Excerpts from McKay’s Notes on The Case of Raoul Wallenberg

01-01-2011 , by C.G.McKay


My work on Raoul Wallenberg has concentrated on his mission to Budapest rather than on his subsequent fate in Russia. I have chosen to examine various assertions, claims and plain simple innuendo to the effect that this mission may have involved other than purely humanitarian goals. In particular, I have looked both at possible connections with various secret services – not simply the OSS- and at possible hidden economic motives. As a result, I have investigated in some detail a string of peripheral figures, many of whom are hardly mentioned in more orthodox presentations of Raoul’s mission. Although I have found nothing to suggest that he acted as an important secret agent with a task radically different from his explicit humanitarian mission to aid the Jews in Hungary, I have unearthed substantial archival evidence showing that he did have interesting contacts with several people who were working for the secret services- Cheshire in Stockholm and Lolle Smit in Budapest – are two fascinating examples. But is this really surprising? As I have had occasion to remark on numerous occasions, it would have been impossible for any neutral businessmen to travel about wartime Europe without contacts with at least one secret service and more probably with several. Moreover Raoul’s purely humanitarian but dangerous task in Budapest necessarily involved clandestine methods – from secret contacts to bribery if it was to be carried out effectively. That Raoul Wallenberg and Lauer may from time to time have performed certain favours on behalf of their secret service friends is for me entirely plausible. Look on it as a quid pro quo pro. The crucial point is surely to retain some balance in judging this sort of thing and to abstain from seeing everything in terms of the Angel-Spy dichotomy5: there is nothing hitherto which has come to light to suggest that Wallenberg’s role in relation to the Secret Services was other than minor and more or less what one would expect in the circumstances.

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One Response to “Excerpts from McKay’s Notes on The Case of Raoul Wallenberg”

  1. Servus. dit :

    The SIS chief in Stockholm, captain (major) Cyril Cheshire, probably in contact with RW, 1943, due to CG. McKay´s conclusions, had according to another source, (TP/2010), an « anti-american » , attitude. Presumably there was a competion with SIS, as McKay, writes, when the U.S. intelligence activities of O.S.S, started up, 1941, as,  » the new kid on bloc ». (CC in place from 1942/43)

    The British SIS heavy-handed, activities in Sweden, were even guarded by the Swedish probably because of the British sabotage operations, cases like the: (1) . Rickman-sabotage-group, 1940, (2). the Krylbo train-explosion,(German, munition) perhaps (3.) the seized and « slaughtered », three Swedish destroyers, June 1940, (by the British navy) and the following (4.) explosions of three Swedish destroyers in September 1941, at a navybase outside Stockholm, so the Swedish navy didn´t appreciate the Royal navy.

    Even the Swedish foreign office (UD) was critical against, the British military operations and planning in the North, Norway, 1940, and against the Swedish oremines and ports. . » – Which small neutral, are you going to destroy now ? / Boheman/UD)

    But It seems as OSS, (100 personell in Sweden) had a real « rookie » offensive attitude, lots of money, but smarter, and symbolized the coming growing, U.S. hegemony, worldwide, and the OSS-factor seems underestimated in the RW-case, because. . . .

    1. Iver Olsens OSS/WRB first operation 1944, was, project to rescue Latvian Jews, by the national Latvian resistance, that was revealed in October, 17th 1944 in media together with the Swedish Mil.Int. »C-byrån ». (Deland /Purgatorium 2010). But most Jews, was then already killed, not at least, by Latvians, (that exceeded the Latvian´s victims of Soviet deportations.) So OSS and Olsen,was most fooled, realized that, those « refugees », was most Latvians, nationalists, and even lots of warcriminals, but not a Jew was rescu-ed,by the 30knots boats, paid by WRB/OSS. But Olsen did even place out agents and radios. (TP/ 2010)

    The Swedish SÄK., Otto Danielsson, was pleased by that, because information of the massacres 1941 in the Rumbula (Crow)-forest, outside Riga, where 27.000 Jews of all ages were executed in two days,by Germans/Latvian police in november/december 1941, and risked giving problems for other Latvian refugees in Sweden, and Danielsson was then very active to prevent information of the Latvian Holcaust, already known in January 1942, by the close Swedish cooperation with Abwehr. Probably was deploy-ments of agents in Latvia, by OSS, and the Swedish C-byrå/int., realized. So this became a very dubious expedition, concerning the WRB-project.

    2. Then the Finnish wellknown,  » Operation Stella Polaris », four vessels transported the most of the Finns military intelligence-organisation,and its archivals, of Soviet war-codes ,etc., in September 1944, to Sweden, probably coordinated with O.S.S., which bought this materiel. This happened just before the cease-fire with Finland, but then Moscow & London were as allies, and very interested in this peaceagreement.

    RW was very good friend with the Swedish int.officer count, Carl Bonde, (b. 1872) (responsible of this Stell Polaris- intell. business, in Sweden), was married (1920) with RW:s Aunt, mrs Ebba Bonde,(b. 1896). She asked RW about an old friend, in Budapest, she was active in the  » Rädda barnen » help-org., but first in October 44´ RW reported, he hadn´t a clue. The special Swedish C-byrå-agent Akrell, (the Kid) was assistent to Bonde, (« The Kid ») sent to Budapest, September 1944, as agent, with a radio, was known by RW.

    3. And of course the OSS, SEPAL-int.bases, with commandos, at the Swedish/Norweg-ian border in the North, late in 1944/45.

    4. The OSS -operation CLAW, in May/June 1945, after the German surrender in Norway, to apprehend the Germans Sig.Int-organisation, from Finland, under command of Edmund Sala, with some thirtysix,(36) Germans, experienced intelligence-personell, and take them to the U.S. Sig.Int. base in Germany, without inform, neither the Norwegians, or the British SIS/SOE, but with help of the Swedish C-byrån, again, and against the Swedish neutrality, all this happened during the RW:s critical period in NKVD-prison. (Edmund Sala had close contacts with Swedish officers, at the border, and stayed a period, in Berlin, from the end of December 1944, to beginning of February 1945.)

    Those German experts, « cream of the cream, » was infiltrated in the ordinary Wehrmacht units, but not the whole SD-organisation of 100 personell could merge with the Army. They were transported to Sweden 12 May, and 12th June to U.S. Sector in Germany/ Wiesbaden, by two Dakotas, from the Torslanda airport.

    The wellknown important, Norwegian Milorg., resistanceman, Kai Holst, (SIS-agent) was then shot to death, in Stockholm, the 27th June, during mysterious circumstances. The reason for that, is said to be Holst´s knowledge of what happened in Lillehammer, when the German officers, was transported away in secret, by OSS and the Swedish C-byrå, a  » joint coup », to Germany´s U.S. sector.

    Many accusing the Swedish C-byrå, as behind Holst´s most unexpected death, to pre-vent both the Norwegians and the British, and Soviets, from taking part of the infor-mation, and competence, from Salas « Meldekopf Nordland »-group.

    (But Edmund Sala, « sonderführer », himself was left behind in Norway to 1946/47. ) (Google give a unexpecting reference to Edmund Salas book from 1944: « Ein unsicht-bare Waffen, (unvisible »), » about chemical weapons, » and Sala was even educated chemist, using it as a cover, when arriving for instance in Finland the spring 1941, open exhibitions, before Barbarossa.

    Sala´s personell may have had knowledge about : Einsatzkommando /Finnlands inter-rogations / executions-business, of suspected Soviet , commissars, GRU, NKVD agents, « suspects », 1941-43 ? Together with Willy Laqua, defamed, who took command after Gustav vom Felde 1942, as Sipo/SD befehlshaber, active both in Norway and Finland, on the Polar circle. (Former chief, Gustav vom Felde use cover as  » Feindlageoffizier »in 6. WSS-NordDivision in Salla.)

    So this indeed, wellknown intelligence-war, then and now, that maybe was known by the Soviet´s NKVD, all what could have must influenced the case of Raoul Wallenberg, as he in a way was connected to OSS. But it must be stated once more, as Sweden has an habit of being the « best pupil in the class, » once member, of  » Abwehr « or UN, or EU….

    So the British SIS/SOE, operated in Sweden, in « Wollweberstyle », 1940/41, (and Norway) and became not popular. The U.S. OSS, seemed smarter, in this four O.S.S-operations
    mentioned, perhaps RW was the fifth… ? U.S. have some problems with the OSS-opera-tions i Norway, what, SIS viewed as « British sphere of interest, » and this was even res-pected by the Soviet Union, 1944. But in the end, Sweden practised from 1945, « the German permittenttrain-policy-of-appeasement » as usual, from the 1940-43 appeas-ment, but now  » by other means », in the coming cooperation with the West.

    And I agree, with McKay and Rydeberg, that among other things, the  » too smart » OSS-intelligence operations, in Sweden 1944-45, could have give Raoul Wallenberg, real problems, (as much as the British SIS-sabotage-operations in Sweden 1940-41, failed)
    and O.S.S & Swedish C-byrån, « seem had, made fools of the Russians. »

    « Göran Rydeberg, writes that U.S. protected Swedish diplomatic interests, from March-December 1945, in Budapest, when Swedish embassy was closed. But then U.S., on its own initiativ did RW- investigations in Hungary. Rydeberg asks if there was any contacts between U.S – USSR ? –  » Did they make a secret deal, influencing the fate of Wallen-berg, asks Rydeberg. »

    « Alexandra Kollontay had already the 20th October 1944, by her own initiativ, called the Swedish UD / Eric von Post, to meet, her secretary I. Tjernysov in Stockholm , who was informed about the the Swedish legations humanitarian, activities, in Budapest, an excellent opportunity to give an account of its opinions. »

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