, specially prepared poisons. In some ways, this theory strengthens the view that the Smoltsov report may be genuine even if Smoltsov certainly suspected that not everything was above board (or, as one interlocutor maintained, he was a ‘trusted’ collaborator, even in sensitive cases such as this). The Mayranovsky laboratory carried out their assignments with the utmost secrecy.

The defecting KGB officer, Gordyevsky, precluded that Raoul Wallenberg was alive after 1947, and claimed to have heard of his having been executed. The remark of the interrogation leader to Raoul Wallenberg in March 1947, that he was a political case and would never be sentenced, was a very sinister forewarning. It indicated that an execution was imminent. On the other hand, he would not rule out that Abakumov and Molotov had conspired without Stalin’s knowledge.

Sudoplatov himself also maintained that Raoul Wallenberg may have been killed in the Mayranovsky laboratory, which worked closely with the Lubianka Prison.
Raoul Wallenberg would have been liquidated for refusing to cooperate. Sudoplatov learned that colleagues from the Central Committee and Suchanov, Malenkov’s assistant, removed documents in a sealed parcel that dealt with the laboratory’s activities in 1953. Sudoplatov had a relative who worked as a secretary to Suchanov.

The interview group spoke to Suchanov, who believed that Sudoplatov had confused material about the Mayranovsky laboratory, about which the former claimed to know nothing, with other documents. Suchanov had however received papers from the office of the arrested Beria and material from the intelligence service, but he had not been able to go through it all. Nevertheless, other witnesses have claimed to have also heard about the part played by Suchanov and material from the Mayranovsky laboratory, and called attention to Malenkov’s very strong position even after the fall of Beria. Suchanov was of the opinion that Raoul Wallenberg was annihilated in 1947 and that the truth would never be uncovered.

Yet another interesting version originated from a high-ranking KGB official in the early 1990's in which Beria plays the chief part. It should be pointed out, however, that this source later emphasised that it was merely his personal theory. He maintained that Beria ordered Raoul Wallenberg to be killed in 1947. The background to his arrest and imprisonment was Beria’s initial plan to create the myth of a ‘Jewish conspiracy’, similar to the one which resulted in persecution in the late 1950’s. Beria needed Wallenberg in order to fabricate the conspiracies which he would later present to Stalin as genuine and originating from the confessions of the Swedish diplomat. In actual fact, the interrogation reports shown to Stalin were false. Nevertheless, the dictator would have become suspicious and it would have led to putting an end to Raoul Wallenberg. Beria then undertook the extraordinary measures that have been substantiated, i.e., isolating Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners, destroying papers etc.

What are the views of the two very trusted interpreters/operators authorised by Smersh/ MGB? One felt it likely that Raoul Wallenberg was probably executed in July 1947, but that it was also conceivable that he fell ill and died under difficult conditions. ‘Perhaps he had created too much of a stir’. The interview group considered that he probably knew more but preferred to be economical with information. He very likely thought that the case was self-evident even without
any further details. The second interpreter claimed that he believed Raoul Wallenberg may have been executed, although it was possible that he died a natural death. On one occasion he let slip that he could not/ was not able to participate in such a ‘wicked deed’. Asked what he meant by the phrase, he replied that the death of Raoul Wallenberg in prison was a wicked deed after having saved so many people.

A colleague of Kartashov stated that he met the latter in the street some time in the 1970's, and asked what had become of Raoul Wallenberg. Kartashov’s somewhat aggressive reply was, ‘Do you really need to know about it?’

An interesting account came from an official who was employed first at the Scandinavian department of the MGB and then at the KGB 2nd Main Directorate (counter espionage) in the 1950’s. He said that the officials were convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was no longer alive. Early on, an inquiry was carried out in various camps and prisons, and it was noted that Raoul Wallenberg was not there. Nevertheless, it was known that he had been in prison earlier, that there had also been documents and that he died. However, officials at this level did not have access to any papers regarding what really happened. Only a narrow circle of chiefs would know that. The version in circulation was that Raoul Wallenberg had been accused of something and then killed. It was extremely doubtful that he just died. He was a young man, and an ordinary death would not need to be surrounded by such secrecy.

According to the same official, there would have been no reason for the then heads of the MGB to conceal Raoul Wallenberg and turn him into an ‘iron mask’. Abakumov and others were so convinced that they would go unpunished that this was an unlikely hypothesis. If no longer necessary, Raoul Wallenberg need only be liquidated. Before the war, a person who was executed was often described as ‘sentenced to ten years without correspondence rights’. After the war, however, there was never any doubt that a person said to be deceased really was dead.

Along with several others, the same person pointed out that by 1947 Raoul Wallenberg had spent two and a half years in prison. It may not have been in the leaders’ interests to reveal how long he had been there after disavowing his presence in Moscow throughout. Besides, Raoul Wallenberg refused to
cooperate, which also emerged from the evidence of his fellow prisoners. In other words, it would have been embarrassing, even dangerous, to suddenly inform Sweden that Raoul Wallenberg had been in a Soviet prison in Moscow all along. What satisfactory explanation could possibly be found? Furthermore, his story would have created a scandal. It became essential, therefore, to remove the problem (cf. the internal correspondence). Placing Raoul Wallenberg in another prison or camp was virtually the same as revealing his existence sooner or later. There were, of course, investigation prisons and Vladimir Prison, for example, where prisoners could be kept fairly well isolated, although even there some contact took place. (Comment: and there was also the risk of the identity of numbered prisoners being revealed).

The argument above came from a former member of the MGB Scandinavian department. The discussion later shows that it is possible to pick holes in his seemingly logical arguments.

**Langfelder’s and Roedel’s fates**

In trying to understand the events surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s death in July 1947, the fates that befell Vilmos Langfelder, his driver, and Willy Roedel, his cellmate of longest standing, are extremely interesting. All that is known about Langfelder was found in a letter from the KGB to the Foreign Ministry dated 12 June 1957, containing a proposed reply to a question about him that had come from Hungary. The proposed reply stated that the question of Langfelder was investigated while attempting to discover what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, and it was established that Langfelder died in prison on 2 March 1948. As mentioned above, it appears to the Russian side that this was pure invention. No papers had been found, and the KGB therefore assumed that they were destroyed when the MGB ordered the destruction of papers about Raoul Wallenberg. Langfelder was somewhat younger than Raoul Wallenberg and in good health...

We have more exact information about Roedel. He was considerably older than Raoul Wallenberg, although according to his fellow prisoner, Loyda, he was in
good health in the spring of 1945. However, a medical certificate dated 12 September 1947 stated that Roedel had some health (heart) problems and the doctor had therefore prescribed better food and outdoor walks. On 14 October 1947, Kartashov ordered Roedel to be sent to the Krasnogorsk prison camp outside Moscow. War prisoners were often sent there during some interval in an investigation. A notice dated 15 October shows that the transport left Lubianka. On 16 October, prison director Mironov reported to Kartashov that Roedel had died in transit. The autopsy report for this case has in fact been preserved. It states that death occurred suddenly due to paralysis of the heart following sclerosis. Roedel’s personal file has not been found. Documents about him were found in a volume of correspondence between various authorities relating to foreign diplomats, intelligence officers and other specially important prisoners (inter alia the former Hungarian Prime Minister, Bethlen, who died in Butyrka in 1946). An exchange of letters about Roedel had taken place with Kartashov’s department, and it was there that an envelope was found containing his personal belongings. If no personal file was opened for Raoul Wallenberg (which should have occurred) any material about him ought to have been found in a similar file.

Although Roedel’s death appears to have been due to natural causes and was recorded in the prescribed manner, suspicions are naturally aroused when it occurred so soon after July 1947, and especially when seen in connection with Langfelder’s reported death five months later. The chances are exceedingly small that three key figures in the same drama all die of natural causes within such a short space of time. (There is of course no proof that Wallenberg and Langfelder died on the dates mentioned). It should also be stressed that the 20-30 minute car journey between Lubianka and Krasnogorsk is not particularly strenuous. Moreover, we should bear in mind that after July 1947, all the other prisoners who had shared Raoul Wallenberg’s cell were held in isolation for several years. Kartashov (or the Minister of State Security) could never have intended Roedel to reach Krasnogorsk where he would have had an opportunity to contact other war prisoners and thus talk about his many months in the same cell as Raoul Wallenberg.

An interesting point is that, unlike Raoul Wallenberg, no evidence has emerged indicating that Langfelder or Roedel were seen alive after the dates of their reported deaths, with the exception of one witness concerning Langfelder (in Vladimir Prison).
The attention of the working group was drawn to a couple of remarkable cases, one of which was settled very near in time to a decisive phase in the Wallenberg case. A brief report follows, since they provide an interesting insight into the thoughts and course of action (= deceitful and conspiratorial behaviour) taken in sensitive cases by the Soviet side. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it is possible to make a direct analogy to Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. It should be noted that the conspiratorial behaviour is fully reflected in the internal documentation, which has been preserved.

The first case concerned the Polish Jewish socialist leaders, Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter. They became Soviet prisoners at the collapse of Poland, and were sentenced to death in July-August 1941. After a few days, this was reduced to a ten-year sentence in a prison camp, and they were released already in September 1941 (following an agreement between the Polish government in London and the USSR).

They were arrested again in December that same year, accused of collaborating with the Germans, but a number of international personalities intervened on their behalf.

Molotov first replied in February 1943, saying that the Supreme Court military college had sentenced them both to death in December 1941. However, the file showed that the court sentence was false. Instead, Molotov had written a fictitious text, approved by Stalin, which kept the actual events secret.

In December 1941, Beria ordered Ehrlich and Alter, who were numbered prisoners (41 and 42), to be placed alone in cells with the NKVD at Kuybishev. No papers were to be drawn up about the two arrested men, and no interrogation was held. Ehrlich committed suicide in May 1942. Since Alter was making depressed remarks, Beria ordered him to be given personal surveillance and improved his conditions in prison. In actual fact, Alter was executed in February 1943. The head of the NKVD at Kuybishev sent Alter’s death certificate to
Merkulov, the Minister of State Security together with his personal file. His possessions were burnt.

The other case concerned Oggins, an American prisoner who was sentenced in 1939 to eight years imprisonment in a Soviet camp. The Americans knew about him, but the Soviet side did not consider it ‘appropriate’ to hand Oggins over as he had cooperated with Soviet intelligence. Abakumov wrote to Stalin and Molotov in May 1947 and proposed instead to eliminate the Oggins problem. His suggestion was quite simply to kill him but to tell the Americans that the prisoner had died in the camp of tuberculosis already in 1946. In order to strengthen the credibility of this announcement, a false medical document would show that Oggins had received treatment for the illness, and a death certificate would be produced.

Evidence of German war prisoners in the 1957 White Paper

The aforementioned interviews with Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners on 22 July 1947 (stated as taking place on 27 July in the White Paper) were significant and unique. The following are quotations from the 1957 White Paper.

Richter: I was taken for questioning at Lefortovo Prison at 10 o’clock in the evening of 27 July 1947. The leader was a colonel from the Ministry for Internal Affairs (NKVD). An interpreter with the rank of lieutenant colonel stood beside him. He spoke fluent German. They asked me about the people with whom I had shared a cell while in prison. I listed the names, including that of Wallenberg. They then asked for the names of people to whom I, in turn, had spoken about Wallenberg, and what he had said to me’. Richter was kept in isolation for eight months after this. - The registration ledger noted that Kuzmishin interrogated Richter between 22.10 - 22.30 on 22 July.

Horst Kitschmann: ‘I was taken for questioning at close on 11 o’clock in the evening of 27 or 28 July 1947. The leader was a colonel. A subordinate with the rank of major also took part. Both were from the Ministry for Internal Affairs. They asked me with whom I had shared a cell during my imprisonment. When I mentioned Langfelder’s name the interrogating leader asked what he had told me. I gave the main gist of what Langfelder had said about Raoul Wallenberg and
What happened to Raoul Wallenberg…
	heir experiences together. The leading interrogator then wanted to know the names of people to whom I, in my turn, had mentioned Langfelder and Wallenberg …’ Kitschmann was also placed in isolation for eight months. According to the registration ledger, Kuzmishin interrogated Kitschmann between 23.00 - 23.20 on 22 July.

Erhard Hille: ‘Krafft was the first to be fetched for questioning on 27 July, followed by Pelkonen a quarter of an hour later. Two high ranking NKVD officers questioned Pelkonen. They asked him what Langfelder had told him about the Swedish legation secretary and whether Pelkonen knew his name. Pelkonen had replied that he did not. Afterwards, Pelkonen was put in a solitary cell on the ground floor of Lefortovo Prison, threw himself from a window sill onto the stone floor and cracked his skull’.

‘Huber was interrogated by high ranking NKVD officials from the Ministry of the Interior on 27 July 1947, the same day as Pelkonen. The interpreter was a uniformed colonel while the actual leading interrogator was a civilian. From what Huber told me, I suppose that the civilian could have been General Karbulov (his correct name was Kobulov) … who was presumably the NKVD representative for General Petrov, head of the war prisoners’ unit … The leading interrogator asked who had been his fellow prisoners in Lubianka in 1945’. (The interrogation leader was out to get Langfelder and Raoul Wallenberg).

Ernst Huber: ‘I was again interrogated in Lubianka Prison. They fetched me for questioning once more at 6 pm in late July 1947. I was not taken to the ordinary interrogation room but to one on the third floor. The leading interrogator was a young, blond giant in civilian clothes. The interpreter had the rank of major. The leader first asked whom I had been with in Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons’. (Later on, the interrogation was touched upon what Langfelder had told him about Raoul Wallenberg, after which he was isolated until April 1948). According to the registration ledger and personal file, Kartashov interrogated Huber for six hours, between 20.10 -02.00 on 22 July. This partly coincided with Kartashov’s interrogation of Schlitter, alias Scheuer, from 20.00-21.15 on the same evening. Schlitter was Raoul Wallenberg’s first cellmate, together with Gustav Richter, and is strongly suspected of having been an informer to both the MGB and the prison management.
Other prisoners who were interrogated between 22-23 July were:

- Otto Hatz, both days;
- Sándor Katona (cellmate with Langfelder for a time), both days;
- Willy Roedel, on 22 July, and
- Vilmos Langfelder himself, on 22 and 23 July (for 14 hours that day, by Kartashov).

It is somewhat perplexing that all these prisoners gave 27 July as the date on which they were questioned (or 28 July in one case). It is admittedly not easy to recall a correct date (documented as 22 July) but then everybody’s memory was at fault in the same way!

We know from the prisoners’ statements and personal files that the authorities then arranged to isolate the small group of Raoul Wallenberg’s and Langfelder’s former cellmates and those who knew them indirectly. Later, they were brought together, mainly in groups of two or three, in Moscow prisons. It should also be noted that Hille and Loyda, who were in Krasnogorsk when the interrogation took place, were returned to Moscow later that autumn and placed together with their former cellmates. Even following the transfer of several of them to Vladimir Prison between 1951-1953, they continued to be held in strict isolation, alone or together. Among them were Huber (a witness of Langfelder), who was kept strictly isolated in Vladimir between May 1951 - October 1952, after which he had a numbered prisoner as cellmate. Schlitter, who was first together with Raoul Wallenberg and then with Huber, was isolated at Alexandrovsk Central prison. Others were isolated in couples, such as Grossheim-Krisco and Szakács, Hille and Pelkonen and Loyda and Hofstetter. Richter was isolated at Vladimir Prison on the orders of the interrogation leader and interpreter, Solovov, a colleague of Kopelyansky, because he had been associated with an especially important prisoner (App. 53). However, shortly afterwards he was placed together with Kitschmann. On the other hand, it should be remembered that from 1953 most of the fellow prisoners were gradually released.

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Taken together, these combined circumstances, i.e., the denial that Raoul Wallenberg was in the USSR, the assertion that he had probably been killed in
Hungary, the interrogation of his fellow cellmates and their subsequent isolation, the scoring out of details in registration ledgers, the absence of notes on where Wallenberg’s effects were sent, the oral information about a parcel containing material on Wallenberg which was handed to the head of the MGB archives in 1947, the deaths of Roedel and Langfelder some months later, appear to point fairly clearly in one direction. However, these reported circumstances are not the same as legal valid proof (documentation) of Raoul Wallenberg’s death in July 1947.

What we do know accords in principle with the hypothesis that, for example, a decision was taken to hold Raoul Wallenberg isolated somewhere. If the authorities took such precautions with his fellow prisoners, and at some point clearly tried to eliminate most documentary traces of his prison stay, it would have been highly illogical and risky to place Wallenberg in a camp or prison where, particularly in the former, he could come into contact with other prisoners (even if there is some testimony to this effect). The more logical course would have been to place Raoul Wallenberg in effective isolation in a high security prison, or perhaps in a closed psychiatric institution, although this could not be described as a hermetically sealed environment. This argument changes somewhat if it is assumed that in 1947 the MGB had no reason to fear the release of some foreign war prisoners in the foreseeable future. But this was hardly the case. Some prisoners were beginning to be released in 1947, some even in 1946. In any case, the more effective isolation ought to have been arranged for Raoul Wallenberg himself rather than for his fellow prisoners (this hypothesis is considered in the following chapter). Vladimir Prison, together with Lubianka, Ivanovo and Alexandrovsk Central, were best suited for isolating the especially important or dangerous prisoners.
XII Testimony relating to the period after July 1947

Method of inquiry

A major part of the work of the Russian-Swedish working group involved following up evidence for the period after the official date given in the Soviet Union for Raoul Wallenberg's death. Over the past 50 years, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has collected over 25,000 pages of records, and a card index containing the names of more than 3,000 people and places of interest. A large number of documents contain the chronicles of prisoners returning from the Soviet Union. Ministry officials interviewed the homecoming prisoners, often in close liaison with the Swedish security police. All the testimony for the 1945-1969 period is available in the Blue Books published in 1980 and 1982. However, this report has made use of the testimony of many others made available at a later date.

Resources are clearly inadequate to undertake a detailed on-the-spot investigation in Russia of all the evidence that has been recorded over the years. The testimony is more or less detailed and credible. Many witnesses, not only from the post-1947 period, have earlier proved to be jokers or mythomania whose testimony was worthless. A selection was therefore made of testimony deemed to contain more than average substance and credibility. A summary was compiled and handed to the Russian side of the working group. The central Russian authorities in Moscow, especially the MVD, then wrote to all local and regional archives and prisons asking for verification. This procedure was repeated a couple of times and has above all involved checking all card index registers and the personal and prison files of prisoners who gave evidence. No trace of Raoul Wallenberg has yet been found in this material covering the post-July 1947 period.
Perhaps the report would have inspired even greater confidence if the Swedish and Russian sides had jointly gone through all the card indices and archives of camps and prisons from which evidence has come. Apart from the abovementioned lack of resources, there would not have been any guarantee of the end result being better. If there were doubts about the Russian side’s sincerity, it would still have been possible to claim that even here interesting archive material had been removed before the joint investigation began. Be that as it may, it was judged that if preserved, the truth about Raoul Wallenberg had to be in the central archives, on the grounds of his being a very important prisoner. (Nevertheless, there may well be other opinions on this).

**Name and number prisoners**

Although it is established that Raoul Wallenberg was registered under his own name (at least between 1945-1947 until March 1947), it is not entirely out of the question that he was held under a different name or number later on. If the former, it would be extremely complicated and time-consuming to try to establish where he may have been held. It is generally somewhat unclear to what extent the method was applied of giving a prisoner another name.

Numbered prisoners have existed to a limited degree, particularly in the Moscow prisons, the Vladimir, as well as in some other prisons and psychiatric clinics. It should be made clear, however, that providing a prisoner with another name or number is not enough to keep his existence secret. His isolation has to be fully effective.

There is some indication that the system of numbered prisoners was centralised in the spring of 1947. The central NKVD/ MVD authorities in Moscow sent instructions on 19 April 1947 to the MGB directorate in the Ivanovo region regarding a recently arrived contingent of Baltic numbered prisoners. The instructions laid down that the prison director, his deputies and guards were responsible for: 1) keeping secret the fact that there were numbered prisoners in the prison; 2) keeping secret their names and background etc.; 3) preventing any attempts to escape and contacts with the outside world and with each other; 4)

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9The section on numbered prisoners is based mainly on Susan E. Mesinai’s report.
ensuring that the numbered prisoners obeyed the prison regime. The guards were not permitted to talk to the prisoners, and no talk about them was permitted in the presence of guards, personnel, etc. In addition, the numbered prisoners’ index cards and cell cards etc. were not included in the prison index system but were to be sent to the head of the directorate of prisons in Moscow (even so, there were exceptions to this rule in some cases in the Vladimir Prison, see below).

It proved difficult to keep a prisoner’s identity completely secret and the prison staff often managed to discover it.

The numbering system was also applied to cases under investigation and to sentenced prisoners. The latter are the easiest to follow. With the exception of numbers 14 and 19-20, all the prisoners in the number series from 1 to 32 used in the Vladimir Prison between 1947-53 (with some renumbering occurring during the period) have been identified. The identity was established of a number of Baltic leaders, several Hungarians with links to Allied intelligence, two of Stalin’s relatives etc. No. 15 was the Jesuit priest Aladjan-Aladjani, one of the four whose name was blotted out in registers at Lubianka and Lefortovo between 1945-47 (blotting out also occurred in the ledger detailing belongings. Besides Aladjan-Aladjani, those involved, as mentioned earlier, were Wallenberg, Langfelder and Sándor Katona). He was sentenced on 28 June 1947 to ten years imprisonment for counter revolutionary activities. No. 21 was sentenced in May 1948. As the numbers were in sequence after the date on which a person was sentenced, no.14 must have been sentenced before 28 June and nos. 16-20 between that date and May 1948. Some complications arise, however, in the case of two Baltic prisoners who were given nos.16 and 17 while being investigated, and nos. 9 and 19 after they were sentenced in 1952. Be that as it may, it is clearly vital to identify all the numbered prisoners in this series.

**Vladimir Prison particularly interesting**

As many of Raoul Wallenberg’s cellmates were transferred to Vladimir Prison after being sentenced, it was a particularly interesting object of study which provided plenty of opportunities for keeping prisoners isolated. It was also from
Testimony relating to the period after July 1947

dthis prison that a large number of witnesses came who gave testimony regarding Raoul Wallenberg.

Testimony from Vladimir Prison was the reason for Sweden’s asking the USSR in 1959 to investigate urgently whether Raoul Wallenberg had been held there. Two Swedish judges were invited to study the information from Vladimir. Their report, published in 1960, stated somewhat cautiously: ‘In our view, and under Swedish law, the present inquiry must find that Wallenberg was probably alive and held at Vladimir Prison, at least until the early 1950’s, although there is no conclusive proof in this respect’. They would not commit themselves further than this. However, the testimony of war prisoners for the 1945-47 period was established as being fully valid in a law court.

As mentioned in the introduction, an international commission under professor Guy von Dardel first investigated Vladimir Prison in 1990. They went through and video filmed a large number of index cards, particularly those concerning foreigners and known Russian witnesses. They concluded that most of the evidence had largely been correct with regard to dates and cell numbers relating to witnesses’ own periods of imprisonment and for their fellow inmates. It was interesting to note that the Soviet Union had never thoroughly investigated Vladimir Prison to ascertain whether Raoul Wallenberg had been imprisoned there.

As far as numbered prisoners were concerned, index cards up to no. 33 were found, contrary to regulations. It was possible to identify all but three with numbers. However, two of them were arrested in 1941 (one was Estonian and the other a Georgian) while the third was a Hungarian born in 1910. A handful of cards were missing from the number series and we do not know with any certainty whether cards for numbers higher than 33 existed and have been removed (App. 54 with the Russian investigation).

The staff at Vladimir Prison were also interviewed, including the former medical officer, Butova, who became known through Abraham Kalinski’s testimony. She denied having treated a prisoner by the name of Wallenberg. Another person working as a hospital orderly identified Raoul Wallenberg from a photograph as a prisoner in an isolation cell in the 1950’s.
Varvara Larina, a hospital orderly at Vladimir Prison 2 was interviewed during a visit to Vladimir in December 1993 as well as later, when Marvin W. Makinen interviewed her in the presence of a prison representative. She stated that she had not known the prisoners' names when she worked there. Nor had she access to any information about them. The only time she came into direct contact with the prisoners was when she occasionally accompanied some medical team into the cells. She spoke of a prisoner kept in isolation, in cell 49 on the third floor of Korpus 2. The prisoner was about 170 centimetres in height, with dark hair and narrow face. She guessed that he had been in prison from the middle of the 1950's and some time into the 1960's. She was sure that the prisoner was there at the time that the prisoner Osmaks died in the cell opposite. She remembered him particularly because he spoke Russian with an accent and she assumed that he was foreign (not German). The prisoner was also rather particular and had complained, for example, that the soup was cold. When confronted with a number of photographs, she chose one of Raoul Wallenberg (never before published) and said straight away that it depicted the prisoner in question. At our most recent contact with Larina, she firmly adhered to her story (App. 55 gives details of Marvin W. Makinen's report on interviews with Butova and Larina).

A former prison guard at Vladimir stated in 1992 that a foreign, non-German prisoner, not unlike a photograph of Raoul Wallenberg, was held isolated in the prison for a long time.

Other testimony from Vladimir Prison that was deemed to be of interest was as follows:

The first is from the Russian prisoner Shulgin, who, according to information passed on by the Swiss national Hoechli-Wihlm, stated that he and Raoul Wallenberg had been transferred to Vladimir in July 1947 and placed in Korpus 2.

Horst Theodor Mülle, a journalist born in Essen in 1911, was a prisoner in Vladimir between 24 February - 22 September 1956. Mülle shared a cell with a Georgian, Gogiberidze, who told him at the time of the publication of the communiqué about Prime Minister Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union, that he had heard other prisoners in the prison hospital speak about Raoul Wallenberg who was in the prison isolation cell. The personal files of both Mülle and Gogiberidze were examined without being able to confirm this information.
Other third hand witnesses also refer to Gogiberidze. He is said to have complained to the guards in 1956 because he knew that Raoul Wallenberg was alive and in a punishment cell. Some 27 pages covering this period are missing from Gogiberidze’s personal file.

Otto Schöggl, born in Vienna in 1921, reported to the Swedish Consulate in Zurich in 1956 that he had been in the Vladimir hospital between 16 April - 28 May 1955 and had met Raoul Wallenberg there. In later interviews, Schöggl said that he had come to Vladimir from Vorkuta in 1952 or 1953, and that he had met Wallenberg in January or February 1955. The Swede told him that he had been in prison since 1945, first in Moscow, probably in Lubianka. His transfer to Vladimir must have taken place some time in 1949/50. Schöggl was uncertain about the date, however, and said that it could have been in 1948 or 1951. Schöggl’s file did not contain any mention of Raoul Wallenberg.

Jusif Terelya was interviewed in Canada in 1987, and stated that he met a prisoner in a corridor of Korpus-2 on about 10 April 1970 whom he later understood could have been Wallenberg. Terelya shared a cell with Ogurtsev. These two had asked the guard for a bedside table from a cell where Raoul Wallenberg is alleged to have stayed. There were two inscriptions on the table, one of “Sweden” and “Raoul Wallenberg” with an address, the other of “Miranda Martina” and an address. According to Terelya, Wallenberg was moved from cell 43 on the second floor of Korpus-2 to cell 53 on the third floor as late as at the end of January 1985. In an interview in 1987, however, Ogurtsev described Terelya as unreliable, and that during his 15 years in Soviet prisons he had never heard of Raoul Wallenberg. In a later interview, he described Terelya as credible although with a weak memory for details. The Latvian Rozkalns has also mentioned Terelya’s information, saying that he heard it from Terelya in a Soviet camp. Rozkalns gave the cell number as 32, and maintained that Raoul Wallenberg was there under a different name, that of a forester from Katyn. Vlada Shakalys told the Swedish police in 1980 that he shared a cell in Vladimir in 1964 with the forester above, whose name was Menshagin. The latter had told him of meeting Wallenberg personally in prison but that the Swede had died in 1954-55.

While in the Vladimir Prison in 1962, Marvin W. Makinen heard from Z. Krumins that the latter met a Swede in the prison who appeared to have been arrested for intelligence activities. Later, in a camp, Makinen was told by
Vorobyov-Vorobyey that Kruminsh had been a cellmate of the Swedish prisoner ‘van den Berg’ (Kruminsh was certainly a cell spy; he was pardoned after serving only half his sentence).

Lazar Berger was also informed by the above Vorobyov-Vorobyey that the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg was being held in cell 2-53 in Korpus-2”, together with the ‘Stalin general’ Gogibereshvili.

A report from Kalinski, mentioned below, said that Raoul Wallenberg had shared a cell with Beria’s subordinate Mamulov (in cell 2-23), and later with Shariya (in the same cell). This information was said to come from Gogiberidze.

The American experts Marvin W. Makinen (himself a prisoner in Vladimir Prison for some years during the 1960’s), Ari Kaplan and Susan E. Mesinai carried out a further, very extensive and time-consuming examination of the Vladimir card index and relevant personal and investigation files.

A selection of over 10,000 prisoner registration cards were computer-processed and analysed (for the period between 1947-72) with regard to the cells in which prisoners were held. This was done, inter alia, to determine by means of the cards whether apparently empty cells were in fact uninhabited, and give credence to some of the testimony about Raoul Wallenberg regarding the assumption that Wallenberg was in Vladimir under a concealed identity, and his registration card later removed. Cell movements were also examined in an effort to determine whether apparently empty cells were uninhabited because they were being refurbished etc., or because prisoners were being given amnesty. Partial studies have also been made about information from arrivals and their case numbers. However, the registration ledgers for 1954 and 1955 are alleged to have been destroyed, while vague information was provided for 1947.

On the whole, considering the time that has passed, the information about cell numbers and transfer dates has deviated very little and confirms the testimony of Shulgin/ Hoechli-Wihlman, Lazar Berger/ Vorobyov-Vorobyey, Kruminsh, Kalinski, Larina and Terelya. Moreover, in all these cases it was noted that compared with other periods, there was an uncharacteristic frequency of seemingly empty cells in a way which appears to confirm that an isolated prisoner may have been held there.
Shulgin, who claimed that he was transferred to Vladimir together with Raoul Wallenberg but not placed in the same cell, was in Korpus-2 from 1947 until 1956. According to the card index, cell 2-2 was shown to be empty from 24 July 1947 until 1 June 1948. Another cell, 2-3, was empty for 281 days, from 28 July 1947 onwards. In addition, details of arriving prisoners are missing for some days around 25 July, the day of Shulgin’s arrival. And there is a gap involving 1,000 prisoners in the number series for new arrivals in Vladimir in the spring of 1947.

The following was noted with regard to Berger’s statement obtained from Vorobyov-Vorobyey to the effect that Raoul Wallenberg had shared cell 2-53 with the ‘Stalin general’ Gogibereshvili. No prisoner with that name has been discovered, although there was a general Bereshvili who was ‘alone’ in cells 2-50 and 2-52 during the autumn of 1954 (he was not isolated on any other occasions). Cell 2-52 was particularly well suited for isolating a prisoner and, for example, preventing contact with other cells through tapping. Vorobyov-Vorobyey also shared a cell with Mamulov, as well as a prisoner called Mukha. The latter mentioned to Makinen that he had heard about a Swedish prisoner in Vladimir.

According to the registration cards, Kruminsh should have been in isolation for more than a year between 1956-57. It is fairly unlikely that he who was so often placed together with various important prisoners, really was in isolation for such a long time. He told Makinen that he had only been isolated for the first months after his arrival. Another observation concerned two prisoners who had known Raoul Wallenberg earlier and were moved on 16 October 1956 to cell 2-36. However, already the next day they were placed in cell 2-23 despite it having been empty the day before. Could the first placement have been a mistake because Kruminsh was in cell 2-37 next door, together with Raoul Wallenberg? It is also strange that Kruminsh sat apparently alone in a large cell in Korpus 1, from 28 January - 17 April 1957 (when the Gromyko memorandum was handed over to Sweden).

In following up Kalinski’s information that Mamulov shared cell 2-23 with Raoul Wallenberg, it was ascertained that Mamulov had at different times been ‘alone’ in three cells in Korpus 2.
Larina stated that Raoul Wallenberg was probably in cell 2-49 when the prisoner, Osmak, died in the cell opposite. It has been established that Osmak died on 16 May 1960 in cell 2-49, which he shared with Bereshvili and another prisoner. If this is the case, it is more likely that Raoul Wallenberg was in cell 2-44 or 2-41 which, according to the card index, were empty at this time.

Finally, with regard to Terelya’s testimony (he was in cells 2-21 and 2-30), it can be noted that cell 2-33 was an excellent isolation cell and that it was ‘empty’ from 2 September 1969 - 27 May 1970.

We are thus unable to eliminate the possibility that Raoul Wallenberg may have been held in Vladimir Prison. Larina’s testimony in particular appears to offer a real possibility of his being there. And if not, what is the explanation of the evidence from there? One can only speculate. In the first place, by that time Raoul Wallenberg was a well known person in prison; several of the prisoners there had come across him in Moscow between 1945-47 and spoken about him (although none of his fellow prisoners from the Moscow prisons said that he was in the Vladimir). Other prisoners had heard about Raoul Wallenberg in other ways. The afore-mentioned Thomsen/ Grossheim-Krisko, formerly employed at the Swedish Legation in Budapest, described himself during tapping sessions at Vladimir as a secretary from the Swedish Legation; a further possible source of error in the testimony of witnesses. Grossheim-Krisko transferred to Vladimir in February 1952 and was released in June 1953. He did not hear anything about Raoul Wallenberg being in Vladimir, but maintained that the latter should have been among a large category of prisoners, including himself, who were moved from Lefortovo to Butyrka in March 1950. Grossheim-Krisko was to be placed in a special category as he was associated with a ‘specially important prisoner’.

In 1991, two Memorial members who had participated in the investigation of Vladimir, made the important observation that everyone held there had arrived after they had been sentenced except for some number prisoners.
Towards the end of the 1970's and early 1980's, Abraham Kalinski, a released Polish prisoner, aroused considerable attention. He was proved to have been an inmate of Vladimir Prison and claimed to have seen Raoul Wallenberg there for the last time in 1959. Kalinski also procured testimony from Jan Kaplan, a Soviet Jew, Dr. Butova, prison medical officer at Vladimir, and the Soviet general, Gennady Kupriyanov. According to Kalinski, Kaplan had noticed a Swede in the hospital at Butyrka, and this emerged in a letter from Kaplan’s relative in the USSR to another in the USA. Kaplan is said to have tried to smuggle out a letter about Raoul Wallenberg, and in so doing was imprisoned once more. This was mentioned in a letter from Kaplan’s wife to Anna Bilder, a daughter living in Israel.

Kalinski forwarded the letter to the relative in the USA to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, cut into small pieces (sic). The remainder of the postmark contained latin letters; it could not therefore have been sent from the Soviet Union. Theoretically, it could first have been smuggled out to the west and posted there. However, the postmark was stamped over a Soviet postage stamp. The letter from Butova was probably written by Kalinski himself. The letter to Anna Bilder was also probably faked by Kalinski, in collusion with Kaplan’s daughter.

According to the Russian representatives of the working group, Kaplan was interviewed about this while in prison. He denied that information about his having met Raoul Wallenberg came from him. Kaplan had not even been imprisoned in Butyrka. His wife categorically denied any knowledge of the matter, or that her husband had mentioned anything about such a meeting. Nor had she sent anything along these lines to her daughter. The view of the KGB was that Kaplan spread information about his alleged meeting in order to obtain an early release. During a conversation with him in prison, he had himself linked the question of a public denial with an early release.

Vasily N. Melnichuk visited the Swedish Embassy in Belgrade in 1989. He said that while visiting Kaplan some time in 1976 or 1977, Kaplan’s daughter (Anna Bilder) telephoned her father from Israel. The latter had mentioned that Raoul Wallenberg was alive in the mid 1970’s. Melnichuk and Kaplan had known each other ever since they were in the Gulag together. Melnichuk promised Kaplan that at the first opportunity he would confirm to the Swedish authorities the truth
of Kaplan’s remarks to his daughter. After spending a couple of weeks in the Ukraine, Melnichuk came to the embassy once more. While there, he mentioned his desire to apply for asylum in Canada. A later inquiry into his whereabouts, including Canada, was unsuccessful.

Kalinski reproduced General Kupriyanov’s information in a Russian emigré newspaper in late January 1979, and in the Swedish press that spring. Kupriyanov was said to have come across Raoul Wallenberg while prisoners were being transported in the Soviet Union during the 1950’s. Kalinski also said that following the publication of this information, Kupriyanov died from the effects of being tortured by the KGB. He also referred to Kupriyanov’s diary of his prison years, alleged to have been smuggled out to West Germany.

Kupriyanov’s son, two daughters and his second wife were interviewed in 1995. It emerged that the general never had any problems with the KGB after his release in 1956. He died of a heart attack on 28 February 1979. His diary was in his wife’s possession all the time. It was examined, and contains nothing about Raoul Wallenberg (although we do not know whether we had access to a complete version). On the other hand, Kupriyanov mentioned Kalinski with whom he shared a cell at one time. Kupriyanov was fully convinced that Kalinski was a cell spy.

A CIA document from 1979 expressed very strong doubts about Kalinski’s credibility. However, his information was often correct about places and times. This means that it was not possible to categorically reject everything he said.

Svartz – Myasnikov

There is still a conflict of evidence regarding professor Nanna Svartz’s report from 1961 (see the White Paper of 1965) on her conversation with professor Myasnikov in which he said he knew that Raoul Wallenberg was in a mental hospital. It has not been possible to determine unequivocally which version is correct - that of professor Svartz or professor Myasnikov’s denial. In talks after her visit to Moscow, Svartz appeared convinced of the veracity of her version and could not be shaken, even if her accounts of the conversation varied somewhat.
with regard to the exact wording used. She herself noted after the confrontation with Myasnikov in 1965 that their statements contradicted one another.

If Svartz’ information was nevertheless based on a misunderstanding, what is the explanation for it? It has emerged lately that Myasnikov had a habit of nodding agreement with the person to whom he was listening. Moreover, language problems and misunderstandings arising from them, cannot be excluded (Myasnikov could have meant, for example, that Raoul Wallenberg might have been in a psychiatric hospital. They both were said to be able to make themselves understood on medical matters but, according to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, Myasnikov was far from fluent in German. Nanna Svartz was somewhat better in German. It has not been possible to clarify this episode - one statement contradicts the other - and further research in archives has not so far resulted in making the matter clear.

It should be added that an inquiry was made to determine whether Raoul Wallenberg had ever been in the Serbski Institute. Based on a profile of his personality, it assumed that he had possibly been given a cover name. The result was negative but it should be pointed out that up to now only the 1945-47 period has been covered.

**Other evidence**

The testimony of many other witnesses has to some extent also been pursued. Some examples are given below.

- Albert Hollosy, a Hungarian, stated in 1981 that some time before being released that year, he spent time in a KGB controlled psychiatric clinic in Moscow and there saw Raoul Wallenberg in a wheelchair (a nurse pointed out Wallenberg to him).

- Antonas Bogdanas from Latvia, alleged that he met Raoul Wallenberg in Norilsk some time between 1945-51. Both were being sent to a special prison (psychiatric clinic) in Kazan in 1951, where Wallenberg was to be treated for megalomania after saying that he had been a Swedish diplomat. So far, admittance to the clinic
Testimony relating to the period after July 1947

and its records has been refused but should become possible during a follow-up period.

- Theodor von Dufving, German officer born in 1907, told the embassy in Bonn in 1982, and later to representatives of the working group, that while in a transit camp (Kotlas or Kirov) in 1949, en route to Vorkuta, he heard about a Swedish diplomat in the camp escorted by a special guard. Some days later, von Dufving managed to meet the Swede who told him that he had been imprisoned ‘because of a big mistake’.

- Aurel von Jüchen, 1902-1991, a Protestant priest, was a prisoner in Vorkuta from 1948 until early in the 1950’s. According to Helmut Schneider, von Jüchen knew that Wallenberg was in Vorkuta. His wife has said that her husband did not have direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg, but often spoke of prison comrades who had met him.

- Dr Menachem Melzer, born 1907, was a physician. In an interview with a Swedish police officer in 1974, he said that he probably met Raoul Wallenberg in May-June 1948 (or 1949) in Chalmer-Ju, north of Vorkuta, when he examined internees at a work camp. A man with the name of Raoul had said that he was Swedish. There was another Swede in the camp as well.

- Jefim Moshinskiy was said to be from Odessa and emigrated to Israel after his release from the Soviet camp. He stated that around 1950 he was in a penal camp on Wrangel Island together with Avraham Shifrin and Raoul Wallenberg. Moshinskiy showed the Swedish Embassy in Tel Aviv two letters from Irkutsk, dated 1975 and 1976 respectively, which mentioned that Wallenberg was in a psychiatric hospital. Shifrin emigrated to Israel in 1970 and informed the embassy that he was sure the two letters were false. He testified to a Senate Committee in Washington in 1973, however, that a large prison camp was located at Wrangel Island as late as in 1962.

- Rudolf Alexander Hedrich-Winter von Schwab, born 1919, told the Swedish Embassy in Vienna in 1964 that he met Raoul Wallenberg in a hospital cell in a special prison at Verchne-Uralsk on 5 December 1959 (von Schwab’s birthday). Harald Hjeld, a Finnish artillery officer, and Arvid Andersson, said to be Swedish were also in the prison. Von Schwab also met a Dr Jakobson (from Tallinn) in
Magnitogorsk in 1953. The latter had spoken of meeting Wallenberg during an
operation. Von Schwab met the Swedish diplomat again in Verchne-Uralsk in
September 1953. Wallenberg then confirmed that he spent two months in
Magnitogorsk after his operation and had met Dr Jakobson. Wallenberg had also
mentioned that he was operated on and received medical care only after the death
of Stalin.

- Boguslaw Baj, a Polish citizen, visited the embassy in Warsaw in 1988 and 1992
to give his testimony. Later on, information was also obtained from his Polish
prison comrades, Jerzy Cichocki, Josef Kowalski and Josef Markuyéwski.
Boguslaw Baj fought in the Polish underground home front army until July 1944.
Captured by Soviet military counter espionage in January 1945, he was sent to
various camps and prisons, including Lubianka and ended up finally in Tashkent.
He was taken to Bratsk in 1949 where prisoners were building a bridge over
Angara. One day in 1950 a prison transport with 160 prisoners arrived in the
camp. Baj asked a man who had been in Lubianka for news of the Polish general
Okulitski, who had twice been on trial and condemned to death (this information
was not generally known). According to Baj, Raoul Wallenberg had been invited
to talk to General Serov in Budapest (Serov was not in Budapest). He never got
to meet him, however, but was arrested on suspicion of espionage. He is said to
have then been sent to Kiev and later to Leningrad and Kresta Prison etc.,
transferring to Lubianka in 1947. There he was sentenced to 25 years forced
labour in special regime camps. He was sent to Tashkent in 1949 but arrived in
Bratsk after only a couple of weeks. In June or July 1950 (1951, according to
Cichocki) about 300 prisoners were rounded up and transported to Magadan.
Both Raoul Wallenberg and Kowalski were among the group. They travelled in
the same carriage to Vanino Bay, where Wallenberg fell ill and was sent to the
prison hospital. Kowalski continued to Magadan and returned to Poland in 1956.
Baj and Kowalski met again in 1989 at a reunion for soldiers of the Polish home
front army.

Further investigation of some of the testimony is needed. The same is true of the
possibility of Raoul Wallenberg having been placed in a closed psychiatric
institution. It is in the nature of things that the lack of firm proof of what
happened to Raoul Wallenberg it is very difficult to bring an investigation of this
kind to a close.
XIII Concluding arguments

It is perhaps appropriate to attempt a more coherent concluding argument at this stage, on the basis of the information available. Two possible main hypotheses with several variations are involved, although it should again be emphasised that the uncertainty factor is very high. The first hypothesis is that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947, in all probability of unnatural causes. The second, that he was 'hidden away' or isolated somewhere where he was unable to make contact with other prisoners, possibly under a concealed identity (another name or number). The following arguments can be said to hold good for both the first and second hypothesis.

Our point of departure is that Stalin ordered, or at least agreed to, the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. This would mean that his subordinates were very unlikely to take a decision on their own, or act independently to seal the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The previous chapter reports on the likely original reasons for arresting him. However, the decision to arrest him need not necessarily have been based on such diverse or profound analyses as those put forward in this account of the hypotheses. The same reasons may have not been valid throughout; on the contrary, they may have changed. Accusations of espionage appeared to predominate in the early days of his imprisonment, when he was being interrogated in the spring of 1945. It is reasonable to suppose that his activities in Budapest were being verified, even though Raoul Wallenberg does not appear to be more in the limelight than other members of staff at the Swedish Legation, with the exception that he alone (apart from Thomsen) was the only one sent to Moscow. Later on, it becomes clearer that Stalin, or at least the Soviet leaders, had a special purpose in retaining the Swedish diplomat. He was seldom interrogated and then only briefly. The leading interrogator is said to have told him that his was a political case and that he would never be sentenced. As far as can be judged, the original ulterior motive may have been to use Raoul Wallenberg in an exchange or, in other words, to hand him over only in return for compensation. It is hard to decide how relevant various top level political motives might have been. Nevertheless, It is also very likely that Stalin did not want to make his mind
up straight away and issued no instructions. Alternatively, the MGB could have been uncertain over interpreting Stalin’s intentions, and ‘Abakumov and Co’ were therefore forced to bide their time. Stalin was not a person whom one reminded. That was inconceivable. The subject was probably discussed exhaustively before and after Söderblom’s conversation with Stalin.

At the same time the Foreign Ministry was under growing pressure from the repeated Swedish approaches. Abakumov and the MGB were urged to speed up their reply. By the end of 1946 it was clear to the very narrow circle of ministry officials concerned that Raoul Wallenberg was, in fact, in MGB hands, although they had certainly worked it out earlier. This marked the start of a discussion on whether to tell Sweden that all things considered Raoul Wallenberg must have died in the final battle in Budapest. They received considerable help from Söderblom persistently repeating the same thing which must have confused the Soviet officials concerned, just as much as the Swedish refusal to take seriously the Soviet demand for the extradition of Soviet citizens in Sweden (frequently put forward at the time of a Swedish approach concerning Raoul Wallenberg) and Erlander’s remark to Chernyshov in 1946 that such matters (handing over Granovsky) should not affect Swedish-Soviet relations.

Internal MID documents give the impression that not even Molotov had been aware of whether Raoul Wallenberg was in the Soviet Union, with the exception of his receiving Dekanozov’s announcement of 16 January 1945. Once again, this seems highly unlikely. In the first place, the person arrested was a foreign diplomat. Secondly, Molotov was still in a very strong position, and we know that Abakumov turned to him regarding the Swiss diplomats. Besides, the circle surrounding Stalin must have known about a case as important as this. Clearly, Molotov must have kept his knowledge to himself and did not share it with his colleagues. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the arguments found in this chapter would have been materially different, even if Molotov had not known about the case prior to 1947.

Spring 1947 saw intensified preparations in order to settle the case, according to papers in the Foreign Ministry archive. The MGB intended to present a report to Molotov showing the reasons for the arrest and giving proposals on the measures to be taken. However, one such presentation was delayed for several months, although we do not know why. They were perhaps awaiting Stalin’s decision, or
at least some sign from him. By May, Vyshinsky at least grew tired of nothing
decisive happening, thus preventing him from replying to the Swedes. He
therefore asked Molotov to instruct Abakumov to make his report, or suggest a
way of settling the case. And Molotov ordered Abakumov to produce his report.
In a letter to Abakumov in early July, Vyshinsky made a suggestion about how
the report, and thus the reply to Sweden, should look. Everything was in place
for a reply in which Raoul Wallenberg is alleged to have died in Budapest. In
practice, this also meant that one way or another Raoul Wallenberg had to be
eliminated. We do not know whether Abakumov’s letter to Molotov on 17 July
contained the news that this had been done. It is evident that something decisive
happened, particularly in view of the interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg’s
cellmates and subsequent isolation and the deaths of Roedel and Langfelder
within the next few months. If Wallenberg died in July 1947, an outright
execution is just as conceivable that he died as the result of harsh treatment, or
that something went wrong (this is the best explanation of the Smoltsov report).

Why was it impossible to acknowledge Raoul Wallenberg’s presence in the Soviet
Union, and then hand him over to Sweden? What compelled another decision to
be taken regarding his future fate (unless, of course, some inadvertent mishap
occurred)? In the first place, Stalin probably had no time for Raoul Wallenberg
and his humanitarian efforts; this was the period when Stalin intensified his anti-
Semitic campaign. Secondly, what if it had been the Soviet intention to use Raoul
Wallenberg as part of an exchange, but Sweden had not responded? On the
contrary, the minister in Moscow had repeated time and again that Wallenberg
must have died in Hungary. To push the point somewhat, Sweden acted to some
degree as if Raoul Wallenberg’s release was not desirable, or was sending double
signals. This at least may have been the impression in Moscow. Double signals
were very common in Soviet foreign politics; official channels put forward the
proclaimed standpoint while private channels expressed a more subtle attitude.

Thirdly, it would have been highly embarrassing to tell the Swedes at this stage
that, yes, Raoul Wallenberg has been in one of our prisons all along. Anything
Raoul Wallenberg himself said upon release would have been extremely revealing,
showing clearly that there had been no question of a mistake or oversight. It
would have been impossible, for example, to announce that he had been found in
some distant prison camp after searching high and low. Moreover, according to
his fellow prisoners, Raoul Wallenberg appeared not to want to cooperate; he
refused to say anything when interrogated and referred to his diplomatic status. They did not appear to be getting anywhere with him. The one exception appears to be the interrogation in March 1947, if one can believe the testimony of the interpreter. This is the only one on which we have information from the Russian side, and it appeared to have taken place in a calm and matter-of-fact atmosphere. Great darkness rests over the final phase of Raoul Wallenberg’s stay in Lubianka.

The reason for the Russian secretiveness, then and later, may have been that an unsuccessful attempt at blackmail had been made, and the Swedish Government had unwittingly avoided the trap by maintaining that Raoul Wallenberg had died. Was this too embarrassing (perhaps for both parties) even to be hinted at?

If no unforeseen misadventure took place, Raoul Wallenberg’s fate was in all probability decided upon in some way. Molotov and Abakumov were certainly involved, and we presume that Stalin was fully in the picture. The alternative hypothesis is almost inconceivable although theoretically cannot be ruled out, i.e., that Stalin was not informed and a conspiracy against him was afoot. We know that Stalin was at least aware of Raoul Wallenberg’s arrest and that the Swedes were constantly asking about him. And Stalin had spoken to Söderblom about him.

The exact circumstances concerning the Swedish diplomat’s fate remained known to a very small circle. This can be seen from Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister, asking Serov, the KGB chief, when and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg had died. However, Serov did not wish to enlighten him.

In the spring of 1956 Molotov and Serov prepared a new reply to an approach from Sweden which was supported by very convincing evidence from a number of war prisoners. Molotov himself wrote to the Central Committee (in practice the Politbureau/Presidium) that this evidence could not be rejected. It largely agreed with the true circumstances relating to Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment (thus implying that Molotov must have possessed fairly detailed information) and for this reason ‘it was just as well to let the Swedes know what happened to Raoul Wallenberg’. This last sentence did not however mean that the whole truth was to be told. Since it was an internal top secret document addressed to the country’s political leaders, it would have been somewhat difficult to maintain that Raoul Wallenberg’s fate was quite different to the one in fact reported, with variations,
In different drafts between 1956-1957. Political conditions had changed to those that prevailed when Vyshinsky wrote his barely truthful, stereotype memoranda to Stalin in 1952. Now it was a matter of finding a more or less appropriate version that, above all, did not cast too great a cloud over Molotov, or the then KGB for that matter. The proposal reached by Molotov and Serov at the end of April 1956 was very similar to the final reply given in February 1957.

Naturally, the long-drawn out procedure which they proposed was primarily intended to create the impression of a thorough and serious investigation being undertaken. We should also bear in mind that after the 20th Party Congress in February, Molotov must have felt he was in a shaky position. For example, if he was in any way to blame for Raoul Wallenberg's removal, Khrushchov could have used it against him. Another reason for delaying his reply may have been that he was hoping that his own position would grow stronger in the meanwhile. He also had a strong interest in laying the blame on somebody else, and Abakumov was the ideal scapegoat in this respect. By blaming Stalin, he would have worsened his chances of saving himself, besides weakening his own position in the current power struggle, because in practice it would have implied that he supported de-stalinisation. The ground was already tottering under his feet. It is out of the question that Molotov would have been interested in confessing to the Swedes that he had lied. Perhaps Khrushchov realised what had happened but felt that the reply that was eventually sent conformed better with the interests of the Soviet Union. It was in the interests of all the leaders to blame Abakumov. Implicating Beria, as Undén had in mind, would have risked implicating themselves to too great an extent. Probably, Khrushchov was not yet prepared to bring accusations against both Molotov and Bulganin in a matter such as the Raoul Wallenberg case. Khrushchov was also interested in seeing that the de-stalinisation process did not happen too rapidly, so that he could retain control. Apart from Molotov, the others who participated in drafting the final reply were Bulganin, Shepilov and Serov.

Probably 1956 was also the year in which crucial KGB documents and Abakumov's letter to Molotov were removed (the possible key part played by Serov was emphasised earlier) - if everything was now destroyed. For some reason, the MID archives escaped being purged. Perhaps the papers there were not considered sufficiently incriminating, or else Molotov did not have an opportunity to deal with the matter in time, i.e. before his departure that summer.
Although this argument may appear convincing, it is not on a par with absolute proof. A definitive conclusion necessitates proof that is beyond any reasonable doubt, i.e., that there is a convincing answer to all outstanding questions. The possibility that Raoul Wallenberg was effectively hidden away (probably under a concealed identity) instead of executed cannot be brushed aside. Although we know that Stalin had few, if any, moral scruples, it would have been exceptional to order the execution of a diplomat from a neutral country. It might have appeared simpler to keep him in isolation.

Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether it was not possible for the Soviet leaders in 1956-57 to acknowledge it and release Raoul Wallenberg, if he was still alive. We can only speculate, particularly as Molotov wrote in his report to the Central Committee presidium in April that he ‘found it appropriate to tell the Swedes about Wallenberg’s fate’.

It therefore remains to be seen whether any of the testimony from the post-1947 period can be confirmed through documentation or some other means. If it proves impossible, what reasons are there for it (apart from purely mendacious witnesses)? In the first place, Raoul Wallenberg was known and discussed among some foreign prisoners in the 1950’s and could have given rise to second-hand and sometimes twisted information. He became particularly well known after Pravda and Izvestija published the communique about Erlander’s visit to Russia, and it was posted up in every camp and prison. Secondly, Raoul Wallenberg may have been mistaken for other Swedes (or people with Swedish nationality from Finland or Estonia), as happened in Vladimir Prison to Grossheim-Krisko, a former employee at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Thirdly, it has been noted that there were other prisoners called Wallenberg in the Gulag system, such as Rudolf Wallenberg, who died in Vorkuta. Fourthly, it is known that well-known Russian prisoners were also alleged to have been sighted here and there, even though they had been executed. This was the case with the author Osip Mandelshtam, for example. The information may have been based on rumours or legends but may also have been part of KGB disinformation activities.

In view of the 1947 official announcement that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union, a question that is difficult to answer reliably is why several of Raoul Wallenberg’s most important fellow prisoners were gradually released between
1951-1956, thereby enabling them to give their testimony about him. The most important explanation is probably that those mainly responsible, Abakumov and Stalin, disappeared from the scene in 1951 and 1953. In addition, several security officials who were responsible at a lower level were also purged. Nevertheless, knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg was preserved, albeit in a very narrow circle and was clearly without operative links to those responsible for war prisoners, the release of whom was otherwise dependent on international agreements.

Even many of the witnesses who claimed to have seen or heard about Raoul Wallenberg later on, particularly in Vladimir Prison, were also released in due course.

It was established by way of introduction that the Russian announcement of Raoul Wallenberg's death could only be accepted if it were confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt. This has not happened, partly for the want of a credible death certificate, and partly because the testimony about Raoul Wallenberg being alive after 1947 cannot be dismissed. The burden of proof regarding the death of Raoul Wallenberg lies with the Russian Government.
XIV Following up the report

So many important questions remain unanswered and the Wallenberg file cannot be closed.

This in turn means that the door must be kept open for new discoveries in archives, or new information appearing by some other means. Thus, information which has not yet been fully examined (see list below) and new items of some substance need to be scrutinised. This can be done without the Russian-Swedish working group as such continuing its work. Both the Swedish and Russian sides have agreed to follow up important clues even in the future and, to a reasonable degree, assist those who wish to examine them further.

Swedish official records of interest that relate to Raoul Wallenberg have to a large degree recently been released. No paper that sheds further light over his fate is likely to be classified secret.

As far as the Russian side is concerned, all the documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg in the Foreign Ministry archive, including cipher telegrams, should be made accessible, i.e., not just those that become public when this report is published. Files concerning Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners (all of whom were named in the 1957 White Book, as well as Grossheim-Krisko) should be made available to researchers.

There is perhaps more to be done to obtain further papers from various archives (including that of the foreign intelligence service). For our part, the Swedish side is not satisfied with the refusal of SVR to let us study the Tolstoy-Kutuzov file for a limited period.

In so far as this has not already taken place, other countries should also release all the material in their archives concerning Raoul Wallenberg (at least documents from the 1940's and 1950's). It should be mentioned that several governments,
including that of Israel and Canada, have declared themselves ready to assist in various ways.

We also strongly hope that the publication of this report will help stimulate further projects or discoveries, particularly in Russian archives. Even research in other countries' archives may generate information that needs to be followed up in Russia.

The Swedish side of the working group propose that the Swedish Government set up a fund or some special appropriations, to be granted to researchers who wish to carry out further study and investigation concerning Raoul Wallenberg, his deeds and his fate. Naturally, an official from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should continue to be responsible for the Wallenberg issue. To the extent that official requests are necessary, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs should also undertake to act as the official intermediary to the Russian authorities with regard to research in Russian archives.

Outstanding unresolved matters

As the above report shows, the working group has not succeeded in finding satisfactory answers to a large number of questions because insufficient basic data has been recovered. Our arguments are largely based on hypotheses. To make it easier in the future, it would be invaluable to obtain complete answers to the following questions.

1. Who took the decision to arrest Raoul Wallenberg and send him to Moscow, and exactly when was this decision taken?

2. What were the reasons for this decision and for Raoul Wallenberg's being detained in prison? Did the reasons for this alter with the passing of time?

3. Did the Soviet side try to indicate that they were interested in an exchange?

4. What were the reasons for indifferent attitude shown by those in charge of Swedish foreign policy to the Wallenberg case, primarily between 1945-1947?
5. What happened on 17 July 1947? If Raoul Wallenberg died, how did it happen? If he was executed, who took the decision? And in that case, where is he buried? If he was held in isolation, where are the relevant papers?

6. When and where was the Smoltsov report found, and by whom?

7. How did the report come to be written?

8. What was in the letter Abakumov wrote to Molotov on 17 July 1947? Where is the letter?

9. Did Roedel die of natural causes in the autumn of 1947, and what are the circumstances relating to Langfelder’s alleged death in March 1948?

10. Was Raoul Wallenberg in Stockholm in the autumn of 1944? Did he talk then to Mme Kollontay?

11. If, as emerged from our interviews, Raoul Wallenberg’s belongings were kept in a file in the care of a KGB archive official during the 1950’s, 1960’s and early 1970’s, surely it is very unlikely that they would be found on a shelf in a basement in 1989? What happened to Raoul Wallenberg’s other possessions?

12. Where are the papers relating to the discussion in 1956 between Vladimirov, the Soviet diplomat and KGB official, and Frey, the Finnish diplomat?

13. Why were so few internal KGB papers preserved, even from the 1956-57 period? When and on whose orders were the papers destroyed?

14. What did Shiryagin from Charkov write in his letter in the spring of 1956 that caused the MID to worry about the information spreading? Where can this information be found today?

15. Exactly when were the references to Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder blotted out in the KGB journals?

16. Why did the Soviet Union not give a completely honest reply in 1957?
17. As long as there is no fully reliable proof of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, the questions relating to the testimony of a number of witnesses must be kept up-to-date and satisfactory explanations obtained. This is particularly valid for Vladimir Prison and the issues concerning the empty cells.
XVI Summary

Chapter I, Introduction, describes the working group’s assignment, the nature of the report and the results of the investigation. It also touches on the conditions under which the work was carried out. An acknowledgement of thanks is directed to all those who have contributed to the undertaking.

Chapter II, Planning and implementing the work, describes the background to the formation of the working group. Details are given about the working group members and experts. Three principal lines of inquiry were agreed upon - to survey relevant Russian archives, to interview former members of the Soviet security services and other people of interest and to discuss and analyse results and hypotheses at the meetings of the working group. At the same time, guidelines were drawn up for further work. The relevant Russian archives are listed (further details in the appendix). It was also noted that inquiries were undertaken in Swedish archives as well as in archives in other countries.

A brief summary presents the categories of the persons who were interviewed.

Chapter III, Political background - the USSR 1944-1957, gives an outline of the general political background with special emphasis on the key people at the political level who played a direct or indirect part in Raoul Wallenberg’s fate. Similarly, Chapter IV, Soviet security organs 1944-1947, describes the structure and working methods of these organisations.

Although it was not the working group’s primary task to examine in detail Raoul Wallenberg’s achievements in Budapest, Chapter V, Raoul Wallenberg In Budapest, recapitulates his assignment and the most important events in Budapest. Comment is made on the protective power assignment for the USSR which the Swedish Legation in Budapest undertook, and the as yet unanswered question of whether Raoul Wallenberg visited Stockholm in the autumn of 1944.
A large quantity of documents have been made available from the US State Department and the OSS, precursor to the CIA. Chapter VI, American papers on Raoul Wallenberg - was he an undercover agent?, contains an analysis of their contents from the point of view of whether Raoul Wallenberg undertook undercover activities for the OSS. It was concluded that existing documents do not lend support to the idea of the Swedish diplomat having such an assignment, although it was probably considered and that there are some documents which can be described as ambiguous.

Chapter VII, Circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s detention and arrest in Budapest, gives an account based on papers from Russian archives, of testimony from former Soviet officers and Raoul Wallenberg’s colleagues; the almost daily communications to Soviet troops in Budapest ordering them to take charge of the Swedish legation staff, what happened when Raoul Wallenberg made contact with Soviet troops, was arrested and taken to Moscow. In addition, attention is drawn to the arrest of the Swiss diplomats Meier and Feller and Slovak envoy Spišak and the order to send them to Moscow ‘in the same way as Wallenberg’. On their return home, some members of the Swedish Legation wrote a description of the events in Budapest. However, they do not appear to have been asked for a systematic, complete report. In addition, this chapter deals with the ambiguous role, to say the least, played by the Soviet undercover agent Michail Tolstoy-Kutuzov.

The reasons for arresting Raoul Wallenberg and imprisoning him have not been determined with any certainty. However, Chapter VIII, Reasons for arresting and imprisoning Raoul Wallenberg, surveys the reasons that emerge from Russian documents and statements, and also the hypotheses which have arisen during the course of the working group’s investigations. The three factors which on balance must be considered the most important are as follows: Raoul Wallenberg was, as far as can be judged, suspected of espionage primarily on behalf of Germany but also for the USA and possibly Great Britain (this has at least been stated). An important objective may have been to use Wallenberg in exchange for Soviet citizens in Sweden. This hypothesis is strengthened by a study of the fate of the Swiss diplomats. Finally, Stalin may have had his own, undeclared purposes for keeping Raoul Wallenberg in custody.
Chapter IX, Circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment in Moscow 1945-47, describes the circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s imprisonment in Moscow between February 1945 - July 1947, insofar as this can be determined on the basis of Russian documents, interviews with former security officials and testimony from Raoul Wallenberg’s fellow prisoners. Attention is paid throughout to the fate of Vilmos Langfelder, the Swedish diplomat’s driver. The remarkably few occasions on which Raoul Wallenberg is interrogated is of particular interest. The interrogation leaders have been identified, but the only one still living who is said to have questioned Wallenberg twice, according to the interrogation journals, denies having met him. An interpreter has described how he was called in to the last known interrogation in March 1947.

Chapter X, How the Soviet authorities and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs dealt with the Wallenberg case, is the longest. It describes and analyses chronologically the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with the Wallenberg case, based on written and oral sources. The actions of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Moscow are reported more selectively. The attempts to suppress the truth is a main thread running through Soviet documentation.

The Deputy Foreign Minister, Dekanozov, announced on 16 January 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and taken in charge by Soviet troops in Budapest. In February and March respectively, Mme Kollontay, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, privately informed Raoul Wallenberg’s mother and Mrs Günther, the wife of the Swedish Foreign Minister, that Raoul was in the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, reference was seldom made to Dekanozov’s note in many of the future Swedish approaches, and Mme Kollontay’s announcement was never mentioned. To be sure, the approaches request information about what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg, but until July 1946 the Swedish minister, Söderblom, consistently weakens the force of the Swedish demands by expressing time and again his personal conviction that Wallenberg died in Hungary. On one occasion he even directly exhorts the Soviet Foreign Minister to make such an announcement. In connection with the Swedish requests, the Soviet side for their part seldom fail to demand the return of Soviet citizens in Sweden in a manner which indicates that the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate could be solved through an exchange. However, very few people on the Swedish side appear to have understood the Soviet hints. Söderblom’s meeting with Stalin in June 1946 was particularly noteworthy (he is probably the only Swedish
diplomat who met Stalin in person). The meeting was not exploited with sufficient force and clarity to bring about a solution to the case.

The first official Soviet statement was handed over in August. It stated that Raoul Wallenberg was unknown in the USSR, and that he had probably fallen victim of the fighting around Budapest. The initial phases to this reply can be followed especially in documents in Soviet Foreign Ministry archives. However, probably the most crucial document was a letter written by Abakumov, Minister of State Security, to Molotov on 17 July 1947, which has not been found.

The next seriously stormy moment was in 1956. During his visit to the USSR in March-April, Tage Erlander, the Swedish Prime Minister, handed over testimony from German and other prisoners of war, making it perfectly clear that Raoul Wallenberg had been in prison in Moscow at least between 1945-1947. The Soviet authorities were now forced to revise their earlier statement, although their new reply, the so-called Gromyko memorandum, was first given in February 1957. This maintained, not particularly categorically, and supported by the ‘Smoltsov report’, that Raoul Wallenberg died in Lubianka Prison as a result of a myocardial infarction. Through available papers and from interviews, we are able to follow the efforts of the authorities to produce a version which ‘would do as a half truth’.

In addition, an account is given of the Svartz - Myasnikov episode, the proposals reported by Carl-Gustav Svingel for exchanging Wennerström with Wallenberg (without full clarity being reached in either of the two events) and the latest developments.

Chapter XI, What happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947?, discusses different hypotheses about what may have happened to Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947, from the point of view that something happened then that was decisive for his future. Particular attention is paid to the Smoltsov report. Even though all the versions from Russian sources largely assume that Raoul Wallenberg had died at that point, the working group has not uncovered any evidence to confirm a definite conclusion to this effect. Nor, if he did die, have they found anything to show the way in which he died or was killed.
For this reason, the past few years have been devoted to attempting to verify the testimony about Raoul Wallenberg having being seen in camps or prisons even after 1947. A report of this is given in Chapter XII, Testimony relating to the period after 1947. The main hypothesis is that he was isolated in Vladimir Prison, at least for one or more periods. Nothing definite has been achieved so far, which means that there are still questions that remain unanswered. The working group therefore propose a follow-up mechanism (Chapter XIV, Following up the report).

Nevertheless, Chapter XIII, Concluding arguments, discusses a more coherent line of argument about the Soviet decision-making processes prior to the announcements of 1947 and 1957. The arguments are valid both in case Raoul Wallenberg died/ was executed or held in isolation. In this connection, the shortcomings in Swedish actions between 1945-1947 are again illustrated.
Chronology of the first phase of the Raoul Wallenberg case

1944

31.12 The MID obtains a list of legation staff in Budapest from the legation in Moscow together with a request for help from the Soviet forces. The MID replies immediately saying that the request had been passed to the military authorities.

1945

16.1 Dekanozov, MID, informs the legation that Raoul Wallenberg has been found in Budapest.

17.1 An order to arrest Raoul Wallenberg is issued. The Soviet Legation asks for the address in Sweden of the Russian girl Makarova.

19.1 Raoul Wallenberg arrested (According to the registration card in Lubianka Prison).

25.1 Raoul Wallenberg sent to Moscow.

26.1 Talk between Söderblom and Dekanozov. Söderblom mentions Raoul Wallenberg and Dekanozov brings up the question of five deserted Soviet seamen whom the USSR wish to have sent home.

6.2 Raoul Wallenberg arrives in Lubianka.
Feb. Mme Kollontay informs Mrs von Dardel that Raoul Wallenberg is in the USSR.

8.2 First interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg. Interrogation leader: Sverchuk.

9.2 The legation in Moscow instructed to ascertain what has happened to the staff from Budapest.

10.2 Swiss diplomat Max Meier arrested in Budapest.

16.2 Swiss diplomat Harald Feller arrested in Budapest.

17.2 Legation in Moscow again instructed to obtain information about the staff from Budapest.

17.2 Legation in Rome instructed to inquire from the Vatican whether they had any information.

19.2 Inquiry to the legation in Bucharest about the Red Cross representative who arrived stating that Ivan Danielsson and Langlet were safe and sound in Budapest on 3 February.

23.2 Inquiry to the legation in Berlin as to whether the Germans or members of the Arrow Cross could have removed the staff.

23.2 Legation in Moscow instructed to ascertain whether Ivan Danielsson was at the papal nunciature.

26.2 Legation in Moscow instructed to ascertain whether Danielsson had taken refuge in a monastery.

March Mme Kollontay invites Mrs Günther to tea, tells her that Raoul Wallenberg was alive in the Soviet Union and that it would be best for him if the Swedish Government does not stir up trouble in this matter.
2.3 Legation in Bucharest reports that travellers from Hungary say that all members of the legation staff, with the exception of Raoul Wallenberg, were safe at the papal nunciature. Raoul Wallenberg said to be intending to travel by car to an unknown destination.

2.3 This message was forwarded to the legation in Berlin with the following words: 'all members of the Budapest Legation except Wallenberg, who was encountered earlier, are safe and sound at the papal nunciature'.

3.3 The same wording was also used to inform the legation in Moscow.

4.3 The Swiss diplomats Feller and Meier arrive in Lubianka. First interrogation.

5.3 Feller and Meier transferred to Lefortovo.

11.3 Legation in Moscow instructed to investigate a message from Bucharest that 'Danielsson détenu environ 20 février'.

17.3 Legation in Moscow instructed ‘to request information energetically’ about conflicting rumours concerning the whereabouts of Danielsson, Anger and Wallenberg.

18.3 Mme Kollontay’s final departure from Sweden in a special Soviet plane.

19.3 Legation in Bucharest instructed to seek information from the Hungarian government and other channels regarding Danielsson, Anger, Wallenberg and other legation staff.

22.3 Legation in Bucharest announces that the Budapest staff had arrived in Timisoara (except Raoul Wallenberg).

23.3 Harald Feller interrogated for the second time, now in Lefortovo.

26.3 Message from the legation in Moscow saying that the announcement from Bucharest had been passed to the relevant Soviet authorities, and also that ‘according to the Bucharest Legation’s message, Secretary
Wallenberg has been missing since 17 January after saying that he planned to make a journey by car.

27.3 Legation in Bucharest announce that the staff from Budapest had arrived there.

27.3 Legation in Moscow instructed that in view of the arrival of the others in Bucharest, it was particularly urgent to obtain information about Raoul Wallenberg.

9.4 The State Department tells the American Embassy in Moscow that the 'Department and (War Refugee) Board would appreciate your giving all possible support to the Swedish Legation in Moscow concerning its request to the Russian Government for assistance in determining the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, attaché at the Swedish Legation in Budapest'.

10.4 Harald Feller interrogated for the third time.

12.4 Averell Harriman, American Ambassador in Moscow reports that 'Swedes say they have no reason to think the Russians are not doing all they can and they do not feel that an approach to the Soviet foreign office on our part would be desirable'.

14.4 Legation in Moscow announce that the Budapest staff had arrived there.

19.4 Söderblom reports that the American Embassy received a long telegram concerning the case. 'The embassy has probably replied by now that it expects contact with the American representatives in Hungary through the State Department. The embassy generally finds it difficult to see what Americans could do'.

21.4 Legation in Moscow instructed to request a careful investigation, in view of Dekanozov's message of 17 January of what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg since then.
25.4 Söderblom approaches Dekanozov, mentions the rumour that Raoul Wallenberg had died.

27.4 Söderblom hands over a letter from Marcus Wallenberg to Mme Kollontay.

28.4 Raoul Wallenberg interrogated for second time. Interrogation leader: Kuzmishin.

19.5 Söderblom reminds Dekanozov about Wallenberg and the Swedes in Berlin.

24.5 Söderblom reports a conversation with professor Szentgyörgi about Wallenberg.

29.5 Legation instructed to allow the military attaché pursue the matter of Raoul Wallenberg through his channels. Wallenberg transferred to Lefortovo.

5.6 The military attaché takes up the Raoul Wallenberg matter at the Defence Ministry.

2.7 Legation instructed to ask prof. Szentgyörgi to request Hungarian assistance on his return home.

6.7 Söderblom claims to have taken photographs of Raoul Wallenberg with him to Moscow, but because of rumours that Wallenberg was in hiding in Budapest, he does not wish to take up the matter with the Russians.

12.7 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs replies that it does not understand Söderblom’s hesitation.

14.8 Söderblom repeats his misgivings.

19.8 The Soviet consul in Sweden visits Makarova and makes threatening demands that she return to the USSR. She refuses.
28.8 Legation in Berne reports that Lauer had heard from Takácsy, director of the Hungarian national bank, that Raoul Wallenberg had been captured by the Russians.

1.9 A memorandum concerning Feller and Meier was handed to a Soviet military mission that arrived in Berne. It stated inter alia that ‘it is feared that the Feller-Meier case may have a highly detrimental effect on our present so far successful efforts to achieve mutual understanding, and thereby on the results of the negotiations between the two delegations on the whole’. It further stated that the Swiss may find themselves forced to publicise the case although so far they had avoided doing so.

31.10 Söderblom instructed to make a new démarche to the MID.

3.11 Barck-Holst reports that the démarche had taken place.

7.11 The Swiss Foreign Ministry informs the Russians that they were prepared to release six Soviet citizens in Swiss prisons on condition that Swiss citizens in Soviet prisons were also released and repatriated.

Nov. The Soviet consul in Sweden visits Makarova again, and she still refuses to return.

1.12 Barck-Holst reports that a new démarche had taken place.

4.12 The Swiss Foreign Ministry confirms to the Soviet military mission that the repatriation of the six Russian prisoners was conditional on Feller and Meier being released.

17.12 Ingemar Hägglöf writes in a memorandum that he spoke to Chernyshov, the Soviet minister in Stockholm on the issue of repatriation. Hägglöf said the cases of Lundberg and af Sandeberg were involved, and for his part, Chernyshov mentioned Makarova.

18.12 Söderblom writes that according to an article written by Langlet in Stockholms Tidningen, Raoul Wallenberg was said to have met his death en route to Debrecen, which was the same conclusion that Söderblom had
drawn after talking to the Swedes from Budapest on 14 April. Söderblom asks whether the photographs may now be handed over (see 6.7).

26.12 Söderblom speaks to Abramov, of the MID, about Raoul Wallenberg. According to Soviet notes on the meeting, he says that ‘it was his personal opinion that Wallenberg is not alive, and it would be best if the Swedish Legation in Moscow were informed of his death; it would be best for Wallenberg’s mother who is devoting herself to a meaningless search. Söderblom said that he had recently spoken to Mme Kollontay about it and she shared his opinion’.

28.12 The chief of the Soviet military mission in Berne tells the Swiss foreign office that Molotov had personally approved the Swiss exchange proposal.

1946

Jan. Contact Makarova-Chernyshov. She refuses to visit the Soviet Legation and Chernyshov says that it does not matter; she will be travelling to the USSR in any case.

3.1 Söderblom refers to a conversation with Mme Kollontay and Abramov, MID, about Raoul Wallenberg. He writes, inter alia, ‘I have now gone through all the various circumstances surrounding the matter, and emphasised the importance of the Soviet authorities saying something on the case, even if the results of their investigation are negative. It emerged from Mr Abramov’s remarks that the Foreign Commissariat recently sent a reminder to the military authorities who, as far as can be judged, do not know what has happened to Wallenberg. It is interesting in this context to note that according to Langlet, the Russians repeatedly asked the Swedes this spring what had happened to Wallenberg’.

8.1 Grafström replies that the photographs should be handed over.

12.1 The Soviet Legation requests in a note that Makarova be sent home.
14.1  Feller and Meier interrogated for the fourth and last time.

17.1  Note to the Soviet Legation that the 40 Balts who were sick would remain in Sweden.

27.1  Söderblom hands over the photographs to Abramov.

Feller and Meier are handed over to Swiss representatives in Berlin.

19.2  SUK (Swedish Alien Commission) decides not to extradite Makarova, and she is given a residence permit.

10.3  Söderblom reports on a new démarche to the MID about Raoul Wallenberg. He also wrote another report the same day about af Sandeberg, whose case he also took up with the MID. In his view, af Sandeberg would not be returned unless Makarova was also sent home.

12.3  Legation in Berne instructed to ascertain whether Feller knows anything about Raoul Wallenberg.

15.3  Legation in Berne reports talking to Feller who said he was hopeful that Raoul Wallenberg was alive.

26.4  Legation in Moscow ordered to send the MID a reminder.

30.4  Söderblom reports a conversation with Abramov who let slip that af Sandeberg had been found and returned to Sweden which might be a hint that Raoul Wallenberg was alive. Abramov’s notes mention nothing about it. On the other hand, a very clear link is made between Makarova and Raoul Wallenberg: ‘I replied that the investigation about Wallenberg continues. In this connection, I reminded him (Söderblom) about Lydia Makarova. Despite her father’s request, and our Ambassador’s repeated approaches to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, she has not yet been returned to the USSR. When I mentioned the family S. was somewhat embarrassed. He has twice promised me to bring about a speedy solution to this case’.
4.6 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs gives a detailed account of the Makarova case in a note to the Soviet Legation.

15.6 Söderblom received by Stalin and says that he believed Raoul Wallenberg had died. According to Stalin’s diary of appointments, the conversation lasted only five minutes (from 21.00 - 21.05). Deputy Foreign Minister Lozovsky was present during the visit and stayed on with Stalin for another hour, according to the appointments diary. The original report from Söderblom is missing. Two years later the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archive ask for a copy of the outgoing report from Moscow.

21.6 The Soviet Legation reply to the note about Makarova, expressing surprise over the attitude of the Swedish authorities and repeating their demand for the girl to be returned.

26.6 Grafström informs the legation in Moscow about af Sandeberg’s remark that while in the USSR he had been in touch with a Rumanian who claimed to have met Raoul Wallenberg in a camp.

17.7 Raoul Wallenberg interrogated for the third time. Interrogation leader: Kopelyansky.

25.7 Barck-Holst asks Abramov if there is anything new. Abramov says not, and then asks how the Makarova case is developing. He also mentions having read af Sandeberg’s article in a newspaper written after he returned home.

30.8 Raoul Wallenberg interrogated for the fourth time. Interrogation leader: Kopelyansky.

30.10 In a note to the legation in Moscow, the MID requests the extradition of the defected seaman Granovsky, who is described as a criminal.

7.11 Hägglöf writes that there does not appear to be much to do except wait for an answer from Stalin.
13.11 Håstad’s parliamentary question.

15.11 Rudolph Philipp’s book on Raoul Wallenberg published (in which he states inter alia that Wallenberg was an American agent).

15.11 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs delivers a note to the Soviet Legation stating that Granovsky is to be extradited to another country than the USSR.

18.11 Chernyshov visits Westman, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to ask for the decision to be reconsidered. He mentions Makarova and the sick Balts in this connection, and points out that Sweden is endangering the favourable development of relations (between Sweden and the Soviet).

22.11 Chernyshov calls on Prime Minister Tage Erlander and hands over a memorandum concerning the Granovsky case.

23.11 Chernyshov calls on Westman in an irritated mood and complains about the way the Granovsky case is being handled.

25.11 Letter from Westman to Chernyshov about the Granovsky case.

26.11 Reply from Chernyshov to Westman about the Granovsky case. The exchange of letters concerned the exact meaning of Erlander’s remarks to Chernyshov. According to the latter, he (Erlander) had admitted that the Swedish side acted wrongly regarding Granovsky. Erlander is presented with a report on Raoul Wallenberg.

28.11 Barck-Holst instructed to prepare a new démarche about Raoul Wallenberg.

4.12 Östen Undén is informed through the UN Delegation of Chernyshov’s remarks that the cases of Granovsky, Makarova and the sick Balts are liable to counteract favourable developments which were based on the
credit agreement, and that Erlander and Westman had pointed out that such issues should not affect good relations.

8.12 Barck-Holst reports on a conversation with Mme Kollontay about Raoul Wallenberg.

10.12 Barck-Holst reports having read Phillip’s book, ‘which could knock my legs from under me in my planned action’.

12.12 Barck-Holst reports that Abramov refused to receive him for a talk about Raoul Wallenberg, referring him to Sysoyev, head of the Scandinavian department. Barck-Holst then ‘hammered away at Sysoyev for an hour about the importance of making a statement’. Sysoyev takes up the cases of Granovskya, Makarova and the Balts and asks whether there is nothing to say about them. Barck-Holst asks if this should be taken as confirmation that Wallenberg is alive and that it was a question of an exchange, whereupon Sysoyev rapidly back away.

13.12 Barck-Holst reports talking to Lozovsky in which he put forward a ‘powerful message’ about Raoul Wallenberg.

22.12 Barck-Holst reports on the growing interest at the MID regarding the Wallenberg case resulting from the press campaign etc. in Sweden.

23.12 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs replies to the Soviet note of 23 May about the Makarova case, stating that she still refuses to return and that therefore there was no reason to reconsider the decision to allow her to stay in Sweden.

30.12 Barck-Holst points out in a dispatch that the prospects of reaching any result are very small if there is nothing to give weight to the démarches. In Barck-Holst’s view, the Russians are trying to use the Raoul Wallenberg case as a basis for negotiations regarding the Makarova, Granovskya and Balt cases. He further mentions hearing from Mme Kollontay that Chernysov reported to the MID that the Wallenberg case had not affected Swedish-Soviet relations. The dispatch was filed away.
1947

1947 Worsening east-west relations, the Moscow Conference, Marshall Plan, Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris in July, George Kennan’s X article.

13.1 Barck-Holst makes a new démarche, is received by Novikov, head of the Northern European department, instead of Dekanozov.

23.1 New note from the Soviet Legation concerning the Makarova case, repeating their demand for her return home.

30.1 Hägglöf makes a démarche. He is not received by Dekanozov either, but has to speak to Novikov. Hägglöf writes a dispatch on the subject in which he concludes by discussing the possibility of exerting pressure on the Russians. The original dispatch is missing and a carbon copy was bound into the file.

According to the Soviet notes on his conversation, Hägglöf said ‘that he does not rule out that Wallenberg had been the victim of an accident in Budapest, but he could also have disappeared by mistake into a camp’.

1.3 Raoul Wallenberg transferred to Lubianka again from Lefortovo.

11.3 Raoul Wallenberg interrogated for the fifth time. Interrogation leader: Kuzmishin.

10.4 While dining at the Soviet Legation, Östen Undén takes up the subject of Raoul Wallenberg with the Soviet minister, and asks him to try to bring about a speedy reply.

7.6 New parliamentary question from Håstad.

14.6 Rolf Sohlman reports taking up the question of Wallenberg with Malik, who said that the matter was new to him.

14.7 Article in Izvestia about the campaign of the dollar against Sweden.
16.7 Rolf Sohlman reports that taking up the question of Wallenberg with Vetrov, head of the Northern European department, whose personal comment was to the effect that the fighting in Budapest was particularly bitter in the latter half of January 1945. It was therefore not improbable that Wallenberg died then. It should be noted that Pest was wholly in Soviet hands on 18 January.

17.7 According to Smoltsov, the prison medical officer, Raoul Wallenberg is alleged to have been found dead in his cell.

18.8 Vyshinsky’s letter to Rolf Sohlman states that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union.

1948

1.7 Rolf Sohlman reports that while Malte Pripp was visiting Abramov for some other purpose, Abramov took up the Makarova case and said that a Swede called Henning Frösth had committed a crime but that they would be willing to send him home in return for the extradition of Makarova.

17.8 The Soviet chargé d’Affaires is summoned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs because Soviet Legation officials attempted to push their way in to Makarova in a summer cottage.

After this, the Makarova case seems to peter out.
Chronological summary of changes to the security services 1944–1957

April 1943

The NKVD security service (led by Beria) is split into two parts:

- NKGB, with Merkulov as chief.
- NKVD, continued with Beria as chief.

In addition, the Smersh counter espionage security service ('Death to spies') was separated with Abakumov as chief, and placed under the Army general staff. Abakumov was thus not a subordinate of Beria, whose formal powers as head of the NKVD were reduced.

Kartashov (died 1979), head of the 2nd department of the Third Main Directorate, was responsible for the Raoul Wallenberg case at Smersh. When Smersh was dissolved in 1946, Kartashov’s department was transferred to the MGB.

January 1945

Beria leaves the post as head of the NKVD to his deputy, Kruglov.
1946

NKVD and NKGB renamed MVD and MGB respectively at the changeover from the commissariat- to ministerial department system.

Smersh dissolved (partly as a result of Stalin’s efforts to restrict Beria’s influence over the intelligence organisations).

In the summer of 1946, A bakumov succeeds Merkulov as Minister for State Security, i.e., head of MGB.

Autumn 1947

The MGB foreign espionage and the military intelligence service (GRU) are merged to become the Information Committee (KI) with the Foreign Ministry partly included. Its first head was Molotov, followed by Vyshinsky; the deputy head was Fedotov.

Early 1950's

Beria still oversees the security organisation to some extent, but Abakumov bypasses Beria and often works direct to Stalin.

1951

Abakumov arrested, charged with knowing about but keeping secret a Jewish bourgeois plot with links to the American CIA. Ignatyev appointed by Stalin to succeed Abakumov (as head of the MGB)
1953

Following the death of Stalin, the MVD and MGB merge under Beria’s leadership and Ignatyev is dismissed. Kruglov, Serov and Kobulov become First Deputy Ministers of Security, Molotov becomes Foreign Minister again after the death of Vyshinsky.

1954

Kruglov becomes head of the new MVD after Khrushchov ordered the arrest and execution of Beria (1953)

Kruglov replaced by Serov when the KGB is established.

December 1954

Abakumov executed following a trial at which the chief charge against him was that he had fabricated the so-called Leningrad affair.

June 1956

Molotov leaves the post of Foreign Minister, but remains a member of the Presidium (Politbureau) and Deputy Prime Minister.

June 1957

The Molotov group forced to resign at a Central Committee meeting convened by Khrushchov.
List of abbreviations

The following is a translation of abbreviations of Russian authorities/organisations which are mentioned in the report:

GRU    Military Intelligence Service
GUPVI  Main Directorate for matters concerning prisoners of war and internees
KI     Information Committee
MGB    Ministry for State Security (1946-1953)
MID    Foreign Ministry
MVD    Ministry of the Interior
NKGB   Peoples’ Commissariat for State Security
NKVD   Peoples’ Commissariat for Internal Affairs
PGU(KGB)   First Main Directorate
Smersh Military counter espionage (‘Death to spies’)
SVR    Foreign Intelligence Service
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