REPORT
on the activities of the Russian-Swedish working group for determining the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg

Both the Russian and Swedish leaderships approved the forming of the joint Russian-Swedish (originally Soviet-Swedish) working group for determining the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, which was duly set up in 1991.

Raoul Gustav Wallenberg (1912-1947) was a member of an influential Swedish family, enjoying prestige and authority in governmental, political and financial circles, not only in Sweden, but also overseas, including the USA and Germany. On 9th July 1944, Wallenberg went to Budapest with the diplomatic passport of the secretary of the Swedish diplomatic legation in Hungary, taking the post of head of the humanitarian section (although he was not a diplomat by career)

As well as carrying out the ordinary activities of a diplomatic legation for its country, the Swedish legation in Budapest in the war years represented the interests of a number of other countries, including the USSR. At the same time, it also provided assistance to people of Jewish nationalities, by arranging for them to leave Hungary. These were the issues with which the legation’s humanitarian department and the section of the Swedish Red Cross were occupied, generally. Raoul Wallenberg was sent to Budapest with the aim of promoting this area of work, but it was in March 1944, when Jewish people in Hungary were faced with the threat of deportation to Germany, that the most intensive period of help for these people began.

On arrival in Budapest, R. Wallenberg established and organized business and personal connections with key figures in Hungarian government circles, and in the SS (Eichmann, Schellenberg, etc.) He had close contacts with the American ‘War Refugee Board’, whose headquarters were in Washington and which worked closely with American intelligence. According to Swedish diplomat L. Berg, in the publication ‘The Lost Book’, the financial activities undertaken by Wallenberg in order to save Jewish
people were generally carried out using resources from the American Jewish community. In December 1944, the rendering of assistance to Hungarian Jews had already extended massively beyond the inclusion only of those who had business or family connections with Sweden, reaching about 20 thousand people. The essential part of the procedure consisted of the provision of so called Swedish protective passports, safe accommodation in a ‘Swedish house’ acquired especially for the purpose, and the supply of provisions, medicines and other forms of aid.

In dealing with such a large volume of Jewish people to receive help, judging by the evidence of Wallenberg’s colleagues on the legation, it is possible that he was forced to make a number of violations of the directions concerning the procedure for issuing Swedish protective passports (these were drawn up by Wallenberg’s department). As a result, such documents were also received by some German and Hungarian Nazis, who were engaged in hostile activities against the USSR, and some of whom fell into the war criminals category.

On 13th January 1945, despite continuing fierce fighting, Wallenberg set out with his driver, Langfelder, for a meeting with Soviet troops, without informing the legation leadership about this.

No reliable information is available regarding the reasons for Wallenberg taking such a step. However, the act is logical enough and illustrates Wallenberg’s character – brave, with an adventurous spirit. But the humane mission to save the Jews, at this point, was taking place in a complicated political situation, against a background of a violent battle for the town. Sweden did not recognise the coming to power in December 1944 of the Szálasi administration, which continued to collaborate closely with Germany. The diplomatic status of Swedish diplomats in Budapest was under threat. Under intensive fire from both German and Soviet artillery, the area in which the Swedish legation was based, caught in the conflict, appeared far from safe. It is not impossible that Wallenberg was attempting to enlist the aid of the Soviet troops.

I. History of the policies of Soviet countries in connection with ‘the Wallenberg affair’ up to the end of the 1980s.

In relation to a note from the Swedish delegation to Moscow on 31st December 1944, appealing to the Soviet powers to offer protection to the diplomatic legation to Budapest, the USSR’s deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, V. G. Dekanozov, in an
NKVD memo of 16\textsuperscript{th} January 1945, informed the Swedish representatives that ‘a meeting took place with the secretary for the Swedish legation, Raoul Wallenberg, at Bentsur street’ and that the Soviet military authorities had taken measures ‘for the protection of Mr. Wallenberg and his belongings’.

After a couple of months, Sweden began to be concerned over the fate and whereabouts of its diplomat - the question was asked officially and then repeated persistently. The issue was taken up at the highest levels of government: according to the interview of minister S. Soderblom with I. V. Stalin on 15\textsuperscript{th} June 1946. In a personal note from the chief deputy minister for Foreign Affairs A. Y. Vishinskii to minister R. Sulman, on 18\textsuperscript{th} August 1947, the fact of Wallenberg being found on Soviet territory was completely denied and the idea that he had died in Budapest, at the time of the battle for the town, was put forward instead. Citing the official NKVD communication of 16\textsuperscript{th} January 1945, relating to the fact that the Swedish diplomat was with the Soviet troops, the note partially established that the military commander who had given this information had based the theory on circumstantial data and had not been found since. It was emphasised that, at that time, it was difficult to verify communications because of the war, as the army only held the town from 12\textsuperscript{th} February 1945.

In the second half of the 1950s, in the new political climate, and also as a result of the persistence of the official Stockholm and international organisations on 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1957, the USSR’s chief deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko sent Ambassador Sulman a memorandum about the results of the examination of material relating to Wallenberg. This included the text of a report by the head of the prison medical services, Colonel A. L. Smoltsov, addressed to the USSR’s minister for National Security V. S. Abakumov. This document, dated 17\textsuperscript{th} July 1947, included the specific statement that ‘the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well known to you, died suddenly tonight in the cell, probably as the result of a heart attack’.

The memorandum of 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1957 has gone down in the history of Soviet-Swedish relations as the ‘Gromyko memorandum’. The Soviet government had admitted, for the first time, that Wallenberg had been in the Soviet Union, had been imprisoned and had died there.

In an answering note, on 19\textsuperscript{th} February 1957, the Swedish nation expressed bewilderment concerning the uncontrolled activities of the former ministry for National Security, and expressed mistrust in the assertion that ‘all other documentary material
relating to the time spent by Wallenberg in the Soviet cells, apart from the report specified in the Soviet government memorandum, has been destroyed’. The responsibility for what happened to Wallenberg was asserted in a note to the Soviet government.

The further official appeal from Sweden gave rise to the appearance of new evidence, in which it was asserted that Wallenberg did not apparently die in the Lubyanka prison, but was moved to Vladimir prison, and then to various prisons or other places for the detention of criminals.

Throughout the period 1945-89, Sweden addressed more than 50 official enquiries to the Soviet government. However, in all the replies concerning the fate of Wallenberg, Moscow invariably gave standard answers in the spirit of the ‘Gromyko memorandum’, stating that the matter was considered to have been resolved.

II. The start of Soviet-Swedish cooperation on the Wallenberg affair

After the democratic reforms in the country at the end of the 1980s, the ‘Wallenberg problem’ was discussed extensively in the Soviet and foreign mass media. Ten articles appeared, in which the humanitarian activities of the Swedish diplomat in Hungary were related, and various theories about his subsequent fate were put forward.

The first essential step to cooperation with Sweden was taken on 16th October 1989 a meeting took place in the USSR ministry for Foreign Affairs, between the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs V. M. Nikiforov and KGB deputy chief V. P. Pirozhkov and the relatives of the diplomat and members of the ‘Raoul Wallenberg Society’. The Swedish representatives were given items that had been kept in the KGB archive: the diplomatic passport in the name of Raoul Wallenberg, two cards from the Hungarian authorities in the same name, his phone book and notebook, some foreign currency confiscated on his arrest, some articles of personal hygiene, and also copies of the Lubyanka prisoner registration card and A. L. Smoltsov’s report on his death. These documents and other items were discovered at the end of August 1989 in the course of work to replace some shelves in the auxiliary buildings of the archive, which housed old forms, cardboard boxes, rough copies of documents, and boxes for personal items and stationery. Later, in 1991, when the work of the joint Soviet and Swedish group began, the Swedish representatives visited the Russian Federal Security Service building in the Lubyanka area, where they examined the site where the personal documents and items were discovered, that had been handed over to Sweden in 1989.
On 25th October 1989, at the next meeting of V. M. Nikoforov and a KGB representative with the relatives of Raoul Wallenberg, copies of 14 archive documents were handed over to them, including 2 documents from the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive – a recording of an interview of Professor A. L. Myasnikov with Ambassador Jarring and Professor N. Svartz in 1965, in which the assertion of Mr. Svartz, that the Soviet professor would say that the Swedish diplomat was alive, was refuted.

On 6th February 1990, H. Magnusson, minister of the Swedish embassy in Moscow, in discussion with a Government expert in humanitarian affairs and human rights from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, V. S. Babenkov, emphasized the desirability of setting up an expert commission on the ‘Smoltsov report’, to include analysis of the papers on which it was written and the ink with which it was written. The diplomat turned his attention to the absence of Wallenberg’s fingerprints on the record card that had been handed over to the Swedish representatives - this procedure had been compulsory for prisoners at that time. In conclusion, H. Magnusson proposed forming a panel of experts, made up of Soviet and Swedish historians, which could take responsibility for the study of the relevant archive materials. On 7th March 1990, the KGB head, V. A. Kruchkov, received a visit from O. Berner and expressed readiness to organise a commission of experts on the ‘Smoltsov report’, and also to select a KGB officer as a contact for the Swedish representatives for archive issues.

Following this conversation on the initiative of the KGB in August 1990, at VNIN (the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute), in the presence of Swedish specialists, forensic experts for the USSR Ministry of Justice carried out graphological and forensic analysis of the ‘Smoltsov report’ on the death of Raoul Wallenberg and confirmed its authenticity. Later, in June 1992, Russia received the response of the Swedish Government’s forensic laboratory in relation to the handwriting and forensic analysis of the ‘Smoltsov report’. This recorded that ‘the observation carried out in the course of the investigation was made in favour of the text known as the ‘Smoltsov report’ having been created by the same person who also added the related material to the Smoltsov text’, and that the conclusion of the Soviet researchers ‘appears a fully acceptable conclusion, and the investigation of this laboratory does not refute it’.

Representatives of the ‘Raoul Wallenberg Society’, citing as evidence a number of witnesses, continued to support the idea that ‘Raoul is still alive today’ (‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’, 19th January 1990). Similar opinions also divide the
members of the ‘International Commission to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg’, which has established that he could have been in Vladimir prison even after 1947. The number of people who have ‘apparently’ seen the Swedish diplomat or heard some information about him has grown.

In this regard, members of the ‘International Committee to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg’ were taken to the Soviet Union. With the assistance of the USSR Ministry for Internal Affairs, in August to October 1990, they visited Vladimir prison, with representatives of the Moscow ‘Memorial’ society\(^2\), and were given the opportunity to talk with the former workers of this institution from the period 1947-1992, and to examine prisoner registration cards that had been kept for years in block 2 (about 80,000 cards). In addition, they were given the opportunity to scan the 6,000 registration cards confiscated from prisoners for subsequent computer processing. The international panel of experts is still working on these cards at the current time. At the same time, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, working through the Department for recording documentation of the civil administration for the town of Vladimir carried out an investigation into the registration of the death of a person kept in Vladimir prison in the period 1945 to 1958. No information about Raoul Wallenberg was found. The Swedish experts established conditions for study of the archives of the criminal and personal files of a number of prisoners, including those from the USSR and foreigners, who were kept in this and other prisons in the 1940-1950 period.

### III. Establishment and activity of working groups

On 20\(^{th}\) October 1990, the USSR’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Y. A. Shevardnadze sent a note to the President of the USSR, M. S. Gorbachev (the document was prepared with the active participation of the KGB), ‘On further action in the matter of R. Wallenberg’. It was proposed to draw up a list of essential actions jointly with the Swedish representatives, in order to be able to remove the matter from the agenda of Soviet-Swedish relations, and in particular it was hoped to conduct talks about this affair with the Ambassador O. Berner and Wallenberg’s stepbrother Guy von Dardel, at the level of the deputy chiefs of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Such a meeting did take place, in Moscow, on 24\(^{th}\) April 1991. On the Soviet side the meeting was presided over by the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs V. M.
Nikiforov, with the participation of the KGB deputy chief V. F. Lebedev and the deputy minister for Internal Affairs L. G. Sizov. ‘The essence of the Soviet approach to the Wallenberg affair – emphasised V. M. Nikiforov – it is our considered opinion that the fact of the death of Wallenberg in 1947 is incontrovertible, and that nothing is to be gained by further investigation of his fate. We value the heroic deeds and humanitarian acts of Wallenberg very highly’. Regarding the remaining questions of the Swedish people relating to Wallenberg, further work was proposed, to be undertaken within the framework of the working groups. The ambassador E. Werner supported this idea, and in a note from the embassy on 16th May 1991 the Swedish authorities officially gave approval to such a proposal. In the course of the contact between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Embassy, it was arranged that the composition of the working groups should include senior staff from the Ministries for both Foreign and Internal Affairs, the national security organizations and other law-enforcement agencies of both countries.

As a result of visits by the President of the USSR, M. S. Gorbachev, to Norway and Sweden in June 1991, an Order was issued concerning steps to develop relations with these countries. The USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry for Internal Affairs were ordered to ‘continue work on the Wallenberg affair, with a view to successively removing all problems arising on the Swedish side, to arrive at a final resolution of this problem’.

When the USSR ceased to exist and the Russian Federation was proclaimed, the activity of the working groups (now Russian-Swedish, rather than Soviet-Swedish) was continued.

By order of Russian President B. N. Yeltsin on 11th April 1992, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was instructed ‘to continue working, with the participation of the interested parties, within the framework of the Russian-Swedish working groups for the purpose of achieving the final resolution of the Wallenberg affair.

The leaders of both countries paid close attention to the work of these groups. In the Russian-Swedish declaration, signed by B. N. Yeltsin and C. Bildt on 4th February 1992, stated in relation to the ‘Wallenberg affair’ that the countries intended ‘to intensify their close cooperation’ by means of analysis of ‘materials in the archives of both governments’.

The activity of the groups was discussed in the course of regular meetings of the ministers for Foreign Affairs of both countries, and also in the consultations attended
by the Russian and Swedish Ministries for Foreign Affairs jointly. At the meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I. C. Ivanov, with his Swedish colleague, A. Lindh, in August 2000 the work to be done by the groups in 2000 was arranged.

The first official session of the working groups took place on 26\textsuperscript{th} September 1991. Altogether about twenty plenary sessions were set up, and also a large number of workshop sessions consisting of smaller groups of participants – group leaders and experts at interdepartmental level.

**Principles of the working groups.** There is no question of a joint ‘mandate’ for the groups. The shared understanding was expressed in the words of Wallenberg’s stepbrother, Guy von Dardel at the first of the groups’ sessions: ‘Not to leave a single stone unturned, that could be hiding a trace of the fate of Raoul Wallenberg’. The Soviet, and then the Russian, side started with the task, put first by the President of the USSR, then by the President of Russia, to work with the Swedish side impartially, to look into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

The structure and principles of the working groups were approved: the sessions were taking place as necessary and by mutual understanding (actually – in accordance with the wishes of either of the sides); each of the sides submitted any items for discussion that it believed to be helpful in clarifying what had happened to Raoul Wallenberg; both sides had the right to call for a session of the panel of experts, including independent experts; researching in the archives was carried out on the basis of national legislation, jointly where possible; the questioning of witnesses took place preferably ‘in pairs’, i.e. with leaders of both sides, etc. In the period between sessions, there was support for maintaining contact between the leaders of both parts of the group, and direct contact between representatives of the government bodies and organizations. The publication of new material, discovered in the course of the group’s work, was theoretically possible on condition that those of the other side should be able to see the items prior to publication, but the names of people, being questioned in the context of ‘the Wallenberg affair’, would only be made public with their consent.

**The general direction of the working groups** took shape from the very beginning:

first – the study of the archive materials of the supreme organs of party and government, starting with the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the leading bodies of national security, defence and foreign policy,
second – discovery of the people who by virtue of their official position or some other circumstances must have had connections with ‘the Wallenberg affair’, and questioning of them or their relatives,

third – checking of the information, from the various channels, including information contained in letters, citizen’s appeals and publications in the mass media, etc.

In the newspapers and on television, appeals were published to all citizens of the country, repeatedly, asking anyone who knows something about Raoul Wallenberg to respond. On television, documentary material relating to the Swedish diplomat was shown, and even a portrait, produced by specialists, of what Wallenberg would look like in the 1990s, if he was still alive.

The group leaders sent a letter to former USSR government and party figures with connections to the affair in question – F. D. Bobkov (deputy chief of the KGB), V. S. Semenov (deputy minister for Foreign Affairs), V. Y. Semichastnii (chief of the KGB), D. N. Suchanov (assistant to G. M. Malenkov), B. N. Ponomarov (head of International department CPSU Central Committee), A. N. Shelepin (Chief of the KGB) – with the request for them to reveal any information known to them about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. A similar request was put to some of them, orally, also in 1991, by the Russian part of the group. Replies were received from V. E. Semichastnii, B. N. Ponomarov and A. N. Shelepin.

At the same time, the experts from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs studied the ministry archive collection, focusing individual attention on the documents of the ministerial secretariats V. M. Molotov, A. Y. Vishinskii, D. T. Shepilov and A. A. Gromyko, and also from deputies V. G. Dekanozov, V. A. Zorin, S. A. Lozovskii, Y. A. Malik, A. Y. Bogomolov, F. T. Gusev, A. I. Lavrentiev, B. F. Podtserob, V. V. Kuznetsov, G. M. Pushkin and V. S. Semenov. In the collections there were copies kept of memoranda from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the CPSU Central Committee, and other government institutions.

In 1994, the representatives of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Department carried out interviews with former KGB chiefs V. A. Kruchkov, V. Y. Semichastnii and F. D. Bobkov. At this time the Russian part of the group assisted in the delivery of letters from the Swedish chairman H. Magnusson to former KGB executives, V. M. Chebrikov, V. A. Kruchkov, F. D. Bobkov and V. P. Pirozhkov.
Any information of interest to the working groups was not received from the aforementioned people.

On a request from the Swedish side, the leader of the Russian part of the group, V. V. Sokolov, on 12th April 1993, arranged a telephone interview with the former head of GRU of the USSR armed forces, P. I. Ivashutin, the recording of the interview with whom was covered by his Swedish colleagues.

The search for materials and evidence, relating to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, has acquired a systematic character following the formation of the groups.

The greatest assistance rendered by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, was assistance in the discovery of documents kept in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. As a result, the working group received and handed over to the Swedish side 68 documents on 274 pages, relating to the examination in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo of problems in Soviet-Swedish relations and the positions of the party and government leadership on the ‘Wallenberg affair’.

Quite a lot of information, specifically showing features of the situation in which Raoul Wallenberg found himself, was obtained from documents of the Federal Archive Service of the Russian Federation and the archive organisations within its jurisdiction: The Russian government archive of socio-political history, Russian government archive of recent history, in which party organisation documents are located in storage, the USSR Council of Ministers, some ministries, including the people’s commissariat for internal affairs (NKVD), the people’s commissariat for national security (NKGB) etc, and also the Russian government war archive, which included the Centre for storage of the documentary history collection, storage of the so-called ‘trophy’ collection from Germany and other countries, including the government NKVD and Ministry for Internal Affairs collection for affairs relating to prisoners of war and repatriated people.

From the material in these collections, information was obtained relating to the German and other prisoners of war who were kept in the Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons at the same time as Raoul Wallenberg, and also those who were kept in Vladimir prison.

A significant number of documents, relating to Wallenberg, were discovered in the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the Foreign policy archive. The special
feature of these documents lies in the fact that they make it possible to track the whole chain of examination of the problem – an appeal from the Swedish side (in the form of a note or an oral enquiry), the consideration of this by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, further enquiries put by the ministry to internal affairs and national security organisations, the corresponding reply from these bodies and the response to this from the Swedish side. The basic selection of documents for this problem was located in the reference collections on Sweden.

Evidence from former workers for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs – M. S. Vetrov, G. N. Farafonov, E. A. Vorozheikin, N. M. Lunkov, V. I. Erofeev, etc – was studied. Unfortunately, the majority of the aforementioned people were already dead. The veterans who were questioned spoke mainly about the extent and volume of their knowledge about the examination of this matter in the machinery of the ministry, about their own participation in the preparation of this or other documents, relating to the fate of the Swedish diplomat. Unfortunately, none of them could provide any concrete information about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

The work of searching for the documents that were of interest to the working groups took place also in the reference collections of Hungary, Rumania, the Union of Inspection Commissions in Hungary, similar Commissions in Rumania, reference collections in Switzerland, Turkey, Finland, the German Democratic Republic and the Information Committee. The examination of various archive files was also carried out for specific enquiries, and also documents from the embassy collections in the aforementioned countries.

Altogether, several hundred archive items were examined and many dozens of documents were discovered relating to Raoul Wallenberg. As they were discovered, copies of the documents were handed over to the Swedish side. On 20th November 1991 the USSR minister for foreign relations, B. D. Pankin, in the course of an interview with Ambassador O. Berner, gave him more than twenty documents from the USSR Foreign policy archive, for his Swedish colleague, M. af Ugglas. Within the framework of the Russian-Swedish consultations of 10th -11th June 1992, the Russian deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, B. L. Kolokolov presented Ambassador E. Berner with a private note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. V. Kozyrev, to be passed on to minister M. af Ugglas. The note had an appendix with 13 declassified documents from the Russian Foreign policy archive, revealing certain moments from the history of the preparation of the ‘Gromyko memorandum’.
On 10th June 1993, the Russian chief deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, A. L. Adamishin, received Guy von Dardel and M. Makinen at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They informed him about the activities of the international commission to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and thanked him for his assistance.

The working group studied the archive documents that were stored in the Central archive of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defence, and also in the Russian government’s war archive.

Emphasis was put on documents of the period of the Great Patriotic war of 1941-1945, including documents of the Political Administration and the coded telegrams of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts that had liberated Budapest. Among these were discovered documents relating to the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg and his being sent to Moscow. In the aim of discovering additional information about the Swedish legation and about Wallenberg, documents from the Office of the Budapest military commandant were checked. However, this search produced no positive results. At the same time, work was undertaken on the study of documentary materials from the central machinery of the people’s commissariat for defence, in the course of which, documents about the Swedish legation were discovered, their contents duplicating what was already known.

When the Russian war archivist delegation was visiting Rumania, headed by colonel V. A. Filippov, it was given the opportunity to look at the Rumanian army’s war archive documents, including some of the documents of the 7th Rumanian army corps, which was in action during the war years as part of the 7th Guards. In this archive an instruction to the commanding officer of the aforementioned corps was discovered, which was about the taking of measures for the protection of the Swedish legation in Budapest in the event of their being exposed.

On a request from the Swedish part of the group, the Russian Ministry of Defence ascertained what had happened to the military servicemen whose names were mentioned in the documents containing information about the Swedish diplomat or who, in the course of their official activities, had had contact with Wallenberg: general G. N. Kupriyanov, major D. Y. Demchenko, Captain N. M. Zenkov and first lieutenant A. L. Ruzhentsov.

In reply to a request from the Russian part of the group, the Central intelligence section of the General staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation reported that
an examination of the documents in their archives did not produce any information about Raoul Wallenberg.

In relation to the request of the Swedish part of the group, the head of the European office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Y. E. Fokin, presented H. Magnusson with an unofficial document on the 7th October 1993. In this document, it was reported that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and its precursor did not have any connection with the Wallenberg affair. It was also recorded that during 1992 ‘deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, V. M. Rozhkov undertook a series of meetings with the envoy-advisor of the Swedish embassy in Moscow, H. Magnusson’, in the course of which ‘answers were given to all specific questions relating to this affair’. The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, E. M. Primakov informed C. Bildt, the Premier, about this, at the time of his visit to Stockholm in April 1992, and in February of 1993, in Moscow, he informed Guy von Dardel.

In 1992, the General Public Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, acting on the request of the working groups, undertook an investigation of the archives of criminal items of the KGB department heads for special operations, P. A. Sudoplatov and N. I. Aiting, and the former deputy chief of the KGB, Y P Pitovranov carried out an interview with P. A. Sudoplatov. No information about Wallenberg was discovered, in either the items examined or the interview.

The materials representing the greatest interest were those of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 1991, all the national security organisations of the USSR received a telegram with the signature of the KGB leadership, about the Wallenberg investigation into the archives and card index records, including the records of the organisations for internal affairs. But no information was received about Wallenberg.

In the Federal Security Service central archives, documents of evidence about Security Ministry executives – V. S. Abakumov, L. F. Reichmann, G. M. Mayranovski and others, material of the secretariat of the Ministry for National Security and the KGB from 1945-1989, including minutes of special conferences at the Ministry for National Security, the central counterintelligence organisation ‘Smersh’, the USSR National Defence Commissariat and then the 3rd central (military counterintelligence) organisation for 1944-1953, the ‘Smersh’ office, the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in 1945, material of the Inspection of the Union Commission in Hungary in 1945, 2 of the central (territorial counterintelligence) organisations in 1945-1989, the first special
section of the NKVD and Section ‘A’ of the NKGB and Ministry for National Security (records, archives, correspondence about those who had been arrested and prisoners, including prisoners of war and internees) for 1943-1953, and Internal, Lefortovsk and Sukhanovsk National Security prisons for 1945-1950. Apart from this, records of evidence relating to foreign citizens who had connections with Raoul Wallenberg, which were kept in the archives of national security organisations, were studied, along with personal files of the former employees of the NKVD and NKGB, ‘Smersh’ and the KGB, who took part in the work in connection with Wallenberg in 1945-1947 and people that were connected with him. The Lefortovo and Internal prison journals were checked, and deleted items were able to be restored with the help of technical services. Some of them had connections with Wallenberg, Langfelder and other people who were in prison with them. In addition, evidence and personal files were studied, which intersected with Wallenberg, or were possibly connected with his fate in the period of 1945-1947, in the Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons, the prison registers and records of interrogation summons, for example, of Y. Loyda, G. Rikhter, K. Kitschmann, etc. The evidence of the foreign citizens from amongst the numbers of prisoners of war and diplomatic workers, in captivity or imprisoned in the Soviet Union after 1944-1945 was studied. The information received as a result of the study of the criminal and prison (personal) archive items was handed over to the Swedish side of the working group.

This information has helped to recreate the picture of where and when Wallenberg was held at the Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons, and in which cells, etc.


On the instructions of the working group, during 1992, the Russian military historian and doctor of legal science, Professor V. P. Galitskii, undertook the investigation of documents enclosed in the collection of the Operational section of the Central Directorate relating to prisoners of war and internees. Individual attention was focused on the materials about foreign citizens amongst the prisoners of war. 983 archive items, with a total volume of about 98 thousand documents, were viewed. The documents cover the period from January 1945 to December 1950, i.e. an even longer
period than the time period confirmed by documentary evidence as being that in which Wallenberg was in USSR territory.

The documents bear the markers NKVD, NKGB, MVD (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and MGB (Ministry for National Security) according to the operational work among prisoners of war and internees, reports of the commissioners to the USSR Government and the Central Directorate of leadership, instructions and orders from the NKVD and Ministry for Internal Affairs to the camps for prisoners of war and internees, issues relating to work organisation, correspondence from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and also internal correspondence between units of the NKVD and Ministry for Internal Affairs, including covering letters for minutes of interrogations. In the records also are specialist reports, replies about work carried out, correspondence between interested bodies connected with the prisoners of war and internees held in prison by internal affairs and national security organisations, complaints and statements made about them, lists of foreign citizens, including those undergoing punishment.

To work with coded information about Raoul Wallenberg a method was used, based on the practice followed at the time, and referred to as ‘numbered prisoners’. It was established procedure that foreign and Soviet citizens were given a number (or changed their names), in the security files of the individual, only in the legal process of operational and investigative work. At the time of their trial they appeared under their surnames. As regards Wallenberg and Langfelder, in the registers of transfers of prisoners from the Lefortovo and Lubyanka prisons, they were also recorded under their surnames.

The comparative investigation of the stored information, received from all the people, who underwent official questioning within the framework of the working groups, a total of more than 70 people, and also the reports of the Joint investigation commission, have shown that none of these sources has produced reliable and convincing evidence for Raoul Wallenberg having been alive after July 1947.

No information concerning the fate of Wallenberg was found in the material of the NKVD escort troops, held in the war archives. The workers of the Federal Security Service also studied the material from the troops of the Red Army guards, stationed in the Budapest area in 1945. In the war archives, documents found that related to the Swedish legation were handed over to the Swedish chairman H. Magnusson.

With the aim of checking the theory that the time was spent by Raoul Wallenberg in a USSR psychiatric clinic, checks were carried out in the archives of the
An investigation was carried out with the aim of establishing the possible cremation of the body of Wallenberg. In addition, it was taken into account that the only place for cremation in Moscow in 1947 was the Don cemetery crematorium. In the records of the cemetery and crematorium, repressed persons were not registered and, as was shown by a check, Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder did not appear in the records. Page-by-page viewing of the correspondence was carried out, with its clustered orders of the Military board of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Special conferences with the Ministry for National Security, tribunals and other bodies for bringing death sentences for execution and for ordering dead bodies to be buried or cremated (collection N 7).

And these materials did not mention R. Wallenberg and V. Langfelder.

On the whole a considerable volume of information was discovered, which has helped to reveal specific aspects of the activities of Wallenberg in Budapest in greater detail leading up to the moment of his arrest, and also to establish the individual events of his time in USSR NKVD prisons. But the key information, the documentation relating to his interrogations and death, was not found.

The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the request of the groups, has used its channels to undertake a second (after the Federal Security Service, see page 16) check of the records and archives of the units of the Russian Federation Internal Affairs organisations, and also in the archives of all existing and former places where the imprisonment and detention of people who had been arrested and the holding of foreign citizens was carried out. There was no information about Raoul Wallenberg having spent time in any of the organisations under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry for Internal Affairs.

Special checks were applied to the archive of documents of the Butir prison in Moscow, which held information about the deaths of its prisoners (starting in 1942), and also the record of the medical services of this prison (kept during the period from 1947). Work also took place in the archives of the Butir prison and the Central Directorate for Internal affairs in Moscow to find the list of workers in the medical unit of this prison from 1945 to 1965, and members of their families, who might possibly
have some information, if Wallenberg was there. These lists of names and addresses were handed over to the Swedish side.

The specific site was checked in accordance with the theories about Wallenberg’s stay in Vladimir prison after 1947 (see p.7)

The organs of the Ministry for Internal Affairs checked with former citizens N. I. Shinkarenko and V. F. Bezrodno, living in the Ukraine, about the supposed locations of their meetings with Wallenberg in the 1950s in places of imprisonment, and accordingly, in the Nizhni Novgorod and Magadan districts, and also information from the Swedish side about possible time spent by Wallenberg at the end of the 1940s to the beginning of the 1950s in prison in Irkutsk territory. No confirmation of the specified information was found in the archives of documents in these areas.

On the request of the Swedish side and in connection with previous evidence from Polish native A. Kalinskii, the organs of the Ministry for Internal Affairs found members of the family of G. N. Kurpiyanov, who would have known about the arrest and whereabouts of Wallenberg. Interviews with these relatives were carried out separately by the Swedish side.

Other research work was carried out, the results of which were examined at group sessions or reported directly to the Swedish side.

**A brief outline of the activities of the Russian part of the working group.**

The structure is intentionally limited to an enumeration of the main measures of the specific activities of each of the Russian participant bodies of the group, which are extremely wide in scope and require a great deal of time. Work has included the organisation of the search for documents in the archives of the President of the Russian Federation, the Rosarchive systems, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the joint organisation working with the Swedish group, of sessions and workshop meetings; the arrangement of visits to prisons and the opportunity for introductions to foreign representatives with card indexes and other documentation. Furthermore, there is the complicated and scrupulous investigation of the Federal Security Service experts, the search for former workers of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry for Internal Affairs, who had connections with ‘the Wallenberg affair’.

Altogether, in the Russian archives, more than 10,000 archive records have been examined. The Swedish side has taken delivery of more than 200 documents. Unfortunately, viewing the numerous documents and the other enquiries made has not brought to light the reason for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg and the circumstances of his death. This has not been found from the documents and reliable information relating to the matter.
In connection with the numerous appeals of Russian and foreign organisations regarding the rehabilitation of Raoul Wallenberg, the Central military public prosecutor for the Russian Federation in 1998 informed the Russian part of the working groups about the relevant checks that it had carried out, and also made enquiries about getting the final documents on the work of the group. The Russian group leaders informed the Central military public prosecutor about the situation regarding the position of the Russian part of the groups in relation to the given proposal, and offered to return to its practical examination on the conclusion of the work of the group. In accordance with the understanding, the present report will be delivered to the Office of rehabilitation of GVP of the Russian Federation

IV. The results of the study of the archive documents and materials, with other evidence, relating to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg

In relation to the note from the Swedish legation in Moscow on 31st December 1944, bearing a request to the Soviet powers to take responsibility for protection of the diplomatic legation in Budapest, assistant head of staff for the Red Army, major general N. V. Slavin, on 2nd January 1945, informed the commander of the 2 Ukrainian fronts, R. Y. Malinov and the 3rd Ukrainian front commander, F. I. Tolbukhin, that ‘the Swedish legation in Budapest has been left in a town that is surrounded’. With the list of the surnames of the legation workers, he wrote: ‘On instruction, I will give orders to take steps for their protection and to inform the General Staff of the Red Army.’

As is well known, on 13th January 1945, with his driver, Langfelder, Wallenberg set out for a meeting with Soviet troops. On that same day, both men were detained and taken by Soviet secret service workers to the location of 151 infantry division of the 7th Army Guards of the 2nd Ukrainian front, which was in battle for the liberation of the town (the specific circumstances were clarified, in that major D. Y. Demchenko, captain N. M. Zenkov, first lieutenant A. L. Ruzhentsov took part in the ‘capture’ and escort and their fate has been established).

On 14th January, general G. N. Kupriyanov sent a coded telegram to the commander of 30th infantry corps (copies were sent to the chief of staff of the 2 Ukrainian fronts), in which the order was given to ‘take’ ‘the secretary of the Swedish legation’, Raoul Wallenberg immediately to the commander of the 18th infantry corps,
major general Afonin, securing his safety and ease of movement; however he should be ‘prohibited’ from having contact with the foreign world.

According to the evidence of German prisoners of war (K.Huber, K. Kitschmann etc.), Raoul Wallenberg and V. Langfelder were taken on 15th January to the headquarters of the aforementioned corps, where ‘they were treated courteously’.

Only one day after the note of V. G. Dekanozov of 16th January 1945 with the information that Wallenberg was in the protection of the Red Army, already on 17th January 1945 the deputy commissioner for defence, N. A. Bulganin was sending a coded telegram to the commanding officer of the 2nd Ukrainian front, R. Y. Malinov, with orders for the arrest of Wallenberg and for him to be taken to Moscow. A copy of the coded telegram was addressed to V. S. Abakumov, the head of the Central Directorate for Counterintelligence ‘Smersh’.

The chief of staff of the 2nd Ukrainian front, M. V. Zakharov, reported to N. A. Bulganin: ‘Raoul Wallenberg has been arrested and sent, on 25.1.45, under chief escort of captain Zenkov Nikolai Matveevich’.

The grounds for the ‘arrest’, judging by the documents available to the Russian-Swedish working group, including the evidence of former prisoners of war, appeared to arise from the suspicion that Wallenberg was involved in spying and his connections with the USA and German secret services, and also the fact that the diplomat had issued Swedish ‘protective documents’ to people, who were engaged in hostile activities against the USSR.

In February and March of 1945, according to evidence from the Swedish diplomats, P. Anger, L. Berg, etc., the whole staff of the Swedish legation and the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest was questioned by the staff of the commandant’s office in Budapest, military intelligence and counterintelligence and by the NKVD troops for the rear guard of the Ukrainian front. The majority of the questions concerned the activities, personal lives and social circles of the Swedish diplomats. Questions were asked about Wallenberg’s involvement in the German spy network, and that of Berg, who worked with him. The greatest attention was given, according to Berg’s evidence, to the clarification of the nature of Wallenberg’s activities and his connections with high-ranking officials in Hungary and Germany. In the opinion of the legation worker who worked with Wallenberg, L. Berg, suspicious attitude of the Soviet military powers to the activities of the Swedish legation and above all Wallenberg was, to a certain extent, well-founded. The expansive nature of his personal connections with
administrative workers, counterintelligence and intelligence agencies in Hungary and Germany, and also the co-operation with the War Refugee Board, based in Washington, could give grounds for the Soviet military authorities to suspect Wallenberg of spying on behalf of Germany or the USA. At the same time, some original documents, stating the reasons for Wallenberg’s arrest, could not be found in the Russian archives.

A very small circle of Soviet leaders (Stalin, Bulganin, Abakumov, etc.) were well aware of the ‘capture’ of Wallenberg, from the very beginning. The NKID, the People’s commissariat for foreign affairs (with the possible exception of Molotov and Dekanozov), was not informed of it, especially not at the level of the territorial section. In subsequent years, the NKID, receiving the next appeal from the Swedish side relating to Wallenberg, conscientiously sent its requests to the NKGB, to ‘Smersh’, and later to the Ministry for National Security and the Ministry for Internal Affairs, but these requests were ignored. As was shown by the later research, section ‘A’ of the Ministry for National Security, responsible for the registration of arrested people, in response to the enquiries of operational units within the Ministry for National Security, gave the information that the diplomat was registered with ‘Smersh’ military counterintelligence. Consequently, official responses from the national security bodies to the enquiries of the NKID and Ministry for Foreign Affairs were erroneous. Accordingly, the official responses of the Soviets to the Swedish appeals, beginning with the first appeal of 25th April 1945 about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and the following notes about checking all the information about his fate, did not correspond with the reality.

On 25th January 1945, Wallenberg and Langfelder in the company of a ‘Smersh’ officer and four soldiers were sent to Moscow. According to the German prisoner of war, E. Huber, who was sitting in the same cell as Langfelder, when the train stopped in Iassi, Wallenberg was given the opportunity to visit the ‘Luther’ restaurant. The exact date on which they were delivered to Moscow has not been able to be established. According to E. Huber’s evidence, in Moscow, the Swedish diplomat and his driver were shown the metro and they ‘went on foot to the Lubyanka’, where they were separated and arrested. This took place on 6th February 1945.

In the prisoner register for Lubyanka prison, there is a corresponding entry for Wallenberg under his own name. On the same day a Lubyanka prison card was filled out for him, in which his status was recorded as ‘prisoner of war’.
The holding of Raoul Wallenberg in the Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons is also confirmed by documentation – the recovery (see p. 17) by restoration of the registers of these prisons, in which summons for interrogation, amongst other things were logged. It was established that the Swedish diplomat was located in the Interior prison from 6th February to 29th March 1945, and from 29th May 1945 to 1st March 1947 was in Lefortov, and from 1st March to 11th March 1947 was once again in the Interior prison of the NKGB and Ministry for National Security. These records have established his summons for interrogation by the SMERSH military counterintelligence investigators, and then by those of the central machinery of the Ministry for National Security.

Over the whole period of his being held in prison, five occasions on which he was summoned for interrogation have been established:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№№</th>
<th>Date of Summons</th>
<th>Time of Interrogation</th>
<th>Surname of workers by whom Wallenberg was registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>08.02.1945</td>
<td>1.05 - 4.35</td>
<td>Sverchuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>28.04.1945</td>
<td>15.35 -17.10</td>
<td>Kuzmishin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.07.1946</td>
<td>10.30 -13.00</td>
<td>Kopelyanskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.08.1946</td>
<td>10.40 -12.20</td>
<td>Kopelyanskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.03.1947</td>
<td>14.15 -16.00</td>
<td>Kuzmishin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The procedure of his interrogations has not been determined. There was no equivalent material discovered as documentary evidence for whether they were alive or dead. All of the archives, studied within the framework of the working groups, did not give the answers to these questions.

As was registered, the appeals to former leaders and workers of the national security bodies also produced negative results. Individual attention was centred on the former investigator, D. G. Kopelyanskii, by whom in the corresponding register of the Lefortovo prison ‘was registered’ Wallenberg as having been summoned to him for interrogation on 17th July and 30th August 1946. He is the only one of the three interrogators still living, who were registered as having been involved in the ‘Wallenberg affair’. D. G. Kopelyanskii, however, insists that he had nothing to do with the summoning of Raoul Wallenberg for interrogations, that he never brought the Swede in for interrogations and that he did not know how his name, Kopelyanskii, had come to be on the aforementioned records. Various approaches to this person were
made, going as far as holding a ‘conversation’ with him at an official group session. All the participants in this meeting were left with the definite feeling that D. G. Kopelyanskii could have said more, but this is a matter for his conscience.

At the same time, the group could not disregard the evidence of the former national security workers who revealed that in the work of the NKVD-KGB, there were practices, when a direct manager, particularly the supervising manager, was able to give oral orders to any worker, including in the prison, to ‘register’ any of the examining magistrates for a summons for interrogation of a prisoner of interest to the management, although in reality there was no such interrogation or it had been held by a different person.

It is possible to say with a certain degree of confidence that Raoul Wallenberg was in the Interior prison, in cell 121, from 6th February to 6th March 1945, and then was in cell 123, together with the prisoners of war, Y. Loyda, W. Scheuer and G. Richter.

His almost continuous cellmate in the Interior prison and in Lefortovo approximately from the middle of March 1945, possibly up to March 1947, was W. Rhedel. From 29th March 1945 to 26th February 1947, Wallenberg was with him in cell 203 of the Lefortovo prison. Subsequently (from 1st March 1947) he may have been held with W. Rhedel in cell 7 in the Interior prison. The possible transfer of Wallenberg from cell 7 of the Interior prison could not be successfully shown on the basis of the material in the archives.

The group did not dismiss the possibility that there were other cellmates with Wallenberg. Thus, the aforementioned Y Loyda, in one of his statements on the administration of the prison wrote that the national security workers gave an undertaking not to reveal that they were in the same cell as Wallenberg and Rhedel. According to the testimony of other prisoners of war, G. Richter, E. Khuber and E. Hille – all the prisoners who were somehow associated or could have been associated with the Swedish diplomat were given to understand that it was essential to keep this information secret.

The evidence of former prisoners of war, given after the prisoners’ return, also agrees on the fact that they ‘tapped out messages’ with Wallenberg and Langfelder and exchanged information with them in secret without the prison administration hearing.
In the first few months after the note from V. G. Dekanozov, the Swedes did not actively raise the subject of Raoul Wallenberg. All the more so because in February 1945 the Soviet envoy to Sweden, A. M. Kollont, in a personal letter, assured Wallenberg’s mother, Mrs. Von Dardel, that her son was safe in the protection of the Soviet authorities.

At the same time, in March 1945, over the Hungarian radio and from various witnesses in Budapest, the Swedes started to receive information indicating that Wallenberg had been killed at the hands of the Gestapo or the Szálashists, or as a result of a car accident.

On 25th April 1945, when all the members of the Swedish legation in Budapest left for their homeland, the envoy to Moscow, S. Soderblom sent V. G. Dekanozov a note with a request for clarification concerning the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. On 18th May, he repeated this request, at the same time expressing the supposition that the diplomat had died in a car accident.

It would be an exaggeration to state that ‘the Wallenberg affair’, at this time, was somehow distinguished from the ranks of the other questions in the relations of the USSR with Sweden. In relations with Stockholm the main topic of discussion for Moscow was concerned with the trade agreement and credit - negotiations were proceeding with difficulty. By this time one problem had arisen – the persistent refusal of the Swedish side to extradite war criminals: Finnish counterintelligence men who had fled before the Soviet army from Finland to Sweden, Lettish ‘legionaries’, who – as ‘invalids’ – found protection in Sweden. Irritation was caused and the Swedish line of questions was connected with the repatriation of the under-age daughters of Makarov, the extradition of the so-called ‘seaman’ Granovskii.

At this time, when a thousand people were sitting in Soviet prisons, including high-ranking foreigners, the question of the fate of Raoul Wallenberg did not come into ‘major’ politics, it was one of a whole series of ‘ordinary’ issues and the approach to it reflected that.

In June 1946, when Wallenberg was in the Lefortovo prison, a development took place that, in the opinion of the Russian experts, had an influence on the fate of the prisoner. On 6th June at a farewell audience with V. M. Molotov, the envoy S. Soderblom raised a question about a personal meeting with Stalin. Although, in the
diplomatic practice of the time, such requests were extremely unusual, the answer from V. M. Molotov was, nevertheless, positive: ‘it may be possible to hold such a meeting’.

It is not known what arguments Molotov used to persuade Stalin to see Soderblom. It is logical to suppose that they included a reference to the difficulty of discussing the trade agreement and other issues remaining to be resolved with Sweden. It is quite possible that there was not even a mention of Raoul Wallenberg. S. Soderblom, judging by his record of the interview, did not touch on the subject.

On 13th June 1946, for a day and a half before the interview, Stalin hosted a session attended by key members of the Politburo: V. M. Molotov, deputy chief of the Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs; L. P. Beriya, deputy chief of the Council of Ministers, with responsibility for the national security bodies; A. I. Mikoyan, the Minister for Foreign Trade; A. A. Zhdanov, Head of the Allies’ Inspection Committee in Finland, G. M. Malenkov, holding an organisational post in the Politburo, and also, invited from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the first deputy minister A. Y. Vyshinskii and the deputy minister V. G. Dekanozov, with responsibility for Northern Europe. The combination of participants gives grounds to suppose that Stalin needed to give careful consideration to the problems connected with policy in relation to Finland and, possibly, Sweden.

The talk took place on 15th June 1946, as shown in the daily records of Stalin’s secretary, and lasted just five minutes, when Stalin’s next meeting was due to begin an hour later. In other words, there was sufficient time reserved for the meeting, making it possible to cover the whole of the relationship, as the envoy was to leave. Deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovskii, the only person present at the interview from the Soviet side, after the departure of S. Soderblom, stayed alone with Stalin for 55 minutes. It is obvious that it was impossible not to evaluate the conversation that had just finished.

The interview, most likely, caused Stalin some bewilderment, and possibly even irritation – not one major issue was raised. It emphasised the ambiguity of the approach to the Wallenberg affair: from one side, a request for an investigation, from the other – a ‘personal opinion’ type of comment that the diplomat had most likely died in Budapest.

In the Russian archives the records of this interview with Stalin were not found. From the Swedish version of the records, it can be seen that, to the Soviet leader, the
name Wallenberg was well known (not Raoul, but ‘Wallenberg House’, in the first instance, due to the role of Marcus Wallenberg in putting Soviet-Swedish contacts in order, which had led in 1940 to the conclusion of the ‘winter war’, and then, once again, in 1944, to the withdrawal of Finland from the second world war. Stalin promised to look into the matter personally and to provide an answer. S. Soderblom, in his reply, mentioned that he, personally, was sure that Wallenberg had died in Budapest.

For the Soviet side, at that time, it was not possible to have ‘personal opinions’ in politics. Consequently, Soviet diplomats had to use strange code: the ‘personal opinion’ expressed by the representative of the USSR could only make an appearance if it had the corresponding sanction of the leader. To represent some other opinion, even for a diplomat from another country, was impossible for the ‘leader’. Consequently, it is logical to suppose that the comment of S. Soderblom was perceived by him according to his own measure – the interview was necessary only for the purposes of communicating this ‘personal opinion’: the Swedish leadership, by this means, was seen to be indicating that it believed its diplomat to be dead, and raising the issue of what happened to him ‘for the sake of setting its mind at ease’ when faced with the relatives and the public.

The Russian part of the groups is inclined to the conclusion that the interview of 15th June 1946, as a rare granting of an opportunity for a meeting with Stalin, was an oversight, in terms of trying to interest the Soviet leader in the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Most of all, it may have given the impression that the Swedish leader accepted the information, complicating the situation.

This view also takes in the interview of the minister for Foreign Affairs, O Undén, at a session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21st November, 1946, with V. M. Molotov. From the Soviet records of the interview that were preserved, it is clear that there was an exchange of congratulations on the settling of the trade agreement, expression of hope for future favourable developments in business and economic cooperation etc. In all it appears as if the Wallenberg issue did not exist in Soviet Swedish relations, as the Swedish minister did not mention it.

It is worth noting that the general secretary for the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Westman, in an interview with the envoy, I. S. Chernishov, on 24th November,
reacting to the insistence of the Soviet side concerning the seaman Granovskii who had fled - made the reply that ‘the response of Moscow on the whereabouts of Wallenberg still amounts to nothing’. Official posing of the question would have been extremely appropriate, but it did not happen.

A new question about Wallenberg, in the form of a reminder about the answer promised by Stalin on 15th June, was sent to the Soviets by the advisor in Moscow, Bark-Holst. This was sent to S. A. Lozovskii, who had been present at the interview of 15th June, but had since transferred from the NKID to the Sovinformburo (to an ‘intermediate pause’ before being arrested in 1948 and shot in 1952).

S. A. Lozovskii reported back, about his interview of 13th December 1946 with Bark-Holst, to the Communist Party Central Committee, or in other words, Stalin. The adviser mentioned Stalin’s promise to have the issue of the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg clarified. Six months passed, but no answer was forthcoming, the diplomat noted that the family and relatives of the diplomat were besieging the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, already the affair was attracting press attention, with the possibility of questions being raised in parliament. The Prime Minister made a report to the Reichstag about the contacts with the Soviet side. Bark-Holst noted that it would not be desirable ‘if, after the conclusion of the Swedish-Soviet trade agreement, questions about Wallenberg were to be raised in the Swedish press or parliament’. S. A. Lozovskii notified the advisor that an appeal, for this reason, would have to get through to the NKID, rather than being addressed to him. But there was no such appeal.

It is obvious: at the level of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of both Sweden and the USSR, the name of Raoul Wallenberg was not generally mentioned, at the level of the general secretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it only featured in the reply relating to the answer about the diplomat, but in the context of a completely separate question, and the advisor in Moscow was only turning attention to the danger of a negative reaction on the part of the Swedish press and parliament. In other words, nothing unexpected was going to happen. The Swedish leadership, clearly, was meanwhile reconciled to the shape that things were taking.

The main problem with the trade agreement by this time was resolved and movement on other existing issues was beginning to seem necessary. It was evidently decided that the time had come to put a full stop to the Wallenberg affair.
In the opinion of the Russian experts, it was then that the final, fatal decision for Wallenberg was also taken.

The documentation has established that in February 1947 the section head at the Ministry for National Security, P. V. Fedotov informed a board member of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, K. V. Novikov ‘orally’ of the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg at the disposal of the Ministry for National Security and his intention to inform V. M. Molotov of the reasons for the detention of the diplomat, and also introduced the proposal relating to ‘further measures’ with regard to this issue.

After the mention of informing the deputy the manager of the 5th European section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, M. S. Vetrov, looked into the question in the Ministry for National Security, and on 2nd April 1947 reported this in writing to A. Y. Vyshinskii with the added note ‘the matter has still not been reported, but is ready’.

Among the key documents in the archive of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs a memorandum from A. Y. Vyshinskii was discovered (No. 312-B of 14th May 1947) to V. M. Molotov, in which he expresses the view: ‘since the Wallenberg affair, until the present time, has continued to remain without movement, I ask you to oblige comrade Abakumov to present information about the existence of the issue and a proposal for its elimination’. On 18th March 1947, V. M. Molotov, who was also the deputy head of the Soviet government, wrote on this document the resolution: ‘to Comrade Abakumov. I ask you to inform me’.

Soon afterwards, there appeared the next document: On 7th July 1947, A. Y. Vyshinskii sent a letter to V. S. Abakumov, in which he asked for an answer for the preparation of reactions to the next appeal from the Swedish side. Accordingly, A. Y. Vyshinskii ‘suggested’ the contents of the awaited answer – the version about Wallenberg having died in Budapest. As a lawyer with experience of work as a public prosecutor, he warned him not to forget about the information, specifying ‘the place where Wallenberg was taken into the protection of the Soviet military powers, where Wallenberg was accommodated at this time, where Wallenberg was moved to, and whether there were battles or bomb attacks in these locations, if Wallenberg had the possibility of freely moving about or if he had been located under continuous bodyguard, and also if Wallenberg had at this time had connections or meetings with members of the Swedish legation in Vienna (note: - January is a misprint of the executor, not knowing the gist of the matter) or with any other foreigners’.
On analysis of this situation, our specialists turned their attention to the letter from Abakumov to Molotov on 17th July 1947. It is registered in the registration documents of the secretariat of the Ministry for National Security and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but was not found in the archives of either of the organisations. This document was not filed in storage in the Foreign Policy archive, but in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archive a note remained, saying that it was transferred personally to V. M. Molotov. At the same time, a ‘strange’ coincidence is obvious: the letter from Abakumov and the report of A. L. Smoltsov bear the same date – 17th July 1947. Our experts came to the conclusion that this date coincidence and the ‘unfiled’ letter from Abakumov had not happened by chance. Their conclusion: the letter from Abakumov, of 17th July 1947, is exactly the document that, possibly, contained the answer to the resolution of V. M. Molotov and gave clarification to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

The Soviet note of 18th August 1947 gives an outline, proposed by A. Y. Vyshinskii: the denial of Wallenberg being located in USSR territory and the allegation, moreover, that he had died in Budapest. The reference to the words of the unknown and ‘undiscovered’ commanding officer of the military unit, as a source of ‘circumstantial information’ as grounds for an official note, speaks for itself.

At that stage, the position of the Soviet side could, obviously, have looked more or less plausible – but the Swedish side then had available only contradictory information about the circumstances of the disappearance of Wallenberg, and was forced to consider the information about his death in Budapest.

But the persistence of Stockholm increased. At the start of 1952, the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko sent a letter of enquiry about the possibility of changing the character of the answer given to the Swedish side about Raoul Wallenberg. However, the minister for National Security, S. D. Ignatiev, in the reply of 3rd March 1952, emphasised that it was reasonable to hold on to the version, as worded in the note from A. Y. Vyshinskii of 18th August 1947.

Then A. A. Gromyko, in a letter to the head of the KGB, I. A. Serov, on 13th October 1954, asked for information for a report to the CPSU Central Committee, stating the question specifically: ‘When and in what circumstances did Raoul Wallenberg die’.
In the answer with reference to the letter from his precursor, of 3rd March 1952, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I. A. Serov confirmed that it was considered expedient to continue with the version, as worded in the note of A. Y. Vyshinskii, and showed that national security leadership was maintaining the same unchanged position.

In the mid-1950s some prisoners of war, returning from the USSR, gave official evidence that Raoul Wallenberg had been located in the Lefortovo and Lubyanka prisons in Moscow, held on a spying charge. These new witnesses had sat in the same cells together with the diplomat or his driver, had heard about them from other prisoners or had received information by means of tapping on the walls. Such information, containing small factual details of the whereabouts of Wallenberg in prison, was most difficult to refute.

On 8th November 1955, the minister for Foreign Affairs, O Undén, in an interview with Ambassador K. K. Rodionov in Stockholm, stated the contents of the aforementioned evidence in detail. Soon after there followed official Swedish memos with corresponding questions. However, the Soviet side continued to react as before.

On 30th March 1956 the minister for Internal Affairs, G. Hedlund, acting on instructions of the Prime Minister of Sweden, T. Erlander, personally sent to V. M. Molotov a copy of the evidence of former German prisoners of war, containing evidence about Wallenberg. ‘Brushing away’ this evidence was impossible.

Literally 3 days later, on 2nd April 1956, V. M. Molotov wrote a memo from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the CPSU Central Committee with a proposal to ask the KGB on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry for Internal Affairs in a two week period, to examine materials pertaining to Raoul Wallenberg and to work with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to present a proposal about the nature of an answer to the Swedish representatives.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the KGB with the signatures of V. M. Molotov and I. A. Serov in the memo to the CPSU Central Committee of 28th April 1956 confirmed: ‘The evidence of these witnesses, and also the evidence of other people presented to the Swedish side correspond strongly with the actual circumstances
of the arrest and detention of Raoul Wallenberg in imprisonment in the USSR’. And they add that the Swedish diplomat was located in the Soviet Union and died in prison.

The essence of the answer offered to the Swedish side comes down to the following: Raoul Wallenberg was detained in Budapest in January 1945 and taken to Moscow on the instructions of V. S. Abakumov without notifying the government and in violation of Soviet law, he was held in particular conditions, staff were not informed of his surname, he was accused of spying for the Germans against the Soviet Union and its allies (‘prompting’ of the sentence was used on 19th December 1955 in a variant of the answer to explain the absence of information about Wallenberg the fact that ‘he was theoretically located in the USSR in the first days after the war and up to his death under another name’). In July 1947 he died in the prison hospital, the body was cremated; on the order of V. S. Abakumov, measures were taken for the elimination of evidence about the secret confinement of the Swede, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs gave false answers about the presence of Wallenberg in the USSR.

The leadership of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considered it expedient to make a statement to the Swedish government about the final results of the checks on the information about the fate of Wallenberg in September 1956 – after parliamentary elections in Sweden. And until this point, it was proposed to play for time about the situation, to ask the Swedish side to present additional information about Wallenberg (distinguishing marks, photographs and other information) and more detailed information about the witnesses of the number of his cellmates. Meanwhile Stockholm would be notified that the thorough checking of the circumstances of the disappearance of Wallenberg was continuing.

On 3rd May, the decision was taken by the CPSU Central Committee in accordance with the memo from V. M. Molotov and I. A. Serov on 28th April 1956. Consequently the question was repeatedly deferred.

After the departure from his post of V. M. Molotov, the new minister for Foreign Affairs, D. T. Shepilov and the KGB representative, I. A. Serov, on 23rd October 1956, presented a report to the CPSU Central Committee, in which the date of the death of Raoul Wallenberg was first named as 17th July 1947, and it was proposed to inform the Swedish side about this. However, this proposal was not accepted.

On 12th April 1957, D. T. Shepilov and I. A. Serov informed the CPSU Central Committee of one planned answer to the Swedish representatives in the form of a
memorandum. He repeated with great emphasis the fact that it was proposed by the previous ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1956. One new item appeared, but the important addition was the ‘discovery’ of the well known ‘Smoltsov’s report’, the text of which was quoted verbatim.

After a protracted discussion of the aforementioned ‘Smoltsov’s report’, a new memorandum with this document was given to the Swedish government, handed over by A. A. Gromyko on 6th February 1957.

In this document, the Soviet leadership first told the truth about the tragic fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

From the very beginning of the work of the Russian-Swedish working groups, our experts proceeded from the fact that the date on which the full stop was brought to the fate of Wallenberg appeared to be 17th July 1947, which was the date marked on ‘Smoltsov’s report’. Up to the present, it appeared to be the only document supporting this fact.

The report of A. L. Smoltsov on 17th July 1947, it was stated in the memorandum had been discovered ‘in the course of thorough examination of the prison archives’ in 1957. The document does not appear to be a standard official death certificate, and is presented as an ‘internal’ memorandum, handwritten and produced in accordance with the rules of business correspondence. In a violation of the existing official system of seniority, the doctor’s report is addressed not to the prison chief, as is customary, but directly to the minister. It attracted attention with the absence of notes about the death of a significant prisoner in the special prison register for recording such events. This indicates the unusual nature of the case in question.

A. L. Smoltsov himself died in 1953. His son, at that time working for the national security bodies, in interviews with a worker from the Ministry of National Security, as well as a member of the working group, A. E. Ziborov, on 29th May and 2nd June 1992, said that his father, prior to his discharge in 1947, was summoned urgently to the Ministry, despite being so ill. On his return, he apparently told his son that some Swedish man had died in prison.

Earlier there was a mention of the practices existing in the Ministry for National Security regarding orders being given orally and in person by managers in order to avoid involving lower-ranking officers. It may be supposed that this was also true for the case of Raoul Wallenberg.
The graphological and forensic analysis of ‘Smoltsov’s report’, carried out by the Russian experts in 1990, and by the Swedish experts in 1992 confirmed its authenticity (see p. 7).

The reason for Wallenberg’s death, specified in the report of A. L. Smoltsov, with regard to the cremation of his body without an autopsy, and also the vagueness around the discovery of this document, have always generated doubts, and not only amongst the Swedish experts. According to the evidence of a former KGB worker, A. V. Bachurin, preparing an answer of this body to the next question of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the reasons for Wallenberg’s death, ‘at this time, the leadership did not want to state the true reason for the death of the Swedish diplomat’.

If the Russian experts have had increasing doubts in relation to the reasons for the death of Raoul Wallenberg, as specified by A. L. Smoltsov, at the time of the death of the Swedish diplomat, additional, albeit circumstantial, evidence was received.

For the Russian experts, the circumstantial evidence is considered to include the aforementioned (p.34) coincidence regarding the date of 17th July for the report of A. L. Smoltsov and 17th July 1947 for the ‘disappearing’ letter from Abakumov addressed to Molotov, but also the evidence of the German prisoners of war, G. Richter, E. Hille and E. Khuber (the last was brought from Ivlievsk camp especially for interrogation).

According to the statement of these last, on 27th July 1947 they were cross-questioned about what they knew about Wallenberg. Although only G. Richter shared the same cell with Wallenberg in the Lubyanka. The rest were with Langfelder at various times and in other cells, all of them were interrogated separately at roughly the same time. When one of them mentioned Wallenberg in the course of the interrogation, the conversation immediately became concentrated around his name. Then they all simultaneously were thrown into the punishment cell, in order to be able ‘to have a good think’ about what they ought to know and what they should forget. It is very likely that this was the first attempt of the national security bodies to cover up the crime. It is unlikely to be an accident that Wallenberg’s cellmate, Rhedel, died soon after this, on 15th October 1947, from ‘paralysis of the heart’ whilst being transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Krasnogorskii camp No.7.

The death of the diplomat has also been confirmed by three workers of the former 2nd KGB Central Directorate has been confirmed, who told how they had had information about the execution of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947 in connection with a charge of spying for Germany.
A member of the working group, A. E. Ziborov, speaking in an interview with the two former KGB workers, in 1991, noted that Wallenberg was executed without a trial on 17th July 1947, on just such a charge, and the majority of the documents relating to this matter were then destroyed.

Thus, all the documents relating to this issue and the evidence are considered circumstantial evidence by the Russian experts, indicating the unambiguous ending to the story of Raoul Wallenberg.
SUMMARY

In almost ten years of work the Russian part of the joint Russian-Swedish group has carefully checked and analysed all the most important archives of the Russian Federation and discovered quite a lot of new documentary information relating to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and questioned living witnesses and the relatives of dead witnesses. Regarding the time factor, the possibility of investigating some new witnesses, who might have had useful information concerning Raoul Wallenberg, actually came to nothing. The publication of documents, that might in principle have opened up new opportunities, is presented by the group as extremely improbable.

Altogether the work of the Russian part of the group has led to the following conclusions:

First
All the circumstantial evidence confirms, that Raoul Wallenberg died, or most likely was killed, on 17th July 1947.

Practically all the direct evidence was destroyed at the time. In the course of thorough investigative work, evidence was examined relating to the detention and arrest, or any other aspect of Wallenberg’s time in prisons of the former USSR national security system. More reliable information was not found.

Second
The responsibility for the death of Raoul Wallenberg lies with the USSR government leaders of the time, since no other authority at the time could be in charge of the fate of the Swedish diplomat, representing a neutral government, a member of the ‘Wallenberg House’, both well known abroad and known specifically to the Soviet leader, Stalin.

Individual blame as a ‘collaborator’ in this crime is carried by Abakumov, as the executor and key figure in the organisation of the physical removal of Wallenberg and the concealment of its evidence, and by Molotov, Vyshinskii and Dekanozov, providing foreign policy protection for the matter.

Furthermore, there are weighty grounds for supposing that Molotov knew about the arrest and death of the diplomat, and moreover that, holding a responsible position, he slowed down the process of exposure of the committed crime.
Third
The conclusion therefore follows that the Soviet leadership as a whole were not keen to go into open discussions with the Swedish side. It must be admitted that in ‘cold war’ conditions, the distrust was mutual. Both sides had to take a complicated path, before they began to leave their distrust of each other in the past.

The start of the process of exposing the crime was set up by the processes of democratisation in Russia. In the latter, the fundamental principle was the clearing out of obstructed channels that had been started at the end of the 1980s.

Fourth
The Russian part of the joint Russian-Swedish group consider the task faced by the group to be resolved, and presents the results of its work to the leadership of the Russian Federation and Sweden. We believe that the work carried out can be of interest to the public.

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The Russian part of the group expresses its thanks to all the bodies and organisations, and also individuals, who gave their assistance in its work, personally – the Swedish and Russian members of the group and the experts, who over many years – whether acting as part of their official duty or by vocation – worked towards clarification of the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.
The Russian part of the joint Russian-Swedish working group for clarification of the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg

25 October 2000

V. V. Tuchnin  
head of department for 2nd European department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, chair of group

V. K. Vinogradov  
leading inspector of the machinery of the deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service

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K. S. Nikishkin  
deputy chief of the department of regional and social relations of the Ministry for Internal Affairs

V. V. Sokolov  
senior inspector of Documentary history for department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

V. A. Filipov  
deputy chief of War Memorial Centre of Russian Federation Armed Forces
Footnotes

1 At that time, Sweden acted to protect the interests of USSR in Nazi Germany, Hungary, Finland and other countries that were at war with the Soviet Union.

2 Social organization, concerned with matters of political repression and establishment of the fate of citizens who were illegally convicted in these years.

3 In May 1991 Sweden assigned the Minister of the Swedish Embassy in the USSR, Hans Magnusson, as group leader, to remain at this post until the conclusion of the group’s work. The Soviet side as its leader the deputy chief of the European office at the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, S. E. Zhuravlev, the group also included the deputy chief of the KGB V. A. Nikonov, deputy chief of the KGB archives V. K. Vinogradov and the head of the office of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, V. A. Gulyaev.

For the second session, in October 1991, the composition of the groups had been significantly enlarged. In came the deputy chief of the Diplomatic history office of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, V. V. Sokolov, head of the Main office department of the KGB, A. E. Ziborov, a KGB Inspection board worker, A. A. Kozlov and, in the capacity of independent experts, the war historian, V. P. Galitskii and the deputy chief of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, N. M. Arzhannikov.

As independent experts, the Swedish side brought in Professor M. Makinena of Chicago University, (later to become a student of Western Berlin University, he was arrested on a spying charge, served his sentence in Vladimir prison, in 1963, was released early and left the USSR), the president of the American ‘Russian Relief Fund’ Mr. S. Mesinai and a historian from the Russian ‘Memorial’ organisation, A. B. Roginskii.

At the start of 1992 the leader of the working group on the Russian side became deputy director of the Documentary history department of the RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs, V. V. Sokolov. In connection with the shutting down of the KGB, V. A. Nikonov had stopped participating in the working group. From the Russian Ministry of National Security, the deputy chief of the section, V. K. Vinogradov, stayed in the group, and from the Ministry for Internal Affairs the chief of the Centre for Rehabilitation of the victims of political repression and of archive information from the Main information centre, K. C. Nikishkin, and from the Russian Armed Forces – the deputy chief of the Archive history department of the archive history and war memorial centre General Staff of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, V. A. Filippov. The Russian leaders subsequently were the leader of the Swedish department of the European section of the RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs, V. I. Tatarkinsev, deputy director of the European section of the RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs, K. I. Kosachov and the head of department for the European section of the RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs, V. V. Tuchnin.